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This PhD thesis examines the conflict between two Yoruba sub-groups in Nigeria (the Ife and 
the Modakeke) which has been continuing for more than a century.  The thesis assesses the 
prospects for the resolution of the conflict by identifying the historical, anthropological, 
social, and legal backgrounds to the conflict. It evaluates, with reference to international and 
national laws, preventive and resolution interventions and processes that may lead the groups 
to a form of self-determination.  In this form of self-determination, the Nigerian State would 
grant the Modakeke sub-group independence from the Ife, and internal self-determination for 
the Ife and the Modakeke. The Nigerian State would continue to be responsible for the 
protection of the groups by keeping them apart from each other. 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that the government of Nigeria should be advised that, the Ife 
and the Modakeke people, having been in conflict with each other over land, status, and 
identity issues since pre-colonial times and with the frequency of violent conflict having 
increased since the end of colonialization, will continue to be in conflict with each other 
because they have not been effectively separated from each other and to resolve the conflict 
the groups must be separated. Separation here refers to economic and political separation by 
means of granting internal self-determination through a Local Government Authority 
dominated by Modakeke and located in Modakeke occupied land within the Nigerian Federal 
system; physical separation is not feasible for resolving their conflict in modern Nigeria.   
In taking these steps to separate the groups, the government of Nigeria would act so as to 
ensure separate land rights, and separate economic and political status for each ethnic group 
relative to the other --primarily by allowing the Modakeke group to have its own local 
authority, and by providing appropriate monitoring to ensure the continuation of peaceful 
relations between the two groups so that each can experience a modern, internal economic 
and political autonomy within the Nigerian State. 
The thesis examines the ability of the international community under customary international 
law and the African Union to intervene so as to require the Nigerian State to carry out their 
responsibility to protect the Ife and the Modakeke groups from any human right breaches and 
negative consequences resulting from the conflict. Furthermore, the thesis assesses some 
aspects of the role of the African Union in putting pressure on the Nigerian government to 
reach a resolution of the conflict between the two groups.  
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The ultimate aim of this thesis is to examine the Ife-Modakeke conflict with the primary 
objective of making recommendations to the government of Nigeria for resolving the conflict. 
However, as it reflects wider and structural issues, it can partly serve as a case study about 
conflict resolution in similar disputes. In this way, the study contributes to the effectiveness 
of resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict in Nigeria and more widely in Africa. 
The main research method used in this thesis is the case study method using archival materials, 
document analysis, maps, and interviews in Nigeria with clearance from the Ethics Committee 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“Often, as the State works to address the [conflict] situation, another layer of conflict 
is created, and the people remain in perpetual circle of violence.”1 
1.1 Background to the Study 
One of the major challenges in the Republic of Nigeria2 is preventing and resolving conflicts 
between different groups of peoples living in close proximity to each other within the territory 
of Nigeria. This thesis examines the conflict between one such pair of groups,3 namely, the 
Ife and the Modakeke, whose conflict (sometimes violent conflict) has endured for over one 
century. 
Long before the independence of Nigeria from Britain in 1960, the territory, of what is now 
modern-day Nigeria, witnessed inter-group conflicts between people groups based on various 
long-standing rivalries.4  Many of these conflicts included periods of violence, and the pattern 
of conflict and violence has not been eliminated following independence leading to ongoing 
disastrous effects in many cases.5  Groupson-Paul has observed that, between 1999 and 2003 
alone, Nigeria witnessed fifty-three major civil disturbances in the form of ethno-religious 
and other communal clashes between groups.6 Some of the group conflicts that have plagued 
Nigeria in the past include the Aguleri-Umuleri of Anambra State, the Tiv-Jukun of Benue 
and Plateau States, the Junkun-Chamba of Taraba State, and the Ife-Modakeke conflict in 
Osun State of Nigeria.7  
Efforts at resolving group conflicts in Nigeria have led to several initiatives by successive 
governments of Nigeria that have been implemented since independence. One such initiative 
                                                             
1H. Abdu., Clash of Identities: State Society and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria (Dev Reach Publishers, 2010) p. 193 
2 In this thesis, the ‘Republic of Nigeria’ is often referred to as the ‘Nigerian State’ with capital “S” or as the Federal Government. See 
Appendix 15 for further explanation. 
3 Groups as used in this thesis refers to a people united by common culture, tradition, or sense of kinship. See Appendix 15 for a more 
detailed definition of groups and reasons for its usage in this thesis. 
4 T.S Osinubi & O.S Osinubi., ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Africa: The Nigerian Experience’ Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 12, 
2006, p. 101-114 [108] 
5According to the report of the National Emergency Management Agency in Nigeria, 676,975 people have been internally displaced as a 
result of conflicts. See the Report by the Director General of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). Online: 
http://nema.gov.ng/nigeria-idps-stand-at-743-062-in-september-2014 
6 O. Groupson-Paul., Ethnic Conflict as a Threat to Nationhood in Nigeria. National Conference in Nigeria Under Democratic Rule 1999-
2003 (Department of Political Science, University of Clonn, 18-20 August, 2003) p. 2427 
7This list is not exhaustive of the many conflicts in the regions of Nigeria, such as the Niger-delta region.  There are constant struggles for 
resources control, and there have been recent religious terrorist attacks in the North of Nigeria by ‘Boko Haram’. J.O Arowosegbe., ‘Ethnic 
Minorities and the Land Question in Nigeria’ Review of African Political Economy vol. 43. no. 148, 2016, p. 260-276  
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is the economic and political separation of groups by creating regions, states,8 and Local 
Government9Areas.10 These initiatives have often been applied at the state11level to end 
conflicts arising from majority-minority discrimination claims by some groups living within 
a state. This thesis examines discrimination and other complaints in the struggle by the 
Modakeke people for economic and political separation from the Ife people.  This is known 
as the Ife-Modakeke conflict, and it is one of the longest-running group conflicts in Nigeria. 
Irrespective of the extent to which initiatives have been applied in the regions and states, there 
appears to be a commonality of objective of such initiatives, namely; the prevention and 
resolution of group conflicts and the prevention of further outbreaks of violence between the 
Ife and the Modakeke.  The resolution of the underlying Ife- Modakeke conflict is the focus 
of this study. 
The Ife and the Modakeke groups belong to the south-west of Nigeria under the broader 
Yoruba group.12 The Yoruba are one of the three major language ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
They are mostly in the states of Ondo, Osun, Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, and in parts of Kwara state 
of Nigeria.13 The Yoruba can be found in other parts of the world such as in the Republic of 
Benin, the West Indies and South America; but, according to Atanda, the Yorubaland of 
Nigeria is the “traditional homeland of the Yoruba people.”14 The Yoruba speak a common 
language- the Yoruba language, with variations of dialects. Although the other Yoruba groups 
such as the Ife, Ondo, and Ekiti bear very great similarities in terms of marriage rituals and 
language, the Oyo are very different from them in these aspects.15 In pre-colonial times, the 
Ife mostly practised traditional African religion,16 but in about the 18th century the Oyo 
                                                             
8 In this thesis, states refer to the second tier (an organ) of government recognised by the Nigerian Constitution 1999 and not to the Federal 
Government. It is preceded by the lower case ‘s’ See Appendix 15 on definitions 
9 In this thesis local government refers to political administration at the grassroots, where the people groups are participants in the local 
authority of their own affairs. See Appendix 15 on definitions.  
10O. Otite., Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria. (Shaneson Ibadan, 1990) p. 252 
11In this thesis the sovereign State of Nigeria is preceded by the capital letter “S” while constituent parts of the greater State will be denoted 
with small letter “s” because the 36 states in Nigeria do not meet the requirements of Statehood in international law by virtue of Article 1 of 
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933. Available online: Council of Foreign Relation 
http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevedio-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897 and Article 4(1) of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945. Available at treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf 
12Erhagbe puts the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria at 400 even though there are only three major language ethnic groups, the Hausa-
Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo. See E. Erhagbe., ‘Ethnicity in the Matrix of Peace and Reconciliation in Nigeria’ European Scientific 
Journal, vol. 8 no. 16., 2012, p. 82-94 [85] 
13J.A Atanda., An Introduction to Yoruba History (Ibadan University Press, 1980) p. 1 
14 J.A Atanda., (1980) Ibid. p. 1 
15 N.A Fadipe., The Sociology of the Yoruba (Ibadan University Press, 1970) p. 37 
16Today, both groups practice three religions: Christianity, Islam and African traditional religion. See H.L Ward Price., Land Tenure in the 
Yoruba Province (Government Printer Lagos, 1939) p. 4 
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converted to Islam.17 Most Yoruba groups, including the Oyo, claim the same ancestral origin 
and the same place of origin as all other Yoruba people: all Yoruba people acknowledge that 
Ile-Ife18 is the spiritual centre of the entire Yoruba people.19  Eades has pointed out that the 
use of the term ‘Yoruba’ as the identifying title for the Yoruba speaking groups in Nigeria 
was coined as recently as the 19th century by the then colonial power, Britain.  However, this 
unity, Eades noted, is mainly “linguistic and cultural” and not political because there were, at 
least at the time of colonialization in Nigeria,20 independent political kingdoms within the 
Yoruba population.  The Ife and the Oyo were two such independent kingdoms in pre-colonial 
Yoruba,21 each with its separate king who, amongst other duties, would settle disputes within 
the different groups and between the Yoruba groups.22  During the 18th century, many of the 
Yoruba peoples were at war with one another, in part because there was no form of 
overarching political authority to maintain unity.23  Nevertheless, although Ile-Ife was the 
spiritual centre of the Yoruba, the Oyo became politically more influential than the Ife.  But 
this was not a long-term feature of the Yoruba people, and the collapse of the Oyo kingdom 
led to today’s Ife-Modakeke conflict.24  A critical consequence of the collapse was that, 
because both the Ife and the Oyo kingdoms relied on farming and fishing for their economic 
survival and wellbeing, additional manpower came from strangers, refugees, and slaves.25  
The collapse of ancient Oyo led to the Modakeke becoming additional manpower for the Ife, 
and the status of the Modakeke in Ife is, even today, the principal issue in the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict.  
When the Oyo kingdom fell in the 1800’s,26 many of its subjects moved away from Oyo to 
other places.  Some founded Yoruba cities such as Ibadan, while others moved into already 
                                                             
17N.A Fadipe., (1970) Ibid. p.34-36 and S.O Biobaku., The Egba and their Neighbours (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957) p. 26 
18Ile-Ife is the land while Ife is the people of Ile-Ife 
19L. Robin., The Oyo Empire c.1600-c.1836. A West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade (Clarendon Press Oxford, 
1977) p. 28 
20J.S Eades., The Yoruba Today (Cambridge University Press, 1980) p. 2 
21 J. Illiffe., Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 78 
22For the judicial function of the Ife and Oyo kings respectfully see W. Bascom., The Yoruba of Southern Nigeria (Waveland Inc., 1984) p. 
45 and New World Encyclopaedia: Oyo Empire. Online: Http://Www.Newworldencyclopedia.Org/Entry/Oyo_Empire 
23A. Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yoruba Land 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria, 1998) 
24The letter of Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister Secretary of State for the Colonies concerning tenders for Ife Native Administration Water Scheme 
reveals that the Oyo Province acted on behalf of the Ife Native Administration inviting for Tenders for Ife Water Scheme. Government 
House Nigeria 15/03/1935. CO583/203/13 National Archive London. Government House Nigeria 15/03/1935. 
25 T. Falola., ‘Slavery and Pawnshop in the Yoruba Economy of the Nineteenth Century’ in P.E Lovejoy & T. Falola., (2003) Pawnship, 
Slavery and Colonialism in Africa (Africa World Press, 2003) p. 109-135 [113] 
26A new Oyo was formed shortly after the fall of the old Oyo. The modern Oyo State capital was not the foundation of the Old Oyo kingdom 
neither is it the power of modern-day Oyo the same as the ancient Oyo empire. According to Robin, the modern Oyo is a mere shadow of 
the ancient kingdom. See L. Robin., The Oyo Empire c.1600-c.1836: A West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade. 
Clarendon Press Oxford, 1977) p. 3. 
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established kingdoms as a group,27 retaining their traditional rulers but still subject to the 
government of the host community, such as the Ogbomosho. But the Oyo group that arrived 
in Ile-Ife, the Modakeke, were designated by the government of the Ife (in Ile-Ife) as refugees 
and therefore entirely subject to the Ife governance and norms of the Ife.28 The Modakeke 
were regarded as being of great economic benefit to the host community, providing economic 
stability for the Ife.29 This was achieved by Modakeke individuals farming lands owned by 
Ife citizens, and by farming land which the Ife made available to the Modakeke. 
As part of the custom in Ife, and in ancient Oyo, and elsewhere amongst the Yoruba, the use 
of another person’s land required a payment, called Ishakole 30in the Yoruba language (a 
‘fee’).  Lloyd noted that these payments were mostly made ‘in kind’: portions of produce from 
the land, “not in respect of the land but … [as]… obligations which stem from their 
membership of the kingdom.”31 Therefore, the Oyo migrants (the Modakeke) living in Ile-Ife 
paid Ishakole to those Ife inhabitants whose ancestors had never left Ile-Ife, regardless of the 
claim by the Modakeke that their ancestors originated from Ile-Ife and shared the same 
culture.  One explanation for the insistence on payment of Ishakole was, and still is, that social, 
cultural and political variations between the Ife and the Modakeke, brought about by years of 
separation between the two groups, contributed to such significant differences between the 
two groups that Ishakole must be paid to the Ife by the Modakeke as refugees or (former) 
slaves.  This is a continuing source of dissatisfaction for the Modakeke and, therefore an issue 
which sustains the conflict and, with other issues, sometimes results in violent conflict 
between them. 
During the more than a century-long conflict between the two groups, there have been seven 
violent confrontations: one during the pre-colonial era (1835-49) after the fall of the old Oyo 
kingdom, two during the colonial period (1882-1909 and 1946-49), and four in post-
                                                             
27O. Olutobi & A.Oyeniyi., (1994) Modakeke from Grass to Grace (Olutobi Ventures Osun State Nigeria, 1994) p. 2 
28Oluobi and Oyeni wrote that the Ife refugees were initially “living within the four walls of lle-Ife” see O. Olutobi & A. Oyeniyi., (1994)  
Ibid. p. 2 
29J.F Ajayi, & S.A Akintoye., ‘Yoruba Land in the Nineteenth Century’ in I. Obaro (Ed) Groundwork of Nigerian History (Ibadan, 1980) p. 
286 
30Ishakole is the “fee paid to owner of land or to Ba’le (where land is deemed to be vested in him) or to Ba’le. Such fee is paid to the Ba’le 
during some ceremony such as a marriage, funeral etc. Such payment is no rent but are a token of the paramount rights of the granter of the 
land.” See R.C Abraham., Dictionary of Modern Yoruba (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978) p. 321 
31P.C Lloyd., Yoruba Land Law (Oxford University Press, 1962) p. 63. Today, the supreme court has decided that Ishakole is not evidence 
of over lordship but land rent which was very different from the ancient Yoruba custom. See the decision of the Supreme Court in Chief 
Alhaji K.O.S., Are Alani Akanmu V Raji Ipaye & Others (1990) Supreme Court Law Reports. 
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independence Nigeria (1981, 1983, 1997-98 and 2000).32The earliest known violent clash 
between the Ife and the Modakeke was in 1835 and the last recorded violence was in 2000. A 
consideration of the violent conflict reveals that, with the passing of time and different 
political eras, the violence became more frequent, sometimes with the same or similar triggers 
(linked to their origins, their religious differences, and the clash of cultural norms observed 
by the Ife and the Modakeke), and sometimes with triggers created by the modern State’s 
political and legal practices. 
According to one of the early works on the history of the Yoruba,33 the first of the violent 
clashes between the groups was in 1835 when the Ife turned against the Oyo migrants living 
among them. The reason for this was because the Oyo migrants living among the Ife shared 
the same Oyo origin with some other Oyo migrants who had conquered Ibadan, a nearby town 
that the Ife viewed as an extension of Ile-Ife. As a dispute resolution mechanism, in 1836, the 
then traditional ruler of the Ife, Ooni34 Abewaila, separated the migrants from the Ife main 
town, providing them a separate tract of land in Ife which was later called Modakeke after the 
cry of a species of bird called Ako (Stork).35 The Modakeke appointed for themselves a leader, 
the Ogunsua of Modakeke,36 thus creating a new identity for themselves free from the Ife. 
Although the Modakeke came to live with their host community, the Ife, the “…Modakeke 
did not fully integrate with those already living in Ile-Ife…”37  The separation of the refugees 
from the Ife, affected the Ife economy and the Ife poisoned their king for separating the 
Modakeke from the Ife.  The reason for the reaction of the Ife people was that they no longer 
had the additional farming manpower.  The first violent conflict between the Ife and the 
Modakeke originated in the steps taken by the Ife to bring the Modakeke back into Ile-Ife.  
                                                             
32R.A Asiyanbola., ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: A Case of Ife-Modakeke in Historical Perspective’ Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences 
and Creative Arts. vol. 5. no. 1., 2010, p. 61-78 [ 63] 
33S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge & Sons 
Ltd, Lagos, 1921) p. 190 
See also I.O Albert.,  ‘Ife-Modakeke Crisis’ in O.Otite & I.O Albert., (eds.) Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and 
Transformation. (Spectrum Books, 1999) p. 144 
34Ooni is the title of the Ife rulers, while Alaafin is the title of the Oyo rulers 
35I.O Albert, I.O., (1999) Ibid. p.145 
36In the Modakeke Resolution from the meeting at the Modakeke ruler (Baale) residence in September 1947, the Modakeke asserted firmly 
that the Baale of Modakeke is the head chief and accredited representative of the Modakeke people. See. Ife Div.1/2 File No. 459. Ibadan 
National Archive. 




And the success of those steps has continued to be the dominant origin for continued conflict 
between the two groups from 1935 onwards.38 
Later, in 1882, the Modakeke sided with the citizens of Ibadan (also an Oyo-migrant 
community) in the war between Ibadan and Ife, helping the Ibadan people to defeat the Ife.39 
This led to war between the Ife and the Modakeke.40 By this time, the colonial government 
was ruling the peoples of what is now Nigeria using traditional rulers who served as 
intermediaries between the local people and the colonial government.41  However, the dispute 
resolution powers of those local rulers were reduced by the colonial government.42  Thus, to 
resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict, it was the colonial administration that disbanded the 
Modakeke in 1866, dispersing them to different places to settle, such as in Ipetumodu, Ode 
Omu and Iwo,43a decision  the Ife supported.44 However, in a Treaty entered by all Yoruba 
groups including the Modakeke in 1886 amongst themselves to end the long years of war 
among the Yoruba, the Modakeke were required to leave the lands to which the British had 
moved them and to move back to the Ife mainland.  But the Modakeke refused and, instead, 
spread into unoccupied lands.45 As land became scarce due to the expansion of the Modakeke, 
they gradually returned to the Ife in 1920,46 but against the wishes of the colonial 
government47 the Modakeke returned, but not to the Ife main town48 but to their original 
separate settlements on the outskirts of Ile Ife as designated by the Ife in 1835. 
Then in the 1940s the economic situation of the Ife and the Modakeke changed with the start 
of the cocoa boom.  This led to another set of violent conflicts between the groups as the 
                                                             
38S. Johnson., (1921) Ibid. p. 723 
39I.A Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1998) p. 14 
40I.A Akinjogbin., (1998) Ibid. p. 14 
41Lord Lugard Political Memorandum in A.H.M Kirk-Greene., The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria. Selected Documents 
1900-1947(Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 71 
42Colonial Report-Annual No. 878 Nigeria. Report for 1914, P.41 Presented to both The Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. 
April 1916. Printed under the Authority of His Majesty’s Stationary Office by Barclay and Fry Ltd, The Grove Southwark Street SE. Online: 
Http://Www.Libsysdigi.Library.Illinois.Edu/Iiharvest/1914/306434_1914_Opt.Pdf .  
43R.A Olaniya., (1992) Ibid. p. 273 
44Archive letter shows the Ife initially did not want the Modakeke back 
45I.A Akinjogbin (1992) Op cit. p. 272 
46B.A Oyeniyi., ‘Greed- Grievance Debate and the Ife-Modakeke Conflict’ Social History (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group) vol. 35. 
no 3. p. 319 
47 The then resident officer in a letter dated 4th June, 1915 to the Secretary Southern province stated emphatically that he does not back the 
return of the Modakeke to Ife rather, he prefers them to settle at Lasole were they were originally sent by the Alaafin before colonial 
intervention. See Letter sent by the W.A Ross Commissioner to the Secretary of Southern Province, 4th June, 1915. D.O. Ibadan No. C. 
39/21/15. Ibadan National Archive. See also Letter sent by the Senior Resident Officer to the District Officer at Ibadan, 25th March, 1919. 
DO NO. 624/203/1919.  Ibadan National Archive 
48 Ife like most Yoruba groups in Nigeria is made up of main town or capital city and subordinate towns and farming villages. See the 
discussion in chapter three under social structure of the Ife-Modakeke. 
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Modakeke claimed that the Ife landlords made them pay more Ishakole for the use of Ife land 
for farming.49 They argued that they should not be paying the Ishakole in the first place 
because the Ishakole that was paid by their forefathers was only acknowledgment of gratitude 
for the use of the land and was not obligatory rent.50  The argument continued that not only 
was increased Ishakole not payable, but that no Ishakole was payable at all.  This led to the 
third occasion of violence between the groups. The colonial government supported the Ife and 
the colonial Supreme Court  in 1948 ruled that the Modakeke must continue to pay the 
Ishakole as land rent and that Ishakole was obligatory rent not just a voluntary tribute and was 
independent of any customary tributes payable at will on certain festivities.51 The violence 
conflict did not end in 1835 but carried on until 1849. But to further assert their independence 
from the Ife, in 1947 the Modakeke petitioned for a separate place of worship (a mosque in 
lands occupied by the Modakeke, in addition to the existing mosque in Ile Ife), but the then 
Ooni of Ife rejected the petition for a separate Imam, noting that the Modakeke were a quarter 
of the combined community of the Ife and Modakeke, and not a separate community.52 Also 
in 1940, the Colonial government of Nigeria rejected a separate native court for the 
Modakeke.53  Although these two events did not directly lead to further violence, they added 
to the sense of discrimination. 
 
In 1958, two years before independence, oil was found in Nigeria bringing great joy and hope 
for economic freedom for the Nigerian people.54 Nigeria’s oil was traded profitably in the 
international market at the time55 and, after independence the revenue was shared at the 
Federal level on the basis of population size of the then regions.56  Unfortunately, the 
imbalance between the regions and the growing importance of crude oil, led to the Nigerian 
civil war which lasted from July 6 1967 to January 13 1970.57 In 1967 the regional structure 
was broken up with the creation of states but with the Federal government gaining more 
                                                             
49R.A Olaniya., ‘The Modakeke Question in Ife Politics and Democracy’ in A. Akinjogbin et al The Cradle of a Race Ife from the Beginning 
to 1980 (Port-Harcourt, Nigeria. Sunray Publications Limited, 1992) p. 275. Further discussions on the effect of the Ishakole payment can 
be found in chapter four of this thesis. 
50 Letter of Modakeke to the Chief Commissioner Western Province: Payment of Ishakole October 1947 Paragraph 4. Ife Div. 1 /1-3/Ife 
Div. 1 /1-3/. Loose Papers. Ibadan National Archive, Nigeria  
51Ife Overlords v Modakekes (1948) The Daily Service, Wednesday 22 December. p. 55 
52Oyo profile 3, File No. Oy/2499. National Archive Ibadan 
53Nigerian Tribune, 7 May 1981. Ibadan. p.3 
54Andrew Walker “The day Oil was discovered in Nigeria” BBC News. 17 March, 2009. Online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7840310.stm 
55I. Nolte., 'Federalism and Communal Conflict in Nigeria’ Regional & Federal Studies, vol.12, no.1p. 171-192 [174] 
56I. Nolte., Ibid. p. 174 
57The New World Encyclopaedia: “Nigerian Civil War” online: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nigerian_Civil_War 
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political and economic control of the resources.58 After Nigerian independence in 1960, the 
revenue allocation formula was based on equality irrespective of contribution from the states 
thus creating economic incentives for more “groups to demand their own states.” 59  This was 
reflected at the local level with demands for separate local authorities.  These opportunities 
were the incentive for the Modakeke to renew the agitation for a separate identity in Ile-Ife 
through the creation of a separate Local Government for the Modakeke to enable them to 
control the land they occupy on the outskirts of Ile Ife and to control the resources coming 
from the Federal and state government through revenue allocation to the Local Authorities.60 
Because the revenue was being allocated to the Local Government areas from the Federal and 
state governments by virtue of section 149 of the 1979 Constitution61 it is not surprising that 
both levels of government were involved in the resolution attempts of the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict but as will be observed from the history of the conflict in chapters three to five, the 
state was more involved as it was closer to the Local Government. At the state level, in 1979, 
Chief Bola Ige, the governor of Oyo state refused to grant Modakeke a separate Local 
Government.62 Regardless of the Ife and the government position, the Modakeke never gave 
up their struggle for a separate identity from the Ife.  Two Federal laws gave the Modakeke 
renewed interest in separating from the Ife economically and politically.  These were the Local 
Government Reform Act 1976, which made Local Governments a third level of government 
in Nigeria, and the Land Use Decree 1978 which vested all land in the Federal government.63 
These statutes gave Modakeke a hope that they can assert their freedom from the Ife by means 
of a separate Local Government authority for themselves and freedom to live in the Ife land 
as part of the Nigerian land and not as settlers in the Ife. 
 
                                                             
58P. Ekeh., ‘Obasanjo & The Burden of Civilization in Issue’ cited by I. Nolte., ‘Federalism and Communal Conflict in Nigeria’ Regional 
& Federal Studies, vol.12: no.1, p. 171-192 [175] 
59 I. Nolte., (2002) Ibid. p. 175 
60Revenue flows from the federal government to the states and to the Local Government through the Constitutional provisions for Local 
Government funding in section 7 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria 
61Section 149(2) provides that “Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the Federal and 
State Governments and the Local Government Councils in each State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly. See The 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. Online: 
http://www.lawnigeria.com/Constitutionhub/Constitution/1979ConstitutionofNigeria.html 
62A. Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria, 1998) p. 173 
63Detailed account of the effect of the Local Government reform and the land use decree on the Ife-Modakeke conflict will be discussed in 
chapter 7  
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In 1980, the Modakeke launched a special Town Hall and Palace fund to care for Modakeke 
economic needs which was disrupted by the Ife and led to renewed violent conflict.64 Physical 
violence occurred for the fourth time between the groups when finally the Federal military 
government created a Local Government for the Modakeke but with the headquarters of the 
new Local Government located in Ile Ife.65 A panel of inquiry headed by Chief Bola Ige came 
up with recommendations for political and economic separation of the groups by giving the 
Modakeke a Local Government which was located in Modakeke lands, but the 
recommendation was never implemented66 providing another opportunity for a future 
violence between the groups. 
 
The fifth instance of violence occurred in 1983 when, first, the majority of the Modakeke 
voted for the National Party of Nigeria against the Ife’s chosen Unity party of Nigeria and, 
second, the National Party ousted the Unity Party. This was said to embarrass the Ooni of Ife 
who then renamed streets in Modakeke and downgraded the title and status of the Modakeke 
ruler, the Ogunsua of Modakeke.67This triggered much violent reactions from the Modakeke 
and resulted in loss of lives and properties on both sides.68  
 
In 1989, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria converted the single Ife Local 
Government into three Local Governments for Ile-Ife and the Modakeke lands, putting the 
Modakeke into the Ife-North Local Government which separated the Modakeke from the 
majority of the Ife people in the Ife-South and the Ife-Central local authorities.  This made the 
Modakeke happy. But when a fourth Local Government was created in 1996 for the 
Modakeke, it ignited violence because the fourth Local Government area created included a 
part of the palace of the Ife monarch. This was considered by the Ife as a humiliation of the 
revered stool, the stool of the Ooni,69 and the Ife youths and adults took up arms and wanton 
destruction of lives and property began in earnest.”70  And when the Local Government 
                                                             
64Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Communal Disturbances in Orangmiyan Central Local Government Area of Oyo 
State, led by Hon. Justice Kayode Ibidapo. Ibadan Government Printer. 1981. p.11 
65 A. Akinjogbin., (1998) p. 173-175 
66T.A Imobighe., Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria (Spectrum Books Limited Ibadan, 2003) p. 159  
67N. Ogbara., The Ife-Modakeke Crisis in Hope Betrayed? A Report of the Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria. (World 
Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) Switzerland and the Centre for Law Enforcement Education, Nigeria, 2002). p. 40 
68A.A Adegbite, B.O Balogun & F.N Buba., ‘Impact of Ife-Modakeke Intra-Communal Conflicts on Spatial Realignment of Ile-Ife City’ 
Global Journal of Science Frontier Research, vol. 16. Issue 2, 2016.   
69N. Ogbara., (2002) Ibid. p. 41 




headquarters were moved from Modakeke land to Oke-ogbo in Ile Ife in 1996, further violent 
conflict ensued between the groups.71 Attempts at resolution of the 1996 conflict(s) was by 
another panel of inquiry in 1997. 
Also, in 1997, Osun state Council of Traditional Rulers set up a committee-The National 
Reconciliation Committee under Chief Alex Akinyele72 to look into the conflict and make 
recommendations for peace. The committee took evidence in Abuja and came up with 
recommendations for the Modakeke to be given a Local Government area and for both 
communities to honour the recommendations for peace.73But the recommendations were 
never implemented. In the year 2000, the Modakeke inhabitants decided amongst themselves 
to implement the recommendations of the peace panel set up in 1997 by declaring themselves 
to be a separate Local Government.74 This led to another bout of war between the two groups. 
Around 1,000 individuals were killed and several thousand were injured.75 
From the background of the Ife-Modakeke and their conflict as outlined above, it can be 
argued that economic and political separation of the two groups from each other is necessary 
for the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Although both groups claim the same origin, 
their long years of independent and separate political and social experiences have made it 
difficult for the Modakeke to integrate with the Ife. The economic benefit to the Ife of having 
the Modakeke as proximate neighbours of the Ife contrasts with the benefit for the Modakeke 
of having a permanent home outside Ile-Ife but being independent from the Ife. These 
opposite interests have contributed to the non-integration of the Modakeke in the Ife and to 
periodic violent conflict.  The nature of conflict in itself means that these diverse interests 
when perceived as unreconcilable by the people leads to continued conflict.76  
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
Political separation from the Ife was one action of the government of Nigeria that brought the 
Modakeke joy and was an incentive to end the violent conflict with the Ife. Describing the 
                                                             
71J.O Toriola., ‘The Ife/Modakeke Crisis: An Insider View’ Ife Psychologia: An international Journal vol. 9. -no. 3 p. 21-29 
72T.A Imobighe., Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria (Spectrum Books Limited Ibadan) p. 159 
73T.A Imobighe., Ibid. p. 59 
74Ibid. fn. 70  
75O.O Akanji., ‘Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: A Critical Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria’ International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights vol.16. no, 1, 2009. p. 31-51[46] 
76Lewicki et al defined conflicts as “[p]erceived divergence of interest or believe that parties’ current interest cannot be achieved 
simultaneously.” See R. Lewicki, D.M Saunder & B. Barry., Negotiation (6th edition, McGraw-Hill, 2010) 
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effect of an attempt at political separation of the Modakeke from the Ife in 1989, Akinjogbin 
wrote:  
 “It is sure that we are in the Promised Land. Agitation, Oppression and Unhealthy 
rivalry between Modakeke and Ife have been solved after 150 years (1838-1989) of 
wars and near apartheid in an independent Nigeria. What an uneasy journey of 150 
years towards the Promise Land”77 
The statement above is a description of how the Modakeke felt when the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria initiated the political separation of the Modakeke from the Ife by 
creating three separate Local Government authorities. The Ife-North authority was dominated 
by the Modakeke with only a small amount of Ife territory, while the Ife South and the Ife 
Central authorities were dominated by the Ife. However, the peace described above did not 
last long because the ultimate vision of the Modakeke to be politically and economically free 
from the Ife had not been realised by a full Local Government authority for the Modakeke 
located in Modakeke territory. Thus, the Modakeke unwillingness to stop violence and their 
negative reaction to government efforts at ending the violence and resolving the conflict 
between the groups: 
“…Modakeke people always accept invitation to all peace meetings, but meanwhile, 
they re-arm and are better prepared. They keep fighting occasionally, accept truce to 
re-arm and then start fighting again.”78 
The government of Nigeria starting from the colonial era have tried to resolve the problem of 
group conflicts in Nigeria by encouraging integration through Constitutional provisions and 
the post-independent Federal structure of the country but this has not succeeded in ending the 
problem.79 The reason is that governments have been part of the problem by continuing 
traditional norms involving land norms that promote ethnic hierarchies and conflict between 
groups continues.80  Akanji observed that starting from the colonial government, all the 
colonial Constitutions in Nigeria from 1922 to 1960 had elements that fostered the 
                                                             
77I.A Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1998) p. 175 
78G.A Agbe., ‘The Ife/Modakeke Crisis an Insider View’ Ife Psychologia. An International Journal vol. 9. no 3. 2001. p. 17 
79Mamdani, M., (2001) ‘Beyond Settlers and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism’ Comparative 
Studies in Society and History (Cambridge University Press) vol. 43. no. 4. Oct 2001. p. 651-664 [661] 
80C. Boone., Property and Political Order in Africa. Land Rights and the Structure of Politics (London School of Economics and political 
Science. Cambridge University Press, 2014) p. 105 
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‘native/indigene-settler/non-indigene relationships along political lines.81  Eke explained that 
the colonial rule promoted division among Nigerians by creating the consciousness of the 
“North for Northerner” and the “East for Easterners” and the “West for Westerners”82 Rather 
than uniting the people, the colonial government drove deeper the issues of identities and 
separateness of the Nigerian peoples.83 
The post-independent Nigerian State attempted to unite groups and reduce conflicts among 
dissatisfied Nigerian ethnic groups by continuing regionalism in the 1960 Constitution in its 
sections 2 and 3 (1).84 However, the continuation of regionalism by the modern State of 
Nigeria only led to continuation of the majority-minority problems to the new states as 
allegations of sectional discrimination in the distribution of development led minorities to 
seek self-government.85 Also, the Federal Character Principle introduced into the 1979 
Constitution in section 14 and the current Constitution of 1999 only served to foster dual 
citizenship cleavages that of ‘local group first’ before being a Nigerian. Because of the dual 
native/indigene-settler/non-indigene relationship that the government promotes in the 
Constitution by virtue of section 147 of the 1999 Constitution, along with State actions, it 
appears that not all groups have the same access to devolved government in Nigeria regardless 
of the provision for creation of states and Local Government areas set out in section 7 of the 
1999 Constitution. This problem of unequal access to devolved government created by the 
modern State must be addressed for a resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict, because, as 
shown in the background to the conflict discussed above, most of the modern-day Ife-
Modakeke conflict is the result of Modakeke struggle for political power through a Local 
Government for the Modakeke. The result has been political manipulation to pacify the 
Modakeke without actually effecting the separation of the groups by means of a Local 
Government. This thesis argues that the issue of unequal devolution of power must be 
addressed to end the Ife-Modakeke violent clashes or else all that will be left is a politics of 
manipulation of the groups to manage the conflict. This would lead every divergent interest 
                                                             
81O.O Akanji., ‘The Problem of Belonging: The Identity Question and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Nigeria’ African Identities 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group) vol. 9. no. 2 May 2011, p. 117-132 [118] 
82S.J Eke., ‘Good Policy Gone Bad: Institutionalised Ranking of Citizens and Identity Conflicts in Nigeria’ India Quarterly: A Journal of 
International Affairs. vol. 71, 2015 p. 318-334 [ 321] 
83O.O Akanji., (2010) Ibid. p. 121 
84Section 2 provides: “The Federation of Nigeria shall consist of Regions and a Federal Territory and section 3(1) provides that “There shall 
be three Regions, that is to say, Northern Nigeria, Western Nigeria and Eastern Nigeria” See the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria 
1960 
85See Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying them. Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office London, 1958. 
13 
 
between the groups, such as the next set of elections in 2020, to provide the potential for 
violence between the two groups considering the precedent of previous violence. 
The fundamental basis for the application of the concept of economic and political separation 
to the Ife-Modakeke conflict situation in Nigeria, arises from the gaps in the colonial and post-
colonial State attempts at resolving the conflict and the existing legal framework none of 
which provide for a concrete framework for permanently resolving the conflict. This is in 
addition to other gaps and weaknesses that exist in the current economic and political structure 
of Nigeria, all of which justifies the application of economic and political separation as 
proposed in this thesis. This change in the relationship between the two groups can be 
justified, inter alia, by reference to the precedent of dispute resolution in pre-colonial and 
colonial Nigeria, to the Nigerian Constitution on Local Government creation;86 decisions of 
the Nigerian Supreme Court relating to land ownership by the Ife and the Modakeke;87 and to 
the recent recognition by the traditional ruler of the Ife of a new status for the traditional ruler 
of the Modakeke.88 
The thesis identifies the strengths in separation of the two groups in relation to their conflict 
and focuses on the advantages and feasibility of an economic and political separation of the 
groups for resolving their conflict.  The overriding theme and ultimate aim of this thesis is to 
examine the Ife-Modakeke conflict with the primary objective of making recommendations 
for resolving the conflict. However, as it reflects wider and structural issues, it can partly serve 
as a case study about conflict resolution in similar disputes. In this way, the study contributes 
to the effectiveness of resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict in Nigeria and more widely in 
Africa. 
Although ethnic conflict in Nigeria is the broader picture, the Ife-Modakeke conflict requires 
immediate action as the most recent violence in 2000 between the groups was characterised 
                                                             
86Section 7 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Cap. C.23 Laws of The Federation of Nigeria Guarantees Creation of 
Local Government Areas. Of the Federal Character System that is aimed at equality of all Tribes in Nigeria. 
87The Court of Appeal in Nigeria has held that proof of long possession can amount to ownership of land see Aminu Raji v Jimoh Oladimeji 
and Oseni Aremu (2014) Court of Appeal/1203/2008(2014); Also, The Supreme Court has held that outright sale of land to strangers was 
improbable not impossible in Yoruba Land Tenure System. See Okiji v Adejobi (1960) Supreme Court Nigeria Law Report. 133. 
88The Ooni (Ife Traditional Ruler) anointing of the Modakeke Monarch the Ogunsua of Modakeke as a recognised ruler of The Modakeke 
with the Governor of Osun State of Nigeria presenting him with a staff of office further opens up the lines for separation of the Modakeke 




by Akanji as borderline genocide.89  Published empirical evidence90 indicates that continued 
conflict of groups such as the Ife and the Modakeke leads to loss of lives and properties on a 
grand scale. For example, the Government reported a cost of 31.8 million naira (£636,000 and 
$676,000) for treating hundreds of victims of the crisis in just one hospital, namely; Obafemi 
Awolowo University Teaching Hospital.91  
The cost of not adequately addressing the violent conflict of the groups is not just detrimental 
to the individuals caught up in violence and, more broadly, domestic Nigerian affairs. As 
Nigeria is governed by the norms of the international community by virtue of Nigeria ratifying 
the United Nations Charter and is also governed by the norms of the African Union (AU), 
Nigeria will inevitably invite the interest of the international community and the AU.  An 
issue which arises is whether the international community or the AU might intervene in the 
affairs of the sovereign State of Nigeria, be it as direct intervention for a peacekeeping mission 
or under the guise of failure to carry out Nigeria’s responsibility to protect its citizens. As 
Engdahl noted, the right for the AU to intervene (including militarily) in a sovereign member 
State’s internal affairs is based in the AU treaty, and that the Constitutive Act of the AU 
permits its intervention for “war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.92 The AU 
intervenes on the recommendations of the Peace and Security Council to the Assembly of the 
Union.93 The Peace and Security Council is guided by the principles enshrined in the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.94 The Assembly of the African Union decides to intervene 
either on its own initiative or by the request of a member State.95 The Republic of Nigeria is 
a Member State of the African Union.96  Although, the Ife-Modakeke conflict is between 
                                                             
89O.O Akanji., ‘Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: A Critical Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria’ International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights. vol.16.no. 1., 2009.  p. 46 
90See generally N. Ogbara., Hope Betrayed? A Report on Impunity and State Sponsored Violence in Nigeria (. World Organization Against 
Torture (OMIT) Switzerland & Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) Lagos Nigeria, 2002) p. 44-45 
91The Guardian Nigeria Newspaper, 8 November, 1999. p.1  
92O. Engdahl., (2015) ‘Protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Necessary Precondition or A 
Clash of Interests’ in C. M Bailliet & K.M Larsen (Editors) Promoting Peace Through International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 
p. 118 , Omitting Footnote 50 Referring to the “Constitutive Act of the African Union, 1 July 2000, 2158 UNTS 3”  
93 Article 6 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of heads of State and 
Government 11 July, 2000. Online: https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf 
94 Articles 7 (e) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Online: 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7781-treaty-0024_-
_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_e.pdf 
95 Article 4(h) (J) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of heads of State 
and Government 11 July, 2000. Online at https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf 




groups in Nigeria, the Nigerian State is not isolated from the international community and the 
African Union97 and as a result have certain internationally recognised obligation towards its 
citizens. In recognition of these obligations, the thesis examines the international obligation 
of the Nigerian State as part of the subsidiary research questions. 
 
Granted, there had been military intervention by the State in the conflict of the Ife-
Modakeke98and the Nigerian government views violent clashes99 as a criminal offence under 
the criminal code and punishable in Nigeria.100 However, this thesis is concerned with acts of 
groups in the expression of their dispute preferences and not as criminals. As a result, only 
the Constitutional and related laws and not criminal codes are dealt with to determine their 
impact on group conflict. Most especially, the Constitution has more far reaching effect on 
matters arising in Nigeria as the Constitution is the highest authority in Nigeria and all other 
laws inconsistent with the Constitution is null and void.101 Also, considering that Nigeria is a 
Federal country and the integration of diverse groups that make up the federation is a 
fundamental part of its guiding principle in section 3(1) of the Constitution, physical 
separation will not be supported by the Nigerian State. However, the Constitution by virtue 
of section 3(6) and section 7 recognises the diverse nature of groups that make up the 
federation of Nigeria, as a result, the chapter argues that economic and political separation is 
possible for groups to allow for a level of autonomy and self-determination102 within the 
Nigerian State. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that the government of Nigeria should be advised that, the Ife 
and the Modakeke people, having been in conflict with each other over land, citizenship 
status, and identity issues since pre-colonial times and with the frequency of violent conflict 
                                                             
97In the present field of conflict resolution International law does not only govern sovereign States, it has progressed to governing the 
relations between sovereign States and nationals. See M. Dixon., International Law. (6th edition Oxford University Press) p. 4 
98 The functions of the Nigerian Military in Section 217 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Cap. 23 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004. Herein after referred to as CFRN 1999 in this Chapter. Also see the allegations of Police involved in Extra-
Judicial killings in Ife-Modakeke conflict in 1999, 2000 in N. Ogbara., (2002) Ibid. p. 49 
99 Clashes here refers to struggles over values with the opposing parties desiring to eliminate the other rivals to gain the values. See N. 
Ogbara., (2002) op cit p. 37 quoting E.K.D Adjaho., ‘The Responsibility of the Legislative Power in the Emergence, Prevention and 
Management of Political Crisis in Parliamentarians of West Africa’ Inter-Parliamentary Seminar 5th edition, 1997 p. 28  
100 Section 42, 70, 441 and 443 of the Criminal Code Act Chapter 77 Laws of The Federation of Nigeria, 1990 
101 Section 1(3) The CFRN, 1999 Ibid 
102 Self-determination as used in this thesis refers to greater autonomy of groups by means a Local Authority system granted by the State. 
See further discussions of the usage in Appendix 15 and chapter 7 of this thesis.   
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having increased since the end of colonialization, will continue to be in conflict with each 
other because they have not been effectively separated from each other and  that economic 
and political separation of the groups is both feasible and necessary to resolve the Ife-
Modakeke conflict. Separation here refers to economic and political separation by means of 
granting internal self-determination through a Local Government Authority dominated by 
Modakeke and located in Modakeke land within the Nigerian Federal system, since physical 
separation is not feasible for resolving their conflict in modern Nigeria.  In order to establish 
this hypothesis, the thesis critically analyses the effect of the social, economic and political 
structure of the Ife and the Modakeke in relation to the level of success in managing the 
conflict in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Against the background above, the fundamental research question of this thesis is whether 
economic and political separation of the Ife from the Modakeke by granting the Modakeke a 
Local Government area will provide a permanent resolution to the Ife-Modakeke conflict in 
Nigeria? Flowing from this, the detailed answer to the feasibility of a successful resolution of 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict will be provided by engaging with subordinate questions 
addressing each of the three political eras of the conflict, namely; the pre-colonial, the colonial 
and the post-colonial State as well as the international obligations of the modern State of 
Nigeria towards groups in conflict and any necessary pressure that can be put on Nigeria to 
carry out such obligations. The subsidiary questions are: 
1. To what extent does the pre-colonial social, economic and political structure of 
societies such as the Ife and the Modakeke demonstrate that separation was useful for 
conflict prevention and resolution? And further, how successful was separation in 
preventing and managing the Ife-Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial times? 
2. To what extent does the colonial social, economic and political structure of the Ife-
Modakeke demonstrate separation or lack of separation as a means of resolving their 
conflict? 
3. To what extent does the social, economic and political structure of the modern 
Nigerian State affect the Ife-Modakeke conflict and resolution by separation of the 
groups? 
4. Is it necessary and feasible for state governments of Nigeria to create Local 
Governments and can the Ife-Modakeke conflict be resolved by an economic and 
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political separation of the Modakeke by means of a new Local Government authority 
for the Modakeke notwithstanding any consequences for demands of similar 
treatments by other Nigerian ethnic groups? 
5. What is the international legal obligation of the Nigerian State to protect the Modakeke 
and the Ife from each other; to grant internal political and economic self-determination 
to the Modakeke; and to prevent the human rights of the Modakeke being breached by 
any individual or group of individuals (whether organs of the State or otherwise)? 
1.5 Theoretical Framework/Literature Review 
As was established under the sections on the background to the study, the major proposition 
of this study is that economic and political separation of the Ife from the Modakeke through 
creation of a Modakeke dominant Local Government area is a possible means of ending the 
more than a century-long conflict between the groups. This is consistent with the fundamental 
criterion of the anthropology/sociology of dispute resolution, theories of ethnic conflict and 
increase autonomy for the groups by means of internal self-determination.  
This thesis aims to be an original contribution to knowledge in the field of conflict resolution 
in Nigeria considering that it is the first study to analyse the feasibility of resolving the Ife-
Modakeke conflict through separation. Previous studies on the Ife-Modakeke conflict have 
had a tendency to concentrate on the general history of the conflict, the causes of the conflict 
and the role of the State in resolving conflict. Also, the failure to consider economic and 
political separation as a means of resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict is a major gap in the 
Nigerian studies on conflict resolution which this thesis addresses.  
Literature on the Ife-Modakeke conflict and dispute resolution in this study is conveniently 
divided into three separate but interconnected fields of study namely: anthropology, sociology 
and legal studies. The objective of separating the literature review into anthropology, 
sociology and law is to bring together important and related explanatory variables under a 
logical and coherent framework.   
1.5.1 The Theories of Anthropology of Group Conflict and Dispute Resolution in Africa 
In broad terms, the anthropology of group conflict and dispute resolution involves 
anthropological study of the causes of group conflicts and how different groups resolve 
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conflicts. Although there are many theories of group conflicts,103 the theories of anthropology 
are geared towards competition for scarce resources as the major causes of group conflict.104 
One writer who built eloquently on this line of argument was Homer-Dixon who argued that 
armed conflicts are caused by competition over resources due to scarcity caused by 
greenhouse-induced climate change, depletion of fisheries and degradation and loss of good 
agricultural lands.105 Bruijn and Dijk, on the other hand, argue that violent group conflicts are 
not a result of scarce resources. They pointed to the example of the Hayre in central Mali 
which usually faces drought and, as a result, always experience scarcity of basic resources, 
yet there are no frequent conflicts between herders and farmers occupying the same area.106 
They further maintained that violent conflicts are frequent in areas where the best resources 
can be obtained and, according to both writers, the relationship between the people, and not 
the recourses available to them, is the key issue of conflicts in societies.107 This might be 
supported by the experience of modern-day Democratic Republic of Congo, where the vast 
mineral resources have resulted in the country being in almost constant conflict.  And one 
reason is that powerful men (self-appointed elites) take whatever they can at the expense of 
everyone else. 
The arguments of Bruijn and Dijk appear to have more relevance to Nigeria because, studies 
in Nigerian group conflict have demonstrated that, in the case of Nigeria, it is not a matter of 
scarce resources that makes for group conflict but rather, as Claude Ake puts it, it is “the habit 
of consuming…without producing.” This study therefore analyses the not just the 
anthropology theories of conflict but the economic structure of the Ife-Modakeke and its effect 
in the resolution of their conflict.  
Furthermore, published works of anthropologists demonstrate that societies without 
centralised systems of government have found separation as a dispute resolution mechanism 
                                                             
103The sociology notion of group conflict is discussed in the section of the literature review under sociology of group conflict and dispute 
resolution 
104B.E Schmidt & I.W Schroder., Anthropology of Violence and Conflict (Routledge, 2001) p. 2 
105T.F Homer-Dixon., ‘Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’ International Security (MIT Press-MASSAC 
HUSETTS Institute) vol. 19 no. 1., 1994.  
106M. Bruijn & H. Dijk in P. Chabal, U. Engel & A Gentili., ‘Is violence Inevitable in Africa? Theories of Conflict and Approaches to 
Conflict Prevention’ Brill Leiden. Boston. Ed vol. 1, 2005, p. 55 
107M. Bruijn & H. Dijk in P. Chabal & A. Gentili., (2005) Ibid. p. 70 
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effective for preventing and resolving conflicts between groups.108But plural societies109 that 
lived under colonial rule and, similarly, in post-independence modern State systems with 
more centralised governments, cannot prevent or resolve conflicts by separation due to lack 
of available land for migration. Instead, plural societies practice traditional negotiation, 
mediation, and arbitration along with modern court processes,110 rather than physical 
separation which is more disruptive but probably more effective. It follows that groups such 
as the Ife and the Modakeke who are locked together physically cannot easily separate from 
each other physically making permanent resolution of their conflict difficult. However, as 
described below, the work done by anthropologists on dispute resolution in African societies 
such as those carried out on the Hadza and! Kung bushmen by Marshall111 and Lee112 as well 
as the notion of contact theory in modern times carried out by William113 and Pettigrew and 
Tropp 114 have not considered the possibility of plural societies resolving conflicts outside 
physical separation such as economic and political separation. 
There has been anthropological interest in the study of the African peoples and their general 
ways of life and their conflict and dispute resolution processes. Ogilby went on an expedition 
in Africa in the 1600’s and wrote on African dispute resolution as being characterised by 
wars.115 Later, Blyden116 mapped the origin of the ‘Negros of Africa’, gathering information 
from several sources including personal visits to Sierra Leone in February 1871.  In 1893 
Mary Kingsley also decided to go to West Africa to study the peoples there. She recorded her 
observations in two main books (and sadly died on June 3 1900 from complications from her 
illness acquired in Nigeria). Mary Kingsley studied the social structure of the people she 
studied in Sierra Leone, French Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Angola and Nigeria, observing their 
                                                             
108See I. Schapera., A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom Compiled for the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Oxford University Press, 1938); 
E.E Evans-Pritchard., The Nuer: A Description of The Modes of Livelihood and Political Institution of a Nilotic People (Oxford University 
Press, 1940); C. Ellis., ‘Hunting and Gathering Societies’ Lecture Notes of University of Western Ontario in W. Lomas ‘Conflict, Violence 
and Conflict Resolution in Hunting and Gathering Societies’ Journal of Anthropology (The University of Western Ontario) vol. 17. Issue 1, 
2009, p. 45  
109Pluralised systems occur where traditional laws and processes coexist with new laws and processes imposed by colonial States or modern 
States where they now find themselves.  
110N. Rouland., Legal Anthropology (The Athlone Press London, 1994) p. 167-168 
111L. Marshall., ‘Talking, Sharing and Giving: Relief of Social Tensions among the! Kung Bushmen’ Africa vol. 31. p. 231-249  
112  R.B Lee., The Dobe! Kung (New York. Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1984). 
113 R.M William jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (New York: Social Sciences Research Council, 1947)  
114T.F Pettigrew & L.R Tropp., ‘Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Recent Meta-analytic Findings’ in S. Oskamp (ed) Reducing 
Prejudice and Discrimination: Social Psychological Perspectives (Mahwah NJ Erlbaum, 2000) p. 93-114 
115J. Ogilby., Africa: Being an Accurate Description of the Regions of Egypt, Barbery, Libya, and Billedulgerid (The Johnson. British Library 
London, 1670) p. 31 




cultures, religious practices and laws.117 Her study contributes to the study of dispute 
resolution through promoting interest in group social culture as a basis of resolving their 
conflict. Commenting on the work of Mary Kingsley, Glynn described Mary Kingsley as an 
“anthropologist, naturalist, and explorer...”118 This comment recognises Mary Kingsley’s 
works as an anthropologist interest in West Africa which this thesis further explores in chapter 
three because the Ife-Modakeke groups are groups in West Africa.  
Although, Ogilby, Blyden and Mary Kingsley’s works did not deal directly with the conflict 
and dispute resolution of these societies, it established interest in the study of the African 
peoples.119 Writing in the history of the Yoruba started with Samuel Ajayi Crowther 1853 
with a study of the Yoruba language.120 Crowther was followed by Samuel Johnson, another 
amateur anthropologist.121 Then in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century more 
works were dedicated to the Yoruba language and culture.122 Many focused on specific 
Yoruba people. Later classics in African anthropology includes the works of Holley on the 
Yoruba of Nigeria,123 Monika Hunter in 1936 on the change of African hunters to urban and 
agricultural wage earner,124 Daryll Forde125 1954 on the social values of the African people, 
Jones on the Ibos of Nigeria,126 John Peel on Yoruba religion ,127 Karine Barber on the Yoruba 
theatre,128 Aiden Southall on the Alur society129 and Insa Nolte on the Yoruba of Nigeria.130  
In this thesis, the anthropological works on African dispute resolution is divided into two: 
works on acephalous societies with little or no centralised system of government (those 
                                                             
117R. Glynn., Mary Kingsley in Africa. Her Travels in Nigerian Equatorial Africa Told Largely in Her Own Words (G. George Harrap & 
Co. Ltd., 1956) See also K. Frank., A Voyager Out: The Life of Mary Kingsley (Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2005). 
118R. Glynn., (1956) Ibid. p.137 
119At a similar time period Maine an anthropologist studied the dispute resolution of ancient societies writing extensively on the dispute 
resolution of ancient societies and the place law had in their lives. H.S Maine., Ancient Law: its Connection with the Early History of Society, 
and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (6th edition. London: John Murray) p. 105 
120S.A Crowder., A Grammar of the Yoruba Language (Seeleys, 1852) 
121S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate. Lagos.   
122 O.J Lucas., The Religion of the Yoruba: Being an Account of the Religious Beliefs and Practices of the Yoruba Peoples of Southern 
Nigeria Especially in Relation to the Religion of Ancient Egypt (Lagos Nigeria CMS Bookshop, 1948) 
123M. Holley., Voyage dans le Yoruba (Les Missions Catholiques, 1885) 
124M. Hunter., Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa (London, H. Milford, Pub. for the 
International Institute of African Languages & Cultures by the Oxford University Press, 1936 
125D. Forde., African Worlds: Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African People (Oxford University Press, 1954) 
126G.I Jones., The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria (James Currey Publishers, 2000 
127J.D.Y Peel., Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba (Indiana University Press, 2000) 
128K. Barber., The Generation of Plays: Yoruba Popular Life in Theatre (Indiana University Press, 2000) 
129A. Southall., Alur Society: A Study in Processes and types of Domination (Lit Verlag Munster, 2004) 
130I. Nolte., Obafemi Awolowo and the Making of Remo: The Local Politics of a Nigerian Nationalist (Edinburgh University Press for the 
International Africa Institute, 2009) 
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societies whom Norbert Rouland referred to as elementary societies) and societies with 
centralised government (those whom Rouland referred to as complex societies).131 
1.5.1.1 Elementary Societies 
For those in non-centralised societies, or societies with very elementary forms of governance, 
separation as a means of dispute resolution was possible because there were unoccupied lands 
to go and there were no authorities that prevented their separation. Also, resolution was by 
the agreement of the parties in dispute and not by any coercion of any central authority.132 As 
in the case with the fall of the old Oyo kingdom large group of people migrated because of 
the breakup of the kingdom. Oguntomisin noted that“...a great number of… refugees did not 
migrate as individuals but as large groups...”133 Also, Roberts, a legal anthropologist, stated 
that hunters and gatherers, such as the Hadza of Tanzania and some groups of Inuit, are 
generally known for their dispersal by way of separation as a conflict resolution 
mechanism.134 Roberts noted that dispersal by these groups were either on a temporary or on 
a permanent basis.135 According to Marlowe, this method of settling conflict can only work 
when food is abundant and the people can afford to live apart such as the case with the Hadza 
of Tanzania.136 But groups of Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari desert cannot afford to separate 
because of the constant fear of endangering their survival.137 Thus living apart is not an option 
for settling conflicts within all groups.138 Ellis also noted that there were limitations to 
separation as a means of dispute resolution even in societies where separation would 
otherwise be viable, namely, on the ground of inadequate land resources.139 
The control mechanisms between different groups of hunters and gatherers are thus defined 
by their unique physical environment, not by internal rules and governance or by external 
laws or other State governance because the ultimate goal was for peace.140 The causes of 
                                                             
131N. Rouland., Legal Anthropology (The Athlon Press, 1994) p. 265-266 
132 Lee, R.B., (1984) Ibid. 
133G.O Oguntomisin., ‘Political Change and Adaptation in Yorubaland in the Nineteenth Century’ The Canadian Journal of African Studies. 
(Taylor and Francis Ltd on behalf of The Canadian Association of African Studies) vol. 15. no. 2., 1981 p. 223-237 [ 225] 
134S. Roberts., (1979) Ibid. p. 84 
135S. Roberts., (1979) Op Cit. p. 84 
136 F. Marlowe., The Hadza: Hunter-Gatherers of Tanzania (1st edition, University of California Press, 2010) p. 39-68 Retrieved from 
www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt/pp172 
137 R.B. Lee., The Intensification of Social Life Among the! Kung Bushmen. (MIT Press, 1972)  
138S. Roberts., Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology (Penguin Books’ 1979) p. 85 
139C. Ellis., ‘Hunting and Gathering Societies’ Lecture Notes of University of Western Ontario in W. Lomas ‘Conflict, Violence and Conflict 
Resolution in Hunting and Gathering Societies’ Journal of Anthropology (The University of Western Ontario) vol. 17. Issue 1., 2009 p. 45 
140 L. Marshall., L (1961) Ibid and C. Schrire., ‘An Inquiry into the Evolution Status and Apparent Identity of San Hunter-Gatherers’ Human 
Ecology vol. 8, 1980, p. 9-32 
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conflicts that require separation by dispersal either of a section of the group or of the whole 
group when it splits up which Bohem reported were mostly the need for mutual respect and 
the desires of hunters to maintain personal freedoms.141 Examples of elementary societies 
shows that physical separation was possible as a conflict prevention and dispute resolution 
process. 
1.5.1.2 Semi-Complex Societies 
The observations of Marlowe, Lee, Roberts, Ellis and Bohem on non-centralised societies 
bear great similarities with those societies which have a form of rudimentary governance 
(semi-complex societies some with chiefs and subjects) because both societies do not have 
internal laws that govern dispute resolution. However, in societies with some form of 
government, feuds, negotiations and traditional mediation and arbitration formed their dispute 
resolution rather than physical separation. For example, in his study of the Tswana society, 
Schapera observed that the Tswana had chiefs who ruled over the tribe before the colonial 
era. According to Schapera, “...the Chief is...not only the ruler of the tribe. He is also the 
visible symbol of its cohesion and solidarity.”142 The chief administers justice and the chiefly 
sanctions ensured compliance, although Schapera noted that the sanctions did not “involve 
any direct coercion on the part of the chiefs.”143 The Tswana had several grades of courts in 
each tribe with other bodies sometimes helping to settle disputes such as between family-
groups.144 According to Schapera, the arrival of the colonial powers meant changes to the 
Tswana laws. Certain offences were taken away from the Tswana courts to be tried only in 
the colonial courts. Schapera noted that the chiefs being influenced by conversion to 
Christianity and the desire to keep pace with modernity, also made these changes.145 However, 
the people also recognised their traditional processes of dispute resolution. Traditional 
mediation and arbitration rather than separation was dispute resolution of the Tswana, 
essentially because they had some form of authority to mediate, so separation would not have 
been a suitable option for conflict resolution.  
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The Tonga group which Colson studied also had a form of government.146While the pre-
colonial Tonga made use of vindictive force to resolve quarrels, the presence of the British 
Administrators, prevented such vindictive actions.147 However she added that: “...underneath 
this superstructure one can still see the interplay of the old forms of social control.”148  
The above discussion demonstrates the importance of studying the old and new to discover 
how the interplay affects the present-day conflicts and disputes resolution in societies. 
Although semi-complex societies did not show a need for physical separation as did the 
elementary societies, the third types of societies discussed below have unique features that 
can allow for other forms of separation for resolving conflicts. The Yoruba sub-groups, such 
as the Ife and the Modakeke, fall into the next category, namely, complex societies. 
1.5.1.3 Complex Societies 
Societies that had more centralised governments with kings and subjects living during 
colonial era and the modern State, practised traditional negotiation, mediation, and arbitration 
and most had courts for formal litigation rather than separation. An example is the Tiv of 
Nigeria studied by Bohannan.149Bohannan wrote that the Tiv had leaders whom he described 
as having “experience”150 and acting as arbitrators in quarrels both within lineages and 
between strangers. He noted that the Tiv recognised use of traditional arbitration as to “sit and 
listen quietly and dispassionately to all sides of a dispute, then...give a just decision.”151 Also 
the Kgatla, studied by Schapera, were a society with centralised government152with 
negotiation and mediation that gave way in the last resort to court processes before the chief 
who has power to enforce the decision.153 Decisions usually resulted in corporal punishment, 
confiscation of stock, or deprivation of the use of land allocated to the individual.154 Appeal 
lay to the head chief who had the capacity to impose a decision after mediating and he had 
the capacity to enforce such decisions.155 Both the Tiv and the Kgatla peoples, as with other 
complex societies, did not practice physical separation as dispute resolution process, mainly 
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because they had authorities to enforce judgments and, therefore, they did not need  to resort 
to any sizeable section of the group physically moving away from the rest of the group so as  
prevent or resolve conflicts. Similar complex societies today, with plural systems that 
recognise traditional authority, and sub-State authority in modern State systems have higher 
authorities to enforce judgments in order to resolve conflicts and disputes. The Yoruba of 
Nigeria had similar complex structure such as the Kgatla and the Tiv in pre-colonial times. 
They had kings whom they recognise as having authority over them and were able to resolve 
their conflicts.156 But because modern day Yoruba groups recognise the authority of both their 
king and the modern State government, situations were physical separation is not possible, 
other forms of separation to resolve their conflict is feasible due to the structure of the modern 
State.157 While the anthropology of conflict and dispute resolution shows that plural societies 
are very unlikely to separate physically in order to prevent and resolve conflicts and disputes, 
the social structure of plural societies in modern times reveal other features of separation.  
This thesis recognises that, the legal pluralism of some traditional societies living in the 
modern era does not allow for physical separation.  Nevertheless, this paper also explores 
other methods of separation that are available to groups in order to resolve their conflicts and 
disputes.  
1.5.2 The Sociology of Conflict Resolution in Africa  
The sociology of conflict resolution in Africa demonstrates the need to study the norms of a 
society in order to settle their conflict. Social groups with complex political structures in pre-
colonial times in Africa, such as the Ife and the Modakeke, have moved from being solely 
ancient complex societies-with kings and social norms into plural societies where local 
traditions and norms are observed alongside processes found in modern States (colonial and 
independent States).158 Therefore, it is important and necessary to discuss groups’ social 
norms and the role of the State in conflict resolution in order to adequately address the plural 
nature of these societies. 
Writing about the benefits of studying African norms and customs for resolution of conflicts 
and disputes, Olaoba and Ayewo159 argued that conflicts tend to continue when local people 
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are not allowed a major participation in their own dispute resolution.160 Considering that the 
social norms and customs of the people are important in ordering a society and resolving 
conflicts, this section of the literature review examined sociologists’ theories of ethnic conflict 
in line with the norms and customs of the Ife-Modakeke group.  
The major theory of group conflict considered here is in relation to groups’ perception of their 
social identity and political status in relation to other groups that lives around them. In his 
study of the sociology of group conflict, Brown noted that intergroup similarities lead to 
intergroup conflicts because when there is an increase in similarity between two groups, it 
tends to threaten the identity of both groups thus affecting their distinctiveness.161 Although 
this goes against the proposition that ‘like attracts like’, as postulated by Newman,162 Brown 
noted that attraction of dissimilar groups is only biological and does not necessarily translate 
into the reality of social group existence.163 Also, Turner maintains that two groups with 
different status positions will always be in conflict because the superior group wants to 
maintain its status while the inferior group seeks liberation from an inferior position.164 
Blumer also argued that group prejudice comes when a group feels threatened in its 
position.165 With such threat comes violence.166 
In the case of Nigeria, with specific relevance to the Ife and the Modakeke, Samuel 
Johnson’s167 history of the Yoruba is one of the earliest systematic recordings of the Yoruba 
people and the Ife conflicts and wars. His work shows that the norms of the Yoruba regarding 
land and the position of settlers in a group, caused conflict between Yoruba sub-groups. In 
addition, norms of societies such as discriminatory norms of indigene-settler status, in terms 
of land tenure, leads to a position of superiority of one group against the other; thus, there is 
an attractiveness of separation for such groups. For example, Fadipe wrote on the indigene-
settler relationship of groups in Nigeria created by the pre-colonial social structure of the 
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Yoruba of Nigeria.168 According to Fadipe, a native/indigene and a settler/non-indigene were 
identified by their respective rights over land. Thus, the settler only had rights of use of a 
native’s land with the native’s permission, guaranteed by the payment of a token called 
Ishakole as an acknowledgement of the native’s over lordship.169  Not only is Ishakole a status 
issue, it is also an economic burden on the settler.  Consequently, it can be expected that, 
where a settler group can be relieved of the duty to pay Ishakole, such a group would welcome 
the change in status and advantageous economic position.  As noted above, there are, 
nowadays, no opportunities for large groups to separate and re-settle elsewhere (without there 
being a refugee crisis).  Accordingly, where there is an opportunity to achieve the same change 
of position without physical separation, a settler group would gladly take that opportunity.  
That opportunity might be the offer of allocation of land tenure freed from Ishakole and a 
separate Local Government.  This will be considered further below. 
The same was true of Mamdani who wrote on the role of the colonial state and the modern 
state in creating a culture of entitlement within groups and encouraging unequal access to 
devolved power such as access to Local Government area for groups that need one. 170 
Although, he addressed the issue of Nigerian Federal structure as contributory to ethnic 
conflict in the country, he did not discuss how this can be remedied in order to resolve long 
standing ethnic conflicts in the country. Akanji, on the other hand, analysed the effect of the 
settler-native relationship in Nigeria in promoting sub-ethnic inequalities that make access to 
State resources a problem in Nigeria, thus increasing ethnic conflicts in the country. He traced 
the social relationships between ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in Nigeria in pre-colonial times 
to highlight the effect of dual political loyalties and identities created by the social structure 
of sub-groups in Nigeria, and which were aggravated by the Federal structure of Nigeria. 
Akanji also noted the negative role in group conflicts of over reliance on State funds, rightly 
stating that “the issues of access to resources…exacerbated the problem of ethnic politics 
during the colonial and post-colonial periods.”171 
                                                             
168N.A Fadipe., The Sociology of the Yoruba (Ibadan University Press, 1970) p. 169-178 
169N.A Fadipe., (1970) Ibid 
170M. Mamdani., ‘Beyond Settlers and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism’ Comparative Studies 
in Society and History (Cambridge University Press) vol. 43. no. 4. Oct. 2001, p. 651-664 [658]  
171O.O Akanji., ‘The Problem of Belonging: The Identity Question and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Nigeria’ African Identities 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group) vol. 9. no.2 May 2010, p. 117-132[ 118] 
27 
 
Suleiman and Maiangwa examined who was to blame for Nigeria’s persistent combative 
identities carried out by ethnic groups.172 They traced the blame from the colonial days to late 
colonial times and then to post-colonial times.173 What they did not do was to examine pre-
colonial Nigerian tribal group norms in order to discover the combative nature of such groups 
and how they were transformed into modern day conflicts. This thesis deals with identifying 
the reason for the Ife-Modakeke persistent combative behaviours since the pre-colonial times. 
Further, as has been mentioned earlier, the social structure of a group can influence their 
method of dispute resolution. For example, some groups have kinship ties which makes 
separation unlikely. The! Kung bush men, being a typical example of small groups with strong 
social and economic ties that makes it difficult to separate physically, even during intra-group 
conflict.174 Studies by both Johnson and Akinjogbin show that the Ife-Modakeke lack such 
intra-group ties because the Modakeke do not regard themselves as Ifes, thus making 
separation more favourable for their conflict resolution. Akinjogbin stressed that the historical 
consciousness of an average Yoruba is restricted to his sub-cultural group and not the whole 
Yoruba land.175  In situations where there is intra-group conflict, lack of common ground 
within the group, such as lack of similar status, interest and tasks, will be important.  
Williams,176 Pettigrew and Tropp177 noted that groups will not benefit from contact between 
conflicting factions being encouraged to reduce prejudice and violence against one another.  
In fact, McClendon has stated that the body of work done on contact theory is not expected 
to produce a reduction of prejudice among groups in conflict.178 However, since physical 
separation is not feasible, the idea of contact theory does not apply directly to resolving intra-
group conflict by economic and political separation.  But, contact theory might have a role to 
play in regard to non-physical separation. Where the two groups remain in close physical 
proximity to one another. Contact theory although will help in non-physical separation is not 
explored in this thesis as the aim is to address the economic and physical separation of the 
groups. Contact theory can be explored in further research.  
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Another theory of group conflict is the State as contributor to group conflict. Academic studies 
have shown that the modern State by means of ineffective intervention in group conflicts and 
by exclusion policies, have contributed to group conflict. Subaru’s work on ethnic minority 
conflicts demonstrates that the lack of effective intervention by the Nigerian State in ethnic 
conflict situations was largely due to over centralization of power and resources in the Federal 
government.179He observed that determination of Local Government boundaries, which is the 
cause of some group conflicts in Nigeria, “are best left to sub-national authorities or 
communities to decide.”180 However, what Suberu did not address is what happens when such 
sub-national authorities fail to resolve long standing group conflicts such as the Ife-
Modakeke. In such circumstances, apparently, the State may be the only available authority 
to resolve such conflicts.   
Also, on State contribution to group conflict, Esman has argued in his work on group conflicts 
that State policies whether positive action policies or negative inaction policies181 precipitate 
most contemporary ethnic conflicts, and the very nature of the post-colonial State encourages 
exclusion of subordinate groups.182 Sorbo and Vale support this theory, pointing out that 
African governments have played a varied role in conflicts in Africa, such as “instigating” 
and “supporting” the resolution of conflicts. But they argue that African governments have 
“sustained conflicts…to serve their own interest.”183 They argue that people lose interest in 
government attempts to end conflicts because governments adopt exclusion policies where 
one group is excluded from gaining access to power due to discriminatory norms.184  
More recently Boone’s work on land conflicts in Africa and the role of the State in continuing 
such conflicts helps to corroborate this theory. Using examples from Burkina Faso and Ghana, 
Boone demonstrates that ethnic hierarchies built into land tenure exist as a result of the State 
institutionalising such hierarchies, starting from the colonial administrations that used land as 
“markers of political status.”185 She further argues that the State “imposes social 
subordination, economic vulnerability, and the norm of deference toward indigenous hosts on 
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the ethnic strangers…”186 By upholding customary land tenure regimes, the State reproduces 
and confirms the hierarchical structure of the local political arena.187 In relation to Nigerian 
experiences, Mamdani wrote on the effects of colonialism on Africa. His main contention was 
that colonialism was not just felt economically in Africa because, he argues, most of the 
literature expands more on the economic effects, and not on the creation of discrimination in 
African ethnic groups by encouraging cultural identity above national identity.188 He 
emphasized the differences between cultural and political identities. 189 He argued mainly on 
the detrimental effect of the colonial powers governing ethnic groups through customary laws, 
not through non-criminal laws, creating differences between races (non-natives) and ethnicity 
(natives) between civil rights and customs and between civil laws and customary laws. Civil 
laws, Mamdani argued, sets “limits to power” and “civic power was to be exercised within 
the rule of law and had to observe the sanctity of the domain of rights.” However, customary 
laws he argues “enabled power instead of checking it by drawing boundaries around it. In 
such an arrangement, no rule of law was possible.” 190  Mamdani stated that the colonial state 
gave civil rights to settlers and customary laws to natives/indigenes, according to him “rights 
belonged to non-natives. Natives had to live according to custom.”191 This created a dual 
system of rights in the colonial era. 
Mamdani argues further that the post-colonial State, which he calls the “mainstream 
nationalist” State, inherited and reproduced the dual identity crated by the colonial State: that 
of natives/indigenes and non-natives (or settlers as used by the modern State) and native rights 
and non-native rights. In his words, however, the post-colonial State not only gave civil rights 
to all citizens, both natives and non-natives (indigenous and non-indigenous), but the State 
also gave discriminatory customary rights as a bonus to the indigenous citizens.192 Thus the 
post-colonial State reproduced a system of inequality that haunts ethnic groups in Africa 
today, including those living in Nigeria. In fact, Mamdani stressed that “[e]ven with the 
Colonial power gone, we keep on defining every citizen as either a native or a settler”193 The 
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problem with such dual citizenship identity is that some become privileged and some under-
privileged and this inevitably leads to conflict such as between the Ife and the Modakeke, with 
the settler community (the Modakeke) wanting emancipation from the privileged native 
community. Describing the situation in the best of ways, Mamdani stated that the State has 
developed “the culture of entitlement as a form of Justice….the bearers of mainstream 
nationalism-have succeeded in redefining yesterday’s natives into postcolonial settlers and 
postcolonial natives.”194  The Nigerian State is guilty of reproducing such dual identities of 
indigene/settler that create and fuel conflicts between ethnic groups through laws such as the 
Federal character system in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
Considering that the Ife and the Modakeke are part of the modern State and the potential for 
their political and economic separation lies in the powers of the State, advising the State to 
address the indigene-settler hierarchy in the 1999 Constitution is of importance in ending the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict. However, to support this advice, the legal platform for such changes, 
and the consequences for not making the changes, have to be addressed. The legal framework 
for amending the Constitution and granting separation of the Modakeke from the Ife is now 
analysed along the lines of previous legal studies in conflict resolution. 
1.5.3 Legal Studies on Conflict Resolution 
This thesis uncovers the level of economic and political influence the State has over ethnic 
groups, with particular reference to the Ife and the Modakeke groups and their conflict. This 
includes analysis of the Nigerian Constitution and its impact on group access to devolved 
powers through Local Government creation, fiscal Federalism, indigene-settler relationship, 
and the granting of internal self-determination in furtherance of human rights protection and 
Nigeria’s responsibility to protect citizens from genocide. The justification for this 
examination is that the “current structure of Nigerian Federalism incites communal 
conflict.”195  In order to address separation as a means of ending the Ife-Modakeke conflict, 
the legal framework that affects the conflict must first be analysed.  
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1.5.3.1 The Impact of the Nigerian Constitution on the Ife-Modakeke Conflict 
Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes provision for the 
creation of Local Government areas by states. The idea is to bring governance to grass-roots 
communities, ensuring an important measure of economic and political autonomy to the 
people.196 Local Government brings a measure of autonomy to groups from Federal and state 
controls, although not total autonomy. The challenges facing Local Government in Nigeria, 
with regards to revenue generation and allocation, puts the idea of separation in a difficult 
solution to the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The fact is that most Local Governments only generate 
10% of the revenue required to meet recurrent expenditure.197 This is confirmed by the data 
collected by Yakubu on Local Government revenue generation showing very low yields from 
the sources of revenue falling within the jurisdiction of Local Governments in Nigeria.198 This 
makes Local Governments in heavy reliance on Federal money from oil extraction, agriculture 
and taxes.199 Where a new Local Government cannot be funded, what possibility is there for 
advising on creating a Local Government for the Modakeke to resolve the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict.? The feasibility of creating a Local Government is an issue that this thesis explores 
in chapter 7.  
Further, when the groups are not separated economically and politically, conflict has tended 
to continue with the intensity of borderline genocide. The human rights of the citizens of both 
groups continue to be breached as violence is carried out and Nigeria fails in its responsibility 
to protect groups in times of violence. These failures introduce the African Union to the 
conflict, as the AU have intervened to help States with group conflicts such as Burundi, Libya 
and South Sudan. Africans seeking to resolve African problems without the involvement of 
any intervention by the West led to the formation of the Organisation of African United 
(OAU) in 1993 now replaced with the African Union (AU) in 1999.200  Regardless of this, the 
benefits of the AU intervening in the Ife-Modakeke conflict by virtue of Article 4(h) of the 
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African Union Constitutive Act201 is yet to be studied and this thesis attempts a discussion 
that can be furthered in future studies.  
1.5.3.2 International Law and Separation of the Groups 
In the present state of legal affairs in Nigeria, section 12 of the 1999 Constitution requires 
local legislative sanctions for international treaties to be effective in Nigeria. While Nigeria 
refused to vote for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 
on issues of self-determination, Nigeria gave international ratification to the African Charter 
in June 1983202 and by virtue of an Act of Parliament- the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1990.203 Both the UN Declaration and the 
African Charter provide for the right of self-determination of peoples. These international 
instruments are relevant to the way in which the Nigerian State conducts itself within its 
territorial boundaries.  Specifically, for the purposes of this thesis, those instruments affect 
the obligations of the Nigerian State towards the Modakeke because Nigeria cannot avoid its 
international obligations by relying on its own laws.204  Where does it place the Nigerian 
government and the Ife-Modakeke groups? These issues will be examined by reference to the 
research questions outlined earlier in this chapter. The research question limits the scope of 
the thesis as shown below.  
 1.6 Scope of the Study 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the necessity for separating the Modakeke from the 
Ife, and the viability of doing so by means of economic and political measures put into effect 
by the Nigerian government. In order to achieve the aim of the thesis, this thesis will explore 
the Yoruba history in relation to the Ife-Modakeke, the anthropology, sociology, the economic 
and political aspects of the relationship between the Ife and the Modakeke, the relationship 
between the two communities and the Nigeria State, as well as the international community.  
The thesis examines the relevant literature, identifies and explores relevant archival materials, 
and provides empirical evidence in support of the arguments offered. Sichone has rightly 
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noted that “all anthropologist does some research at home” Although this is not a pure 
anthropological work, it involves some aspects of anthropology of the groups being studied. 
Therefore, it was the privilege of the researcher to do some fieldwork among the Ife and the 
Modakeke groups in 2014.205 
The historical part of the thesis neither intends to be a comprehensive review of works on the 
Yoruba or Ife-Modakeke conflict nor attempts to deal with all the neglected themes. Rather, 
it focuses on the place of separation as dispute resolution mechanism for resolving the Ife-
Modakeke conflict. Given the long years of conflict and the diverse nature of the conflict, a 
coherent historical narrative is not possible. However, to enhance clarification and easy flow 
of the reading a few repetitions are included deliberately. It is worthy of note here that Yoruba 
orthography is being modernised and on expert advice, the new form has been used much in 
this work. Thus, the thesis does not spell personal names and places in the original forms as 
they appear. 
The empirical/fieldwork research is restricted to two sub-groups in Nigeria even though there 
had been many group conflicts206 in Nigeria. Also, although there had been many works on 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict, Ntarangun had rightly noted that “repeated consultancies in the 
same community or with the same group of people could result in an accumulated set of data 
that, overtime, amounts to critical ethnography.”207 The purpose of restricting the case study 
to the sub-groups is simple. The interest of the researcher is in the possibilities of separating 
group norms from modern politics to give all groups the same access to devolved government. 
This is examined through the eyes of self-determination and group autonomy. The researcher 
argues that in the case of the Ife-Modakeke conflict resolution, this can be achieved by 
granting internal self-determination to the Modakeke group and not through actual secession 
from the Nigerian State. The Nigeria Biafra could have been used as a case study but it 
involved attempt at actual secession from the Nigerian State. The Niger Delta conflicts, 
although well documented, are not in actual relevance to this study as it involves mainly 
resource control not self-determination by separation. The other relevant group conflict that 
was initially attempted but dropped at a later stage of this thesis as a result of the restricted 
time-scale is the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict as it deals with land conflict and many court 
                                                             
 
206Tribal conflicts in Nigeria includes Zango Kataf in Kaduna between the Hausa and Kataf, Aguleri and Umuleri in Anambra State, Jos 
crisis between the Hausa Fulani and Beron/Anaguta/Afizere, Ife/Modakeke crisis, Niger Delta crisis and the Ogonis struggles.  
207M. Ntarangun, D. Mills & M. Babiker., African Anthropologies: History, Critique, and Practice (Zed Books, 2006) p. 31 
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processes of State intervention. The Ife-Modakeke conflict focus mainly on social conflict 
resulting from discrimination, self-identity and territorial disputes and rarely involve court 
processes.208  Also, as a result of the present unrest in Nigeria, the study avoided exploring 
on-going religious conflicts and terrorist activities such as the Boko Haram.  The researcher 
takes an objective, non-participatory stance in her study of both communities. 
The Ife-Modakeke conflict has been selected as a representative case study considering its 
negative impact on the lives of the Ife-Modakeke peoples and Nigeria’s economy and image 
outside the country. As was shown in the background to the study, the Ife-Modakeke conflict 
affects the lives of both groups as well as all citizens of Nigeria. The economy of Nigeria is 
also affected when there is constant outbreak of group conflict in the country especially as 
Nigeria is identified as “the world’s sixth largest producer of oil”209 and receives 95% of her 
export earnings from oil and gas with 80% of Government revenue coming from the same 
source.210 Suggesting that readership and audience of the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict in this thesis will be wide and diverse. 
The relationship between the Ife-Modakeke groups and the Nigerian State social, economic 
and political structure as well as the benefit of separating the groups under international and 
regional laws is also examined. The processes of separation of the groups through granting 
internal self-determination to the Modakeke by Local Government creation touches on 
Constitutional issues as well as international law doctrines/principles and therefore adequately 
illustrates the relevance and link between the two. The role of the African Union is also 
considered because Nigeria although a sovereign nation 211 has responsibility to protect its 
citizens from the effects of violent conflicts and failure to carry out this responsibility is an 
invitation to the international community to intervene to prevent further violations of citizen’s 
rights and protection.212 Therefore, the first three research sub-questions addressed the 
domestic nature of groups in Nigeria. As will be illustrated in the study, groups have moved 
from isolated traditional States to plural societies where they come under a modern State such 
as Nigeria that is not just governed by a domestic framework but by international law 
doctrines of self-determination and the responsibility to protect citizens from human rights 
                                                             
208S. Olayiwola., ‘Integrated Education: An Instrument for Resolving Ife-Modakeke Conflict in Osun State, Nigeria’ Journal of Alternative 
Perspective in the Social Sciences, vol. 2. no.2. 2010, p. 953-965 [956-957] 
209Y. Omorogbe., Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Malt House Law Books, 2003) p. 19 
210See Nigeria’s 2007 Budget- <http://budgetoffice.gov.ng/PDF/2007budget.pdf>  Accessed  22nd December 2008.  
211See section 2(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Cap 214 Laws of the Federation 2004 
212ICISS ‘Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ December 2001. Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre. p. XI 
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abuses. As a result, the fourth sub-question flows from the first three and deals with the 
international aspect of the conflict which leads to the fifth sub-question on the urgency of 
ending the conflict by separation. The research methodology follows the pattern of the 
research questions by explaining the method used in answering each of the research questions. 
However, the details of the methodology are set out in a separate chapter (chapter two) 
because the research methodology is very detailed and interrupts the flow of the narrative in 
this chapter.   
This research takes on an interdisciplinary method, combining anthropology, sociology and 
law. For anthropologists, this research is aimed at providing an account of traditional 
settlement systems in the Ife and the Modakeke in relation to their ability to separate for peace 
in a modern sovereign State. This is aimed at providing an up-to-date example in legal 
anthropology of the modern realities of the two warring groups in Nigeria.  
For sociologists, it hopes to provide enlightenment on the social realities of dual allegiance to 
traditional norms and modern relationships of warring groups that are part of modern 
sovereign State system. The attitude and perception of the two groups regarding their conflict 
and the most appropriate conflict resolution strategy in times of group conflict is analysed. 
For legal scholars and students, this research hopes to set the legal dynamics in Nigeria in 
relation to law and order. It hopes to demonstrate how law can be used to promote ancient 
customs and continued old feuds between groups. It also shows how a group’s perception of 
law in their lives can be changed by availability of information and education. 
The study is a qualitative anthropo-social-legal enquiry.  It is aimed at gathering as much 
information as is possible on the conflict in the case studies as a guide to future mediators, 
who may be called upon to help parties to negotiate their conflicts. The goal of the research 
is to gather the right and relevant information that is in line with the theoretical frame work 
developed and to contribute to knowledge. 
1.7 Originality and Contribution of the Study  
This study is an original contribution because this is the first work to attempt a detailed 
analysis of the feasibility of resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict through economic and 
political separation of the groups. By analysing the social, economic and political history of 
the two groups and their conflict resolution processes and the present legal and political 
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position of Nigeria in relation to group norms and self-determination, the thesis demonstrates 
the benefits and feasibility of separating the groups. 
As is demonstrated by means of evidence from the Ife-Modakeke conflict, the thesis 
compared both Constitutional and system rules between the two groups to help comparative 
legal theorists and practitioners to examine the sufficiency of the procedural and substantive 
rules for resolving group conflicts in Nigeria.  
The researcher attempted to fill the gap in literature by collecting oral narratives of the 
perception of the people in Ife and Modakeke regarding unique areas of their conflict 
resolution through interviews conducted in June/July 2014. The researcher asked questions 
on the Nigerian State legal and political influence on the conflict resolution and the resultant 
effect on the ability to resolve the conflict. Specific questions were asked such as those 
concerning the people’s view of the relationship between the two groups to establish current 
perceptions of the groups with regard to separation of the groups. The researcher asked both 
groups their views on traditional leaders’ autonomy in modern conflict resolution to establish 
the roadblocks of separation and the possible ways of addressing those blocks. The fieldwork 
contribution is original to the Ife-Modakeke conflict resolution discussions in Nigeria. 
The study found out that the modern State of Nigeria by means of the Constitution and 
inadequate intervention in conflict promotes norms that exacerbates conflict such as 
native/indigene-settler/non-indigene norms.213 By so doing, the government exacerbates the 
difficulties of resolving some group conflict, such as the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The 
government thus becomes part of the problem not a solution to the problem. The justification 
for looking into the role of the government in promoting group traditional land norms is to 
show to the academic community that it does not matter which processes groups prefer, 
because both traditional processes and government resolution furthers ancient norm of 
native/indigene-settler/non-indigene status.214 
Generally, the academic community knows too well the history of the Ife-Modakeke conflict 
as many authors have written extensively of the conflict in books and journal articles.215 What 
is less well known is that for each of the violent episodes of the Ife and the Modakeke, in the 
                                                             
213This will be discussed in details in chapter five. 
214The thesis makes use of interview responses to analyse this concept 
215For a list of some scholars that have written on the Ife-Modakeke conflict, see the literature review section of this chapter 
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course of their conflict, the quest for separation either physical, political, economic or 
religious has been the trigger to the violence. Also, attempts at resolution has been geared 
towards separation but never pursued to completion.216 This thesis makes this the subject of 
analysis as an original contribution to knowledge. 
1.8 Structure of the Study 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 serves to introduce the problems that 
necessitated this study. The theoretical framework and the literature review are presented as 
the foundation for advising the government to separate the Ife and the Modakeke to resolve 
their conflict. The research questions and the scope of the thesis are provided. An analysis of 
the relevant literature review and the originality of the study to prove the contribution of this 
study to knowledge in the field of conflict resolution in Nigeria is also presented in chapter 
one. 
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the steps that were taken to address each of the research 
questions of this study as well as the procedure used in collecting and analysing the data.  It 
is relevant to the overall thesis because it ensures originality and rigor that is a core facet of a 
PhD by research.217  
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the anthropology of dispute resolution in the Ife-Modakeke 
through a consideration of their pre-colonial social, economic and political structure to 
determine the feasibility of physically separating the sub-groups to resolve their conflict. This 
is an appropriate starting point for answering the first research sub- question considering that 
it recommends to the modern State a consideration of economic and political separation to 
resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The thesis identifies and justifies, in this chapter, the need 
for separating the groups arising from the relative success of pre-colonial attempt to end the 
conflict.  
Chapter 4 examines the social, economic and political structure of the colonial Ife-Modakeke, 
their conflict and conflict resolution and the effect on the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict by separation. 
                                                             
216The subsequent chapters of this thesis attempt to prove this by reference to all the violent episodes of conflict between the Ife and the 
Modakeke as it considers major aspect of their conflict history. 
217S.C Dodd., ‘A Ph.D. Defined in three Tenses’ The Journal of Educational Sociology vol. 30. no. 9., 1957, p. 423-427 [423] 
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Chapter 5 discusses the group’s conflict and conflict resolution in the post-colonial Nigeria, 
the social, economic and political structure of the modern State of Nigeria and its effect on 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The chapter analyses the power of the Federal State to separate 
groups by means of Local Government area and how the modern State can separate cultural 
identities from political identities by eliminating the traditional distinction between indigenes 
and non-indigenes and aligning land law with the reality of the ownership and possession of 
land by groups to end the conflict.  
Chapter 6 analyses the possibility of resolution by economic and political separation of the 
groups through the creation of a new Local Government area for the Modakeke. The chapter 
determines the necessity, feasibility and power of the Osun state government in creating Local 
Government for the Modakeke. It deals with the organisation of Local Government and the 
re-organization in Nigeria and how Local Government creation can be harnessed to resolve 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Chapter six also deals with the attribution to the Nigerian States 
of any internationally wrongful act brought about by the omission of the Osun state to create 
Local Government for the Modakeke to bring an end to the Ife-Modakeke conflict and prevent 
further human right breaches of both groups and mass suffering to the people. 
Chapter 7 deals with the obligation of the Nigerian government as part of the international 
community to protect its citizens from effects of violent conflicts and grant internal self-
determination to the Modakeke by means of a Local Government area dominated by the 
Modakeke to prevent intervention from the African Union. The chapter also explores the 
benefit to the Nigerian State ending the Ife-Modakeke conflict.  
Chapter 8 summarises the major findings and recommendations of the study and concludes 
with directions for future research such as how Nigeria can strengthen the Constitution and 
laws to enable equal access to devolution of power through Local Government creation in 
Nigeria. And the recommendation for setting up a local committee that will look into the 
administrative nature of upgrading the Area Office in the Modakeke into a full Local 
Government area that will serve to separate the groups politically and end the conflict.  
In keeping with the structure of the thesis outlined above, the next chapter examines the 
methodology adopted in carrying out this research. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the procedure used in collecting and analysing data is described within the 
context of the five research sub-questions of the thesis. The overall purpose of the chapter is 
to address the methodology of this research.  
The methodology section of this research is relevant to the overall thesis for two main reasons: 
one, it reinforces the need for care and caution in drawing conclusions in the research because 
according to the scholarly work of Eplattenier, “…methods should remind us that we often 
work with limited palette of information.”1 Therefore, caution need to be exercised in drawing 
general conclusions. Two, the method section ensures originality, which is generally 
recognised as a core facet of a PhD research. According to Dodd a sociologist and educator, 
skills in methodology test a researcher’s ability to add knowledge that is verifiable to current 
studies.2 Thus, to be able to enlarge knowledge through an original contribution, a clear 
methodology is undertaken in this chapter. For a method to be reliable, valid and verifiable, 
Rudner3 argues that it must be a method that is not likely to result in misleading readers to 
continue to believe false statements by deliberately omitting things from the research. It 
should be noted however, that false sentences do not include omissions deliberately done 
because they do not relate to the research. It is only where evidence relates to the research and 
it was deliberately omitted by a researcher that it can be said to be invalid or non-dependable.4 
As will be shown in the subsequent sections of this chapter, this researcher ensured that the 
methods employed and the style of reporting evidence gathered in furtherance of this research, 
did not result in a deliberate omission of key evidence.   
In order to describe the methodology in this chapter, the chapter is divided into four sections. 
Section one provides the primary method and the justification for using it. Section two 
addresses the method of collecting and analysing documents. Section three deals with the 
method of collecting and analysing archival materials from the two archives, while section 
                                                             
1B.E Eplattenier., ‘An Argument for Archival Research Method: thinking Beyond Methodology’ College English (National Council of 
Teachers) vol. 72. no. 1., 2009.) p. 67-79 [75] 
2S.C Dodd., ‘A Ph.D. Defined in Three Tenses’ The Journal of Educational Sociology, vol. 30. no. 9., 1957 p. 423-427[423] 
3R. Rudner., Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall, 1966) p. 73-83 
4M. Martin., ‘The Objectivity of a Methodology’ Philosophy of Science vol. 40. no. 3., 1973, p. 447-450 
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four described the method for the fieldwork conducted among the Ife and the Modakeke in 
2014. The second, third and fourth sections will be characterised by sub-sections dealing with 
the research question it addressed, the particular method and justification for the method 
chosen, how the data was collected, and how the data was analysed. 
2.2 Section One: The Method 
This section addresses the primary research method used in this thesis and the justification for 
choosing the method. The choice of research methodology in this study was informed by two 
major reasons: (1) “the nature of the topic of research” and (2) the aim of the research.5 The 
research is a socio-legal research aimed at providing recommendations to the government of 
Nigeria on resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict and possibly providing a basis for resolving 
similar conflicts. Therefore, the methodology for this study was generated by a careful 
consideration of the research questions to carry out the aim of the study.  
In keeping with the broader aim of making recommendations to the government for resolving 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict and providing a basis for resolving similar conflicts, the 
predominant research method applied in this study is the case study research method. 
Essentially, the case study method involves document analysis, archival materials and 
interviews conducted among the Ife and the Modakeke groups in June/July 2014. The 
document analysis covers two source materials. These are primary sources comprising of 
Nigeria’s Constitutions (previous and current), legislation dealing with land use, local 
government creation, and the African Union as well as the archival materials dealing with the 
anthropology of the Ife-Modakeke and their dispute resolution. 
The secondary sources comprise of scholarly sources such as books/monographs, journal 
articles, and news reports. The archival materials were collected from two archives: The 
National Archive Ibadan, Nigeria and the National Archives Kew Gardens, London United 
Kingdom. In addition to document analysis and the archival material, some interviews among 
the Ife and the Modakeke groups in June/July 2014 were necessary to fill the gap. Considering 
that latest literature on resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict in Nigeria were published as far 
back as 2010 confrontations6and thus creating a gap from then to the time of commencement 
                                                             
5C. Chatterjee., Methods of Research in Law (Old Bailey Press, 1997) p. 8 
6R.A Asiyanbola., ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: A Case of Ife-Modakeke in Historical Perspective’ Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences 
and Creative Arts vol. 5. no. 1, 2010, p. 61-78; B.A Oyeniyi., ‘Greed- Grievance Debate and the Ife-Modakeke Conflict’ Social History 
(Routledge Taylor and Francis Group0 vol. 35. no 3. 2010 p. 308-329 [320] 
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of this research in 2012. A copy of the transcript of the interview is lodged with the University 
of Westminster, London but the coding from it is attached as an Appendix of this thesis. 
This study used triangulation of methods to provide a “confluence of evidence that breeds 
credibility.”7 In addition to credibility, Mathison emphasised that triangulation in qualitative 
study helps to control bias and establish valid propositions.8While it is arguably not common 
or considered appropriate to talk about correctness and validity in qualitative research such as 
this, Lincoln and Guba argues that the equivalent of correctness and validity in quantitative 
research is dependability in qualitative research.9 In keeping with Lincoln and Guba’s 
arguments, this thesis makes use of the above three methods of gathering information for the 
thesis to be highly dependable and suitable for repeated reviews. 
A generally recognised hurdle in combining methods as undertaken by this researcher is often 
the limited knowledge of the researcher and the possibility of combining some methods with 
others. In dealing with the first hurdle, the researcher acquired a solid background of 
methodology and the use of methods in research through a year’s course in research methods 
during her master of laws degree.  Also, the researcher had the step by step guidance of one 
of her research supervisors who specialises in research methods and comparative study.10 
Rather than relying on just published works, the researcher chose to combine methods. The 
justification for using more than one method is in keeping with the observations of Atkinson 
and Coffey that the use of documents alone is not a good research practice as they are not firm 
evidence of what they report.11  The convictions of several scholars that the methods chosen 
in this research can be combined effectively, helped to allay the fears of the researcher. For 
example, Hutchinson noted the feasibility of combining case study with other methods when 
he wrote that: “A modified case study approach is very possible within a legal research 
project. It can be combined with a doctrinal study and allow typical examples to be 
explored….”12 
Here, Hutchinson argues that case study research and doctrinal research can be combined 
within a legal research project. Also Denzin who argued that different methods can be 
                                                             
7E.W Eisner., The Enlightened Eye: Qualitative Inquiry and the Enhancement of Educations Practice (Prentice Hall, 1991) p. 110 
8S. Mathison., ‘Why Triangulate? Educational Researcher’ vol. 17. no. 2, 1988, p. 13-17[13] 
9Y.S Lincoln & E.G Guba., Naturalistic Inquiry (Beverly Hills CA: Sage, 1985) p. 300 
10Professor Lisa Webley provided a thorough guidance to the researcher on her use of methods in this research. 
11P.A Atkinson & A. Coffey., ‘Analysing Documentary Realities’ in D. Silverman (Ed) Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice 
(London: Sage, 1997) p. 45-62 
12T. Hutchinson., Researching and Writing in Law (2nd edition. Law Books/Thomas Reuters, 2006) p. 104 
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combined “in the study of the same phenomenon.”13 Further justification for using more than 
one methods is keeping in line with the observations of Atkinson and Coffey that the use of 
documents alone is not a good research practice as they are not firm evidence of what they 
report.14 In keeping with the above observations, this thesis combines all three methods that 
come under the case study method to answer the research question and sub-questions.   
The case study method was chosen after a consideration of a full range of methods available 
for the research such as purely doctrinal research and legal history. This is in keeping with 
suggestions of scholars in the selection of appropriate methodology such as Yin15 and 
Gerring16 who emphasised that there are a number of ways to undertake socio-legal research 
and the case study method is just one of them.  A single case study is selected for this study 
namely the Ife-Modakeke conflict because the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict is the 
main focus of this study. Also, a study of the groups provides insight into their conflict and 
attempts at resolution over time with particular attention being paid to examining separation 
as a means of conflict resolution. A single case study has allowed the researcher to robustly 
test the idea of financially and politically separating groups in conflict over internal self-
determination, citizen’s land rights and identity.  
The Ife and the Modakeke groups were chosen deliberately to limit the conclusions derived 
from this study to mainly apply to resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict in Nigeria. This is 
consistent with the case study method which is characterised by “investigating a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context...17” The Ife-Modakeke conflict is also 
selected as it provides a longitudinal opportunity to examine separation as a conflict resolution 
strategy over a century covering three separate periods of time namely the pre-colonial, the 
colonial and the post-colonial eras of the Ife and the Modakeke.  The researcher is aware of 
the fact that selection of a case study is prone to bias led by dependent rather than independent 
variables. This is made worse when the researcher does not have a firm grasp of the causes 
(independent variables) that gave rise to the research interest. A solid grasp on the literature 
can help to alleviate such bias. The researcher considered a range of possible case studies 
prior to the final selection such as the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict for land and the Niger Delta 
struggle for financial autonomy. The first two years of the research was used to pursue both 
                                                             
13N.K Denzin., The Research act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (New York: Aldine, 1970) p. 291 
14P.A Atkinson & A. Coffey., (1997) Ibid. p. 45-62[ 47] 
15R.K Yin., Case Study Research Design and Methods (5th edition, Sage Publications, 2014) Chapter 1. 
16J. Gerring., Case Study Research: Principles and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2007)  
17R.K Yin., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994) p. 13 
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the case of the Aguleri and Umuleri conflict and the Ife-Modakeke conflict for a comparison 
of the two situations however, due to time constraint the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict was 
dropped. Therefore, the researcher is not ignorant of other possible case studies. But the Ife-
Modakeke case study is better suited for testing separation as it directly relates to political 
identity and not just struggle for financial autonomy. 
The study discarded the sole use of legal history or purely document analysis as a method 
because the thesis does not deal entirely with the legal history of the Ife and the Modakeke 
conflict although it forms a large part of the analysis. Since the study is not meant as a means 
to view the whole world but the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict, the case study 
method was more appropriate.  
Yin gave specific conditions on which a case study method should be applied. He noted that: 
“a case study will be preferred method...when (1) the main research questions are 
“how” or “why” questions; (2) a researcher has little or no control over behavioural 
events; and (3) the focus of study is a contemporary phenomenon” 18 
All three conditions were met by this study. To answer a “how” or “why” question, a wide 
range of data sources are required and only the case study method allows for such wide range. 
In addition, the Ife-Modakeke conflict introduce the study of universal principles such as 
autonomy, self-determination and the responsibility to protect. Such universal principles are 
best approached by means of a real-life situation such as in the Ife-Modakeke conflict.  
The proceeding sessions deals with the major components of the case study method namely; 
the document analysis, archival materials and the interviews starting with the document 
analysis.  
2.2.1 Summary 
In summary, case study method was adopted as the primary method of research. The case 
study was used to explore separation as a means of resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Thus, 
the case study groups were restricted to the Ife and the Modakeke even though the problem 
of group conflicts in Nigeria is not unique to the Ife-Modakeke. However, in dealing with 
internal self-determination for political separation, the Ife-Modakeke case is unique because 
                                                             
18R.K Yin., (2014) Ibid.  p. xxxi, 16-17 
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it is the longest group conflict in Nigeria and as described in the background to the study in 
chapter one, their historical experiences place them in a unique circumstance that requires 
separation. 
2.3 Section Two: Document Analysis 
In undertaking the document analysis, the research method employed a combination of the 
doctrinal legal analysis of some laws involving the conflict, such as the Nigeria Constitutions 
(past and the present 1999 constitution) and the Land Use Act 1978. As well as, the analysis 
drawing on scholarly sources in published books and articles. The justification of combining 
both primary and secondary documents in this thesis is that the research sub-question one and 
two, bears on the analysis of the history of both groups which required analysing arly written 
works on the groups and their conflict. While sub-questions three to five have a bearing on 
modern State structure and the International law which required an examination of primary 
legal documents.   
2.3.1 Research Questions Addressed by Document Analysis 
The document analysis contributed in answering all five research sub-questions. However, 
the type of documents used for each question varied according to the requirements of the 
question. The first research sub-question only analysed secondary documents such as books 
and articles on the Ife-Modakeke social, economic and political structures and their conflict 
resolution. This was substantiated with interviews showing the contemporary perceptions of 
the conflict by the Ife and the Modakeke groups in a continuum with the history of conflict 
through the pre-colonial period.  In dealing with the first research sub-question on the Ife-
Modakeke pre-colonial structures in relation to the idea of separation, the historical records 
of already, published works on the group’s conflict and dispute resolution was essential. This 
was mainly because written history of pre-colonial Yoruba was limited since Africans were 
known for oral and not written traditions.19 Therefore, the early works on the Yoruba and the 
Ife-Modakeke are priceless regardless of some bias and minor inaccuracies attributed to some 
of them. For example, Eades noted that the Oyo king list, presented by Samuel Johnson20 in 
his history of the Yoruba, was inaccurate. Also, he noted that the history presented by Smith21 
                                                             
19J.A Atanda, J.A., An Introduction to Yoruba History (Ibadan University Press, 1980) p. 1 
20S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge & Sons Ltd 
Lagos, 1921) 
21R. Smith., Kingdoms of the Yoruba. (London Methuen and Co Ltd, 1969) p. 34  
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and Law 22cast doubts on the accuracy of the history of the Yoruba presented before the 19th 
century.23 
Furthermore, published materials on the Ife and the Modakeke pre-colonial history were used 
to assist in identifying gaps in published work that is filled by oral narratives of the people. 
They also assisted to establish a baseline against which to measure the results of the interviews 
conducted while remaining open to new date/information from the interview conducted 
among the people.  
During the colonial times, records were kept by the colonial administration in Nigeria. These 
documents included primary legal documents in form of Treaties, Constitutions and Maps. 
The analysis derived from the legal documents in colonial and modern times assisted in 
answering research sub-questions two to five.  
2.3.2 How the Documents were Selected 
Academic materials from libraries were selected as data sources for answering the first 
research sub-question. Sources such as textbooks, academic journals and internet database 
that held discussions on the key words such as ‘anthropology of dispute resolution’, ‘urban 
societies’ ‘dispute resolution’, ‘Yoruba dispute resolution’, and ‘the Ife-Modakeke dispute 
resolution’ were consulted and selected based on the most significant and relevant to the 
arguments in either proving or disproving arguments in the thesis.  The library of the 
Anthropology Society of Britain located in the British museum, the British library collections, 
the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies’ library in London and the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS) library in London, provided rich collections of published books and 
articles and Nigerian case law reports. Some Treaty laws were gathered from the United 
Nations Treaty collections while the Newspaper articles were gathered from online sources. 
Newspapers were accessible via online sources such as the Guardian website and through 
goggle search. For the internet sources, the Boolean Operators such as AND, OR and NOT 
are used to search for articles and materials. In addition, positional operators such as w/# and 
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Pre/# were used to preface main terms in search engines. Westlaw, LexisNexis, Jstor, Google 
scholar, and Ethos were all valuable sources of online information.  
Due to early scholarly warning to this researcher that incomplete selection of documents can 
lead to bias on the part of the researcher,24  data was divided into categories which made their 
collection orderly, detailed and much easier. The categories included formal documents such 
as constitutions, treaty laws, case laws, government white paper, informal communications 
such as memos, letters, and notes. Public records included newspapers, census figures, maps; 
personal papers such as letters, and diaries. Publications included academic literatures. 
Secondary data included multimedia such as photos, videos, websites, and online archives. 
The categories determined where to look for the data. 
2.3.3 How the Documents were Analysed 
The thematic analysis was adopted for all non-legal documents. Intensive reading of academic 
materials of different scholars on conflicts and dispute resolution and the social, economic 
and political structure of the Ife and the Modakeke was carried out and notes were taken.  
These texts were compared to see if they constructed the same or different understandings 
from the arguments of the thesis. Similarities and differences were identified and noted. The 
arguments were then used to verify the thesis arguments or to justify a rejection of the 
argument. Renowned authors were sometimes quoted verbatim to give weight and 
corroborations to certain descriptions. These were used as direct positive contributions to the 
thesis or criticised for analytical purposes. 
The fourth and fifth research sub-questions dealt mainly with the post-colonial economic and 
political structure of the Nigerian State and State attempts at resolving the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict. The research sub-questions analyse aspects of the Constitution and legal doctrines 
that sustains the conflict and makes recommendations on possible method of ending the 
conflict by separation. This aspect of the thesis involved detailed analysis of legal doctrines 
such as autonomy and internal self-determination, as well as, indigene/settler relationship of 
groups. Therefore, the legal “doctrinal methodology” is applied. This methodology is applied 
in analysing local and regional legislations such as provisions of the Nigerian Constitution 
and the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights as it relates to internal self-
determination for groups. Such as Local Government creation in Nigeria, the indigene/settler 
                                                             
24R.K Yin., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd edition Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994) p. 80 
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relationship in the Constitution and the role of the African Union in intervening in Nigeria’s 
conflict situation under the African Charter. The doctrinal methodology consists of four steps 
symbolised by the acronym IRAC25 wherein “I” stands for Issues, “R” stands for Rule of law, 
“A” stands for Analysis and “C” stands for Conclusion.  
After identifying the issues in the legal document as it relates to the particular research 
question in the thesis, the rule of law is then applied to the issues raised. The relevant Nigerian 
legislation most especially the Nigerian Constitution are loosely equivalent to the Rule (s) of 
Law. The thesis then sets out the relevant analysis and attempts to reach a conclusion (s). In 
order to apply the “doctrinal methodology” in research questions four and five, a two-step 
approach is applied as follows: 
First, the triggers to the Ife-Modakeke conflict identified in the background to the study in 
chapter one is analysed in relation to their history and State attempts at addressing the conflict 
using examples from relevant Nigeria’s legislation. These included: the 1999 Constitution, 
the Land Use Act and Local reform law with a view to determine whether or not separation 
was an option in past violent conflict. In the event that such triggers showed separation as an 
option, the next step is to determine the gaps in the government management of the situation 
with a view to recommend steps to apply separation to resolve the conflict considering that 
the government had always been involved in conflict resolution of the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict.26The second step of analysis is to determine the advantages of separation or the 
disadvantages of non-separation in relation to Nigeria’s responsibility towards groups in 
conflict as a member of the international community and the African Union. This analysis is 
aimed at providing the necessary pressure on Nigeria to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict. A 
conclusion is then established concerning the way forward for the Ife-Modakeke. 
2.3.4 Summary 
This section has shown that when dealing with the historical structure of peoples dating to 
pre-colonial era, early published materials on the history of a people is priceless especially of 
people known for oral transmission and not on written records. However, published works 
sometimes have been discredited because they carry some untruths and bias from the early 
writers.  Thus, the preserved archival materials often tend to iron out these discrepancies.  In 
                                                             
25T. Hutchinson., Researching and Writing in Law (2nd edition, Law Books/Thomas Reuters, 2006) p. 33-34 
26T.A Imobighe., Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria (Spectrum Books Limited Ibadan, 2003) 
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line with this, the following sections described the archival research undertaken by the 
researcher to answer the research questions. 
2.4 Section Three: Archival Materials 
The relevance of archival method in this thesis is that it helps to provide historical context 
and data for this study. To reiterate, the objective of this thesis is to add knowledge in the field 
of group conflict resolution in Nigeria by researching separation as a means of resolving the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict. According to the Meriam Webster online dictionary an archive is “a 
place in which public records or historical materials (such as documents) are 
preserved.”27 This research covers histories of the Ife and the Modakeke group in 
relation to their more than a century long conflicts and dispute resolution. Therefore, 
to gather information on the people’s history, the archival method is used. In 
addition, Gaillet made it clear that “[a]rchives are now viewed as primary sources 
for creating knowledge rather than storehouses for finding what is already known.”28 
It follows that, in order to add knowledge to the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke, the 
use of archival method was essential. 
Most of the archival materials used in this thesis were found in the National Archives (London 
and Ibadan Nigeria), the Royal Institute of Anthropology library (formerly museum of 
Mankind) and the British Library. 29A total of five weeks of long days was spent in the 
archives in Nigeria in 2013, 2014, and many hours in the National Archive in London. More 
than three hundred works on the history, conflicts and conflict resolution of the two groups 
were read with the aim of ensuring unification and establishing the generally agreed 
differences. Materials retrieved from the National Archive in London included photographs 
of native soldiers in the 1900, native fortifications, Nigerian regiments in the world wars, 
native government land 1929, transfer of tribal areas, conference of Yoruba native chiefs, and 
map of ancient Ife 1888. Materials recovered from the National Archive Ibadan included 
correspondence respecting the war between the native tribes in the interior, papers and 
correspondence between the colonial government and the native authorities  1851-1872, 
correspondence between Rowe and Kimberley 1882, 1884, Alaafin letter inviting colonial 
government for help in ending the Yoruba wars, Christian missionary intelligence 1852-1855, 
                                                             
27Mariam Webster Online Dictionary. Online: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/archive 
28L.L Gaillet., ‘Forming Archival Research Methodologies’ College Composition and Communication vol. 64. no. 1, 2012, p. 35-58 [ 39] 
29 Consent for the use of maps from the National archive London was obtained via email. Email can be found in appendix 3 
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intelligence report on the district of Ondo 1934, notes and letters of Rev. J.B. Wood 1881-
1886. Materials recovered from the British Library: treaty for the cession of Ife to H.M the 
Queen of England, Treaty of peace by all Yoruba tribes 1886, letters from Nigeria by David 
Wynford Carnegie 1899-1900, and Memorials of Anna Hinderer C.M.S Missionary in West 
Africa gathered from her letters and journals.  
2.4.1 The Research Questions Addressed 
The archival materials assisted in answering the second research sub-question “to what extent 
does the colonial social, economic and political structure of the Ife-Modakeke demonstrate 
separation as a means of resolving their conflict?” The justification for the use of archival 
materials in answering the second question in this thesis is that it provided primary sources of 
information and acted as evidence of the colonial structure of the Ife and the Modakeke 
groups. According to Eplattenier, such evidence is what makes readers decide whether they 
can trust the history presented in the thesis.30The archival evidence backs up themes identified 
from published books on the Ife-Modakeke and their conflict such as their dispute resolution, 
matters of the Yoruba norms, and the colonial Treaties dealing with the groups. In addition, 
the use of archival research to gather materials was supported and reiterated by several 
authorities in the study of the Ife and Modakeke groups and their conflict.  For example, 
Johnson,31 Evans-Pritchard, 32Bohannan,33 Willett,34 Bascom,35 Akinjogbin,36 Falola & 
Oguntomisin, 37 and Imogbihe38 all made use of archival materials for their research. For the 
Nigerian writers that published works on the Yoruba of Nigeria, their main sources of 
information were from the different National archives in Lagos, Ibadan and Enugu Nigeria.  
                                                             
30B.E Eplattenier., ‘An Argument for Archival Methods: Thinking Beyond Methodology’ College English, vol. 72. no. 1, 2009, p. 67-79[74] 
31S. Johnson., (1921) Ibid.  
32E. Evans-Pritchard., The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford University 
Press, 1940) 
33P.J Bohannan., Justice and Judgement Among the Tiv (Oxford University Press, 1957) 
34F. Willett., ‘Recent Excavations at Old Oyo and Ife, Nigeria’ Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland vol. 59. June 
1959, p. 99-100[99] Online: Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/2797128. Accessed 06/05/13 
35W. Bascom., The Yoruba of South-Western Nigeria (University of California, Berkeley, 1969)   
36A. Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1998) p. 349 
37T. Falola, & G.O Oguntomisin., Yoruba Warlords of the 19th Century (African World Press, 2001)  
38T.A Imobighe., (2003) Ibid 
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2.4.2 How the Archival Data was Collected 
The National Archive in London holds records of former British colonies including Nigeria. 
These consist of letters between the governors of territories and the British governments. 
Journals of British missionaries and colonial visitors all shed light on the 1800 in Niger area, 
which became Nigeria. Electronic search and order for materials is used to access the 
materials in the London National Archive. Only three materials can be ordered at a time. 
Waiting times are from 40 minutes of ordering and that posed much challenge. The electronic 
search has the materials arranged under heading such as ‘War and Colonial department’, 
‘Colonial office 1854-1966’, ‘Common Wealth relations office 1947-1966’, etc.  
Correspondences are recorded in Registers. Letters are numbered and bound into volumes for 
each country or department in numeric order not by subject.  Records of colonial government 
are not held. 
The biggest challenge in retrieving materials from the archives was in Nigeria. The materials 
at the National Archives were difficult to extract once the money had been paid39 to gain 
access into the archives. A fee of N10 ((0.021 Pound Sterling) (for each)) was requested for 
a form to request documents. N200 (0.42 Pound Sterling) was charged for each photocopied 
page to be used for the research. This was for ethical requirements of the Nigerian National 
Achieve. It is called the prize of photocopy for legal use. Most of the time, the photocopier 
was not working and when working was very faint. The researcher had to handwrite 
quotations and passages of materials that appeared relevant. The Nigerian National Archive 
contains papers of government, native and local authorities and of semi-public bodies. The 
Colonial Secretary’s Office (CSO) finding-aids-cupboard contains a special list of documents 
held on a particular subject area and this proved useful, as there were no electronic finding 
aids. Only six items at a time can be ordered. Ordering starts at 10am and ends 2pm. When 
handed in, there is usually a long wait sometimes up to four hours for the documents to arrive. 
This is in contrast to the 40minute wait in the National Archive in London. The greatest 
challenge is the high number of missing documents. Out of fifty documents ordered over two 
weeks, only twelve was received. The others were either missing or unaccounted for because 
they have been filed wrongly. In fact, I was told by a fellow user to treat the documents as 
gold because of the likelihood of it being misplaced at a future date.  Thus, the majority of the 
                                                             
39N3000 was paid to gain one-month access to the Ibadan Archive. And a few of £200 per page was charged for photocopying for legal use 
or for stamped certification. As a result, much of the works consulted where read there and notes made while others where snapped by 
camera and analysed later paying a flat fee of N5000 everyday of photographing.   
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archival documents used, were hand written paragraphs from the available materials which 
took so much time. 
The materials were marked out in year order and file numbers. Most of the colonial materials 
where torn and in very fragile papers, so one was not allowed to take them for photocopying. 
Sometimes citations were not clear and staff at the archive will come to the rescue to say what 
material was delivered. Camera scanners were not allowed into the archives. Some of the 
pages of the materials were missing.  Colonial intelligence files, court documents, 
memorandums and minutes of meetings were consulted for information of past resolution 
attempts of the conflict and only a few were available. 
Examples of archival documents collected and the data analysed are given in Table 1 below 
 
Documents selected Data Analysed 
Natives Unrest in Nigeria 1929 Fight for traditional conflict resolution? 
Native Authority Policy 1934 Loss of tribal autonomy? 
Oyo profile 3 District officer memorandum to Secretary of 
State Southern Province. Ooni (king) 
decision on Modakeke autonomy for 
separate Imam 
First Conference of Yoruba Chiefs 1937 Tribal autonomy? 
Transfer of tribal areas Loss of tribal autonomy? 
Photograph of Ife Court House Presence of conflict resolution? 
Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Loss of tribal autonomy? 
Correspondence war between the native 
tribes in the interior C.5144 
Tribal conflict 17th century/ old conflict new 
solutions?  
Correspondence Rowe to Kimberley, 
Latosisa to Barrow, Barrow to Young, 
Alaafin to Wood, Johnson to Griffith, Evans 
to Granville, Evans to Stanhope 
Tribal recognition of early intervention? 
Report of the judicial commission of inquiry 
into the communal disturbances in 
Role of State in conflict resolution 
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Oranmiyan central Local Government area 
of Oyo state. Ibadan government printer 
Ife Division File Modakeke separate ruler from the Ife 
Modakeke refusal to pay the Ishakole 
Table 1 A Small Sample of Documents and Data Analysed 
2.4.3 How the Archival Data was Analysed 
Informed consent from the archives was sort and obtained through emails by the researcher 
before any of the materials derived from the archives were used in the thesis.40 According to 
Mckee and Porter, “[t]he need to obtain informed consent is a given for qualitative 
researchers.”41 They further argued, “papers are also people.”42As a result, this researcher 
considered ethnical matters involving the use of archives for research such as disclosing 
private matters that are meant to be private and copyright issues. Data from the archives were 
arranged under the themes that they belonged to. The themes were already identified from the 
literature review. However, new information found in the archives was recorded separately 
under the ‘emerging’ theme. The data under each theme is described in the thesis and used to 
back-up arguments of the thesis or negate such arguments. 
2.4.4 Summary 
The third section has shown the value of using archival materials and analysis as additional 
evidence for separating the Ife from the Modakeke for a resolution of their conflict. The 
archival materials assisted in answering the second research-sub question on the colonial 
social, economic and political structure of the Ife-Modakeke. However, in the triangulation 
technique, the thesis uses more than archival materials in the study. As part of the triangulation 
method, oral interviews were used to substantiate evidence from documents and archives. The 
detailed process for the interviews is presented in the section below. 
                                                             
40Email consenting to the use of archival materials from the National Archive London can be found in Appendix 3. Extra money was paid 
separately for copying archival materials for use in the National Archives Nigeria. 
41H.A McKee & J.E Porter., ‘The Ethnics of Archival Research’ College Composition and communication (Research methodologies National 
Council of Teachers of English) vol. 64. no. 1., 2012. p. 59-81[66]  




2.5 Section four: Interviews Conducted Among the Ife and the Modakeke in June/July 
2014 
This section provides details of the fieldwork carried out by the researcher in Nigeria, why 
and how the fieldwork was carried out, as well as, the impact of the fieldwork on the doctrinal 
study. The fieldwork provided the researcher with additional evidence for proposing advice 
to the government on how to assist the Ife-Modakeke in resolving their conflict by separating 
the groups financially and politically thereby restoring them to their politically autonomous 
state in pre-colonial Nigeria. The researcher was in a privileged position to carry out research 
in Nigeria, because she had direct access to the people, being a Nigerian citizen herself. Since 
the University of Westminster was supporting the research effort, the researcher felt that it 
would have been almost wrong not to embed herself into the field especially as her Ph.D. was 
about giving back autonomy to the one group. As a result, this section first discusses the 
research questions the method addressed, the process leading up to the fieldwork between the 
Ife and the Modakeke in Nigeria dealing mainly with the initial plan for the fieldwork. It then 
goes on to discuss the design stage of the fieldwork and the actual interviews. The impact of 
the fieldwork on the doctrinal study is also delineated. The analysis of the fieldwork data is 
presented as contemporary perceptions of the conflict in a continuum with the history of the 
conflict throughout the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods as set out in chapter’s 
three and four of the theses. 
2.5.1 The Research Questions Addressed 
The interviews assisted the researcher in answering primarily the first and second research 
sub-questions that dealt with the pre-colonial and colonial history of the people’s conflict and 
dispute resolution.  Some aspects of the interview related to the perspectives of the people on 
modern State resolution methods, which are featured in the third research sub-question. 
Because the oral interviews were used to find out the perceptions of the Ife and the Modakeke 
people on their conflict and preferred dispute resolution and explore the similarities and 
differences of the people as a means of exploring separation for resolving their long conflict, 
it was suited for answering the first three research sub-questions. 
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2.5.2 Process Leading up to the Fieldwork  
The fieldwork that was carried out was interviews between the Ife and the Modakeke in 
June/July 2014. The interviews were carried out in both the Ife main town and the Modakeke 
main town. The researcher initially proposed to carry out some interviews in some farming 
villages of the Ife occupied by the Modakeke but was dissuaded by her contact from doing so 
as they were potential areas of sudden violent clashes.  
The plan for the fieldwork was to conduct interviews among the Ife-Modakeke people to 
compliment the doctrinal study. The plan was to be guided by major themes identified in the 
doctrinal study but at the same being open to adopt new themes that might emerge during the 
interviews. The encyclopaedia of qualitative research encourages researchers to keep an open 
mind when doing fieldwork (especially when coding) to get more from the data collected.43  
Not all the themes identified prior to the interviews were included in thesis, because the bulk 
of the doctrinal work was readjusted to make for an intellectually defensible research long 
after the fieldwork was concluded. Only the relevant themes therefore were featured in the 
analysis of the fieldwork conducted and reflected in this thesis. 
The initial themes identified from the doctrinal study (before the fieldwork was carried out) 
are provided in table 1 below:  
No. Themes/Concepts 
1 Anthropology of group conflict and dispute resolution/ Anthropology of the Ife and 
the Modakeke conflict resolution 
2 Social relationship between the Ife and the Modakeke 
3 Political autonomy of the Ife and the Modakeke- pre-colonial era 
4 Political autonomy of the Ife and the Modakeke- colonial era 
5 Political autonomy of the Ife and the Modakeke- post-colonial era 
6 Yoruba traditional dispute resolution 
7 Modern State intervention in to end the conflict 
8 Power of the International community to intervene to require modern States to grant 
internal self-determination to groups 
Table 2 Themes 
                                                             




The themes in the table above formed the majority of the information looked for in the 
fieldwork because they related to the original goal of the research study to offer 
recommendations to the government of Nigeria in order to end the conflict of the Ife-
Modakeke through separation. Other themes researched and added to a thesis that were not 
directly addressed by the interview, were the indigene/settler relationship and the political 
history of Nigerian State as it relates to group conflict resolution. In order to gather the 
information to substantiate or discredit the themes in the table, the interviews of the fieldwork 
followed the seven stages of interview promoted by Kvale,44 namely; the schematizing stage, 
the designing stage, the interviewing stage, the transcribing stage, the analysing stage, 
verifying stage and reporting stage.45 The flow chart for the fieldwork is represented below: 
The flow chart is discussed below:  
 
 
Figure 1 Stages and Sub-Stages of the Fieldwork Process 
                                                             
44S. Kvale., Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (Sage Publications, 1996) 
45S. Kvale., (1996) Ibid. p. 88 
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2.5.2.1 Stage 1: Thematising Stage 
According to Kvale, in the thematising stage, the researcher determines the what, the why and 
the how of the interview by obtaining pre-knowledge of the subject matter to be investigated, 
clarifying the purpose of the study, acquiring knowledge of different techniques, and deciding 
which is the most appropriate for use in the research.46 In this study, as the doctrinal study 
and the literature review progressed, it became increasingly important to trace the political 
history and the dispute resolution  history of the Ife-Modakeke from their pre-colonial days 
(when tribal dispute resolution was the only means of settling conflicts), to the modern State 
influence of setting up committees and the use of the courts to determine whether the idea of 
separation had any foundation in past dispute resolution or a future in present day attempts at 
resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict. As the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history 
of the Ife-Modakeke unfolded, the need arose to find out the perspective of the people on their 
conflict history and traditional dispute resolution. 
Admittedly, there are no known people that are still alive from the ancient Ife-Modakeke 
however, history in West Africa is generally noted to be transferred orally from generation to 
generation.47 Therefore, the fieldwork planned to include elderly people that had  the 
community history handed down to them orally and were able to remember more. The 
interviews were also used to include younger people who have opinions on the history handed 
down. Apart from authenticating their history of autonomy and dispute resolution, the 
fieldwork that was planned, aimed at uncovering the people’s perception of government 
intervention in their conflict to determine whether separation by government will be agreeable 
to all parties involved in the conflict. 
The fieldwork carried out in this research can be summarised by reference to four themes or 
factors of Ife-Modakeke society. First, people’s perception of their relationship with the other 
group. Second, perceptions of both groups concerning their current political status within the 
modern State. Third, how the Ife and the Modakeke views the conflict and dispute prevention 
and resolution processes functioning in their society. Fourth, how the Ife-Modakeke perceive 
State intervention in their conflict and dispute resolution. The four themes are important 
considering that the thesis was geared toward cultural understanding of the two groups studied 
                                                             
46S. Kvale., (1996) Op cit. p. 95 
47See Discussions of the History of Nigeria in T. Falola & A. Genova., Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. Historical Dictionaries of Africa. 
No.111 (The Scarecrow Press Inc. UK, 2009) p. Xxxiv 
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and how financial and political separation can be archived to resolve their conflict. Thus, 
speaking with the people to get their current perceptions regarding political autonomy and 
internal self-determination for the groups was essential. Although, data collection can take 
various forms,48it was more appropriate to get the people’s views by going out to talk to 
them.49 It is generally agreed that law does not operate in a vacuum but within the 
society.50The fieldwork was aimed to discover any discrepancy in doctrinal textual 
information and the actual practices of the Ife-Modakeke with regards to their conflict and 
dispute resolution. 
Having decided on the advantages of the fieldwork, the next stage of the interviewing process 
was followed. This stage involved the designing of the interview as described below. 
2.5.2.2 Stage 2: The Design Stage 
Vaus stated the function of a research design in qualitative study in these words: “The function 
of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial 
question as unambiguously as possible.”51  
To ensure that the data from the interviews provided answers to the research questions, this 
stage of the fieldwork involved determining the method of conducting the interview, planning 
how to recruit suitable52 participants for the interview, deciding on the sample size, drafting 
the interview questions, carrying out risk assessment of the possible participants in the 
interviews, obtaining ethics approval from the University of Westminster, and the 
procurement of travel insurance. Yin had stated that the case study design is more suitable for 
studying complex social phenomena in real life context.53This research made use of the case 
study design to collect data to answer the research questions. This was the most appropriate 
design as the research was focused on understanding the Ife-Modakeke conflict and dispute 
resolution as groups in a modern State system. Although the research questions included the 
pre-colonial and colonial history of the Ife-Modakeke political status, the longitudinal 
research design was not used as it did not involve collection of information from the 
                                                             
48T. Webley., ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in P. Cane, & H. Kritzer., (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Empirical 
Legal Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 926-951[928] 
49Speaking with the people face-face was more appropriate in this study. See reasons in interview methods in this chapter 
50J. Getman., ‘Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research’ Journal of Legal Education vol .35, 1985. p. 489 
51D. De Vaux., Research Design in Social Research (London: Sage, 2001) p. 8 
52Suitable participants are those in positions to provide answers to questions that will assist in achieving the purpose of the interview.  
53R. Yin., Case Study research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2003) p. 2 
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participants over a period of time.54 This was not the case with the history questions presented 
to the participants in this study, information on history were collected at the same time from 
the stories handed down orally to participants. The detailed description of the design process 
is provided below.  
The Interview Method 
In this study, the planned method for the interview was the use of face-to face semi-structured 
interviews.  Admittedly, there are other methods of collecting data from participants made 
possible by advancing technology such as through emails and telephone interviews. Webley 
noted that “data can take a number of forms.”55 Emails and telephone sources of data are even 
considered56better suited for dangerous or politically sensitive environments such as the case 
of the Ife and the Modakeke. They also tend to save the cost of travelling and maintain the 
anonymity of researchers.57 However, Bryman noted an important benefit of choosing a face-
to face interview to other methods, which is that termination of a face-to-face interviews are 
much easier than other methods as one tends to get enough cues from body language and tone 
of voice.58 Termination at the right time arguably helps to maintain participant’s consent and 
avoids distressing the participants. Avoiding needless stress on the participants was very 
essential to the Ife and the Modakeke as the interviews bordered on sensitive subjects- 
“conflicts” and “disputes” which have undoubtedly caused pain and claimed the lives of many 
of loved ones from both groups. In the two last decades alone, there had been reportedly over 
2000 deaths as a result of the Ife-Modakeke conflict.59 Another reason for deciding to use the 
face-to face interviews was the consideration for the financial status of many of the proposed 
participants,60 making it likely that many of the participants were unlikely and unwilling to 
have telephones or electronic devices for such a purpose due to the high cost of such 
endeavours. Although, Howard and Garland stated that globally in 2014, over a billion people 
                                                             
54The detailed discussion of the different research design and the criteria for a choice of design can be found in D. De Vaus., (2001) Ibid 
55T. Webley., (2010) Ibid. p. 928 
56For a detailed discussion on the use of Emails and Telephone Interviews see R. Opdenakker., ‘Qualitative Social Research Advantages 
and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research’ Forum vol. 7. no. 4. Article 11 September, 2006. Online: 
Http://Www.Qualitative-Research.Net/Index.Php/Tqs/Articles/View/175/391. Accessed 1.09.16 
57R. Bampton & C.J Cowton., ‘The E-Interview [27 Paragraphs]’ Forum: Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research. 
Online Journal vol. 3 no.2 Article 9, May 2002, Paragraph 25. Online:Http://Www.Qualitative-Research.Net/Fqs-Texte/2-02/2-
02bamptoncowton-E.Htm. Accessed 1.09.16 
58A. Bryman., Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 112  
59N. Ogbara., (2002) Hope Betrayed? A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria (World Organisation Against Torture 
(Omct) and Centre for Law Enforcement Education, 2002) p .43 
60See ‘Unicef Nigeria’ Online: Http://Www.Unicef.Org/Wcaro/Countries_1320.Html. Accessed. 01.09.16  
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accessed the internet,61 the 2006 United Nations Human Development Index noted that in 
2006, 70.8% of the Nigerian Population was living on less than $1 a day.62  The poverty 
situation was at a record high in 2012 when BBC News reported that more than 60% of 
Nigerians live on less than $1 a day.63 True to Bryman’s words “people who do not own or 
who are not contactable by telephone obviously cannot be interviewed by telephone.”64  In 
addition, the lack of ready access to computers and email facilities to all Nigerians as a result 
of the almost non-existent electricity65makes it highly impractical to carry out interviews on 
the telephone or by email with the Ife-Modakeke. 
Another type of interview that this researcher considered during the design stage was group 
interviews. The value of group interviews was highlighted by Blumer in these words:  
“A small number of individuals, brought together as a discussion or resource group, 
is more valuable many times over than any representative sample...such a group will 
do more to lift the veils covering the sphere of life than any other device...”66 
In recognition of the value of group interviews, the researcher considered using group 
interviews to offer additional data but decided against it. Some University of Ife staff advised 
the researcher against group interviews because when groups are seen gathered in such a way, 
it might create   suspicion that one community is beginning discussions on resuming the 
conflict among locals. An alternative would have been conducting the interviews at the 
university that is a safer environment for group interviews. However, it was not possible in 
the University of Ife, which was the safest environment, because of the time required to 
process permission from that University, as well as the fact that the University was on holiday 
at the time of the scheduled interviews rendering it difficult to get people to participate in the 
interviews.  
Having chosen the face-to-face interview method, tape recording was the proposed choice of 
recording and storing of information from participants because tape recording ensures more 
                                                             
61M.O Howard & E.I Garland., ‘Social Work Research: 2044’ Journal of the Society for Social Work Research (The University of Chicago 
Press on Behalf of the Society for Social Work and Research) vol. 6. no. 2., 2015 p. 173-200 [176] 
62 Ibid. fn. 60 
63BBC News: ‘Nigerians Living in Poverty Rise to Nearly 61%. 13 February, 2012’ Online:  Http://Www.Bbc.Co.Uk/News/World-Africa-
17015873. 
64A. Bryman., (2001) Ibid. p.112 
65The Vanguard News reported that only 25% of Nigerians had access to electricity in 2013. See Vanguard News: ‘Nigeria’s Electricity 
Situation a Nightmare-Federal Government’ 6 June, 2013. Accessed 1.09.16 
66Blumer, H., (1969) Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. p. 41 
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accurate information than writing notes.67 Importantly, according to Bryman, tape-recording 
interviews allows the public to scrutinize the interviews.68 In addition, tape recording helps in 
avoiding respondents’ answers being distorted and thereby introducing errors.  The 
researcher’s choice of tape recorded interviews was also predicated on the general findings 
that a large amount of data are lost in written interviews and that tape recorded interviews 
eliminate a large source of bias by removing the conscious and unconscious selection of what 
to write down on the part of the researcher.69 However, the researcher also noted  that there 
had been general findings to the effect that tape-recorded interviews increase the resistance to 
interviews and thus increasing the refusal rate.70 As will be discussed later in the interview 
analysis, the use of a tape recorder was discontinued after a few days of unsuccessful use and 
replaced by the use of extensive notes, writing down respondents’ words as exactly as possible 
to reduce the likelihood of errors being introduced into the work. Although, note taking proved 
to be advantageous for getting participants to take part in the whole interview, the researcher 
knew that it reduced her freedom of involvement in the interview situation due to the level of 
concentration required in note taking. As noted by Laslett and Rapoport, such extensive note 
taking makes the researcher miss non-verbal signs provided by the participants.71The 
researcher does not rule-out the possibility that she missed some of the non-verbal answers 
given by the participants.   
 Sampling/Recruiting Participants 
In this study, the  relevant options in recruiting participants were considered because sampling 
involves recruiting participants.72 Onwuegbuzie and Leech stated that: “…sampling should 
be a consideration in all qualitative inquiries, regardless of purpose of research.”73 The 
random sampling technique which is ideal with generalizing about the population74 was not 
                                                             
67R.  Opdenakker., ‘Qualitative Social Research Advantages and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research’ 
Forum vol. 7. no. 4. Articles 11 September, 2006 Online: Http://Www.Qualitative-Research.Net/Index.Php/Tqs/Articles/View/175/391. 
Accessed 1.09.16 
68A. Bryman., (2001) Op cit.  p. 318  
69See for example Rubucher and Fritz Arguments in Q. Rubucher & C.E Fritz., ‘Tape Records Interviews in Social Research’ American 
Sociological Review vol. 2. no. 3, 1956, p. 359-364. 
70B. Laslett & R. Rapoport., ‘Collaborative Interviewing and Interactive Research’ Journal of Marriage and Family (Special Section: 
Macrosociology of the Family, National Council on Family Relations) vol. 37. no. 4, 1975, p. 968-977[ 970] 
71B. Laslett & R. Rapoport., (1975) Ibid. p. 972 
72Kath Likened It to Snowball That Increases as They Slid Down Hill. See B. Kath., ‘Snowball Sampling: Using Social Networks to Reach 
Non-Heterosexual Women’ International Journal of Research Methodology vol. 8. no. 1, 2005  
73A. Onwuegbuzie & N.L Leech., ‘A Call for Qualitative Power Analysis’ Quality and Quantity vol. 41, 2007, p. 105-121[106] 
74F.L. Leeuw & H. Schmeets., Empirical Legal Research: A Guide Book for Lawyers, Legislators and Regulators (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., 2016) p. 110 
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appropriate for the research. Rather, three types of non-random sampling techniques were 
adopted in the research namely: the maximum variation sampling; snowballing; and the 
random purposeful sampling. According to Leeuw and Schmeets, if the purpose of the 
research is: 
“to obtain insights into a phenomenon, individuals, or events, then the researcher 
purposefully selects individuals, groups, and settings that maximize understanding of 
the phenomenon.”75 
From the statement above, it is evident that the perception of the people on their social 
relationship with each other and their political status in Nigeria had to be considered in 
order.to understand the impact of separation of the groups by the modern State so as to resolve 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Also, consideration had to be given to recruiting participants that 
could provide rich information. Patton76 encouraged the selecting of people that are 
information rich when deciding on the sampling technique.  
In order to get participants with rich information on the conflict and dispute resolution, the 
maximum sampling technique was adopted, involving selection of different individuals to 
demonstrate the true nature of complexity of the Ife and the Modakeke communities.  
The maximum variation sampling technique assisted the researcher in selecting a wide range 
of participants to cover different research themes. According to Elisberg and Heisel, the 
maximum variation sampling approach helps to identify common patterns77 across the main 
themes of the research.78 This helped in recruiting participants to cover different ages, 
educational background, sexes, and experiences in dispute resolution. The importance of 
using maximum variation sampling was captured by the work of Allmark who noted, “groups 
excluded from qualitative research maybe deprived of its benefits.” Allmark’s statement is of 
particular importance to this study, because the research aim was to advise the Nigerian 
government to amend the Constitution to allow for separation of the groups in Nigeria. In 
order to present a convincing argument to the government, the evidence must capture the 
diversity of the population of the Ife and the Modakeke.  The importance of capturing the 
diversity of the population was made by the department of Health in 2001 that “it is 
                                                             
75F.L Leeuw & H. Schmeets., (2016) Ibid. p. 111 
76M.Q Patton., Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (2nd edition Newbury Park. Ca: Sage, 1990) p. 169 
77Patterns here refers to repeated themes 
78M. Elisberg & L. Heisel., Researching Violence Against Women: A Practical Guide for Researchers and Activists (Washington Dc. United 
States World Health Organization, 2005) p.106  
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particularly important that the body of research evidence available to policy makers reflects 
the diversity of the population.”79  
In order to represent the diversity of the Ife-Modakeke population, participants were selected 
for interviews from several areas of both the Ife and the Modakeke township. Areas here mean 
a number of streets grouped together under one named locality. The researcher’s contact who 
works in Modakeke town but is not a native of Ife or Modakeke, and had lived among the Ife 
and Modakeke for decades, provided a list of Ife and Modakeke main residential areas. The 
researcher compared this to an updated online map of both communities and discovered that 
the Ife-North and South Local Government areas where outside the Ife and Modakeke 
township. However, Ife-Central and Ife-East where within the boundaries of the township in 
which it was safer to conduct the interviews. The researcher randomly picked participants 
from the Ife-Central and the Ife-East Local Government areas. The Modakeke such as Gbogan 
dominated some nearby Ife neighbours, these were identified but they were not targeted for 
the interviews. Although there were several areas dominated by the Ife and the Modakeke, 
only ten areas for each group was selected. The table below shows ten areas of the Ife and the 
Modakeke respectively where the interviews took place.  
 
S/N Ile-Ife Main Areas 










1 Aba Coker 3 Ade Owo 4 
2 Ashipa/Akinlalu 8 Aranse Olukoola 4 
3 Edunabon 6 Akarabata 5 
4 Eleyele  8 Alapata 5 
5 Ilare 8 Bosa 3 
6 Iremo 2 Esuyare 5 
7 Ipetumodu/Yakoyo 4 Iraye 4 
8 More 4 Oke ola 5 
9 O.A.U 5 Oke Otubu 4 
10 Oyere 7 Oke D.O 3 
                                                             
79Quote from the Department of Health: Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care London in P. Allmark., ‘Should 
Research Samples Reflect the Diversity of the Population?’ Journal of Medical Ethics vol. 30. no. 2., 2001, p. 185-189 [189] 
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S/N Ile-Ife Main Areas 










Total  55  42 
Table 3 Ife-Modakeke Sample Areas 
 
Ten areas were selected among the Ife and ten among the Modakeke. Random houses were 
selected from the streets in each of the ten areas of the Ife and the Modakeke selected. In the 
table above, the areas with a larger concentration of streets were mostly selected. The 
researcher could not have unconsciously influenced the selection, because she was not 
familiar with the Ife or the Modakeke and had never visited the areas before. Due to time 
constraints and the safety considerations of the researcher, the intended total number of 
interviews for both groups was 120 participants 60 from each group. This number is a very 
small fraction of the Ife and the Modakeke compared to the actual size of the groups.80 
Therefore, the sample within the selected areas was in a ratio of 6:1: in other words, six streets 
in every selected area. The researcher was unable to determine beforehand how many streets 
were in an area, thus, there was a backup plan to extend to other areas if the 60 interviews 
were not covered in the ten areas selected for the Ife interviews. It was hoped that there would 
be at least one participant from every street totalling six participants from an area. The reality 
was different, some areas such as Iremo and Aba Coker in the Ife had fewer streets five and 
six respectively therefore the ratio 6:1 was not followed in all areas. Some areas had more 
than six interviews while other areas had fewer than six.  
The second sampling technique used was snowball, which according to Cohen and Arieli:  
“is a distinct method of convenience sampling...commonly used to locate, access, and 
involve people from specific populations in cases where the researcher anticipates 
difficulties in creating a representative sample of the research population.”81 
Since this research was conducted in conflict prone society, the researcher considered 
allowing the community leaders alone to recruit those whom they know will not be 
psychologically affected by the interview. However, this was decided against because of the 
                                                             
80The Ife number over 600,000 and the Modakeke over 300,000. 
81N. Cohen & T. Arieli., ‘Field Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological Challenges and Snowball Sampling’ Journal of Peace 
Research vol. 48. no. 4, 2011 p. 423-435 [426] 
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difficulty in getting community leader’s co-operation due to their acclaimed busy schedule. 
As well as, the bias the researcher believes it might introduce into the research work when a 
community leader recruit people who have the same stand on matters as himself, thereby 
restricting the interviews to a single set of ideas. Kaplan, Korf and Sterk82 have agreed that 
such method of recruiting participants through snowballing can lead to bias. In addition, 
Brace-Govan argues that those recruited by snowball sample, may feel under compulsion and 
pressured to participate.83   However Jacobsen and Laudau84 has recorded for the benefit of 
researchers their high rate of success in using snowballing sample to overcome the challenges 
of recruiting interview participants that are distrustful of interviewers. Such distrust usually 
stems from conflict societies such as the Ife-Modakeke. Cohen and Arieli noted that: 
“...in an environment affected by conflicts, all parts of society, including ‘normative’ 
sectors, can be highly suspicious of outsiders and express a preference to refrain from 
exposure.”85 
Therefore, in order to get those who have served in peace committees involved in the study, 
the snowballing technique was used in respect of these interviews. Kalton and Anderson had 
stated that to sample rare population, members of the general population could identify 
members of the rare population.86 
People who had served in Peace Committees set up by the government and foreign interveners 
such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Office of 
Transition Initiative (OTI) between 1999 and 2000 were targeted for interview because they 
are usually knowledgeable in the various processes of dispute resolution (including the 
success and failures of the resolution methods) both tribal processes and modern resolutions 
that they have witnessed being adopted to resolve disputes. Therefore, to search for people 
who had served in peace committees in the past, the researcher used screening questions to 
ask participants in the general population whether they had served in any committees before 
and to tell the researcher about others they know that have served before. The only two 
                                                             
82C. Kaplan, D. Korf & C. Sterk., ‘Temporal and Social Contexts of Heroin-Using Populations: An Illustration of the Snowball Sampling 
Technique’ Journal of Mental and Nervous Disorders vol. 175. no. 9, 1987 p. 566-574 
83J. Brace-Govan., ‘Issues with Snowball Sampling: The Lawyer, The Model and Ethics’ Qualitative Research Journal vol. 4. no. 1, 2004, 
p. 52-60 [52] 
84K. Jacobsen & L.B Landau., ‘The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and Ethical Considerations in Social 
Science’ Research on Forced Migration Disasters vol. 27. no. 3, 2003, p 185-206 [199] 
85N. Cohen & T. Arieli., (2011) Ibid. p. 425 
86G. Kalton & D.W Anderson., ’Sampling Rare Populations’ Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) vol. 149. no. 1, 
1986, p. 65-82 [66] 
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members of the Modakeke representatives of the Peace Committees that were interviewed 
were recruited by snowballing. The first member actually called the other member on the 
telephone, requesting that the researcher be granted audience. He was reluctant, at first, but 
later agreed after much persuasion from the first member. Although it is generally agreed that 
the snowballing method may lead to bias, it was the only possible way at the time to get to 
speak with another committee member. 
The proposed ages of the interviewees were from 18-30 years, 31-60 years and 61 and above. 
The three ranges were coded 1-3, with 1 representing 16-30 years of age, 2 representing 31-
60 years of age, and 3 representing 61-years of age. These codes appear in the appendix of 
this thesis under the Ife and Modakeke coding. Below is a table representing the age range 
used. 
Age Brackets 18-30 Years 31-60 Years 61 and Above 
Table 4 Age Range for Ife and Modakeke Combined 
 
The first range 18-30 gave the researcher an opportunity to hear the views of the conflict and 
dispute resolution by young people affected by the conflict either by having to stop school or 
losing members of their families in the last violent round of conflict in 2000. Also, the young 
people will inevitably determine the future of the conflict, whether to continue the conflict of 
their elders or to consider ways of ending the conflict. The second age range was more 
matured and had experienced more than one crisis in their respective areas thus, are able to 
give more information about the conflict resolution and the history of the groups as handed 
down to them. The third age range was aimed at getting more information on history in the 
conflict and dispute resolution of the groups, as they were older and had experienced more 
than two violent clashes.    
The sampling of the interview included uneducated87, semi-educated88 and highly educated89 
individuals in both the Ife and the Modakeke communities. The Ife has a long-established 
federal university open to all groups in Nigeria including the Modakeke.90The standard of 
                                                             
87Those who did not attain any formal level of education 
88Semi-Educated are classified as those who attain a level of education up to Secondary School level but did not attain any degree certificate. 
89Higher education represented those who went to University, Polytechnics or Colleges of education and acquired a degree. 
90The University of Ife formerly known as the Obafemi Awolowo University was founded in 1961. See the Encyclopaedia Britannica on 
Ile-Ife Nigeria. Online: Https://Www.Britannica.Com/Place/Ile-Ife 
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education of the interviewees was to ensure that the research recorded the views of educated 
people who might see things from a broader perspective. It also ensured balanced 
representation of the present Ife-Modakeke population. 
The third sampling approach carried out by the researcher was the random purposeful 
sampling.  This researcher chose random houses from the streets in the areas designated for 
the interviews because the number of households were very many in the selected areas, thus 
the random purposeful sampling helped to reduce the challenges of selecting participants from 
these areas.   
 Sample Size 
This study represents a very small sample of the Ife-Modakeke. In total 97 participants were 
interviewed and only 92 could be analysed in comparison to the approximately 600,000+ 
inhabitants in the Ife and the Modakeke combined. The study cannot be used to represent the 
whole Ife-Modakeke; however, it gives a broad insight into the minds of the people. The 
planned number of interviews for the Ife and the Modakeke was 60-64 respectively for a 
combined 120 interviews. Some academics have given guidelines for deciding on sample 
sizes. Creswell recommended between 15-20 interviews for grounded theory research.91 
Morse on the other hand recommended 30-50 interviews for ethnographic and grounded 
theory research.92 These recommendations are only guidelines but the ultimate size will 
depend on other factors such as cost, time and the sensitive nature of the interviews. The table 
below shows the planned sample size and the actual samples that the researcher could analyse 
from the interviews,  
Age 18-30 31-60 61 and Above Totals 
Male 10 40 10 =60 
Female 10 40 10 =60 
Total 20 80 20 =120 
Table 5 Proposed Sample Grid for Each Group (the Ife and the Modakeke) 
*The number includes both committee and non-committee members. 
                                                             
91J.W Creswell., Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research (Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Pearson Education, 2002) p. 197 
92J.M Morse., Designing Funded Qualitative Research in N.K Denzin & Y.S Lincoln., (Eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand 
Oaks. Ca: Sage, 1994) p. 220-235  
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It should be noted that the proposed number of participants to be sample between the ages of   
31-60 is higher because they represent the largest number of people in the sample are.93 
Age 18-30 31-60 61 and above Total 
Male 3 16 5 =24 
Female 4 16 6 =26 
Total 7 32 11 +50 
Table 6 Sample Grid Analysed in the Ife 
 
Age 19-30 31-60 61 and above Total 
Male 4 15 3 =23 
Female 3 13 4 =19 
Total 7 28 7 =42 
Table 7 Sample Grid Analysed in the Modakeke 
The proposed sample grid assisted the researcher to ensure that diverse groups are represented 
in the interview. The actual samples collected revealed that the researcher’s sample size was 
not achieved but it was close enough to produce results for analysis. The Ife sample size 
achieved was more than the Modakeke, because the safety of the researcher was compromised 
in the Modakeke and the researcher had to discontinue the Modakeke interviews and return 
to the United Kingdom.94 
After determining the sample size, the interview questions were drafted and checked to make 
sure they are able to provide data that will answer the research questions. 
The Interview Questions 
The research questions assisted in the formulation of the interview questions. The interview 
questions tried to cover all the major aspects of the research questions. The themes derived 
from the doctrinal and archival research carried out prior to the fieldwork were used as a guide 
to formulating the research questions. The use of themes from the doctrinal research was 
                                                             
93The National Population Census 2006 by age have a combined total of ages 20-29 = 25,646505, Ages 30-59 = 34,342522 and Ages 60+ = 
6, 98704. See Census 2006 Online: Http://Www.Population.Gov.Ng/Images/Priority%20table%20vol%204.Pdf. 




aimed at preventing the researchers’ educational background in law to colour her choice of 
interview questions thereby creating bias.  Table 8 is the format of the interview questions. 
 
Broad Areas covered by the interviews 
Introductory Questions/Settling Questions 
Social structure of the community 
Political history of the community 
Personal dispute resolution preferences 
Past community dispute resolution 
Nature of the conflict  
Group’s perception of their relationship with the modern State 
Group’s preference of dispute resolution process: State initiated versus traditional dispute 
resolution 
Effects of the conflict and dispute resolution on the groups 
Table 8 Broad Areas Covered by the Interview 
As seen from the table above, the interview questions were divided into nine headings with 
an estimate of forty-minutes to one-hour for each interview. The nine headings covered 
different types of questions structured after Patton’s95 types of interview questions namely, 
background/demographic questions, experience/behavioural questions, opinion/value 
questions and the knowledge questions.96 The background questions were intended to help 
calm the nerves of both the interviewees and the interviewer.97 The experience/behavioural 
questions enabled the researcher to analyse the personal behavioural preferences of 
participants in relation to their answers of the group conflict behaviour and resolution 
preferences. This is important as participants have been observed to respond in a socially 
                                                             
95Although Patton discussed six types of interview questions that can be used in Qualitative Research this research applied 4 of the most 
appropriate questions. See M.Q Patton., Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (2nd edition Newbery Park. Ca. Sage, 1990)  
96Appendix 6 of this thesis provides a sample of the interview questions divided into various types of question to correspond with four of 
the types of questions identified by addressed Patton in his book on qualitative research methods.  
97The background questions did very little to calm the interviewer during the interviews 
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desirable way and not truly how they felt, because, of the interpersonal nature of interviews.98 
The third type of interview questions, the opinions/values questioning, assisted in analysing 
how participants’ opinions relate to the realities of the times in which they are living. The 
final type of questions used was the knowledge questions. This assisted the researcher in 
determining participants believe on the true involvement of the government in their conflict 
and conflict resolution and what they believed to be the real solution to their conflict.  
The research questions and risk assessment carried out for the fieldwork were discussed and 
approved by the three research supervisors. Details of the research questions and risk 
assessment carried out to ensure that the questions were not too sensitive to elicit negative or 
even violent reactions from the participants are provided for in appendix 6 of the thesis.  
Risk Assessment 
Prior to any research of this nature being conducted, potential hazards, which may have caused 
harm or distress to the participants, either psychological or physical, were taken into 
consideration. A copy of the risk assessment carried out prior to the interview can be found 
in appendix 2 towards the end of the thesis document. In the risk assessment, the criteria and 
monitoring mechanisms were set out for deciding the end at which the researcher might 
consider termination of the interview due to unjustifiable further risk of harm such as distress 
to the participants or safety risk to the researcher and interpreter. The extent to which risks 
were balanced against potential benefits of the study’s contribution to knowledge was also 
taken into consideration. The control measures for security risk included inquiring of any 
festival periods so that they could be avoided. Prior to travelling for the interviews, the 
researcher was reliably informed that there were no festive periods at the proposed time of 
visit. However, she was not aware of any local elections scheduled for the time and what risk 
that could entail. Extra caution was then taken while conducting the interviews.  
The balance of risk although judged as low prior to the visit, changed to medium because of 
an incident in the Modakeke palace that increased the risk to the researcher. On the third day 
of the final week of the interviews, while acting on the arrangements for interview made by 
the researcher’s contact to conduct interviews among palace chiefs in the palace of the 
Ogunsua of Modakeke, the researcher and her interpreter called on the Modakeke palace. On 
arrival, the researcher explained to the palace guards her reason for coming. The guards 
                                                             
98R.K Yin., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th edition Thousand Oaks Ca: Sage, 2009) 
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instructed her to wait outside because there was a meeting of politicians taking place inside 
the palace and after the meeting, the chiefs will be happy to participate. After about two hours 
of waiting on a bench provided at the gate of the palace, the palace guards brought news of 
another unscheduled local government election campaign meeting and reported that neither 
the palace chiefs nor the Ogunsua could see the researcher until 3pm. An arrangement was 
made to see the Ogunsua at 3pm and the researcher went away to conduct interviews 
elsewhere in the Modakeke. On the second visit at 3pm, the guards started behaving very 
strangely. They would not speak English anymore to the researcher and asked the researcher’s 
interpreter in the Yoruba language if she was from the Modakeke or from the Ife. She replied 
that she was an indigene. They requested the researcher’s place of origin but due to security 
reasons she declined to specify which university she was representing but repeated that she 
was a Nigerian researching conflict resolution. After waiting for another twenty minutes, the 
researcher was asked to go into the palace to see the king alone without the interpreter. That 
request was refused for safety reasons as the researcher insisted on taking her interpreter but 
the guards refused her request. The researcher had been earlier cautioned that during election 
periods and traditional festivals, strangers are sacrificed to the gods. Since the guards had 
prior knowledge of the researcher’s visit as they scheduled the 3pm visit but still spent a 
considerable amount of time deliberating on the visit, the researcher refused to go in without 
her interpreter. The researcher then made the decision not to conduct interviews in the Palace 
of the Ogunsua and left the environment. The researcher did not deem the circumstances safe. 
The following day after the incident at the Palace, the researcher was conducting interviews 
in the Modakeke and two participants stated that there is news going around that the 
government had sent someone asking around about Modakeke conflict. The researcher thus 
believing her safety might be compromised from that time onwards decided to terminate the 
process and return to the United Kingdom. 
Ethics Clearance 
Another major factor that influenced the design of the interviews was the ethical issues 
involved. In collecting and using materials for this study, the researcher analysed issues such 
as copyright, informed consent, confidentiality and ownership. Consent was received via 
email from the British Library to use Maps from the British library.99 Leeuw and Schmeets 
noted that researchers must “assess the participants’ willingness and ability to voluntarily 
                                                             
99 Email showing consent from British library for the use of maps can be found in appendix 4  
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consent to participation.”100 Arrangement was made to ensure that the consent of participants 
was obtained before any interviewing took place by having an interpreter in case of someone 
who did not understand English to read the participant information sheet and consent form.101 
The method of obtaining consent is described in the actual interviewing section below. 
Confidentiality was maintained throughout the interview by allocating pseudonym to each 
participant in the research writing. 
Ethical clearance was sought and granted by the University of Westminster ethics committee. 
A copy of the ethics clearance issued by the University of Westminster is in appendix 1 of 
this chapter. Also, the researcher obtained the consent of Google Maps to use Google My 
Maps through email.102 The researcher made sure that the guidelines set by the University in 
part B of the ethics clearance form was adhered to.103 The details of measures taken to prevent 
or reduce distress to the participants, psychologically or physically, in the study were taken 
into consideration. Safety measures that were taken included the researcher explaining to the 
participants that they could withdraw at any time without giving reason, explaining that 
participants did not have to answer questions if they did not wish to, ensuring that the 
participant information sheet was read, interpreted and understood by participants (with the 
help of interpreters) and their written consent given before proceeding with any interview. 
Travel Insurance  
Having obtained permissions from the ethics committee of the University of Westminster for 
the fieldwork,104 the need arose to obtain travel insurance, specifically insurance for kidnap 
and ransom. This was essential since there was, and still is, a high prevalence of kidnaps in 
Nigeria.105 In the foreign travel advice section on Nigeria found in the travel advice of the 
government of the United Kingdom website, it was noted that:  
                                                             
100L. Leeuw & H. Schmeets., Empirical Legal Research: A Guide Book for Lawyers, Legislators and Regulators (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd, 2016) p.155 
101 A sample of the participant information sheet, the consent form and the intellectual property form used can be found in appendix 7 
102 The email from google consenting to the use of google my maps can be found in appendix 5 
103See Ethics Clearance Form Part B in Appendix 2 
104See a copy of the Ethics approval in Appendix 4 to this study 
105Foreign Travel Advice: Nigeria: Online at Https://Www.Gov.Uk/Foreign-Travel-Advice/Nigeria/Safety-And-Security 
106 Foreign Travel Advice: Nigeria. Ibid 
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“[t]here is a high threat of kidnapping and other armed attacks.... British nationals of 
Nigerian origin visiting friends and relatives are often perceived as being wealthier 
than locals and are at particular risk of kidnap for ransom.”106 
The reality of the situation meant being very cautious in making sure that plans of the visit 
were kept secret only letting people involved in the fieldwork such as the interpreter aware of 
the date of arrival and departure of the Ife-Modakeke. The question that one might consider 
now is why undergo all the risk for the fieldwork? The balance of risk of causing another 
round of violence or distress to the participants due to the research was far lower than the 
knowledge that was derived from the fieldwork especially as the researcher was born and 
raised in Nigeria. After the necessary approvals were obtained, the researcher set out on her 
journey to the Ife-Modakeke in Nigeria. 
2.5.2.3 Stage 3: The Interviewing Stage 
To ensure that participants were willing and understood the purpose of the interview, the 
researcher had the participants read or was read to, the participant information sheet and the 
consent letter before obtaining their signatures or thumbprint.107The researcher also repeated 
the confidentiality clause at the beginning of each interview. The response from both the Ife 
and the Modakeke was very disappointing when tape recording requests were made. Many 
declined to be interviewed, if it was to be recorded despite repeated reassurance.  
Although, it was explained to the participants that the interview was for forty-minutes to one-
hour, the majority of the participants were too frightened to spend such a long time talking 
about the conflict as they said that their identity was known in town either as those who fought 
during the last conflict in 1999/2000 or those in support of the conflict continuing. Thus, a 
few said they could only give fifteen minutes to half-an-hour in some instances. There were 
instances where some participants were willing to start their interviews but later stopped half 
way or asked the researcher to hurry up, requiring the researcher to decide which were the 
most important areas to ask before the participants ended the interview. For example, in the 
interview transcript,108 it is clearly shown that interview four withdrew her consent after 
talking to her friends. Rather than reject those that agreed to give a small amount of time, the 
researcher chose to conduct the interviews choosing a few questions to meet with the wishes 
                                                             
 
107 A sample of the Participant information sheet, the consent form and the intellectual property form used is in Appendix 7 
108 The interview transcript is in a separate document to this thesis. 
35 
 
of the participants. However, after a few frustrated days and a review of the interview method 
with supervisors in England (through telephone and email), the researcher decided to only 
take notes and almost every participant from then on who consented to the interview was 
willing to start and finish the interviews.  In most cases the forty-minutes was not sufficient 
for the interviews, often interviews went up to 60-90 minutes.  The names and ages of the 
participants could not be confirmed. The researcher relied upon whatever name they asked to 
be called and the age they choose to provide. Some refused to provide their names choosing 
to be addressed by their children’s names for example “mama A” (mother of A). 
The body language of the participants revealed a lot about the mind-set of the participants in 
the groups. The Modakeke people, especially, were very frightened to talk about their conflict 
with the Ife and conflict resolution, they were however very assertive in stating that they were 
different from the Ife. They showed much fear and often requested that we step away from 
the public eye for the interview. This is so unusual for a Nigerian setting where people sit 
under a tree for cool breeze to talk. In three instances on the day the researcher terminated the 
interview process, she was warned not to come back to conduct interviews in the area because 
according to the participants, news had been going around that the government had sent a spy 
lady to see which tribe was still holding plans to resume the conflict. For safety reasons the 
researcher heeded all such warnings. 
To ensure privacy and anonymity, the interviews were numbered and each number coincided 
with the participant information sheet numbers.  For those that participated by tape, the nine-
theme topic guide was used with some having to be amended for brevity as the interviewees 
said they were only willing to give abbreviated interviews because of time. Quotes that appear 
in the findings are attributed with a code reference: interview ‘I’ and ‘M’ (letters I and M 
representing Ife and Modakeke respectively) followed by a number representing the number 
at which the interviews were transcribed. In addition, capital letters ‘M’ and ‘F’ represented 
males and females respectively. ‘Y’ (Young) represented 18-30-year olds, while ‘Ma’ 
represented 31-60 (Middle age) and A (Advanced) represented 61 and above.  For example, 
a reference to interview three, a Modakeke interview by a female within the age bracket 18-
30 is rendered: Interview MFYa 3. The use of the code references enables the speakers to be 
distinguished and it allows for confidentiality of the interviewee to be maintained without 
losing the context of the interview. 
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2.5.2.4 Stage 4: The Transcribing Stage 
Interviews were conducted with both the Ife and the Modakeke during June and July 2014. 
However, due to increased risk in the Modakeke, the interview process was cut short. The 
target of 120 interviews planned was not achieved. 97 interviews were conducted, 55 between 
the Ife and only forty-two among the Modakeke. Although in total 97 interviews were 
conducted, only a combined total of 92 were analysed because some of the tape-recorded 
interviews conducted were either inaudible (the volume of the tape recorder was not set 
properly by the researcher or the participants did not speak loudly enough in some periods of 
the recording) or the researcher did not find an interpreter as the interpreter who was engaged 
for the whole set of interviews was not available for one of the Ife interviews, so one Ife 
interview was not interpreted into English.  
The transcribing stage was the very difficult and the most time-consuming of all the 
interviewing stages. The denaturalized transcription approach where a researcher transcribing 
an interview “attempts a verbatim depiction of speech”109 but rather than focus on accents and 
involuntary vocalization, concern is focused on the substance of the interview meanings and 
perceptions created during the interview. The geo-ethnic accents of the interviewees such as 
pronouncing “wit dat” instead of “with that” and slang were sometimes corrected and 
sometimes left the same way because the purpose was not to transcribe accents. Although 
Oliver et al noted that during analysis of an interview, researchers can introduce bias by 
making assumptions of the interviewees’ educational level based on the accents and 
vocalizations,110 this research reduced such bias by asking questions of educational 
background in the settling questions. Thus, the educational background of the interviewees 
was already established before the main interview questions were answered and therefore the 
bias was prevented from entering into the analysis. 
Since the majority of the interviews conducted were done by note taking, the researcher had 
to spend time after each written interview to fill in the gaps from what was heard in that 
interview. Virtually all the nights were taken up in completing the writing of the interviews 
for each day to make sure that the shorthand was clear and readable for analysis. Some of the 
interviews were typed immediately while still in Nigeria and stored away, while other was 
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later typed out in London. Because, the majority of the interviews were written, it was a little 
bit easier to go through the audio interviews at a later date. It took about six-hours to transcribe 
one-hour of the oral interviews into written form. A few were not audible at some points and 
thus could not be fully transcribed. Then the tabulation and coding of the interviews for easy 
description and analysis was undertaken. For the coding, abbreviations were used to capture 
the responses of the participants such as “Y” for Yes, “N” for No, “DK” for I do not know, 
“NS” for Not Sure and “NA” for No answer. In order to respect the wishes of the participants 
and protect them from any distress during the interview, participants who did not want to 
answer a question was allowed to say “no answer.” The replies of those that answered no 
answer was not included in the total percentage calculated. 
2.5.2.5 Stage 5:  Analysing Stage  
The data from the interviews were analysed using four of the stages of data analysis promoted 
by Eisenhardt namely, within-case analysis, cross-case analysis, constant comparisons, and 
comparison of emergent concepts with ‘extant literature’.111  
The data from the interviews were analysed using themes that emerged from the archival 
materials and literature selected. This was possible because a broad range of literature and 
documents were consulted for both the historical aspect of the research and the international 
law aspect. The process of identifying themes was described by Epstein and Martin as 
coding.112 According to Epstein and Martin, coding “is the process of translating properties 
or attributes of the world (variables) into a form that is susceptible to systematic analysis.”113 
In order to carry out such systematic analysis, Bryman, included giving names to data in his 
definition of coding as the processes where “data are broken down into component parts, 
which are given names.”114 Names used for the coding included whether the groups were the 
same. The language the same; Pre-colonial history; colonial history; post-colonial history; 
tribe’s honour tradition; government intervention; conflict over and so on. The encyclopaedia 
for qualitative research methods noted that codes could be derived from existing literature or 
directly from the data collected.115 In this research, the codes used were derived from a 
                                                             
111K.M Eisenhardt., ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’ The Academy of Management Review vol. 14. no. 4, 1989, p. 532-550[ 
539-544] 
112L. Epstein & A. Martin., An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)  
113L. Epstein & A. Martin., (2014) Ibid. p.95 
114A. Bryman., Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 391 
115L.M Given., (Ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods (vol. 1&2. Sage: A Reference Publication, 2008) p. 86 
38 
 
combination of the themes arrived at before the interviews as well as new ones that emerged 
from the interview data.  
The first stage of the data analysis – initial coding – was undertaken by simply reading the 
interviews. Bryman stated that the researcher should first read through the initial set of notes 
without making any interpretations.116 During this stage of analysis, the researcher did not 
decide on the importance of the information, it was mainly identifying where they fit into a 
theme. This approach was used to identify patterns and theoretical properties in the data. Notes 
about significant remarks and observations were made before identifying connections 
between the codes. The initial patterns and observations were tabulated and named Ife coding 
combined (taped and notes) and Modakeke coding combined (tapes and notes). These can be 
found in Appendix 13 and 14 respectively.   
The second stage of analysis involved actually looking at the coded data from different 
viewpoints to find similarities and differences within the data. In the case of the Ife interviews, 
within case analysis was carried out by looking for similarities and differences between the 
Ife interviews. These included similarities and differences between the answers provided by 
the different age groups and sexes. This created connections that were useful for arriving at 
the conclusion in chapter 8. The importance of identifying connections was emphasized by 
Leeuw and Schmeets when they said that: 
“Examining relationships is the centrepiece of the analytic process because it urges 
the researcher to move from description of the people and settings to explorations and 
explanations of why things happened as they did”117 
The interviews were checked and rechecked to discover the repeating codes and concepts. 
The codes were placed into categories and the categories were compared across all the 
interview transcripts and the documents collected. The coded segments were compared by the 
use of questions such as how this text is similar to or different from the preceding interview 
text. What kinds of ideas are mentioned in both the interviews conducted and the documents 
collected. With this, the researcher was able to identify similarities, differences, and general 
patterns in all the data collected.118 Where the researcher discovered that new categories 
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emerged from a data source, the previous transcripts of the interviews and the documents 
gathered were re-analysed to determine their category. This helped to narrow down excess 
categories and complement underdeveloped categories. 
To capture the relationships between categories, Miles, Huberman and Saldana119 encouraged 
the use of a matrix which involves putting the relationships in a table with columns to enable 
cross-sectional analysis. They describe how to analyse data in the matrix by first having a 
quick scan of the columns in the matrix, identifying themes and patterns, comparing the 
themes and patterns, and understanding how the themes and patterns fit together within the 
case analyses and between case analyses.   
The Matrix system was used to make general comparisons of participants’ or interviewees’ 
backgrounds, comparing the responses of older age categories such as the answers given by 
age 60 plus interviewees with those given by younger age categories such as age 19-30 
interviewees. An example of in-case and cross-case analysis carried out is provided below.  
As earlier mentioned in the sub-heading sampling/recruiting participants, the interviews 
included males and females aimed at achieving balance to the interview as the perception of 
the people was easily discovered from both male and female experiences. To check whether 
there was consistency in the answers given, the researcher used in-case analysis and cross-
case analysis. In the in case-analysis, the answers provided by different sets of participants of 
the same group were compared and analysed. The cross-case analysis was a comparison 
between answers provided by Ife participants to those provided by the Modakeke participants. 
After several comparisons along the themes of the codes, the fourth stage of the research 
began: the comparison of the findings with extant literature and knowledge. The result of the 
comparisons is featured in different chapters of the thesis. 
2.5.2. Stage 6: 10 Validity and Reliability 
One method of testing the validity of the fieldwork is through comparisons of emerging 
concepts with “extant literature.”120 Eisenhardt recommended that questions such as, what is 
this finding similar to and why? What does this contradict? And so on, can help in comparing 
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the work with literature.121 This researcher compared the study with the published works of 
other academics on the study of dispute resolution in stateless societies, the history of the 
tribes, the effect of the modern State on the Ife-Modakeke conflicts and the methodology. 
Published works of academics such as Rouland,122 Roberts123, Evans-Pritchard124 where 
consulted for the study of dispute resolution in ancient and urban societies. The work of 
Johnson125and Akinjogbin126 on the history of the Yoruba, on State impact127 and Yin128 on 
methodology were compared with the findings of the research. The process described in 
existing literature was different from this study in that they did not focus on resolution of the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict. Also, this study contributes to knowledge by demonstrating that urban 
societies with ancient conflicts on autonomy and internal self-determination can achieve 
dispute resolution through political separation in a modern State system. 
Flick also noted that to test the validity of research, the information gathered must be genuine 
and not from unquestionable origin, with consent given and research ethics followed.129 The 
researcher made sure that ethics approval was given by the University of Westminster before 
embarking on the fieldwork, also there was participant information read to the participants 
and their consent given in form of signing the consent form or in a few cases thumb-printing 
the form. All signed participant observation and consent forms were kept safe in locked locker 
and are available for auditing.  
To ensure that the study is valid, Chambliss and Schutt noted that: “Data collection should 
not begin unless the researcher has a plan that others see as likely to produce useful 
knowledge”130 The researcher discussed all plans for the fieldwork including the going 
through the interview guide with her research supervisors before embarking on the fieldwork. 
The University of Westminster also scrutinized the risk assessment carried out by the 
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researcher before embarking on the fieldwork, weighing the risk to the benefit of knowledge 
to be derived from the fieldwork. 
According to Miles et al,131 for the research to be reliable, the research process must be 
consistent across researchers and their methods of investigation. This research method of 
investigation namely case study method comprising interviews is consistent with previous 
studies of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, legal 
anthropologists who had studied African societies such as the Ife and the Modakeke have 
done so by means of fieldwork where they ask questions and observe. Previous works on the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict have also used interviews for their study of the conflict.132  
2.5.2.7 Stage 7: The Reporting Stage 
The reporting of the fieldwork was done using grounded theory and discourse analysis. 
Charmaz defined grounded theory as “systematic guidelines for collecting and analysing data 
to build middle-range theoretical frameworks that explain the collected data.”133 Charmaz’s 
definition reveals a focus on building theory from data collected. Although this study had 
already identified themes, grounded theory method featured because the themes were not 
fixed, they were open to refinement by emerging themes. Eisenhardt noted that for grounded 
theory “[n]o construct is guaranteed a place in the resultant theory, no matter how well it is 
measured.”134In order to build theory from data collected, Oliver et al noted that grounded 
theory is concerned with perceptions rather than how it is communicated,135 therefore rather 
than focusing on how the interactions during the conversations are analysed, this research 
features the meanings and perceptions created during the interviews. In addition, Chambliss 
and Schutt noted that grounded theory is characterised by summarising the data into 
categories, refining the links between the categories and noting the evolving theory.136 Despite 
using the grounded theory the reporting style features discourse analysis. Webley’s 
explanation of discourse analysis includes conversation analysis which often focuses on the 
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language and repetitions in the conversation being studied.137 The research reporting in 
chapter eight is styled in a discussion manner using the language of the Ife and Modakeke 
people as much as possible in the quotations that are used to explain findings. Chambliss and 
Schutt noted that conversation analysis focuses on how the reality of the situation is 
understood in the conversation.138 Therefore, the findings reported in different chapters are 
reported with only as much detail as are relevant to the conversations they are featured. 
Illustrative quotes are used as evidence to support the themes that emerged from the interviews 
conducted.  
2.6 Researcher’s Standpoint 
The researcher is a native of Delta state in the South-South of Nigeria and do not speak the 
Yoruba or Oyo language. The researcher does not relate in any way (political, economic, 
religion) to the Modakeke or the Ife so takes a neutral stand in the Ife-Modakeke conflict.   
2.7 The Impact of the Fieldwork on the Doctrinal Study 
The doctrinal study was about exploring economic and political separation of the Ife and the 
Modakeke to end their long-standing conflict. Physical separation was not explored due to the 
nature of the land tenure in modern Nigeria. However, the possibility of economic and 
political separation through the notion of internal self-determination for the Modakeke by 
manes of a Modakeke local government was explored. Since group autonomy was the 
underlining message to the government of Nigeria, it was only necessary to get evidence from 
the people themselves in the conflict. The oral interviews thus provided contemporary 
perspectives of the people on their pre-colonial, colonial and modern conflict position and 
possible dispute resolution. The fieldwork therefore complements the gaps of the documents 
by providing evidence of the benefits and disadvantages of not separating the groups.  
The fieldwork greatly impacted on the research questions and the conclusions arrived at in 
this thesis. The preparatory work for the fieldwork impacted on the research ethics by 
increasing the researcher’s consciousness of following approved ethical standards both in 
carrying out the interviews and in writing out the observations. The consent of the participants 
and waiver of the intellectual property rights of participants was impressed on the researcher 
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while preparing for the interviews. The research questions for the thesis were amended 
slightly to accommodate findings from the fieldwork and the ethics of the research. For 
example, before the fieldwork, the emphasis of the research question was on identifying the 
perception of the Ife-Modakeke on the right of the Modakeke to self-determination from the 
Ife and the modern State intervention in their conflicts to determine why the conflicts keep 
reoccurring. The researcher, however, discovered during the fieldwork that rather than just 
expressing their views of autonomy, the people were more concerned about resolving the 
conflicts. Thus, the research questions were amended to include resolution of the conflicts by 
separation.   
The fieldwork introduced views of the Ife-Modakeke on issues that had not been covered by 
the literature. Among those issues are matters of Modakeke quest for autonomy from the Ife 
stronger perception than the Ifes. While Ife had more attachment to land as the cause of the 
conflict, the Modakeke was more for local government of their area and also perceived 
autonomy of the groups. For example, only from the fieldwork could the researcher determine 
the people’s perception of their political status in relation to the modern State. The fieldwork 
thus established that the Ife-Modakeke retained their local norms even though recognising the 
authority of the Nigerian State over them. This discovery confirmed the analysis in chapter 
six, which deals with autonomy and self-determination for the Modakeke. The chapter 
emphasised what perspective of autonomy and self-determination was more suitable to 
persuade the Nigerian State to grant self-determination to the Modakeke from the Ife. 
Importantly also, the fieldwork puts the results of the interviews in line with some prior 
works139 on group dispute resolution which incorporated fieldwork in their study of societies 
in Africa as discussed in chapter three. 
2.7.1 Summary 
This section has provided the methodology for fieldwork carried out among the Ife and the 
Modakeke in Nigeria.  It has attempted to describe the fieldwork carried out and justification 
for it, the method of analysing the findings and validity of the fieldwork. The fieldwork has 
contributed to make the whole thesis a substantial contribution to knowledge in the field of 
group conflict and dispute resolution.  
                                                             




This chapter have provided the details of the research methodology used in answering the 
research questions posed in chapter one of the thesis. The four sections of this chapter have 
described, with justifications, the use of triangulation for gathering information for the 
research. The case study method involving document analysis, archival research and oral 
interviews was used to answer the five research sub-question. The first question on the pre-
colonial structure of the Ife-Modakeke was answered with the aid of information from the 
document analysis and oral interviews. The second research question was answered using the 
document analysis and archival materials preserved by the colonial administration in Nigeria. 
The third, fourth and fifth research sub-questions were answered by means of document 
analysis both doctrinal and non-doctrinal analysis. 
The methodology has helped the researcher to constantly reflect on the materials being 
gathered and how they were being analysed by the researcher for valid conclusions to be 
drawn. It is hoped that this will provide other researchers and readers of this thesis with a 
basis to understand and access for themselves the validity of the arguments put forward in the 
preceding chapters.   
The next chapter examines the anthropology of dispute resolution in primitive and urban 
societies and the pre-colonial social, economic and political structure of the Ife-Modakeke. 
The next chapter attempts to answer the first research sub-question by analysing published 
sources and the oral history of the people on their social, economic and political structure.
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THE PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE 
IFE AND THE MODAKEKE AND THE IDEA OF SEPARATION 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will analyse the social, economic and political history of the Ife and the 
Modakeke as part of the wider Yoruba group in Nigeria. The analysis in this chapter will seek 
to answer the first research sub-question: “to what extent does the pre-colonial social, 
economic and political structure of societies such as the Ife and the Modakeke demonstrate 
that separation was useful or not for conflict prevention and resolution? And further how 
successful was separation in preventing and managing the Ife-Modakeke conflict in pre-
colonial times?” 
To answer this question, it is necessary to first identify the social, economic and political 
structure of the Ife and the Modakeke as part of the larger Yoruba group in Nigeria. Having 
identified the social, economic and political structure of the groups, the next step is to 
determine whether these structures demonstrate separation as a useful tool for conflict 
prevention and resolution in pre-colonial Ife-Modakeke history. As background, it is also 
necessary to analyse the origin of the Ife and the Modakeke in West Africa and the root causes 
of the pre-colonial Ife-Modakeke conflict that necessitated a consideration of past separation 
attempts at resolution and, by extension, determine whether separation is relevant and 
applicable to the resolution of the modern Ife-Modakeke conflict as proposed in this research.  
The justification for this chapter is the need to lay the foundation for readers to understand 
the Ife-Modakeke people and the effect of their social norms in their conflict. This chapter 
argues that the Ife and the Modakeke are part of the Yoruba group in West Africa and that 
although they had close cultural and economic ties, they enjoyed political and judicial 
autonomy and self-determination from each other as Yoruba sub-groups. It also shows that 
pre-colonial dispute resolution of the Ife-Modakeke was highly dependent on hierarchical 
authority and as such, physical separation was possible at the request of the highest authority 
of the land. However, the loss of support from the various checks and balances existing within 
the authority, led to an unsuccessful resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial 
times. By means of evidence from the history of the Ife-Modakeke conflict and dispute 
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resolution, this chapter lays the foundation for advising the government of Nigeria to grant 
the Modakeke economic and political self-determination from the Ife. 
 
3.2 Background: The Origin of the Ife and the Modakeke as Part of the Yoruba of West 
Africa and Nigeria, the Causes of Their Pre-colonial Conflict and Separation Attempts 
at Resolution 
With respect to the origin of the Ife and the Modakeke, this thesis analyses the Ife and the 
Modakeke as part of the broader Yoruba group in Nigeria as they are each highly influenced 
by the Yoruba civilisation which is the result of their origins and cultural ties. 
3.2.1 The Yoruba of West Africa 
The Yoruba are very prominent in the history of West Africa. In fact, Falola and Genova 
rightly noted that “there is perhaps no other single African people who have commanded so 
much attention as the Yoruba.”1 They can be found in West Africa with the greatest number 
in the western part of Nigeria.2 Yoruba is the “third largest ethnic group in Africa”3 
Generally, the term ‘Yoruba groups’ is used to describe communities occupying western 
Nigeria who speak the Yoruba language and not a collection of people under one hierarchical 
government with sub-groups. The map of the pre-colonial Yoruba land shows the different 
Yoruba communities herein referred to as groups.4 
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Map 1 Pre-colonial Yorubaland identifying Yoruba groups including the Ife, the Oyo and the Modakeke 
The history of the Yoruba in West Africa can be derived from several sources, such as 
serology, archaeology, linguistics, and local legends which all point to a very early start of 
the Yoruba. This is contrary to some early works of historians who claim that West Africa 
had no history. For example, Cromwell wrote that “[s]o far as Western Africa is concerned, 
there is no history.”5  Also, Fry, who observed the artistic works of the Africans he studied, 
wrote that Africans had no culture.6 However, Equiano claimed Africa to be the lost tribes of 
Israel from which all humans originated.7 The origin of West Africa has been traced by 
linguistic configuration and blood group maps.8 Christopher Wrigley, who argued the origin 
of West Africa based on linguistics configuration of Niger-Negros, clearly posited that present 
inhabitants of West Africa, including, the Yoruba’s must have been living in the region for 
several thousands of years.9 Furthermore, Garlick has attempted to trace African groups by 
providing blood-group maps of Africa.10 More recent work on the African peoples has shown 
that West African settlers developed culture, as evidenced by the Nok civilisation of 1000 to 
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200 BCE.11 Basil also has traced the origin of West African cultures to 1200 BCE.12 
Regardless of the seemingly infinite link of Africa to human existence, this thesis restricts the 
pre-colonial times of the Yoruba to the 16th century when documentary materials such as 
Yoruba-related artefacts remain available. Materials on the Yoruba are mostly linked to 16th 
century writings such as those of James Welsh13 who made voyages to Africa (Benin), John 
Ogilby’s Africa in 167014 with descriptions of the African regions he visited such as Egypt 
and Libya, Robert Norris’s 15 18th century writings as an African trader, as well as, the 19th 
century works of Mary Kingsley.16 In addition, Flint17 and Hodgkin18 have diligently traced 
the history of major groups in Nigeria leading to a conclusion that before the 16th century 
there was no documentary evidence on the Yoruba people of which the Ife and the Modakeke 
are sub-groups. However, archaeologists have placed the history of the Yoruba to 1000 to 
1400 A.D.19 The Encyclopaedia Britannica reported that the Yoruba seem to have migrated 
from the east to lower Niger river.  
As noted in chapter one under the background to the study, the term Yoruba was a colonial 
invention. However, before the use of the term Yoruba, Adediran noted that other words to 
identity the people such as “Anago” and “Olukumi” were already being used. As a people 
with common origin and culture, Adediran further noted that for the Yoruba “the exact period 
when the differentiation into sub-ethnic units occurred is not certain.”20 However, in the 16th 
century, sub-groups such as the Oyo and the Ijebu were identifiable by European writers.21  
In the pre-colonial era, Yoruba kingdoms were large with capitals of substantial size. There 
were the Oyo, Ife, Ijebu and Owu and smaller Yoruba sub-groups such as the Ekiti and Egba.22 
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Yoruba is unified through language and origin and “exhibited a strong presence in pre-
colonial West Africa.”23  
There seems to be uniformity on the political autonomy of the Yoruba sub-groups by authors 
of Yoruba history. For example, Oguntomisin noted that while all the Yoruba groups formed 
a civilisation, they lived separate lives and all the Yoruba kingdoms developed independently 
under their respective rulers.24 Ajisafe also stated that “[e]very [Yoruba] tribe [had] its own 
form of government….”25 On the other hand, consider the arguments of Agbiboa that there 
was nothing like a Yoruba group in ancient Nigerian history and that even though they had 
common descendants, they lived completely autonomous lives and that the pre-colonial 
Yoruba knew the various communities as autonomous areas.26 In fact, he claimed in 
agreement with other writers that even ancient Yoruba language similarities were mutually 
unintelligible.27 It should be noted however, that regardless of their mode of formation, new 
kingdoms were allowed to rule themselves independently, even newly conquered ones  were 
allowed to rule themselves subject to annual tributes paid to the master conqueror.28 This 
clearly is some proof of the political autonomy the sub-groups enjoyed in the Yorubaland. 
Because of these differences in the autonomy of the Yoruba some writers such as Lloyd29 and 
Atanda30 have warned that the Yoruba should not be discussed historically as if they were 
one, because in reality, they have varied patterns of government and linguistic variables. 
Yoruba sub-groups formed alliances when they needed to, but notably, “all of them never 
united for war.” 31Despite these differences, Lloyd has noted that the distinctions between the 
Yoruba sub-groups are not recognised by the Yoruba themselves and were not of a magnitude 
to affect the work of scholars such as ethnographers in discussing the Yoruba as a whole.32 
Also, Adediran have noted that pre-19th century Yoruba history reveals kinship ties between 
the rulers of major Yoruba kingdoms such as sharing the properties of a dead Oba among the 
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other Yoruba Obas.33 Thus, for the purpose of this research, the Ife and the Modakeke will be 
analysed as part of the broader Yoruba group.  As is demonstrated below, it is this link to the 
Yoruba of Nigeria that ties both the Ife and Oyo migrants whom later became the Modakeke 
together culturally.  A more detailed analysis of the factors that make the Yoruba a single 
cultural unit such as geography, language and religion will be considered under the social, 
economic and political section of this chapter. 
3.2.2 The Origin of the Ife and the Modakeke as Sub-groups of the Yoruba 
As will be shown below, the history of the Ife and the Modakeke demonstrates that the Ife 
had a special spiritual place in the lives of the Yoruba speaking people which serves to unite 
the Yoruba culturally and linguistically but not politically. It follows that, it may not be easy 
to separate the Yoruba sub-groups culturally, but they could be separated politically.  
It is generally thought that the Ife group was the result of creation by one of the sons of God 
Oduduwa whom his father sent to create the world.34According to the myth, Ile-Ife35 was 
Oduduwa’s first point of call and from there all other Yoruba36 migrated and formed new 
settlements.37 Thus Ile-Ife38 became known as the spiritual centre for all the Yoruba sub-
groups and the cradle of the Yoruba speaking people.39 Since the Ife is said to be the cradle 
of the Yoruba race, 40could it be concluded that Ife had sovereign control over all Yorubaland? 
Documentary evidence available on the pre-colonial history of Yoruba sub-groups reveals 
that the Ife had an autonomous status. For example, the Treaty between H.M the Queen and 
the King, Chiefs, Elders and Peoples of Ife 1888, noted that pre-colonial Ife were perfectly 
independent and paid no tribute to any other power.41 Also, there were separate treaties 
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between H.M. the Queen and other Yoruba sub-groups.42 Forde noted that there was never a 
single political authority for the Yoruba sub-groups.43 In addition, Akinjogbin stressed that 
the historical consciousness of an average Yoruba is restricted to his sub-cultural group and 
not the whole of Yorubaland.44 Ogunremi and Adediran argue that because most ancient 
Yoruba towns sprang from the Ife, either by direct migration from Ife through mandate from 
the Ife to form their own town or through towns acquired by conquest of the Ife, it is generally 
accepted that the Ife is the cradle of the Yoruba.45 For his part, Obayemi has argued that the 
reason why other Yoruba groups accepted that myth was that the Ife could have been the 
source of the crown beads from which other Obas (Yoruba rulers) got their crowns.46 Writing 
passionately about the place of the Ife in Yoruba, Omidiora  wrote that Ile-Ife should be to 
the Yoruba as Jerusalem is to the Jews.  
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that Yoruba groups, including the Ife, were 
politically autonomous in pre-colonial times but the Ife did not act as the political sovereign 
of the Yoruba. 
In pre-colonial times, the Ife was influential in the Niger-Benue area.47 As an established 
kingdom, the Ife has been traced to the 11th century.48 Even though Frobenius claimed to have 
discovered a lost continent in the 1911 when he discovered sculptures of bronze in Ile-Ife,49 
by the 12th and 13th centuries Ife was known for its terracotta heads and bronze pieces.50 By 
the 15th century, several other Yoruba kingdoms coexisted alongside Ife, “each with its walled 
capital, secluded king claiming Ife origins, city chiefs heading powerful co-resident groups, 
and outlying villages.”51 One of the kingdoms that claimed origins from the Ife was the Oyo, 
said to have been founded by one of Oduduwa’s sons Oranmiyan who left Ile-Ife to found the 
Oyo people.52  The old Oyo kingdom covering Dahomey (now Republic of Benin) and Nupe 
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in Niger State, is said to have been founded in the 13th century.53 The ruler of Ife was called 
Ooni while the ruler of Oyo was called the Alaafin. 54The Alaafin55 of Oyo ruled from the 
capital city of Oyo but allowed conquered kingdoms to rule themselves subject to annual 
tributes to him.56  Falola and Genova noted that “[b]y the sixteenth century Oyo had become 
the most powerful empire in present-day southern Nigeria, controlling trade routes north to 
Hausa land.”57 It is significant that the pre-colonial Oyo appears to have more political 
influence than the Ife province which we have earlier established to be the cradle of the 
Yoruba groups.58 According to Lloyd, the power of the Oyo was derived largely from its 
control of the trade route from the savannah to the sea and its vast army.59 
The Oyo and the Ife continued to grow as independent kingdoms60 alongside other Yoruba 
kingdoms such as Ijebu, Ijesa, and Ekiti.61 Regardless of their closely connected origins, the 
long years of separate existence of the Ife and the Oyo as independent kingdoms gave them 
varied and unique experiences. For example, while the Ife practiced traditional religion being 
“the source for connection to the ancient Yoruba religion…” and worshiping several hundreds 
of Gods every day of the year,62 the Oyo were mainly Muslims.  
The narratives from the Ife and the Modakeke interviews conducted in 2014 demonstrate that 
both the Ife and the Modakeke practice both traditional religion, Islam and Christianity today 
with none of the groups claiming special ties to any one of the three religions. However, some 
Ife participants clearly noted that their pre-colonial religion was traditional and that 
Christianity and Islam were new to them.  For example, an Ife female participant stated that: 
“formerly Ife has been known to have been worshiping series of idols before the advent of the 
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missionaries. The Ibos brought Christianity and Islamic religion.”63Another participant stated: 
“Ife practices traditional beliefs but there are some other religions like Christianity and 
Islam.”64 Another Ife participant stated that: “Ife people were originally in Ife land but the 
Modakeke people come from some place so their origin is from a different place so they 
practice separate religion.”65 
The Modakeke on the other hand did not place any special emphasis on the Islamic religion 
as dominant in the Modakeke. A participant however noted that the Ife had some traditional 
festivals which are not practiced by the Modakeke. He stated:  
“… Generally, in Yoruba land some of the things are similar. However, there are some 
that are practiced at one place but not others. For example, there is one called ‘Edi’ 
practiced by the Ife’s. It is a type of tradition to do with women dancing around. 66 
Although, the contemporary Ife and the Modakeke did not speak passionately of any religious 
preferences, historical records reveal that Islam grew from contact with Islamic areas through 
the activities of soldiers during wars, settlers migrating  and through trade.67As a result Owu, 
a Yoruba town, had Muslims residents before its destruction in 182568 and so did Badagry69 
Thus, Islam was introduced into the Yorubaland before 1840.70 As for the Oyo, the ruler or 
Alaafin had allowed some Arabs to stay in his palace and the Arabs spread their Muslim 
beliefs.71 It was reported that in Oyo there were “no less than five holy men, two or three of 
whom were Arab Emirs…spread the dogmas of their faith amongst the inhabitants, publicly 
teaching their children to read the Quran.”72 
Although The Alaafin of Oyo had allowed the Arabs to stay in his palace, he persecuted the 
Muslims and reports were that he killed as many corpses that could fit into the palace at any 
material time.73 According to Gbadamosi, the “massacre terrified the Muslims, and made 
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them bitter against the entire traditional system.”74 The Muslims were persecuted in all other 
Yoruba lands except in Ilorin. Then in the second phase of Islam in Yorubaland they fled to 
other places to take refuge such as Ife, Ibadan, Abeokuta and took with them their religion.75 
Therefore, as rightly pointed out by Fadipe, even if the Oyo and the Ife “were originally 
closely related ethnically and culturally, a separation of between one thousand and two 
thousand years would involve a resultant divergence of experience and traditions.”76  
The divergent experiences and traditions led to their conflict beginning in the late 18th century 
when fate brought them together under one government. Historical records reveal that the 
ancient Oyo77 kingdom fell in the 18th century due to economic, military and mainly political 
decline. 78 Later most of the Oyo conquered cities rebelled, declared their independence and 
the Oyo empire eventually collapsed by the end of the eighteenth century.79 The strife in Oyo 
and its eventual collapse led refugees to flock into neighbouring towns such as the Ife.80 As a 
result, a group of refugees from the fallen Oyo kingdom went to settle in other Yoruba 
towns.81 Migrating in large groups,82 some conquered cities and formed new settlements such 
as the Ibadan83, while others were absorbed into already established towns such as Ile-Ife and 
Odunabon.84 Some formed their own cities such as Ijaye and Eruwa, while others such as 
displaced existing villages such as the allied army that displaced Egba village to form the 
Ibadan.85 
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The Ife provided refuge to the Oyo migrants while the migrants provided help in farming and 
fishing and also military service to their host.86 The native/indigene-settler relationship was 
then formed between the Ife and the Oyo migrants. Both groups lived peacefully together 
until the first violent confrontations between 1835 and 1849. 
3.2.3 The Causes of the Pre-colonial Ife-Modakeke Conflict 
 As stated in the background to the study in chapter one, there was only one recorded violent 
conflict between the Ife and the Modakeke which took place in 1835 when the Ife turned 
against the Oyo migrants as a consequence of their relationship with the new conquerors of 
Ibadan. The Ife claimed that the refugees became arrogant and unruly slaves.87 According to 
Johnson, this led to the Ife’s change of attitude toward their refugees, treating them from then 
on as “slaves and dogs.”88  
Responses from contemporary Ife and Modakeke people also reveal the stated causes of the 
pre-colonial Ife-Modakeke conflict. A major factor that led to the foundation of the pre-
colonial conflict, as borne out from the oral interviews conducted among both the Ife and the 
Modakeke, was the cultural cleavages reflected in the indigene/settler relationship between 
the two groups.  Although Ile-Ife is said to be the cradle of all Yoruba, the Ife viewed the 
initial residents of Ibadan as brothers but the Oyo migrants who conquered Ibadan and the 
Oyo living with them as strangers. The Ife considered themselves the landlords of the 
Modakeke and viewed the Modakeke as strangers. As can be seen from the statements of the 
Ife during the 2014 interviews in Ife. Some participants stated: “They (Modakeke) are 
strangers, they met Ife here. The Ife people gave them their land.”89 “Before the Whiteman 
came, we were all living peacefully. We had our king called Ooni, and then the Modakeke 
came as refugees to our land to help us farm our lands as strangers”90 An elderly Ife participant 
bluntly stated: “Modakeke are strangers to Ife.”91 
 Even the Modakeke did not dispute the fact that they are strangers in Ile-Ife. In fact, 
contemporary Modakeke still refer to themselves as refugees in Ife and see the Ife as their 
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landlords. While narrating the history of the Modakeke in pre-colonial times, a Modakeke 
participant stated that “we recognize the Ife as the father of all Yoruba groups. We came as 
refugees to the Ife after old Oyo was destroyed. Then the Ife needed us to farm their lands as 
they are very lazy people. Later they started treating the Modakeke badly and the Modakeke 
fought them. Ibadan helped Modakeke to sack Ife three times.”92 
Another stated: “We the Modakeke came into Ife long time ago. They gave us land free to 
farm on, and then we helped them to fight the Ibadan. But later they became greedy and 
wanted more from us calling us their slaves. Our fathers could not take it anymore so we start 
to fight them saying we are freeborn from Oyo not slaves.”93  One Modakeke participant 
however referred to the Modakeke as Ife neighbours rather than strangers or refugees. She 
stated that “war made us run to Ife for shelter as neighbours but then they started treating us 
badly as if we were their slaves.”94 
The responses above demonstrate that both groups recognized the dividing line between the 
groups that of the indigene/settler relationship and the effect it had on starting the conflict and 
preserving it. Resolution attempts in this first crisis period was by physical separation, which 
was initiated by the traditional ruler of Ife, Oba Abewaila. He separated the refugees from the 
Ife main town, giving them a separate tract of land in Ife which was later named Modakeke 
(after the cry of a bird).95 The Modakeke, as they came to be known, appointed for themselves 
a king, the Ogunsua of Modakeke96 thus creating a new identity for themselves free from the 
Ife. Therefore, the Modakeke although initially living with their host community Ife, “…did 
not fully integrate with those already living in Ile-Ife…”97 Thus, they began their separate 
existence from the Ife. 
The question is, to what extent did the social, economic and political structure of the Ife and 
the Modakeke affect the conflict and dispute resolution attempts in pre-colonial times? The 
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section below examines the social, economic and political structure of the Ife and the 
Modakeke and the idea of separation as a method of dispute resolution.  
3.3 The Social Structure of the Ife and the Modakeke as Part of the Yoruba Group 
To establish that the social structure of the Ife and the Modakeke as part of the Yoruba did 
not encourage separation as a useful method of conflict prevention and management in pre-
colonial times, the analysis under this sub-heading will identify two major Yoruba social 
structures that made physical separation unsuccessful for conflict prevention and resolution 
namely; kinship and land tenure system. 
3.3.1 Kinship 
Anthropologists have long studied ancient societies and observed that some societies depend 
on each other to stay alive. For example, the !kung bushmen need each other to survive, thus 
will not separate in times of conflict as a measure to avoid more conflict or resolve existing 
ones.98 However, among the Plateau Tonga people of the former Northern Rhodesia, Colson 
noted that quarrels often led to movement.99 Like the !Kung,  others having such need for 
physical dependency, have very strong kinship ties that makes separation impractical for 
dispute resolution. For example, the Minj-wahgi of Western High lands of New Guinea have 
such strong social ties that rather than separate during conflict, groups place their arms behind 
their backs, kicking at each other’s backs until one group withdraws.100 Also, there are records 
of the buffeting contests of some Eskimos where both groups deliver blows to each other’s 
heads until one is knocked to the ground and withdraws.101 
From the foregoing, the question is: did the pre-colonial social structure of the Ife and the 
Modakeke allow strong kinship ties that encourages or discourages separation or any other 
model that encourages separation during times of conflict? A careful analysis of the kinship 
structure of the Yoruba appears to suggest that within each group, kinship ties were strong. 
And further, although ties between major groups were strong, separation was successful in the 
long-term as a means of dispute resolution of the pre-colonial Ife-Modakeke conflict because 
kinship ties were not strong enough to include all Yorubaland in pre-colonial times.  
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This view appears to be supported in leading empirical works on the Yoruba people such as 
Bascom and Fadipe who acknowledged within each Yoruba sub-group the pre-colonial 
Yoruba had kinship ties and the principle of seniority. According to Bascom, the patrilocal 
dwelling, which is the compound, comprised of the children of the house (idile) the wives of 
the house (iya ile) and unrelated outsiders (alejo).102 The three types of kinship Bascom 
referred to were the blood kinship, kinship by marriage and secondary kinship that exists 
outside blood and marriage but by the choice of the parties.103 These three types of kinship 
did not include outsiders of a separate group that did not get assimilated into a group. As 
earlier argued by writers such as Agbiboa , there was nothing like a Yoruba group in ancient 
Nigerian history that lived completely autonomous lives and knew the various communities 
as autonomous areas.104 In fact, he claimed in agreement with other writers that even ancient 
Yoruba language similarities were mutually unintelligible.105 In addition, Akinjogbin had 
stressed that the historical consciousness of an average Yoruba is restricted to his sub-cultural 
group and not the whole of Yorubaland.106 It follows that the Ife and the Modakeke lacked 
such kinship ties as to foster the type of relationship that exists amongst members of a kin. As 
described by Fadipe: “[t]he pragmatic value of the kinship principle lies in the co-operation, 
mutual help, loyalty and other expressions of solidarity which it evokes in those whom it joins 
together.”107 As can be seen from the trigger to the pre-colonial conflict between the Ife and 
the Modakeke, the Ife did not view the Modakeke as part of their kin but as strangers in their 
land.108Answers given by contemporary Ife and Modakeke to the question “are the Ife and the 
Modakeke the same peoples?”, help to corroborate the lack of kinship ties between the Ife 
and the Modakeke. Several participants of the interviews conducted in 2014 by this researcher 
noted that the Ife and the Modakeke are different peoples even referring to themselves as 
strangers. These are some of their comments: 
Ife participant: “No. Modakeke are strangers. They even say it themselves”109 
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Ife participant: “Ife is the landlord while Modakeke are strangers”110 
Modakeke participant: “No. We are from Oyo given land by the Ife people a long time ago”111 
Although the majority said the Ife and the Modakeke are not the same people, a very small 
proportion of the Ife participants (4 out of 50) said that the Modakeke and the Ife are from the 
same place thus are seen as the same people.112 
Closely related to kinship ties is the Yoruba custom of seniority. Bascom noted that kinship 
recognises seniority in Yorubaland. Since kinship meant seniority, it is expected that 
submitting of a dispute for mediation will be due to respect for the seniority of the eldest male 
member of the house. According to Fadipe seniority “guarantees obedience to authority which 
reinforces the concept of leadership.”113 Therefore the decision of the Ooni of Ife to separate 
the Oyo migrants in a different settlement was in his prerogative as a senior spokesman in the 
land and was binding on the people as long as he lived. 
The social hierarchy created by Yorubaland tenure system also served to demonstrate that 
physical separation was not feasible for resolving conflict in pre-colonial times. 
3.3.2 Land Tenure 
Under English law three relationships can exist where land is involved. The landlord-tenant 
relationship can be created where ground rent is paid for the periodical use of the land.114 
When the land and the buildings are used, the payment for such land use becomes the rack 
rent which reflects the full periodic value of land.115 There is also the payment of rent charge. 
This does not create a landlord-tenant relationship. Rather it is the sum of money secured on 
land owned by the person paying the rent charge thus earmarking the land as security for a 
loan without actually passing any estate.116 For the Yoruba of Nigeria, there is no clear English 
equivalent to the relationship created under customary land tenure system because there is a 
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tribute payable for use of land in recognition of overlordship and there is a payment for use 
of land called Ishakole. 
Samuel Johnson’s117 history of the Yoruba is one of the earliest systematic recordings of the 
Yoruba people and the Ife conflicts and wars. His work shows that the norms of the Yoruba 
regarding land and the position of strangers in a group, was pre-modern and caused conflict 
between the groups. For example, the structure of land tenure created hierarchy among groups 
and thus served to divide rather than bring the groups together. If the sociology of group 
conflict is anything to go by two groups with different status positions will always be in 
conflict because the superior group wants to maintain their status while the inferior group 
seeks liberation from an inferior position.118 Therefore,  the pre-colonial structure of land 
tenure system would have been  a source of division and conflict, and not one of conflict 
prevention.  
The Yoruba land tenure system was communal in that the community controlled the land use. 
Lloyd in his discussion of the two major descent groups in Yoruba, the Agnatic and the 
Cognatic, noted that they both have a relationship to Yoruba land tenure and dispute 
resolution. Lloyd noted that members of the Agnatic group “corporately hold rights to both 
the town land on which their compound is built and to one or more large blocks of farm 
land”119In the Cognatic descents land is vested in the village not on the descent.120  
Fadipe also wrote on the indigene-settler relationship of groups in Nigeria created by the pre-
colonial social structure of the Yoruba land tenure system in Nigeria.121 According to Fadipe, 
a native and a settler were identified by their rights over land. Thus, the settler only had rights 
of use of a native’s land temporarily at the native’s permission guaranteed by the payment of 
a token called Ishakole as a reminder of the native’s overlordship.122 This created a landlord-
tenant relationship between the native and the stranger/settler. Refusal to pay the Ishakole is 
taken as intention to claim absolute ownership of the land granted temporarily. Therefore, the 
Yoruba land tenure system where the Ife are the landlords and the Modakeke the tenants made 
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the Ife higher in rank to the Modakeke who are seen as strangers. There is no known refusal 
of the Modakeke to pay the Ishakole in pre-colonial times, obviously because they recognised 
themselves as strangers and needed to pay the Ishakole. The status Modakeke acquired when 
they were physically separated from the Ife and the effect it had on the payment of the Ishakole 
is worth considering.  
The landlord-tenant relationship was not a new arrangement with the coming of the refugees 
in Ife.123 Ajasin explained that it was customary to give a “stranger-farmer” land to farm on 
but the farmer could not be the absolute owner of such a land, he could be ejected if he 
breached the conditions of use such as breaking the laws of the land on moral and criminal 
grounds.124 Johnson also noted that: 
“[l]and are never sold but may be granted to outsiders for life...Land once given is 
never taken back except under special circumstances as treason to the State which 
renders the grantee an outlaw, and he is driven altogether from the State or tribe, and 
his land confiscated.”125 
Strangers pay rent to compensate for the land of members of the communities who consider 
that they are depriving themselves of their sources of profits, thus deserving of compensation 
for their economic deprivation.126 The rent Ishakole was in the form of a certain percentage 
of their agricultural produce.127 In addition, it is worth noting that lease of land to a 
stranger/settler was under the condition that the stranger/settler must accept the jurisdiction 
of the recognised authorities of the land and identify themselves with the rest of the 
community.128 With such a condition placed on the use of land by strangers, physical 
separation of the strangers would have breached the Yoruba criterion for land use because the 
Modakeke would no longer be identifying themselves with the rest of the Ife community. 
Further, the land they were settled in by the Ooni in pre-colonial times was cleared by the 
Modakeke and thus must have conferred the right of ownership on the Modakeke as the 
                                                             
123Lloyd described in detail the long-standing land-lord tenant relationship in Ancient Yoruba Land. See P.C Lloyd., Yoruba Land Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1962) 
124A.K Ajisafe., The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People (London George Routledge & Sons) p. 11 
125S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge, 1921) 
p.95 
126 P.C Lloyd., Yoruba Land Law (Oxford University Press, 1962) p. 64 
127 J.O Toriola., ‘The Ife/Modakeke Crisis an Insider View’ Ife Psychologia. An International Journal, vol. 9 no.3., 2001, p. 24-25 
128N.A Fadipe., The Sociology of the Yoruba (Ibadan University Press, 1970) p.169 
62 
 
Yoruba have “always looked upon the expenditure of effort upon an object as conferring the 
right of ownership on that object.”129 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the Yoruba land tenure system created a hierarchy 
between the natives and the settlers where no adult native “who has need of land goes without 
it” but for the stranger/settler they had to lease land under the condition of identifying 
themselves with the community and payment of lease sum Ishakole. With such a system, 
physical, economic and political separation was not practical as a dispute resolution 
mechanism because the land remained the property of the natives and was tied to the political 
identity of the natives and settlers. 
3.4 The Economic Structure of the Pre-colonial Ife and the Modakeke 
In line with the anthropological theory of ethnic conflict between groups, the theoretical 
framework in chapter one of this study demonstrated that some armed conflicts are caused by 
competition over resources.130  In this context, a consideration of the economic structure of 
the pre-colonial Ife and the Modakeke is essential for an understanding of the effect on the 
economy when  separation is employed as dispute resolution in pre-colonial times. This thesis 
argues that the economic structure of the Ife and the Modakeke in pre-colonial times acted as 
a trigger to the first conflict and made physical separation a difficult and unsuccessful option 
for resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Therefore, for any possibility of resolving the 
conflict through separation, the economic implication on the conflict must be considered and 
adequately addressed.   
 
Africans were good at trading and long-distance trade was one way of meeting the economic 
needs of the society. Coquery-Vidrovitch and Lovejoy pointed out that long distance trade 
was attractive to the elite of those days because of the profit involved.  As a result, they 
recruited men to work for the trade through kinship, slavery and attracting people who worked 
for wages.131 Because of the nature of long-distance trade, a tremendous amount of manpower 
was required. According to Coquery-Vidrovitch and Lovejoy the traditional social structure 
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based on kinship remained capable of offering manpower and necessary animals. According 
to Coquery-Vidrovitch and Lovejoy: 
“…[t]he sons, nephews, and other dependents recruited for commercial journey on a 
regular basis by their elders, lineage heads, and chief merchants were certainly 
exploited…only a part of the surplus as well as the product went to these 
dependents.”132 
The above statements provide a reason why workers developed consciousness of the fact that 
they were being exploited, often resulting in strikes such as the 1753 strike of the canoe men 
who sailed goods, especially gold, from Ghana to the Europe as well as the 1887 Kongo strike 
of porters. 133 
Generally, the economic survival of a group is adjusted to varying degrees to their 
environment and the indigenous economy is influenced by the suitable materials available to 
the people.134 As for the Yoruba, to which the Ife and the Modakeke belonged, their location 
meant that they had open trade routes to the north across the Sahara and the sea through to 
Europe.135 According to Lloyd, the Yoruba developed considerable power in pre-colonial 
times largely from control of the trade route from the savannah to the sea and its vast army.136 
The Yoruba environment in Nigeria favours farming, hunting, cloth making and fishing. 
Cross-bows and iron traps were used for hunting available animals such as giant rats, 
warthogs, bush-babies and large birds.137 Hunting activities are higher during the dry season 
because it is the off-peak farming period. According to Afolabi Ojo, during this period, the 
forest land is thinner and gra ss is scorched thus making it more penetrable, longer sighting of 
animals is increased and it makes the burning of bushes by professional hunters possible.138 
The mangrove readily found in the Yorubaland also encouraged craft industries to flourish 
among the Yoruba because of the tropical rain forest rich in vegetation, species and density. 
The luxuriant variety of plants, especially woody plants, provide raw materials for 
craftsmanship in the Yoruba culture. “[w]ood carving flourished long ago among the 
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Yoruba.”139  Dyeing of clothes resulting from the availability of dye from the Indigo fera tree 
was the job of almost every Yoruba woman.140 As a result of the diverse economic 
possibilities of the Yoruba, households were self-sufficient. 141However, the need for plenty 
of manpower for farming and trading purposes meant that slave owning and the prospect of 
strangers depending on the indigenes for survival was welcomed by the Yoruba’s. Falola 
noted that: 
 “…those who had access to slaves, especially in large numbers, there was no need to 
rely on co-operative work groups with the reciprocity that it involved. Neither was it 
economical to make use of the labour of lineage for the simple reason that lineage did 
not tolerate exploitation.”142 
This problem of manpower reflects the adverse consequences of the Modakeke being 
separated from the Ife after the first violent conflict between the groups. Oluobi and Oyeni 
wrote that the Ife refugees were initially “living within the four walls of lle-Ife” and 
consequently received a favourable welcome from the Ife kings such as, Akinmoyero (1770-
1800) Gbanlare (1800-1823), Oba Wunmonije (1835-1839) and Oba Adegunle (1839-
1849).143 However, Ajayo and Akintoye claimed that the coming of the Oyo refugees into Ife 
was the major hope of Ife regaining economic stability after being driven from their homeland 
by war.144 Most importantly, Asiyanbola145 claimed that the Oyo refugees provided military 
support to the Ife host during the Owu war of 1825.146 Thus when the Ife king separated the 
Modakeke from the Ife, there was peace for a while but according to Johnson, separation 
brought economic hardship on the host community, Ife having lost their slave farmers and 
warriors. This did not go down well with the Ife. Thus, they poisoned their king in 1846147 
and sought to bring the Modakeke back to Ife which led to further violence. 
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The economic structure that relied upon manpower for farming, fishing and trade meant that 
separation of the conflicting groups was not successful in resolving the pre-colonial Ife-
Modakeke conflict. If the Ife had not been economically reliant on the Modakeke refugees in 
pre-colonial times and the Modakeke reliant on the Ife land for survival, physical separation 
would have been the best resolution. The Modakeke, although happy for the refuge provided 
for them among the Ife, did not like the fact that they had to fend for the Ifes. As related by a 
Modakeke participant in the 2014 interview:  
“[o]ur neighbours are not always at peace with us, they rate us as second-class 
citizens. We are very hard-working farmers but our neighbours the Ifes are lazy. They 
demand money from us as their slaves. Modakeke people are hardworking, we have 
farmlands although given to us by the Ife but we cultivate them. We cultivate cocoa, 
kolanut. But our other counterparts who gave the land to us are lazy dogs, drinking 
palm wine and at the end of the day when they see us performing, they will be 
demanding money that we are their slaves and that we have to feed them. That is one 
of the major reasons that cause the conflict.148” 
An Ife participant on the other hand claim that: 
“The Ife people are the original Yoruba people. They were very accommodating to 
strangers. When the people of Modakeke who were travellers came they were treated 
very kindly, giving land to stay. But they were ungrateful and started to cause trouble. 
After some time, they refused to pay the Ishakole (dues to the Ife king).149” 
From the foregoing, the economic structure of the Ife and the Modakeke did not allow for the 
use of physical separation of the groups in pre-colonial times without hurting the economy of 
one of the groups. One could speculate that if the economic situation was one that allowed the 
Modakeke refugees virgin land for economic purposes without reliance on the Ife, separation 
would not have produced the negative effect on the conflict as it did in pre-colonial times. 
In view of the foregoing the sub-heading hereunder analyses the political structure of pre-
colonial Ife and Modakeke vis-a-vis- its relationship to the separation as a dispute resolution. 
The purpose of the analysis is to demonstrate that the Yoruba political structure made 
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separation difficult as a dispute resolution method therefore resolving the conflict by 
separation involves separating the Yoruba norms from the conflict and dispute resolution.  
3.5 The Political Structure of Pre-colonial Ife and the Modakeke 
In this section, the thesis argues that the political structure of the Ife and the Modakeke, as 
part of the broader Yoruba group, made separation possible but a difficult option for managing 
and preventing further conflict in pre-colonial Ife and Modakeke. The structure recognised 
main governments and subordinate governments as well as empowering the kings to resolve 
disputes.  Also, due to the difference of the political structure of the Oyo from other Yoruba 
political structures, as well as the various checks and balances on the king, the resolution by 
separation brought about by the Ife king (Ooni) was short-lived as the people asserted their 
sense of justice and sought to bring back the Modakeke to the Ife.   
The failure of the pre-colonial attempt at resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict is in line with 
the sociology of group conflict, which suggests that ethnic breakdown leading to extreme 
harm being done to victims is a result of people’s perception of justice. According to Esses 
and Vernon, when people perceive that their security (whether economic or political status) 
is threatened, they think justice demands that they protect it and the principle of deservingness 
always takes root.150 Also Zartman noted that the causes of group conflicts include a peoples’ 
perception of a weak State which leads individuals to seek to defend themselves and their 
territory.151As evidenced below by the views of sociologists, the pre-colonial structure of the 
Ife and the Modakeke were implicated in the result of the pre-colonial attempts at resolving 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict.  
3.5.1 Pre-colonial State Capitals and Subordinate Towns 
The general political development of the Yoruba in pre-colonial times was that of states and 
mini states with some states succeeding while others did not.152  A typical Yoruba state 
comprised the capital, towns and villages.153 As Atanda indicated: 
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“the key political unit on which government was based in all the Yoruba kingdoms 
was the town, ilu. Each kingdom consisted of many towns, but this did not mean that 
there were many independent governments in each kingdom .... the government of the 
capital served as the central government of the kingdoms, while those of the 
subordinate towns served as Local Government units.”154  
The government in the town was headed by the king (Oba or Ooni in Ife) and kept in check 
by the council of chiefs the Igbimo, (known as Oyo mesi in Oyo and Iwarefa in Ife) whom he 
had to consult. The subordinate governments were headed by a Baale (father of the land). 
155In contrast to the general Yoruba political structure, Fadipe noted that the Oyo-Yoruba 
subordinate groups such as Ibadan and Ogbomosho while under obligation to render annual 
tributes to the Alaafin (ruler of the main town) of Oyo “left them more or less in unrestricted 
control of their own affairs” 156 and practically independent.  Fadipe further noted that: 
“[t]here was no chief in the capital who was responsible for the communities outside the 
capital…it was only chiefly in regard to the conduct of external affairs as well as in the 
collection of revenue…”157 Also, the Alaafin158 of Oyo ruled from the capital city of Oyo but 
allowed conquered kingdoms to rule themselves subject to annual tributes to him.159 
Oguntomisin noted that:“...a great number of these refugees did not migrate as individuals but 
as large groups carrying with them their corporate identities as towns.”160  
This different system of towns being independent in the Oyo and retaining their identities 
must have given the Modakeke, who had originated from the fallen Oyo, a different perception 
of their sovereign role when separated from the Ife.  
Strictly speaking, it could be argued that under the general Yoruba political structure which 
the Ife were familiar with, governments under a Baale were subordinate to the main 
government headed by an Oba and thus could not claim to be an independent government. It 
follows therefore, that although separated from the Ife physically, the Modakeke in pre-
colonial times were not, according to the general Yoruba political structure, deemed to be a 
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separate government. This can be seen to be consistent with the Ife understanding that the 
separation of the Modakeke to a settlement outskirt of Ife as described under the causes of the 
pre-colonial conflict, was not a grant of self-determination or self-rule but a mere subordinate 
government created in terms of a quarter in Ife and therefore to be referred to as Modakeke-
Ife.161 However, the separate political structure the Modakeke were exposed to by virtue of 
their Oyo origin meant that although separating the groups was possible in pre-colonial times, 
its success was not a permanent solution to the problem. The Yoruba political structure did 
not allow for the Modakeke to be its own independent government with equal political status 
as the Ife because the Modakeke were settled in a part of the Ife land as a subordinate town in 
Ife.  Another illustrative example of the effect of the Yoruba political structure on the success 
of separating the groups is the powers of the king in political and judicial matters described 
below. 
3.5.2 The Power of the King  
The Yoruba political system is fused with their judicial system and recognises the king as 
having the powers of life and death as he rules with the gods.162 Therefore, the king was the 
final court of appeal for the whole kingdom. A close consideration of the two systems reveals 
that the hierarchy of the political system represents the same for the judicial system. Thus, 
disputes were resolved traditionally by negotiation, mediation or traditional adjudication right 
from the lowest level of authority ending with the highest government of the king and those 
who acted as checks of the kings’ actions. The Yoruba political and judicial system can be 
represented this way: 163 
Oludumare          Olodumare    
 
Oba+  Igbimo                     Oba+ Igbimo 
  
Olori Adugbo                               Olori Adugbo 
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162 J.A Atanda., An Introduction to Yoruba History (Ibadan University Press, 1980) p. 19 
163 Figure 2 And 3 Has Been Specially Adapted from the Work of T. Onadeko., ‘Yoruba Traditional Adjudicatory Systems’ African Study 
Monographs vol. 29. no 1., 2008, p.15-28 [21] 
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Olori Ebi                                 Olori Ebi 
       Baba                     Baba 
Key: 
Baba Father (head of family) 
Olori Ebi-  Head of Compound 
Olori Adugbo  Head of a Ward 
Oba King 
Igbimo  Council of Chiefs 
Olodumare Supreme Being 
Figure 2 Figure (with key) Representing the Relationship Between Yoruba Political and Judicial 
Structures (from T. Onadeko) 
The figures above clearly describe in the simplest of terms the Yoruba political and judicial 
structure. This structure represents that which is practiced by the Ife-Modakeke too. The 
inversion of the political structure is the exact adjudication as practiced by the Yoruba with 
very slight differences in some Yoruba groups.164  
Fadipe has rightly noted that: 
“…the administration of public justice [in Yoruba land] may be said to begin at home 
(according to the nature of the case and the relationship of the parties involved) and 
to end with the highest State authorities as the highest tribunal as well as the highest 
court of appeal.”165 
In line with the above statement, the political structure of the Yoruba starts with the gods 
represented by deities and ancestors called Imala and Osi respectively.  The Yoruba fear the 
wrath of the gods thus they will maintain order provided the gods are called into question. For 
conflict resolution purposes, even though the gods are the highest political powers, they are 
the last resort for problems that cannot be resolved. Although, the modern-day Yoruba, still 
fear the gods, it is noted that they are now in the habit of breaking oaths, especially peace 
oaths, taken in the name of the gods.166 However, the respect they have for their kings, as 
                                                             
164 For example, the Ife King is Ooni while the ruler of the Modakeke community subject to the Ooni is the Ogunsua of Modakeke 
165N.A Fadipe., The Sociology of the Yoruba (Ibadan University Press, 1970) p. 224  
166 See Statement of An Interviewee in Interview M 15 
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revealed by how fondly they speak of the rulers167 still stems from the fact that they see their 
kings as representatives of the gods thus deserving of absolute obedience.  
Below the gods is the King (Oba) 168who was the king as most Yoruba sub-groups had a 
King.169 The king was installed by statesmen who were empowered to select and install a king 
and curb the excesses of his office.170 While the policy-making part of government was carried 
out by those having political power such as the Oba, the administrative aspect of government 
is carried out by chiefs low in hierarchy.171 The monarchical system appears to be a common 
feature of the Yoruba government, where the king was the highest level of authority. In Ile-
Ife, there are four ruling houses, Lafogido, Ogboru, Giesi and Oshhikola.172 The four houses 
are all descendants of the first divinely appointed king of Ile-Ife, Oduduwa. Academic 
literature also demonstrates the power wielded by pre-colonial rulers of the Yoruba groups.  
Lloyd noted that there was no judiciary independent of the administration of the king and his 
chiefs.173 Describing the powers of rulers of the ancient Yoruba empire of Oyo, the new world 
encyclopaedia stated: 
“Regarding the judicial function of the Oyo Empire, the Alaafin acted as the Supreme 
Judge and only heard cases after dispute were first ruled on by lesser kings or local 
chiefs”174 
The powers of the rulers to resolve disputes were reflected in the local tribunals available to 
the people. Fadipe pointed to two central tribunals in Ife: the Feku court and the Geru court. 
He stated that the Geru court was both court of first instance and court of appeal175 thus 
showing that the judicial system was tied to the hierarchy ending with the king. The Oba’s 
court tries all cases civil and criminal. Serious offences such as murder, treason, rape and 
armed robberies were tried in the Oba’s court and punished according to the offence, mostly 
execution.176 The Oba’s court usually will bring the matter to an end. For example, murder 
was not tried by the family head but left for the highest authority, the Oba’s Council to effect 
                                                             
167 Interviews Conducted by Researcher June To July 2014 
168 The Ogboni Secret Cult Is Said to Have the Final Say in Certain Instances Such Crimes of Murder Even Though the Oba Was the King. 
169 A.K Ajisafe., The Laws and Customs of The Yoruba People (London George Routledge & Sons, 1924)  
170 A.J Omosade & D.P Adelumo., West Africa Traditional Religion (Ibadan. Onibonaje, 1979) p. 22 
171 P.C Lloyd., (1962) Ibid. p. 39 
172 The History of Ile-Ife Online: Http://Theooni.Org/Ileife.Htm 
173 P.C Lloyd., (1962) Op cit. p. 48 
174 New World Encyclopaedia: ‘Oyo Empire, Online: Http://Www.Newworldencyclopedia.Org/Entry/Oyo Empire 
175 N.A Fadipe., The Sociology of The Yoruba (Ibadan University Press, 1970) p. 229 
176 W. Bascom., The Yoruba of Southern Nigeria (Waveland Inc., 1984) p. 45 
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both arrest and dealing with. This was corroborated by several Ife interviewees. One 
interviewee stated: “If there is a problem, it will be reported to the chiefs in the community 
but if it requires the palace to resolve it, then it will go to Seju Ade the king of Ife.”177 
The response above shows that even Ife traditional dispute settlement recognises that certain 
disputes have to be left for the government authorities, such matters incurring execution are 
normally left to the recognised cult the Ogbonito handle. Onadeko noted that in the 19th 
century, the Ogboni cult was the highest tribunal in Yoruba land.178 In narrating how disputes 
were resolved in the Obas’ court, a seventy-year retired female teacher who has lived all her 
life in Ife noted that: 
 “the people go to the palace and the case will be sorted amicably. Everybody brings 
their supporters who they call to give witness of the character of the opposing party. 
…. If one party is not satisfied, they go home complaining but the matter must end.”179 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this kind of dispute resolution is the fact that reconciliation 
is geared toward mutual co-operation and unity. This is notable because parties to disputes 
are often made to share from the same cup of drink as a means of reconciliation.180 Pictures 
taken by foreign Colonial visitors in figure 3 shows that Ife had a recognised court house that 
was still operational during the colonial period.181 
 
Figure 3 Undated Photograph of the Ife Court House 
                                                             
177Ife interview IMa I  
178T. Onadeko., ‘Yoruba Traditional Adjudicatory Systems’ African Study Monographs vol. 29. no. 1., 2008, p.15-28[21] 
179Interviewee IA33  
180A.K Ajisafe., The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People (London George Routledge & Sons,1924) p. 17 




Fig.3 Undated photograph of the Ife Court House 
While the Oba’s court has the final say in conflict resolution (apart from the spiritual nature 
of conflicts led by the Ogboni court) it is notable that the Oba does not rule alone, neither 
does he command the respect of the people absolutely without any checks and balances. An 
Oba will rule with his council of chiefs with rights to legislate for the people.182 He is selected 
to ascend the thrown by birth from the royal lineage by the chiefs of the villages because the 
chiefs “represent the people of the town.”183 Fadipe rightly noted that: “no change had any 
chance of being adopted which did not commend itself to the elders of the community.”184It 
follows that the power of the Oba is limited by his chiefs in the matters he handles both in 
dispute resolution and even in land matters. The Ooni of Ife testified to this when he gave a 
detailed description of land ownership in Yoruba land especially in Ife. He stated that: 
“The native law with regard to land was very simple one and everybody knew it; the 
ownership of land was vested in the family, and such ownership applied to every 
branch of the family and was sacredly safeguarded. The Ooni was ruler of the people, 
but he could not interfere with the land rights of any family except his own family. If 
a man committed any offence and was banished or driven away from the country, his 
land could only be taken possession of by his children or his relations. In case a man 
dies and leaves no children, his land could only be taken possession of by his next of 
kin. Ife had been destroyed 3 times, some of the people captured and the rest driven 
into the bush; and the ruins which you see about the towns have not been built up, 
because the family owners have not come to build upon them; and it is the same case 
with farm lands. No one would dare to take possession of them in the absence of the 
owners. This is the land law of the Yoruba’s throughout the Country and everybody 
knows it.”185 
A statement of the Ooni from the above quotation which is particularly illuminating is that 
“the Ooni was ruler of the people, but he could not interfere with the land rights of any family 
except his own family.” The check on the powers of the kings does not mean that they could 
                                                             
182P.C Lloyd., Yoruba Land Law (Oxford University Press,1962) p. 48 
183P.C Lloyd., (1962) Ibid. p. 44 
184N.A Fadipe.,  The Sociology of The Yoruba (Ibadan University Press, 1970) p. 314 
185‘The Land Tenure Question in West Africa Being: A Brief Report of The Meeting Held at Abeokuta, Ibadan, Oyo, Oshogbo, Ilesha, Ife 
And Ede By the Deputy Despatched to The Yoruba Hinterland for The Purpose of Collating Evidence on Native Land Tenure System’ 




not have the final say in dispute resolution of their subjects in some instances. It was probably 
a curb of their powers to ensure there was no misuse of it and that justice was handed down 
correctly.  For example, in matters of war, Ajisafe stressed that the Oba (king) had the 
responsibility of protecting the subjects under his rule and he alone could declare war against 
enemy communities.186 The power to declare war was not to be used arbitrarily because that 
would endanger the life of the king and his subjects. Ajisafe also highlighted the seriousness 
of not declaring war arbitrarily because if the king declared war and loses the war, he must 
die before the defeated army returns home.187 With this fate in view, the rulers of the various 
Yoruba groups must have been careful in resorting to war as a means of resolving conflicts. 
However, this does not mean that they never resorted to war.  Akinjogbin188 dedicated a book 
to the wars of the Yoruba people from 1793 to 1893. Falola and Oguntomisin189 also dedicated 
a book to the Yoruba warlords of the 19th century. Furthermore, a Yoruba man takes honour 
in fighting for his immediate family, his community, and his Country.190 Therefore, a Yoruba 
man would only have required little prompting from the kings to fight. According to 
Mabougunje, for most ancient Yoruba towns, “[w]ar was a way of life, constructive as well 
as destructive, with its own customs, creeds and artefacts.”191 These literary works reveal that 
wars formed part of conflict resolution of the Yoruba. Corroborating these academic works 
are journal entries of foreign visitors. Mr. Samuel Crowther’s journal entry of September 27th, 
1841 reported that the Yoruba groups carried out wars for dethroning of kings and many 
Yoruba expressed the impossibility of ending war which they claim to be sanctioned by God. 
192 In addition, the Memoir of Henry Townsend, a Christian missionary to Nigeria in 1842 
reported that the village chiefs in one Yorubaland-Abeokuta have prepared and erected 
platforms about 10-12 feet high to fire at observed enemy motions.193 The power of the king 
to declare such wars was absolute and came with responsibilities. The decision of the king of 
Ife Oba Abewaile to send the Oyo strangers away to the outskirts of the Ife was within his 
political and judicial authority. It follows that separation was possible as a pre-colonial 
attempt at resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict because of the political structure of the Yoruba 
                                                             
186A.K Ajisafe., (1924) Ibid.  p. 17 
187A.K Ajisafe., (1924) Op cit. p. 2 
188A. Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yoruba Land 1793-1893(Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1998) p. 351 
189T. Falola & G.O Oguntomisin., Yoruba Warlords of the 19th Century (African World Press, 2001)  
190 A.K Ajisafe., The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People (London George Routledge & Sons,1924) p. 18 
191 A.L Mabogunje., Yoruba Towns (Ibadan University Press, 1962). p. 224. 
192 J.F.A Ajayi., Journals of the Rev. James Frederick Schon and Mr. Samuel Crowther Who Accompanied the Expedition up the Niger in 
1841 (2nd edition with an introduction by Ajayi Frank Cass & Co., 1970) p. 317 
193Memoir of the Rev. Henry Townsend. Late C.M.S Missionary, Abeokuta West Africa. Marshal Brothers. Available in the National 
Archive London. and British Library 
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which gives the king the power to resolve of conflict. However, the various checks and 
balances meant that the people could kill their king and seek to bring back the Modakeke as 
a justification of justice since the general Ife did not benefit economically from the strangers 
being separated from them. This did not go down well with the Ife, thus leading to the 
perception that their king was weak and later the Ife poisoned the king who had sent the 
Modakeke away and sought to bring back them to Ife. 194 To the Ife justice demanded that 
they keep hold of the Modakeke as subordinate to themselves as the Modakeke sided with the 
Ibadan rather than the Ife in the Ekitikparapo war which displaced the Ife from their land from 
1849 to 1854, while the Modakeke remained in the land allocated to them by the late king 
Abewaila.195The Ife came back to reoccupy their land in 1854.196 It can be argued that the 
Modakeke foundation of self-rule was laid when the Ife king separated them from the Ife in 
1835 and the poor relationship with the Ife continued from then on. 
Although the king’s court and the Ogboni’s decisions played the most important role in 
dispute resolution in the pre-colonial Ife-Modakeke, it is worth mentioning that the other 
hierarchy of dispute resolution in the council of chiefs and family heads played an important 
role in ensuring justice in the land and keeping the peace of the land. It must be stressed that 
at these levels, only civil matters are heard. The criminal matters are left for higher judicial 
authorities, mainly the Oba Igbimo’s courts. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, under this chapter, this study has demonstrated that the pre-colonial social, 
economic and political structure of the Ife and the Modakeke as Yoruba sub-groups made 
separation a useful but difficult option for conflict prevention and resolution. Due to the 
unique relationship between the Ife and the Modakeke from Oyo, although the Ife king could 
separate the two groups, the separation initiated by the him to resolve the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict was only short lived in preventing and managing the conflict. To reach this 
conclusion, this thesis have presented evidence on the following key aspects of the Ife-
Modakeke social, economic and political structure in pre-colonial times (1) Causes of the Ife-
                                                             
194S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge and Sons 
Ltd, 1921) p. 723 
195J.F.A Ajayi & S.A Akintoye., Yoruba Land in the Nineteenth Century in O. Ikime (ed) Groundwork of Nigerian History (0HEBN 
Publishers Ibadan, Nigeria, 1980) p. 286 
196R.A Olaniya., The Modakeke Question in Ife Politics and Democracy in I.A Akinjogbin., The Cradle of a Race: Ife From the Beginning 
to 1980 (Sunray Publications, Port Harcourt, 1992) p. 274 
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Modakeke conflict and separation attempts (2) kinship ties (3) land tenure (4) the Yoruba pre-
colonial economic system and (5) pre-colonial state capitals and subordinate towns and the 
power of the king. 
The evidence presented under the key aspects discussed above, helps to answer the first 
research sub-question “to what extent does the pre-colonial socio-economic and political 
structure of societies such as the Ife and the Modakeke demonstrate that separation was useful 
for conflict prevention and resolution and how successful was separation in preventing and 
managing the Ife-Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial times.?” The answer to the question is 
that separation was to a considerable extent useful for resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict in 
pre-colonial times. However, there were challenges to the success of separating the groups. 
These challenges were caused by the social norms of the Yoruba which encouraged separation 
and the autonomous existence of the Yoruba groups, native/Indigene-settler discrimination, 
economic benefit and reliance of the Ife on Modakeke migrant labour and the political 
structure of the pre-colonial Ife and Modakeke sub-groups. The thesis therefore 
acknowledged that in order to separate the groups, these challenges must be adequately 
addressed. 
The next chapter builds on this chapter to present an analysis of the effect of the social, 
economic and political colonial structure of the Ife-Modakeke on their conflict and attempts 

















4. CHAPTER FOUR: THE COLONIAL SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE IFE-MODAKEKE AND THE 
FEASIBILITY FOR SEPARATION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at providing evidence in support of the argument that the social, 
economic and political structure of the Ife and the Modakeke in colonial times made 
separation difficult as a means of resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict because the traditional 
rulers lacked the judicial power to separate the groups. Further, the colonial government 
sustained the norms of the Yoruba that prejudiced all effort at separation such as the hierarchy 
created between natives and settlers in land tenure. Therefore, to resolve the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict, it is necessary to separate the norms of the people from the realities of dispute 
resolution. The chapter focuses on the analysis of the social, economic and political structure 
of the Ife-Modakeke and applies this to answer the following research sub-question: to what 
extent does the colonial socio-economic and political structure of the Ife-Modakeke 
demonstrate separation or the lack of separation as a means of resolving their conflict? The 
materials retrieved from archives, published literature and contemporary oral testimonies of 
the Ife and the Modakeke groups in 2014 shall provide illustrative examples for the analysis. 
The method used has previously been delineated in chapter two. 
To answer the second research sub-question, the chapter first identifies the time line for the 
colonial era in Nigeria. The time-line helped in determining which laws and Constitutions 
were to be analysed in relation to their impact on group structure and dispute resolution. Then, 
the chapter deals with the history of the Ife-Modakeke conflict and attempts at resolution in 
colonial times to assess the impact of the colonial State in the conflict between the groups. 
The chapter then examines the three structures of the Ife and the Modakeke and concludes 
with the effect of the social, economic and political structure on the Ife-Modakeke conflict 






4.2 Time-Line for the Colonial Era 
Trading was evident between the British and the local people living around the Niger1 but in 
1849 a British Consulate was established for the Bights of Benin and Biafra.2 Importantly, the 
dispute resolution abilities of the chiefs were impacted upon during those early days of 
trading, as disputes between the British traders and the natives were  addressed through 
discussions in meetings between the native chiefs and shipmasters. However, it was only the 
shipmasters who could punish the British seamen.3 Active involvement in the political affairs 
of the tribal people and the colonial occupation of the areas now making up the Ife and the 
Modakeke did not start until 1886, when Lagos was made a separate colony from Gold Coast 
and Sierra-Leone following the Berlin conference of 1884, where the entire Yoruba region 
was accepted as belonging to the British Empire.4 The letter of Governor G.T Carter to 
Chamberlain stated that the foreign traders and missionaries intervened in the wars of the 
Yoruba group primarily for the protection of their trading routes rather than because they had 
a desire to colonise the people and take away their autonomy.5The Treaty entered into between 
Her Majesty the Queen of England and the King, chiefs, elders and peoples of Ife in 1888 
stated that: “[The] Kingdom of Ife is perfectly independent and pays tribute to no other 
power”6 
The 1888 treaty implies that the Ife was not under colonial rule at the time. Supporting this 
position is the statement of Moseley to the Colonial Office in 19047 that the Treaties entered 
into with the Ife were for the mere validation of other treaty agreements entered into with 
Yoruba communities since Ife played an important role in ancient Yoruba. In addition, Lord 
Lugard in his political Memorandum 1913-1918 stated that: 
“there are no two sets of rulers-British and Native working either separately or in co-
operation, but a single Government in which the Native Chiefs have well-defined 
duties and an acknowledged status equally with the British officials.”8 
                                                             
1J. Illiffe., Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 204 
2B.O Nwabueze., A Constitutional History of Nigeria (Hurst & Company London, 1982) p. 5 
3B.O Nwabueze., (1982) Ibid. p.5 
4Nwabueze Stated that Complete Power over the Yoruba Land was by order in Council of 1913 
5Letter of Governor G.T Carter to Chamberlain Dated 11 January, 1896. CSO. 1/1/16 National Archive Ibadan 
6Treaty Between H.M the Queen and the King, Chiefs, Elders and Peoples of Ife. 22 May, 1888 in E. Hertsiet., The Map of Africa by Treaty. 
(3rd edition, British Colonies, Protectorates and Possessions in Africa, Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1967) p. 106 
7Letter of C.H.H. Moseley to the Colonial Office Dated 8th July, 1904 National Archive Ibadan. CSO 1/3 VII  
8Lord Lugard Political Memorandum in A.H.M Kirk-Greene., The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria. Selected Documents 1900-
1947 (Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 71 
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The above statement suggests that it was only when the British could not rule the local people 
by means of the people’s representatives that they decided to take over the complete political, 
legal and military authority of their colonies. A more political action was thus needed and 
effected in 1914 by the amalgamation of the Northern Niger Protectorate and the Southern 
Nigeria Protectorate, joining Yoruba regions and other British territories into the colony and 
protectorate of Nigeria. Colonialization of the local people in Africa was according to Lord 
Lugard due primarily to the idea that they were colonisable.9 This view may have led the 
British to occupy areas around the rivers Niger and Benue and would later begin to impact on 
the political autonomy and dispute resolution processes of the people in these areas. 
From the above discussion, the established start of the time-line for the British takeover of 
tribal political authority is around 1886 when Lagos was colonised, followed by the period 
from 1888 to 1914 when the North and South Protectorates of Nigeria were amalgamated with 
Lagos to form the colonial territory of Nigeria. Therefore, only Constitutions and laws that 
fall within the period starting 1886 and ending in 1960 (when Nigeria gained independence 
from British rule) are analysed to determine the impact of the Constitution and other laws on 
the dispute resolution processes of tribes during the colonial period. The analysis draws on 
various accounts in archival documents, oral interviews conducted and colonial papers 
available on the colonial interventions in the Ife-Modakeke conflict.  
 
With the time-line identified above, the two episodes of violent conflict between the Ife and 
the Modakeke in the colonial era are discussed below in relation to the triggers of the conflict 
and attempts at resolution by separation. 
4.3 The Ife-Modakeke Conflict and Attempts at Dispute Resolution: Colonial Era 
This section argues that the two violent conflict in the colonial era between the Ife and the 
Modakeke are a result of the non-enforcement of separation of the groups by the colonial 
government. Also, the change in economic structure of the groups led to their conflict.  
 
                                                             
9 F. D Lugard., The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London, 1922 W6 9556 British 
Library) p. 9 
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As a starting point, it is essential to point out that the colonial era only saw two violent 
confrontations between the Ife and the Modakeke between 1882 to 1909 and 1946 to 194910 
essentially because the colonial government did not initially change much among the Yoruba 
groups. In fact, Fadipe noted that “the establishment of the British Protectorate over the 
various states of Yorubaland was not accompanied by any major outward change in the system 
of government to which the people had been accustomed.” 11 Therefore, this sub-section 
provides an analysis of the triggers to the two violent conflict and attempts at resolution, to 
demonstrate that non-enforcement of the separation of the groups in colonial times led to the 
continuation of the conflict coupled with the colonial administration sustaining the norms of 
the Yoruba that discriminated against strangers’/settlers’ use of land. 
 
After the 1835 war with the Ife discussed in chapter three (3.2.3), the second violent conflict 
between the Ife and the Modakeke took place in 1882 when Ibadan, an Oyo-migrant Yoruba 
community, used the Modakeke who were Oyo refugees now residing in the outskirts of Ife 
(still part of Ife land) to defeat the Ife in war.12 This led to war between the Ife and the 
Modakeke.13 But this was not the only war going on in the Yorubaland. In a letter to Ripon in 
1891, the governor of Lagos G.T Carter requested that the Ife evacuate their war encampment 
against the Modakeke and return to their homes.14 Ife also took part in the sixteen years of 
wars (1877-1893) with Ibadan and other Yoruba countries in the most notorious war at Kiriji 
which ended with a peace treaty in 1886.15  
 
The proliferation of war in Yorubaland clearly shows that war was a means of addressing 
disputes with other sub-groups of the Yoruba. This was corroborated by the people themselves 
in interviews conducted in Ife-Modakeke in 2014. When asked questions on the consequence 
of not honouring traditional settlements, one participant said: “They will have to accept the 
settlement otherwise there will be war.”16Also giving the history of the Modakeke as handed 
orally down to him, a Modakeke participant said: “That time there was crisis between Ife and 
Modakeke in 1884. In 1884 when the crisis came the two communities were fought so 
                                                             
10R.A Asiyanbola., ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: A Case of Ife-Modakeke in Historical Perspective’. Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences 
and Creative Arts. vol. 5 no. 1, 2010, p. 61-78[ 63] 
11 N.A Fadipe., The Sociology of the Yoruba (Ibadan University Press, 1970) p. 213 
12 I.A Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1998) p. 14 
13I.A Akinjogbin., (1998) Ibid. p. 14 
14 See letter of Gilbert T Carter to Ripon dated 30 August, 1894. CSO 1/1/14 National Archive Ibadan 
15 W. Bascom., The Yoruba of South-Western Nigeria (University of California, Berkeley 1969) p. 15 
16 See Interview IMa26  
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meanwhile Modakeke have to go away from Ife.”17These statements corroborated the 
conclusion reached by this thesis that war was a method of conflict resolution recognised by 
the people themselves. Yet war as a means of dispute resolution only results in a continuation 
of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. 
 
One very notable intervention of the British colonial administration in the Yoruba wars came 
in September/October 1886 when the Lagos government sent a peace envoy to the Yoruba 
interior. According to Akinjogbin, the envoy became “disenchanted with protracted and 
intractable conflict and left early November”18 Captain A.C Maloney the new governor of 
Lagos then set up a peace commission in 1886 to look into the Yoruba wars that included that 
of the Ife and Modakeke.19 He made the Ife and the Modakeke send representatives to Lagos 
where a peace treaty was drawn up.  In an attempt to bring permanent peace to the Yorubaland, 
the British colonial government intervened in the conflict in 1886 by having parties to all the 
existing local conflicts in the Yorubaland sign a peace Treaty.20 The fifth clause of the Treaty 
provided that the Modakeke should abandon the land allocated to them by the Ife king Ooni 
Abewaile and move to the mainland of the Ife.21 Under the provisions of the 1886 Treaty, the 
Modakeke land was to revert to the Ife kings and chiefs who were to deal with the land as 
they thought expedient.22Apparently, the Ife kings and chiefs did not enforce the Treaty and 
neither did the colonial government. As a result, the individual Ife people started taking steps 
to enforce the law by molesting the Modakeke people.23 According to Johnson, the colonial 
resident officer in the Ife saw the Modakeke being molested but did nothing about it and in 
1909 the Ife was broken up, the Modakeke fleeing from their land.24There is no proof that the 
Modakeke went to settle in any other part of Nigeria but evidence shows that the Ife did not 
reoccupy the Modakeke land when they were disbanded. According to Willet in 1910, when 
archaeologist Leo Frobenius visited Ife and requested a visit to Modakeke, Modakeke was in 
ruins and not being occupied by the Ife.25 Because the Ife did not occupy the Modakeke land, 
                                                             
17 See Interview MA6  
18 A. Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yoruba Land 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1998) p. 272 
19Letter by Maloney 1886in C.R Niven., A Short History of the Yoruba People (Longmans, Green & Co., 1958) p. 100 
20S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge & Sons Ltd 
,1921) p. 723 
21I. A Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yoruba Land 1793-1893(Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1992) p. 272 
22See 1886 Treaty in Appendix of S. Johnson., (1921) Ibid. 
23S. Johnson., (1921) Op cit.  p. 646 
24S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge & Sons Ltd 
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it paved the way for the Modakeke future return to their land allocated to them by the Ife king 
Abewaila and the continuation of the conflict between the groups. 
In a letter dated 27th May 1915 to the Resident Officer on the re-migration of the Modakeke 
to the Ife, the Ooni of Ife stated that the Ifes would not wish to have the Modakeke back to 
Ile-Ife. Their reason being that they “do not want to turn what [their] fore-father has put 
right”26 The Ooni then went ahead to plead that the Commissioner at Oyo help to enforce their 
wish. 
It is obvious from the 1915 letter of the Ooni that the Ife recognized that physical separation 
was the right way to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict but needed the help of the colonial 
administration to enforce the non-return of the Modakeke to Ile-Ife. However, according to 
Johnson because of scarcity of land, the Modakeke came back to settle in the Ife in the 
1920’s.27The return of the Modakeke was against the wishes of the colonial government 28 
and their return was not to Ife main city but to their initial separate settlements. This is 
supported by the response of the resident officer in a letter dated 4th June 1915 to the secretary 
of the southern province in which he stated emphatically that he did not back the return of the 
Modakeke to Ife, rather he preferred them to settle at Lasole where they had originally been 
sent by the Alaafin before colonial intervention.29 Also in a letter from the senior resident 
officer at Oyo to the District Officer at Ibadan dated 25th March 1919, the Resident officer 
stressed that: “The Town of Modakeke cannot be re-built without reference to his Excellency 
the Governor…. I shall support no re-migration of any Modakeke from Ibadan territory.”30 
Although the colonial government did not actively support the return of the Modakeke to the 
land  the Ooni had settled them previously, the Modakeke returned to their  settlement  with 
a condition that Modakeke would not be a separate community but part of the Ife.31 This 
arrangement later posed a problem because, although by virtue of the Treaty they agreed to 
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return as part of the Ife, their return was not physically into Ile-Ife but to an old Modakeke 
settlement which appeared to have been autonomous of the Ife.32 
There was peace from 1920 to 1930 because, according to Asiyanbola, the Ogunsua33 of 
Modakeke was incorporated by the colonial government into the native administrative system 
of Ife 34apparently giving the Modakeke pride of place in the Ife and ensuring their relative 
autonomy. The Modakeke later tried to breach the terms of their return by applying for a 
separate native court for their people. The colonial government rejected the application in 
194035apparently as a means of enforcing the 1886 Treaty that requested the Modakeke leave 
their land and move into Ile-Ife as part of Ife or go somewhere else to settle.  Also, although 
there was already an Ife Imam for the Muslim community in Ife, the Modakeke petitioned the 
Ooni of Ife for their own separate Imam but the Ooni rejected the petition stating that the 
Modakeke were a quarter in Ife and not a separate community.36  This failure to acknowledge 
to the Modakeke that they were separate from the Ife, even though they had returned to the 
Ife, meant that the conflict persisted among the groups as the Modakeke refused to see 
themselves as part of the Ife.  
 
The second violent conflict between the two groups was in 1946 with the new trigger of the 
conflict being the cocoa boom. The Ife started requesting 10% of the cocoa yield as a form of 
Ishakole, rent for the use of land by the Modakeke. The latter refused to pay, writing to the 
colonial government complaining of the Ife extortion but the Modakeke failed on judicial 
rulings in 1948.37This led to continued bitterness between the Ife and the Modakeke. The 
colonial State could not end the conflict between them through separation. The reasons are 
provided below by an analysis of the social, economic and political structure of the Yoruba 
in colonial times. 
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4.4 The Ife and the Modakeke Social Structure in Colonial Nigeria 
Considering that the overall theme of this thesis is that economic and political separation is 
both feasible and useful for resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict, this section analyses the 
colonial precedent of separation and considers the reasons for the success or failed use of this 
method to resolve the conflict.  The first line of analysis is the social structure of the Ife and 
the Modakeke under the colonial administration. In this section, the thesis demonstrates that 
the social structure of the Ife and the Modakeke in colonial times did not encourage separation 
as a dispute resolution mechanism even though the colonial government made attempts at 
separating the groups. The colonial government, by sustaining the Yoruba norm of Ishakole 
and the indirect rule system in which the traditional rulers were used to rule the people, 
retained the hierarchy between natives and settlers thus sustaining the conflict rather than 
resolving it. Chapter three demonstrated that the Ife and the Modakeke did not have close 
kinship ties except for marriage and belief in the same origin, therefore separation was 
possible but did not result in permanent resolution of the conflict because there was hierarchy 
between the natives and the settlers.  This hierarchy was evident in the land tenure system and 
meant that the Modakeke could not deal with land in the same way as the Ife regardless of 
how long they lived together. 
4.4.1 Kinship Ties 
Within Yoruba groups, the compound was still the unit of society in colonial times because 
everything in pre-colonial Yoruba remained the same in the early beginnings of the colonial 
era. As stated in a letter of Bennett to Baylis dated 20th July 1897 “The local officials of the 
RNC do not as a rule attempt any interference with the customs and laws of the people…”38 
However, in the resolution of conflict between the Yoruba groups, the colonial administration 
eroded the autonomous status of these Yoruba groups by means of indirect rule, which was 
an attempt by the colonial administration at restoring the monarchy arrangement in 
Yorubaland. Such indirect rule meant that local traditional rulers continued to rule their people 
while being answerable to the colonial power.39 This was deemed necessary by the colonial 
power because they wanted the cooperation of the traditional rulers who at the start of colonial 
rule had lost their place among the people. Akinjogbin reported that, by 1862, militarism had 
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overshadowed and undermined monarchy and the powers of rulers.40 During this time period, 
Adepegba described the extent of the powers of the military over the rulers of the people, 
claiming that when there were claims of superiority among the Yoruba, they were decided in 
the battlefields.41 With respect to this, Adepegba further noted that: “those who dictated the 
events of the period were in some cases not the rulers of the people; they were the soldiers of 
fortune to whom the rulers looked in the face of attack.”42 
With the powers of the military described above, suffice it to state that the situation needed 
intervention. Such intervention came when the British colonial rule tried to salvage the 
situation by introducing indirect rule, where the powers of the military were reduced by 
bestowing new chieftaincies on prominent military war lords and placing them under the 
existing traditional rulers.43While this served to restore the pre-19th century monarchy 
arrangement, the reality is that the association of the colonial administrators with the elite of 
the Yoruba created artificial ties for the people to suit the need for colonialization. For 
example, Captain W.A. Ross was appointed as district commissioner in Oyo in 1906 to 1931. 
Then he became close friends with the ruler of new Oyo named Ladugbolu. The relationship 
led to the elevation of the Alaafin of Oyo over the other Yoruba areas. Otite noted that what 
colonialism did was help to perpetuate or encourage internal separateness and gave a lack of 
recognition of group differences and boundaries by “incorporating traditional institutions into 
its administrative arrangement.”  Having succeeded in weakening the internal harmony of 
ethnic groups, they could then “rule each and all of them [colonised states] together more 
effectively”44 This invariably contributed to the animosity and struggles for superiority that 
continued to exist between the Ife and the Modakeke. 
4.4.2 Land 
As discussed in chapter three, under the social structure of pre-colonial Ife and Modakeke, in 
pre-colonial times there was no scramble for land as each adult native male that needed land 
had it. In the colonial times however, land became very valuable as it was used for planting 
cash crops that yielded profitable trade to the local people and the European traders. As a 
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result of the realization of the value of land in the colonial times, suddenly each group wanted 
to keep whatever land they had in the family. As noted by Boone45the people who bore the 
burden of that were always the strangers and, in this case, it was the Modakeke. The Ife wanted 
to reclaim the land given to the Modakeke and the Modakeke in return laid claim to the land 
given to them by the Ooni in pre-colonial times and refused to relinquish it.  
 
The difference in the number of contemporary Ife participants who stated that land was the 
major contributing factor to the triggers for the Ife-Modakeke conflict compared with the 
Modakeke numbers is indicative of how both groups view land as part of the conflict. For the 
Ife, 26 out of the 50 participants noted that land was a major contributory factor to the conflict, 
while for the Modakeke it was 14 out of 26. This amounts to 52% for the Ife as against 33% 
of the Modakeke. The Ife thus see land struggles as a very high cause of the conflict. This is 
not surprising as the Ife were the earliest residents in the land while the Modakeke are settlers 
in the region. 
 
While in pre-colonial times traditional rulers dealt with land communally, in the colonial 
times, the traditional rulers could no longer solely proceed in this way. The colonialists dealt 
with lands as Crown properties, even the lands of the tribal people were transferred to other 
groups at the will of the colonialist.46 Although the traditional rulers became part of the 
colonial government as native authorities, the description of indirect rule offered by Lord 
Lugard (a former Governor-General of Nigeria) in his 1922 book shows that the traditional 
rulers were merely puppets in the hands of the British administration.  Lugard explained that: 
“The Resident’s advice on general policy must be followed but the native ruler issues 
his own instructions to his subordinate chiefs and district heads - not as the orders of 
the Resident but as his own”47 
Therefore, the Ife could not claim tribute from the Modakeke without resistance and court 
cases from them. The colonial administration, however, sided with the Ife to continue the 
norm of paying Ishakole, this time not as gratitude for use of land but as rent. As a result, the 
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Modakeke petitioned the Ooni of Ife on the payment of Ishakole.48 In reply to the petition it 
was noted that: 
“Every Modakeke man has a right to own land if only he agrees to go to the bush and 
take it. But whoever chooses to farm in another man’s land must pay the inevitable 
fee. There is no justification for a man to refuse to pay Ishakole to his landlord.”49 
This statement reveals the Ooni’s decision on the matter. The colonial administration 
supported the decision of the Ooni replying to the Modakeke Memorandum to the Chief 
Commissioner of the Western Province on the same matter of Ishakole50 that: 
“His Honor has no intention, and indeed has no power to order the Ife people to 
refrain from demanding the Ishakole which they regard as the customary payment by 
tenant to landlord…”51 
The government response pointed the people to the decision of the Ooni and concluded that 
if any Ife landlord feels their rights have been deprived, they should have recourse to the 
established courts.52This continued the hierarchy of the Ife against the Modakeke settlers and 
thus the continued conflict.  
4.4.3 Native/Indigene-Settler Relationship 
Mamdani wrote on the effects of colonialism in Africa. His main contention was that 
colonialism was not just felt economically in Africa, as indicated in most literature but 
included the creation of segmentation in African ethnic groups by encouraging cultural 
identity issues, emphasizing the differences between cultural and political identities.53 His 
argument centred mainly on the detrimental effect of the colonial powers’ governing of ethnic 
groups through customary laws rather than civil laws, creating a difference between races 
(non-natives) and ethnicities (natives), between civil rights and customs and between civil 
laws and customary laws.  
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Civil laws, Mamdani argued, set the “limits to power” adding that “civic power was to be 
exercised within the rule of law and had to observe the sanctity of the domain of rights.” 
However, customary laws he argued “did not circumscribe power, for custom was enforced. 
The language of custom enabled power instead of checking it by drawing boundaries around 
it. In such an arrangement, no rule of law was possible.” 54 
Mamdani stated that the colonial State gave civil rights to non-natives and customary laws to 
natives. Hence, according to him, “rights belonged to non-natives. Natives had to live 
according to custom.”55 This created a dual system of rights in the colonial era. For Mamdani 
the post-colonial State, which he calls the “mainstream nationalist” inherited and reproduced 
the dual identity crated by the colonial State, that of natives and non-natives (or settlers as 
used by modern State) and native rights and non-native rights. In his words, however, the 
post-colonial state not only gave civil rights to all citizens both natives and non-natives 
(indigenous and nonindigenous), but the State gave customary rights as a bonus to the 
indigenous citizens.56 Thus a system of inequality was reproduced which continues to bedevil 
ethnic groups in Africa today, including in Nigeria.  
Turner maintained that two groups with different status positions will always be in conflict, 
the superior group wanting to maintain their status and the inferior group seeking liberation 
from an inferior position.57 This is corroborated by the relationship of Ife and Modakeke prior 
to the conflict between them. Oladoyin noted that the initial relationship between the Ifes and 
the Modakekes was cordial when it was the superior Ife over the immigrant, inferior 
Modakeke, until the former lost political and economic dominance over the latter.58 This 
continued differentiation in status between the groups led to continued conflict and greater 
appeals for separation on the part of the Modakeke. The method of conflict resolution initiated 
by the British colonial administration was having parties to all the existing local conflicts in 
the Yorubaland sign a peace Treaty in 1886.59 The fifth clause of the Treaty provided that the 
Modakeke should abandon their land and move to the mainland of the Ife60 and for the  
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Modakeke land to revert to the Ife kings and chiefs who were to deal with the land as they 
thought expedient.61 This resolution sustained the native/indigene-settler hierarchy 
relationship between the Ife and the Modakeke because the Treaty made it clear  that the land 
belonged to the first settlers, the Ife, thus the Modakeke had no rights to the land as settlers in 
Ife.  
4.5 Economic Structure of the Ife and the Modakeke and Separation 
Although it was the principle of the colonial administration never to alienate indigenous lands, 
because of foreign companies coming to manage palm plantations it became necessary to do 
so. This land alienation introduced a lucrative economy for the Yoruba and led to greedy 
alienation.62 Following this, the new-found norm of the people led to the increased 
determination of the Modakeke to be self-ruled and the Ife, on the other hand, to want to keep 
the Modakeke territory as Ife property and not allow the Modakeke to become independent 
people.  
Also, during the colonial period in Nigeria, different groups, especially the three major ethnic 
groups, depended upon various cash crops or minerals. The north depended on groundnut, the 
East on palm products and the West on cocoa. Post and Vickers noted that this variation was 
the basis for separate political developments that ended in polarization of the groups.63 Rather 
than bringing groups into close cooperation, the economic structure of the colonial era served 
to separate them. With regards to the Ife and the Modakeke as part of the Western Yoruba 
groups, the high dependency on cocoa drove a wedge between the two groups and triggered 
the 1946 conflict which saw the Modakeke more determined to be separate from the Ife as the 
Ife landlords demanded more Ishakole for the use of their land to farm cocoa. If the two groups 
had remained separated during the colonial era and during the cocoa boom, the conflict would 
not have resumed in 1946 with the increased demand for Ishakole by the Ife landlords. There 
would have been no need for the Modakeke to pay the Ishakole.  
In addition, during the colonial era, the Native authority, which was the British way of indirect 
rule through the tribal leaders, needed financing by means of taxation of the people.   This 
proved to be problematic as the people were not used to a systematic method of taxation, even 
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though they were used to giving tributes to their kings.64Thus the Modakeke needed to 
continue to pay the Ishakole and this continued the terms of the conflict. Fadipe’s observation 
of the effect of the economic shift during the colonial era appears to endorse the negative 
impact of the colonial era on Ife autonomy and conflict resolution abilities.  Fadipe noted that 
indirect rule saw the chiefs and king restored to their economic and political positions. This 
is because under the Native Authority system, the chief collected taxes from the people and 
served in the Native courts. As a result, the evils usually associated with money began to be 
felt by the Yoruba people. The interest of the chiefs became very removed from the interests 
of the people.  Fadipe further noted that:  
“Squabbles about boundaries took place with greater frequency and persistence than 
would have been the case if the chiefs did not know that the greater the number of 
heads the greater the dividend among themselves.”65 
The loss of integrity of those who were in a position of trust to resolve the conflicts of the Ife 
and Modakeke, namely their chiefs, was being directly influenced by monetary gain. As a 
result, justice was not to be expected from these corrupt rulers. Traditional dispute resolution 
was thus negatively impacted by the Colonial State.     
Local government laws such as the Western Region Policy 1952, fashioned after the English 
Local Government Act of 1933, created a three-tier system of government: regional, district, 
and local councils.66 The local councils had jurisdiction over remote communities such as the 
Ife and the Modakeke and gave each council autonomy to access taxes, rates and award 
contracts. This economic benefit created more determination in the Modakeke to be separate 
from the Ife. The finding of oil in Nigeria in 1958 later created greater dependency that led to 
further conflict between the groups but this will be discussed in the next chapter. Coleman 
rightly summed it up by indicating that the changes from self-sufficiency to dependence in oil 
have “profoundly affected traditional loyalties, patterns of behaviours, and social 
obligations.”67 
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4.6 The Ife and the Modakeke Colonial Political Structure and Separation 
Chapter three demonstrated that the political structure and the judicial structure of the Yoruba 
including the Ife and the Modakeke were fused in pre-colonial times with the traditional rulers 
playing the roles of both king and adjudicator for the people. Thus, a disruption of the judicial 
powers of the Yoruba traditional rulers struck a “decisive blow against the sovereignty of the 
Yoruba states.” This section argues that the loss of judicial sovereignty by the Yoruba rulers, 
in effect the Ooni of Ife, by treaties signed in the early 19th century British colonial rule meant 
that the Ooni could not keep the Modakeke separate from the Ife so as to resolve the conflict. 
The Ooni had to rely on the colonial government to keep the Modakeke from returning into 
the Ile-Ife.  
It will be recalled that in chapter three it was stated that the Yoruba groups were engaged in 
wars among themselves for many decades. During this period, the traditional rulers lost their 
prominence in Yorubaland. They could not stop the wars that had engulfed the Yorubaland 
and  the struggle for supremacy in the 19th century which led to the movement from 
monarchical rule where the right to rule was inherited68 to purely military rule where the 
military warlords decided on war outside the wishes of their king.69 Akinjogbin stated that, 
by 1862, militarism had overshadowed and undermined monarchy and the powers of rulers.70 
During this time period, Adepegba described the extent of the powers of the military over the 
rulers of the people, claiming that when there were claims of superiority among the Yoruba, 
they were decided in the battlefields.71 
The loss of the Yoruba kings’ political powers meant that they could not settle the internal 
and external conflicts in Yorubaland, their words were no longer respected or taken as final. 
Johnson noted that the efforts of the traditional rulers to bring peace to the Yorubaland were 
limited at the time.72As evidence of the failures of the traditional rulers to resolve the conflicts 
in their communities, an 18th century Yoruba ruler Adeyemi, the Alaafin of Oyo Kingdom, 
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with the greatest distress, called out for assistance to the British colonial government in these 
words: 
  “[w]ith all possible speed I beg that the Imperial Government…come to my help.”73 
Also, the king of Iwo made a plea to the imperial government in these words: 
“Do not leave us. There is not a king in this whole country that is not in some way 
mixed up in this war, so there is not one who can act as mediator. We can only look 
to the white man to act for us in this capacity.”74 
Those frantic words underscore the point that the Yoruba traditional rulers could not end 
violent conflicts in their communities, the Ife and Modakeke groups being an example of one 
such Yoruba community. In the case of the Ife-Modakeke conflict, attempts by the Ooni of 
Ife to end the conflict by separating the sub-groups in 1835 did not last long and the conflict 
continued. 
The British colonial administration came to the rescue of the Yorubaland and made all groups 
sign the 1886 Treaty of Peace and the Yoruba wars ended in 1893. As gratitude to the British 
government, the Yoruba traditional leaders agreed to sign various treaties granting the 
colonial administration rights over the judicial system and lands.75 As for the Ife, as soon as 
the Oyo signed a judicial agreement, the Ooni of Ife himself invited the colonial 
administrators to sign one with him.76 In time, the colonial administration took over dispute 
resolution from the traditional leaders only leaving them with customary matters deemed not 
repugnant to public justice.  
The year 1914 proved to be the major turning point in colonial rule when an Order in Council 
amalgamated the northern Protectorate of Nigeria and southern Protectorate of Nigeria under 
one rule: the Nigerian State.77 The amalgamation brought together distinct people under one 
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early Administration to break the power of the various states [tribal states] by armed force...” see Colonial Report-Annual No. 878 Nigeria. 
report for 1914 presented to both the Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. April 1916. Printed under the Authority of his 
Majesty’s Stationary Office by Barclay and Fry Ltd, The Grove Southwark Street SE. Online: 
Http://Www.Libsysdigi.Library.Illinois.Edu/Iiharvest/1914/306434_1914_Opt.Pdf 
76Ooni of Ife letter to A.G Parsons 30 June, 1904; enclosure to Moseley to Colonial Office 8 July, 1904 National Archive Ibadan CSO 1/3 
Vii 
77 Amalgamation of the North and South of Nigeria Protectorate was by the Nigeria Protectorate Order-In-Council 1913. 
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government without much consideration for their complex pluralities.78 The 1914 annual 
report on Nigeria acknowledged that before the amalgamation of 1914, the various groups, 
especially in the north of Nigeria, were under the law courts of traditional rulers who were 
impartial. However, the report continued to state that indirect rule was set up in: 
“...the recognition of the fact that native rulers were not fitted for independent 
government, but that under supervision by a political staff...they could be educated to 
conduct their own affairs and to control a reorganized Native Executive and 
Judiciary”79  
The above statement reveals that the colonialists did not deem the groups fit enough to manage 
their affairs. Since the natives were not deemed qualified to handle executive and judicial 
functions, the judicial system underwent changes in 1914 with a single supreme court hearing 
tribal disputes, land and fishery rights.80 Newly revamped native courts were no longer under 
the traditional rulers but the report noted that the: “...native courts were presided by District 
officer... (an alien to the district on a low salary) and the interpreter.”81 
  
The district officer took over the courts from traditional rulers and in effect removed their 
powers of dispute resolution in contrast with how it truly was in pre-colonial times when the 
rulers were the highest court of appeal.82 Also, the Supreme Court Ordinance 1945 made the 
application of customary laws subject to the repugnancy test where customary laws were only 
applicable when they were not deemed by the court to be repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience.83 
 Different courts came to be operational in the late 1800s. Among these were the Petty Debt 
Court (1863), the Court of Requests (1870) and the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 
(1872). By 1876, the Supreme Court had replaced all other courts. Several Ordinances 
extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to the Western part of Nigeria. A notable 
example is the Ife Jurisdiction Ordinance no. 20, 1904. However overall, it was the 
                                                             
78 Osutokun (1979) p. 98-99 in A.O Oluwatobi., ‘The Politics of States and Local Government Creation in Nigeria: An Appraisal’ European 
Journal of Sustainable Development vol. 2., 2013, p. 155-174 [156] 
79  Colonial Report-Annual No. 878 Nigeria. Ibid. p. 37 
80  Colonial Report-Annual No. 878 Nigeria. Op cit. p. 40 
81   Colonial Report-Annual No. 878 Nigeria. Report for 1914 Presented to both The Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. 
April 1916. Printed under the Authority of His Majesty’s Stationary Office by Barclay and Fry Ltd, The Grove Southwark Street SE. Online: 
Http://Www.Libsysdigi.Library.Illinois.Edu/Iiharvest/1914/306434_1914_Opt.Pdf . p. 41 
82 See Discussions in Chapter 3.6 
83Section 17 (1) of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1945 Chap 211 Laws of the federation of Nigeria containing Ordinances of Nigeria vol vi 
p. 202-236.  
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Jurisdiction of Courts Extension (Protectorate) Ordinance no. 2, 1915 that extended the 
Supreme Court jurisdiction to all Yorubaland.84 Both the old and the new courts were a far 
cry from the native chiefs or the king’s decisions in most Nigerian tribes.  
Customary law was the applicable law of the native courts established in 1900 by Ordinance 
No. 9 of 1900. Appeals lay from the native courts to the magistrate courts set up by the British 
administration. Administrative officers of the courts were all not educated but in 1957 the 
Customary Courts Law No. 26 abolished the native courts and set up customary courts with 
entirely different structures.85The customary courts were presided over by presidents or 
chairmen when more than one sat. The laws used were the customary laws of the people 
provided they were not regarded as repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.  
The courts had narrowed natural justice to situations that were extreme and oppressive to the 
common man. For example, in Charlie King Amachree v Daniel Kallio and others86 the court 
held that the customary law that gave an exclusive right to a person over a great navigable 
river was contrary to natural justice, equity and a good conscience and thus must be held 
unenforceable. This turn of events meant that the peoples’ customary laws became outdated 
and subject to colonial acceptance as a result, the native groups could not be said to have any 
autonomy over their conflict resolution using the accepted rules.  
Although the 1914 Native Authority Ordinance placed the native courts under the authority 
of the native chiefs, these chiefs were supervised by the District Officer appointed by the 
Colonial authority. The Ordinance also gave powers to the District Officer to override the 
decisions of the chiefs and even to order a retrial.87 As a result, as demonstrated in 4.3 the 
Ooni’s wish to keep the Modakeke separate was not granted, the Modakeke came back to the 
Ife in the 1920’s and the conflict continued.  Thus, the loss of the absolute judicial powers of 
the traditional rulers was a blow to the sovereignty of the people. As noted by Adewoye, “[i]n 
Yoruba society, as most other African societies, the ultimate power to redress grievances and 
thereby maintain peace and order is, like sovereignty itself, indivisible. The judicial 
agreements sought to divide that power and consequently undermined the sovereignty of the 
states.”88 This was corroborated by the contemporary Modakeke and Ife people during the 
                                                             
84T.A Aguda., Brief Historical Development of the Western Nigeria Legal System in A. Adedeji., An Introduction to Western Nigeria: Its 
People, Culture and System of Government (Institute of Administration, University of Ife Nigeria, 1966) p. 43 
85A. Adedeji., (1966) Ibid. p. 42 
86Charlie King Amachree v Daniel Kallio (1913) 2 Nigeria Law Report. p. 108 
87Native Authority Ordinance, 1914 
88O. Adewoye., ‘The Judicial Agreements in Yorubaland 1904-1908’ The Journal of African History vol. 12. no. 4, 1971, p. 607-627[623] 
Cambridge University Press 
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interviews in 2014 in which among the Ife 31 out of the 37 responses to the question “Did the 
traditional rulers retain their political and judicial powers during the colonial times?” were 
negative. A similar response was derived from the Modakeke interviews as 33 out of 37 
responded that the traditional rulers lost their political and judicial powers in the colonial era. 
It follows, therefore, that any attempt to separate the groups by the traditional rulers was not 
possible during the colonial era because they lacked such power to enforce the separation. 
Neither did the colonial administration succeed in keeping the groups separate as seen in the 
discussion on the causes of the colonial conflict in 4.3 above, because their main concern was 
the furtherance of their commercial interest not on the people and their conflict.89  
In addition, Vaughan noted that the colonial administration created inconsistencies in the 
Yoruba political structure by elevating some traditional rulers and undermining others. For 
example, he noted that Captain William Ross a district commissioner pre-colonial Oyo 
“worked ceaselessly to advance the authority and prestige of the Alaafin, whom he considered 
the legitimate ruler of the Yoruba people”90 The effect of indirect rule by the colonial 
administration according to Vaughan is that it “...failed to construct a stable mechanism for 
mediating conflict among contending political forces and interests”91 in Yorubaland. 
Therefore, attempts of the colonial administration to keep the groups separate were not 
followed through and the people remained in conflict while the colonial administration took 
care of their own interests.  
In the interviews conducted among contemporary Ife and Modakeke, the nature of the colonial 
impact on the Ife-Modakeke conflict was one of the questions directed to participants. Their 
perceptions of colonial rule on the autonomy of their rulers in relation to dispute resolution 
reveals that both groups recognised the colonial administration to have reduced the political 
powers of their kings and chiefs and in effect their dispute resolution abilities.  33 and 34 out 
of the 37 participants of the Ife and the Modakeke respectively answered that the traditional 
rulers had lost their judicial autonomy during colonial times and thus the continuation of the 
conflict and the inability of any of the traditional rulers then to separate the groups. 
                                                             
89Adewoye noted that the judicial agreements were a crucial element in establishing British authority in Yorubaland. See O. Adewoye., 
(1971) Ibid. p. 621 
90O. Vaughan.,  ‘Chieftaincy Politics and Communal Identity in Western Nigeria 1893-1951’ The Journal of African History vol. 44 no. 2, 
2003, p. 283-302 [290] See also, Elevation of Alaafin over the Ooni of Ife in C.O Adepegba., ‘The Descent from Oduduwa: Claims of 
Superiority Among Some Yoruba Traditional Rulers and The Arts of Ancient Ife’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 
vol. 19. no. 1. p. 77-92[79] Boston University African Studies Centre. Online: Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/218696. Accessed 06/05/13.  
91O. Vaughan., (2003) Ibid. p. 288 
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Furthermore, the amalgamation of the north and south of Nigeria in 1914 created a new 
political unit and groups began to identify themselves not just with tribal allegiances but as 
Nigerians, creating dual loyalties that were led by the educated elites.92 In effect, cultural 
identities transcended kinship and traditional political identifications.93 This suggests that sole 
adherence to traditional norms became destructive in the resolution of the conflict as both 
groups became Nigerians not just Yoruba with dual loyalties. 
In the political sphere, the differentiation between natives and settlers continued in colonial 
Nigeria. Akanji observed that all the colonial constitutions from 1922 to 1960 in Nigeria had 
elements that fostered the native-settler relationships along political lines.94 The Federal 
structure of the country was laid by the Constitution establishing three Regional Houses of 
Assembly in the north, east and west. The regionalization policy led to the creation of three 
majority groups: the Hausa in the North, the Yoruba in the West and the Igbo in the East. 
Within these groups lay minorities and still further minorities within them.95The minority 
groups (tribes) started to clamour for the creation of more states and Local Government areas 
to alleviate the discrimination suffered by the minority tribes.96 
Below is a map showing the three Regions created by the 1946 Constitution that created 
minority problems of discrimination. 97 
                                                             
92M. Crowder., The Story of Nigeria (Faber and Faber Ltd.) p. 207 
93K.W.J Post & M. Vickers., Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966 (Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1973) p. 23 
94 O.O Akanji., ‘The Problem of Belonging: The Identity Question and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Nigeria’ African Identities, 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group) vol. 9. no. 2., May 2010. P. 117-132 [118, 121]  
95 Chapter Five examines in more details the impact of the majority-minority problems raised by the Regionalism created by the 1946 
Constitution had on the Ife-Modakeke conflict 
96 B. Smith., ‘Federal-State Relations in Nigeria’ African Affairs, (Oxford University Press on Behalf of The Royal African Society) vol. 80. 
no. 320., July 1981, p. 355-378 [356] 




Map 2 1954 colonial map showing the three regions, with part of Yorubaland represented by the 
Western Region, and Ife as the smaller Oyo 
The Map above shows the three Regions created by the 1946 Constitution. Within each 
Region were minority groups. 
Akanji noted that the 1946 constitution introduced regionalisation thus marginalising the 
minority groups in Nigeria and making politics toe the line of sectionalism. Thus by 1959 the 
three major political parties represented each of the major tribes in Nigeria. The Action Group 
representing the Yoruba, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) representing the Hausa-
Fulanis in the North and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) 
representing the Igbos.98In addition, Bach noted that the regionalisation of the civil service in 
1954 also fostered native-settler relationships in the colonial era where a settler was defined 
                                                             
98O.O. Akanji., ‘The Problem of Belonging: The Identity Question and the Dilemma of Nation-Building in Nigeria’ African Identities 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group) vol. 9. no. 2., May 2011. p. 117-132 [118, 121]  
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as one who was not a member of a native community living in the area of a native authority.99 
The introduction of indirect rule by the colonial government fostered native-settler 
relationships by retaining the pre-colonial traditional discrimination of settlers. Thus, Graff 
noted that the colonial government fostered separate identities in Nigeria.100The continued 
segregation between settlers and natives, as reflected in the modern State system of Federal 
character in Nigeria, is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In the final analysis, this chapter has demonstrated that the social, economic and political 
structure of the colonial Ife and the Modakeke made separation difficult as a mechanism for 
resolving the conflict. This was in part because the colonial government continued the 
discriminatory land tenure system of the people. This section proves that to separate the 
groups it is thus necessary to separate the norms of the people from their dispute resolution 
mechanism. By so doing the thesis has answered the second research sub-question. To prove 
that the two conflicts during the colonial period were tied to the non-enforcement of the 
separation of the groups in colonial times, this chapter demonstrated that land tenure in the 
colonial era remained largely communal but with the increased value of land came the further 
breakdown of the relationship between those considered the natives and the settlers and this 
fuelled the continuation of the conflict. Also, the native/settler relationship meant that the 
Modakeke continued to pay the Ishakole as land rent in colonial times much to their 
displeasure. Furthermore, evidence and examples from colonial times were provided of the 
economic impact on the conflict demonstrating the consequences of not separating the groups 
in times of economic boom resulting from agriculture and oil revenue. The political structure 
of the groups in colonial times also reveals that indirect rule elevated the Oyo over the other 
Yoruba groups thereby creating power struggles which affected the Ife and Modakeke groups. 
These examples identified the problems of not separating both groups with the changing face 
of the economy and political structure in Yorubaland.  
 
In the next chapter, the modern State’s social, economic and political structure and its impact 
on the conflict and separation of the groups shall be analysed.
                                                             
2. D. Bach., ‘Indigeneity, Ethnicity and Federalism’ in L. Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene & Oyediran (eds.) Transition Without End: Nigerian 
Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 1997) p. 370-392 [376] 




5. CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
NIGERIAN FEDERAL STATE ON THE IFE-MODAKEKE 
CONFLICT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLUTION BY 
SEPARATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines three issues: first, the impact of the social, economic and political 
structure of the modern Nigerian State on the Ife-Modakeke conflict; second, the State’s 
current inability to resolve that conflict; and third, the solution to the conflict by economic 
separation of the Modakeke from the Ife. In order to do this, the chapter first sets out some 
details about past conflict between the Ife-Modakeke and the peoples’ understandings of the 
Federal State’s role in ending the conflict. Ultimately, the chapter makes three arguments. 
The first argument in this chapter is that the Federal State has intervened inadequately in the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict and that the modern structure of the Federal State of Nigeria 
contributes to the continuation of the conflict by sustaining oppressive ancient group norms. 
The second argument is that the Federal State, by means of its inefficient revenue allocation 
policies and the principles of exclusion in the Constitution, has not only rendered itself unable 
to resolve the dispute by economic and political intervention, it has enabled the continuation 
of the conflict. The third argument is that the Federal State has the power to end the conflict 
by following its precedence of devolution of power by state creation in managing group 
conflict, but at a lower Local Government level. Based on the theory of separation and the 
history of the Ife and the Modakeke and their conflict, the solution proposed is that the two 
groups should be separated from each other economically and politically.  The routes by 
which this can be justified are explored below and in later chapters. 
 
The current Nigerian Constitution (and, previous versions) underpins the State’s failures with 
regard to the Ife-Modakeke conflict. First, the Constitution creates or continues dual 
citizenship identities and loyalties: loyalty to the State, and ethnic group loyalty. Second, the 
Constitution provides for political and economic subdivision of Nigeria into states and local 
authorities with economic benefits cascaded from central government to local communities.  
Third, the political structure of the Federal State also provides precedence of conflict 
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resolution in Nigeria by the Federal State sharing powers with the states1 in order to curb 
majority-minority conflicts.   Therefore, the Federal State is in a position to effect conflict 
resolution at the grassroots by enabling states to share powers with the Local Governments. 
In so doing, the Federal State can resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict by accenting to Local 
Governments created by states and funding such Local Governments. 
 
The impact of the modern State on the Ife-Modakeke conflict and dispute resolution and the 
feasibility of a resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict through separation, is assessed by 
answering the third research sub-question: “to what extent does the social, economic and 
political structure of the modern Nigerian State affect the Ife-Modakeke conflict and 
resolution by separation of the groups?” To answer the research sub-question with a coherent 
analysis of the three issues raised, the chapter starts with a time-line for the events analysed. 
Following the time-line provided, the chapter examines the violent clashes between the Ife 
and the Modakeke groups within the time-line provided to determine the triggers to the violent 
clashes in modern times and the feasibility of a solution by economic and political separation 
of the groups.  
5.2 The End of Colonialism and the Legislation of the Nigerian State 
This sub-section demonstrates legislation which is analysed in examining the impact of the 
social, economic and political structure of the Ife and the Modakeke groups in the modern 
State on their conflict. The end of colonialism in Nigeria is the end of the British rule in 
Nigeria. The end of the British rule and Nigerian independence occurred in October, 1960.2  
 
Section 1(1) of Britain’s Nigeria Independence Act, 1960 provides that: 
 
On the first day of October, nineteen hundred and sixty (in this Act referred to as “the 
appointed day”), the Colony and the Protectorate as respectively defined by the 
Nigeria (Constitution) Orders in Council, 1954-1960, shall together constitute part of 
Her Majesty’s dominions under the name Nigeria.3 
                                                             
1 As described in the definition session in the beginning of the thesis, states beginning with small letter ‘s’ refers to the second tier of 
government in Nigeria while State beginning with capital letter ‘S’ refers to the Sovereign States not organs of a State. See p. xx 
2 The History of Nigeria in History World. Available Online  
Http://Www.Historyworld.Net/Wrldhis/Plaintexthistories.Asp?Historyid=Ad41 




Section 3(1) of the same statute also clearly provides that: 
 
Notwithstanding anything in the Interpretation Act, 1889, the expression “Colony” in 
any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day 
shall not include Nigeria or any part thereof. 
 
The above provisions indicates that although Nigeria became independent from British rule 
on 1 October  1960, it only became a Republic in 1963 by virtue of section 2 of Nigeria’s 
1963 Republican Constitution.4  That Constitution removed the Queen of England as the Head 
of State of the Federation, and the executive powers were then vested in the Nigerian 
President.5 Although, Nigeria became a Republic in 1963, on the international level, Nigeria 
became a sovereign State on 1 October, 1960.6 It is important to mention when Nigeria 
became a Republic because some Nigerians still considered the period between 1960 and 1963 
to be a colonial period, therefore placing the birth of the Nigerian State as sovereign, in 1963 
rather than 1960. For example, an academic, Olaide, noted that the 1963 Constitution emerged 
mainly to free Nigerians from colonialism that was still inherent in the 1960 Independent 
Constitution.7 However, in this thesis, the impact of the modern State of Nigeria will be 
measured from 1st  October, 1960 because that was when Nigeria officially gained her 
independence from British rule. The composition of the modern Nigerian State is provided 
below to aid an understanding of the impact of the modern State in the prevention and 







                                                             
4 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963. Herein after called the 1963 Constitution 
5 Section 84 of the 1963 Constitution of Nigeria  
6 Nigeria was admitted into the United Nations as a Sovereign State 7th October, 1960. See the list of United Nations Member States and 
dates of Admission Online: Http://Www.Un.Org/En/Member-States/Index.Html 
7 I.A Olaide., ‘Towards the People’s Constitution in Nigeria. Journal of Law and Diplomacy’ vol. 7. no. 2., 2010, p. 87-93 [89] 
101 
 
5.3 The Relationship Between the Nigerian State and the Ife and the Modakeke 
The most recent Constitution of Nigeria is the 1999 Constitution. Section 2(1) of the 1999 
Constitution provides that: “Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign State to be 
known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”8  
Section 2(2) of the 1999 Constitution states that: “Nigeria shall be a Federation consisting of 
states and a Federal Capital Territory.” 
A federation emerges in either of two ways, one; the coming together of previous independent 
States as one single State (e.g. Canada and the United States) or, two; by devolution of powers 
between levels of political authorities (e.g. Nigeria and India).9 Nigeria as a Federal State is 
made up of diverse peoples within three sub-structures, namely: the Federal capital; 36 states; 
and 768 Local Government Areas. As well as being Nigerians, these diverse communities 
maintain their respective local group identities within the federalism. As rightly pointed out 
by Chibueze, “[a] federal system of government often arises from the desire of the peoples to 
form a union without necessarily losing their identities.”10 The federal State of Nigeria 
dispenses its obligations towards the thirty-six states and the numerous diverse local 
communities within local authorities through constitutionally guaranteed rights provided for 
in Chapter IV of the Constitution.  These are fundamental human rights in the 1999 
Constitution.11 It will be argued that it is the denial of economic human rights to the Modakeke 
which needs to be corrected so as to provide them with the independence which is at the heart 
of the solution to the conflict: economic separation from the Ife. The Ife and the Modakeke 
belong to one of the 36 states of Nigeria- the Osun state which was carved out of old Oyo 
state in 1991.12 The Osun State covers approximately 14,875sq kms with more than two 
hundred major towns and villages. 13 Ife, incorporating Modakeke, is one of the major towns 
of Osun state. 
                                                             
8The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Cap. 23 Laws of The Federation of Nigeria 2004. Available Online: 
Www.Nigerstate.Gov.Ng/Epubl/Niger-Constituion-1999.Pdf 
9O. Aboyade., Integrated Economies: A Study of Developing Economies (London England: ELBS & Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1985)  
10I.C Chibueze., ‘Politics of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria: A Reconsideration of some Contending Issues’ Sacha Journal of Policy a 
Strategic Studies vol. 1. no.1, 2011, p.121-136 [122] 
11The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Ibid  
12‘Osun State History: Website of Osun state Nigeria’ Online: Http://Osun.Gov.Ng/About/History/  
13‘Osun State: Geography’ Website of Osun state Nigeria Http://Osun.Gov.Ng/About/Geography 
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Map 3 Map 3 Undated, present-day map of Nigeria showing Ile-Ife in Osun State (Google authorised map) 
5.4 The Relationship Between the Ife and the Modakeke in Modern Nigeria 
Ife is bounded by the Ogun, Kwara, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti states of Nigeria in the South, North, 
West and East of Nigeria respectively.15 It lies within the high forest zone of Southern Nigeria, 
7° 28 north of the Equator and 4° 34 east of Greenwich at a height of 800 feet above sea 
level.16While Modakeke is 241 metres above sea level with Latitude 7: 23 North of the 
Equator and Longitude 4: 16 East of Greenwich.17 The population of Ife is set at 529, 90518and 
                                                             
14Map created by the researcher from Google my map. See Appendix 5 containing email from Google permitting the researcher to use 
Google my maps for her thesis. 
15A. Oyewole & J. Lucas., Historical Dictionary of Nigeria (2nd edition. Africa Historical Dictionaries, no.40, The Scarecrow Press. Inc. 
Lanham, Maryland and London) p. 424 
16Statistics in O.A Ajala & A.M Olayiwola., ‘An Assessment of the Growth of Ile-Ife Osun State Nigeria using Multi-Temporal Imageries’ 
Journal of Geography and Geology vol. 5. no.1, 2013, p. 45 
17Http://Ng.Geoview.Info/Modakeke,2330028 




the population of Modakeke is set at approximately 113,000.19 The distance between Ife and 
Modakeke is 21 miles, from the centre of Ife to the centre of Modakeke and 33.79 in 
kilometres which translate to 0.43 hours (26 minutes) journey when driving at 96 km/h.20 
Below is a map of Ife showing some Ife and Modakeke localities.21 
 
Map 4 Undated, part of a present-day map showing an approximation of the relationship between Ife and 
Modakeke locations in Ile-Ife (Google authorised map) 
                                                             
19Http://Ng.Geoview.Info/Modakeke,2330028 
20Http://Www.Distance-Calculator.Co.Uk/Miles-From-Ife-Nigeria-To-Modakeke-Nigeria.Htm 
21Map created by the researcher from Google my map. See Appendix 6 containing email from Google permitting the researcher to use 
Google my maps for her thesis. 
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Johnson has noted that only a small stream separates the Ife from the Modakeke.22 Apart from 
living in close proximity, both groups have intermarried over the years.23 Contemporary Ife 
and Modakeke participants in the interviews conducted in 2014 agreed that the Ife and the 
Modakeke groups are mixed. 45 of the 50 Ife participants stated that the Ife is mixed with the 
Modakeke while 39 of the 42 Modakeke participants agreed that the Modakeke is mixed with 
the Ife.24 When asked: Is the Modakeke people mixed with Ife people? Do they live mixed 
together? An Ife participant stated: 
“Modakeke lives with Ife and Ife lives with Modakeke because all the boundaries were owned 
by Ife. Modakeke people were given land by Ife. When asked how the mixing came about? 
His reply was: “Through marriage.”25 Some of the Ife participants noted however that at 
present the Ife and the Modakeke are sceptical about intermarriage with the Modakeke.26 
The response from the Modakeke was similar to that of the Ife participants. For example, 
when asked the question: Is the Modakeke mixed with the Ife? If yes, how did the mixing 
come about? A Modakeke participant responded: Yes, as a result of marriage.27 
The question is, does intermarriage make Modakeke and Ife the same community? Empirical 
work carried out in both groups does not show that the high rate of intermarriage between the 
two groups has changed the feelings of separateness. The majority of the Ife and the 
Modakeke participants (in fact, 90% of both the Ife and the Modakeke participants) stated 
that they were not the same people.28 During the interviews conducted by the researcher in 
June/July 2014, 45 of 50 of the Ife participants noted that the Ife-Modakeke are mixed but 
they do not consider themselves to be the same group, while 39 of the 42 Modakeke 
participants said that they were mixed with the Ife but not of the same group.29 An earlier 
study by Asiyanbola also demonstrated that more than 40% (33% and 13.6% respectively) of 
the children of intermarriage between both communities are viewed by both the Ife and the 
                                                             
22S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge & Sons Ltd 
,1921) p. 477 
23R.A Asiyanbola., ‘Identity Issues in Urban Ethno-Communal Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Study of Ife-Modakeke Crisis in Nigeria’ 
African Sociological Review vol. 13. no. p. 92.  Johnson is not referring to land ownership; but if the Modakeke’s argument (discussed 
below) is successful, the stream would probably become the territorial boundary between the Ife and the Modakeke.  
24 See Ife and Modakeke coding in appendix 13 and 14 respectively 
25 Ife interview IMA 9 
26 Ife interviews IMA 9 and IMA 14 
27 Modakeke Interview MMA 1 
28 See interview coding of the Ife and the Modakeke in appendix 134 and 14 respectively 
29See Coding from interviews in Appendix 13 and 14 for the Ife and the Modakeke respectively   
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Modakeke as either strangers or enemies.30 Despite their similarities, the Ife and the 
Modakeke has been locked in violent conflict for over a century. Although, the last violence 
between the Ife and the Modakeke was in the year 2000, this long period of peace should not 
be construed as permanent peace between the communities. As soon as a window of 
opportunity presents itself, the age-old bitterness arises in the form of violence. From the 
interviews conducted by this researcher among the Ife and the Modakeke in 2014, it was found 
that 44% and 57% of the Ife and the Modakeke respectfully thought that the conflict was still 
active.31 In addition,  as recently as the years 200832 and 2014,33 the Nations Newspaper of 
Nigeria reported that the Modakeke community were still angry because the Ife had not 
allowed the Modakeke to have access to farming lands (the Ife claim that the lands  are theirs 
while the Modakeke insist they have been farming those lands for a long time)  since the year 
2000.34 The report stated that the investigation by the Nations Newspaper revealed that “the 
Ife had planted their own people and installed Baales (village heads) on [the] farm lands [of 
the Modakeke] and found it difficult to quit.”35 There has been no change since 2014 therefore 
a fresh bout of violence is probable, making government intervention by addressing rights 
relating to land use and the status of Modakeke in Ife more urgent now than ever before.  
Apparently, although the Ife wants the Modakeke to remain politically and economically part 
of the Ife, when it comes to land use, the Ife do not want the Modakeke to make use of Ife 
land occupied by the Modakeke for their own economic sustenance. To demonstrate the 
urgency of separating the groups economically and politically, the next section examines in 
more detail the four episodes of violent clashes between the two groups in the years from 
independence in 1960 to the present time 2018, while Identifying the triggers to the violent 
confrontations.36 
5.5 History of Ife-Modakeke Conflict: 1960-the Year 2000 
As mentioned in the background to the thesis in chapter one, there have been seven violent 
clashes so far between the Ife and the Modakeke. Four of these clashes have taken place after 
                                                             
30R.A Asiyanbola., (2009) Ibid. p. 92 
31 See coding of Ife and Modakeke responses in Appendix 14 and 15 respectively. The coding is presented in percentages here 
32The Nations Newspaper “Modakeke Community Still in Pains” 30th March, 2008. Online: 
Http://Www.Thenationonlineng.Net/Archivez/Tblnews-Detail.Php?Id=47865 
33The Punch Newspaper 20 October, 2014: “Fresh Crisis Between the Ife, Modakeke” Online: Http://www.punchng,com/news/fresh-crisis-
brews-between-ife-modakeke. 
34The Nations Newspaper “Modakeke Community Still in Pains” 30th March, 2008. Ibid 
35The Nations Newspaper “Modakeke Community Still in Pains” 30th March, 2008. Op cit 
36 The pre-colonial and colonial conflict between the Ife and Modakeke is discussed in chapter 3 and 4 of the thesis respectively 
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the independence of Nigeria in 1960. A consideration of the violent conflict reveals that with 
the passing of time and different political eras, the violence has become more frequent, with 
similar triggers each time linked to their origins, religious differences and clash of cultural 
norms of the groups within the modern State´s political and legal practices. The modern 
violence between the two groups also reveals similar triggers, but in recent years they are 
more tailored to internal self-determination in the form of a separate Local Government for 
the Modakeke.  
Attempts by the government of Nigeria both at Federal and state levels to resolve the Ife-
Modakeke conflict have been inspired by the Federal State and, unlike the pre-colonial and 
colonial eras, State attempts at resolution have not involved physical separation of the groups 
from each other.  There have been two post-independence approaches to the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict: one has been military intervention to stop violence, and the other has been the setting 
up of several formal committees to suggest a solution for resolution of the conflict. 
The interviews conducted in 2014 by this researcher support the fact that the modern State 
has intervened to attempt to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict.  As many as 92% of the Ife 
and 95% of the Modakeke participants stated that the government intervened to resolve the 
conflict and end the violence during the clashes in the modern era. Notably, however, the most 
pronounced method of intervention by the government, as related by the participants in both 
groups, has been military intervention. The answer to the interview question of how the 
fighting was contained or stopped was met with answers from all age groups of both the Ife 
and the Modakeke participants pointing mainly to government military intervention and a few 
committees set up by the government to look into the causes of the violence and to make 
recommendations for conflict resolution.  An elderly Ife participant clearly notated that: “It 
was the then President Obasanjo who settled it by bringing in soldiers who took the 
ringleaders from both sides away to Abuja. The Modakeke ringleaders were forced to sign 
that Modakeke and Ife are one (Modakeke Ile-Ife).”37 Also, a middle-aged Ife participant 
noted: “[t]he government of President Obasanjo sent troops to stop the fighting.”38 In addition,  
a young Ife participant noted that: “[t]he government sent delegates to discuss the conflict 
                                                             
37Ife interview IAM1 in transcript in a separate document 
38Ife Interview IMF39 
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with elders from both Ife and Modakeke and the fighting stopped.”39 Modakeke responses 
were similar along all three age groups.40 
An elderly female Modakeke participant responded that: the “[g]overnment bring soldiers and 
police.”41 Also, a young adult gave a similar response when she stated that: [t]he government 
“always send in the police men to restore peace”42  A middle aged man from Modakeke stated 
that: 
“[t]here were a series of committees. At the state (it started at the state level), the state 
government setup a committee…They were about 10 or 11 in the committee so they 
invited us. And it was at that time that the crises were at the peak around 1997, 98 or 
there about. There were crises, the fighting was still raging. After some time that 
committee collapsed. There were other committees by the state. They set up a 
committee headed by Olabode George, so at the end of the day when they wrote the 
report, they presented it to the Obasanjo as the president….43” 
The responses above demonstrate that the government intervened both militarily and by 
setting up committees. The Ife and Modakeke participants did not believe this was adequate 
to resolve their conflict. Of those who responded to the question: would you recommend 
government intervention as a method to resolve the conflict? 46 % of the Ife participants said 
Yes, while 50% said No with the remaining 4% saying it depends on the situation at the time. 
The Modakeke on the other hand, displayed stronger feelings of rejection of government 
intervention methods in the conflict. 31 % of the Modakeke participants answered that they 
would recommend government intervention, while 62% said they would not do so. The 
remaining 7% of the participants said it depended on the situation at the time. Perhaps the 
Modakeke do not feel supported by the government in times of crisis. A Modakeke participant 
who was a member of the Central Modakeke Peace Advocacy Committee set up in 1999/2000 
by the state government noted that: “[t]he government of the day has uppermost power over 
us as regards Ife because Ife are influential.”44 Also, complaining of being marginalised by 
the government, a Modakeke participant lamented: “[s]ince 1977 Modakeke has remained as 
                                                             
39Ife Interview IYAF38 
40Coding for the three age-groups are contained in a separate document lodged with the University of Westminster  
41Modakeke interview MAF 42 
42Modakeke Interview MYA 40 
43Modakeke interview MMA 7 
44Modakeke Interview MMA 8 
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3 wards. There is a neighbouring town called Ipetumodu that had 3 now they have 7 wards 
while Ife has 10. We remain the same, we are marginalised.”45 
From the interviews conducted among the Ife and the Modakeke in 2014, it can be safely 
argued that the Federal government’s use of military intervention was not sufficient in 
resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict. This is because, as will be seen from the discussion 
below of the four violent episodes between the groups in modern Nigeria, the root problems 
remained among the people after every military intervention and meetings of committees 
which were established to look into each violent clash between the groups. The discussions 
in this chapter, however, provide evidence for the argument for economic and political 
separation of these two groups in order to resolve the root problems of the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict.  
5.5.1 The 1981 Violence 
As earlier mentioned in chapter 4 in section 4.3, the colonial era only saw two violent clashes 
between the Ife and the Modakeke between 1882 to 1909 and 1946 to 194946 essentially 
because the colonial government did not initially change much among the Yoruba groups. 
The end of the colonial era in 1960 only led to democratic rule for a short period as the military 
took over the rulership of the newly independent Nigerian State in 1966 and lasted up to 1979. 
Most likely the instability of the country at that early stage and coupled with the effect of the 
Nigerian civil war (July 1967 to January 1970) caused the Ife and the Modakeke not to go 
into violent confrontations until 1981. 
 
The first of the four post-independence violent clashes between the Ife and the Modakeke was 
in 1981. The 1981 violence was preceded by the refusal of the Federal and state governments 
in Nigeria to grant the request of the Modakeke for a separate Local Government from the Ife 
in 1960.47 In 1978, the Federal Military Government partitioned the Oranmiyan Local 
Government of Ife-Modakeke into three Federal constituencies namely; the Oranmiyan South, 
Oranmiyan Central and Oranmiyan North.48 The Oranmiyan North constituency was 
comprised of the Modakeke, while the South and Central constituencies were comprised 
                                                             
45Modakeke Interview MMA 8 
46R.A Asiyanbola., ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: A Case of Ife-Modakeke in Historical Perspective’ Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences 
and Creative Arts vol. 5 no. 1, 2010, p. 61-78[ 63] 
47I.A Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria, 1998) p. 173 
48Modakeke Summary of the Conflict Online: Http://Www.Modakeke.Info/2013/04/17/Summary-Of-Conflict 
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mainly of the Ife. Thus, the Ife-Modakeke were to an extent separated politically. Because a 
constituency only defines the physical boundaries of specific areas for electoral purposes,49 
the Modakeke were not satisfied with being under the Oranmiyan constituency but wanted a 
full Local Government area which is a tier of government in Nigeria.  But in 1979, when the 
Modakeke requested a full separation by means of a Modakeke-only Local Government, 
Chief Bola Ige, the governor of Oyo state –in which both groups were situated at the time 
(prior to the formation of Osun state)-- refused to grant Modakeke a separate Local 
Government.50 Then, in 1980, the Modakeke elites launched a special appeal amongst the 
Modakeke for funds for the building of a new town hall and palace fund.  However, this was 
disrupted by the Ife,51 when the ruler of the Ife (the Ooni) held that the Modakeke were not a 
separate town and therefore had no right to raise any funds for the development of the alleged 
Modakeke township. As a result, the Modakeke elite commenced a new range of agitation for 
a separate Local Government as a means to assert their autonomy from the Ife. 
 
In 1981, Oyo state created 54 additional Local Governments including one which was 
dominated by the Modakeke. However, its headquarters was placed under the Ife and this 
action led to violent crisis.52 The Modakeke claimed that the Ooni of Ife had used his influence 
in preventing them from getting a Local Government with the headquarters in Modakeke. The 
Modakeke therefore decamped from the ruling party, the Unity Party of Nigeria (which was 
supported by the Ife) to an opposing party, the National Party of Nigeria. As a result, the Ooni 
degraded the ruler of the Modakeke, the Ogunsua, who to the Modakeke was the symbol of 
their autonomy as they had had a Modakeke ruler since their initial separation from the Ife in 
1835.53 This led to communal violence between the two groups in 1981.54 The response of 
the Federal government was to set up a committee of inquiry under Justice Kayode Ibidapo 
who recommended a new Local Government for the Modakeke.55 Also, the Oyo state 
                                                             
49 Understanding Constituency Delimitation in Nigeria: The Quest for an Equitable Democratic System. Being Text of a Paper Presented at 
a Seminar on “Participatory Democracy in Nigeria: The Challenge of Constituency Delimitation” Organized by the Rights Monitoring Group 
with Support from Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) the Rock view Hotel Abuja, 23 October, 2009 
http://umarpate.blogspot.com/2009/06/understanding-constituency-delimitation.html. Accessed 30th May 2018 
50I.A Akinjogbin., (1998) Ibid. p. 173 
51‘Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Communal Disturbances in Orangmiyan Central Local Government Area of Oyo 
State Led by Hon. Justice Kayode Ibidapo’ (Ibadan Government Printer, 1981) p.11 
52I.A Akinjogbin., (1998) Ibid. p. 173-175 
53 See discussions in chapter 3.3 on the social structure of the Ife and the Modakeke in pre-colonial times 
54N. Ogbara., The Ife-Modakeke Crisis: Hope Betrayed? A Report on the Impunity and State Sponsored Violence in Nigeria (World 
Organization Against Torture (OMCT) and Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), 2002) p. 41 
55See the Recommendations in the ‘Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Communal Disturbances in Orangmiyan Central 
Local Government Area of Oyo State Led by Hon. Justice Kayode Ibidapo’ (Ibadan Government Printer, 1981) p. 38-39 
110 
 
government set up a panel of inquiry into the Ife-Modakeke conflict headed by Chief Bola 
Ige and the panel came up with similar recommendations that Modakeke be given a separate 
Local Government yet it was never implemented.56The report of the judicial commission of 
inquiry set up by the Oyo state government in 1981 held strong views as the  Modakeke when 
they said that: “Modakeke is a town, Modakeke has history, Modakeke is an Oyo-speaking 
people, Modakeke should be separated from Ife.” 57 
The strong desire of the Modakeke to be physically and politically independent from the Ife 
did not go unnoticed by the Commission of Inquiry which came up with recommendations of 
political and financial separation of the groups by giving the Modakeke a separate Local 
Government council though these recommendations was not implemented.58 This left room 
for a further outbreak of violence in 1983.  
5.5.2 The 1983 Violence 
The second violent clash between the groups came in 1983 shortly after the first in 1981. In 
1983, the Modakeke people voted for the National Party of Nigeria against the Ife-chosen 
Unity Party of Nigeria, the former ousting the latter in the state elections. This was said to 
embarrass the Ooni of Ife who then renamed streets in Modakeke59 triggering many violent 
reactions from the Modakeke and resulting in loss of lives and properties on both sides.60 The 
conflict took the form of liberation struggle and self-determination61because the remaining of 
the streets in Modakeke was a blow to the Modakeke´s claim to autonomy in the Ife. 
 
In 1989, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria elevated the status of the three 
Oranmiyan state constituencies into Local Government areas. namely the Ife-North, Ife-
Central and Ife-South.62 Modakeke was part of the Ife-North, although termed Ife-North, the 
Local Government area was occupied by the majority of the Modakeke, separated from the 
                                                             
56T.A Imobighe., Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria (Spectrum Books Limited Ibadan, 2003) p. 159  
57‘Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Communal Disturbances in Oranmiyan Local Government Area of Oyo State, 
Ibadan. Government Printer. 1981. p. 19 
58T.A Imobighe., (2003) Ibid. p.159  
59N. Ogbara., (2002) Ibid. p. 40  
60 A.A Adegbite, B.O Balogun & F.N Buba., ‘Impact of Ife-Modakeke Intra-Communal Conflicts on Spatial Realignment of Ile-Ife City’ 
Global Journal of Science Frontier Research vol. 16. Issue 2., 2016  
61A.S Elugbaju., ‘The Role of Traditional Institution in Managing Ife-Modakeke Conflict’ International Journal of Arts and Humanities 
(Bahir Dar-Ethiopia) vol. 5. no .2, 2016, p. 7-19 [13] 
62B.A Oyeniyi., Greed- Grievance Debate and the Ife-Modakeke Conflict.  Social History (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group) vol. 35. no 
3., 2010. p. 308-329 [320] 
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majority of the Ife people in the Ife South and the Ife Central causing the Modakeke people 
to be very happy and to declare peace.63 This peace discovered in 1989 did not last long 
because the ultimate vision of the Modakeke to be politically and economically free from the 
Ife had not been realised by means of a Local Government area solely for the Modakeke. 
Thus, in 1997 violence broke out again for the third time in post-independent Nigeria. 
5.5.3 The 1997-1999 Violence 
The third episode of violence between the two groups in post-independent Nigeria was 
triggered by the actions of the federal military government in setting up of the Nbanefo Panel 
to bring government to the grass-roots and requesting groups to send in memorandum to a 
panel. The Modakeke requested that the Ife-North Local Government Area be split into two; 
Ife North and Ife North-East to give the Modakeke complete political autonomy from the 
Ife.64  This was partially granted when, the military regime of the late General Sani Abacha 
created a new Local Government area for the Modakeke, the Ife East Local Government area 
(instead of the Modakeke request for two separate Local Government areas) with the 
headquarters in a place called Enu Owa in Ife. a part of the palace of the Ife monarch.  This 
was considered by the Ife as a humiliation of the ‘Revered Stool’, the stool of the Ooni.65  So, 
the Ife youths and adults took up arms and wanton destruction of lives and property began in 
earnest.66 The military government then moved the headquarters of the new Local 
Government area from Modakeke occupied land to Oke-Ogbo in Ife and the bloody clashes 
started again in 1997-1999.67 
Attempts at resolution of the 1997 conflict were undertaken by another panel of inquiry. In 
1997 the Osun state Council of Traditional Rulers set up a committee to look into the conflict.  
The National Reconciliation Committee, under Chief Alex Akinyele,68 took evidence in 
Abuja and came up with recommendations for the communities to honour an agreement for 
peace.69  However, that recommendation was never implemented. 
                                                             
63I.A Akinjogbin., (1998) Op cit. p. 175 
64‘Summary of the Conflict’ Online: http://www.modakeke.info/2013/04/17/summary-of-conflict 
65N. Ogbara., (2002) Ibid. p. 41 
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5.5.4 The Year 2000 Violence 
Since the recommendation for a new Local Government Area for the Modakeke was not 
implemented by the government, the people of Modakeke town decided to implement the 
recommendations of the National Reconciliation Committee set up in 1997 by declaring 
themselves a separate Local Government. 70 This led to another bout of violence between the 
two groups in the year 2000. Around 1,000 individuals were killed and several thousands were 
injured.71 There was a loss of cultural materials worth millions of naira.72 Also the University 
of Ile-Ife reported the displacement of 5,000 students and 1,000 staff members as well as 
disruption of lectures; and there was disruption to the academic calendar as a result of the 
forceful closure of the campus for several weeks during the various violent conflicts between 
1997 and 2000.73 The Government reported a cost of 31.8 million naira for the treatment of 
hundreds of victims of the crisis in just one hospital, namely, Obafemi Awolowo University 
Teaching Hospital.74  
Resolution attempts of the fourth violent conflict were by the intervention of the then 
President of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who brokered a ceasefire in March 2000 and 
set up a 27 Member committee- the Olagode George committee. Also, peace talks which 
concluded with the formal inauguration of Ife-Modakeke Inter Community Peace Advocacy 
Committee in September 2000 was initiated by the United States Agency for Internal 
Development/Office of Transition Initiative, under the leadership of Dr. Isaac Olawale. Both 
communities agreed to keep the peace after the intervention of the United States Agency.75 
The Modakeke was also given an area office in Modakeke in place of a Local Government 
council to pacify the people. The Area government gave a form of political and economic 
autonomy to the Modakeke as it was being financed by the Osun state government under the 
provisions of section 162 of the 1999 constitution. Since then, there have not been any 
physical confrontations but threats of violence have broken out between the groups.76 
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5.6 Insights from the Four Incidents of Violence in Post-independent Nigeria 
The events of the four violent confrontations between the Ife and the Modakeke between 1960 
and 2000, arguably reveal Modakeke feelings of political suppression and inequality brought 
about by both the Ife and the government of Nigeria77which are still entertained. The 
Modakeke responses to the cause of the conflict from the interviews conducted in 2014 are 
indicative of their feelings of oppression both from the Ife and the government. Some of these 
are: 
 “The thing that caused the issue between Modakeke and Ife was the Local 
Government. Modakeke wanted their own Local Government which would help them 
to develop at their own pace. But the Ife said they were not going to allow them to 
have a Local Government and that Modakeke must remain under them so that 
whatever they give, Modakeke will take.78” 
“The Government of the day has uppermost power over us as regards Ife because Ife 
are influential”.79 
 
             “The Local Government is supposed to be in Modakeke instead of Ife.80” 
 
              “The Ife treats us as slaves.”81 
 
With some Modakeke still having strong feelings of oppression in recent times, it is pertinent 
that this trigger of conflict be addressed to prevent any further violence between the groups. 
Also, the four violent confrontations between the groups shows that attempts at resolution 
have been essentially State-based with little attempt at implementing recommendations of the 
committees which were set up to look into the resolution of the conflict. The interviews 
conducted among the Ife and the Modakeke reveal that the contemporary Ife and Modakeke 
acknowledge the major role of the government in resolving the conflict in modern times. The 
46 out of 50 (92%) Ife participants who answered gave a positive response to the question of 
                                                             
77See S. Olayiwole., ‘Integrated Education: An Instrument for Resolving the Ife-Modakeke Conflict in Osun State Nigeria’ Journal of 
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the State intervening in resolving their conflict. A higher response was recorded in the 
Modakeke with 40 out of the 42 (95%) participants who answered questions giving positive 
response to the State intervening to resolve the conflict. The reality of the State intervening 
in the Ife-Modakeke conflict shows that any attempt at resolution in modern times has to take 
the State position into consideration as well as the possibility of persuading the State to take 
action to resolve the conflict. 
The next section examines the effect of the social structure of the modern State in the conflict 
by reproducing some of the local norms of the people such as native/indigene-settler 
relationship, thereby contributing to the continuation of the conflict. 
5.7 The Social Structure of the Ife and the Modakeke Groups in the Modern State: 
Impact on the Ife-Modakeke Conflict and Dispute Resolution 
It is argued in this section that ethnic groups with their norms continue to form the foundation 
of group social structures in modern Nigeria.  Furthermore, the Nigerian State by means of 
Federal State laws, have sustained traditional community norms.  However, it can be argued 
further that the norms of the two groups, the Ife and the Modakeke, also sustain the strained 
and volatile relationship between them: these ancient norms inherited from the ancient Oyo, 
include those relating to land ownership, refugee status, land usage, and Ishakole. These are 
sustained by the norms of the State. In addition, it is clear from the researcher’s interviews 
that these norms will probably continue as 41 of 50 (82%) Ife participants stated that they 
respect their tradition in relation to dispute resolution.82 Likewise, 37 of 42 (88%) Modakeke 
participants responded in the same way.83  These ancient norms are not such as to prevent the 
creation of a new Local Government for the Modakeke.  Indeed, they are the reason why it is 
essential for Federal laws to be changed so as to provide the Modakeke with their own, 
separate, Local Government authority. 
 
Before discussing options open to the   Federal government, it is first necessary to examine 
the communal land tenure system that creates hierarchy between groups, as seen in Yoruba 
land tenure system sustained by the modern State.  
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In general, land in Africa is regarded as being sacred and held under customary land tenure.  
The statements of Caldwell and Caldwell show the relationship between land and traditional 
authority. Although Caldwell and Caldwell were discussing fertility in Africa, their 
observations are relevant. They stated that: 
  
“Land was held communally by clan or lineage. A sacred trust, it was essentially in 
the holding of the ancestors...”84 
 
As demonstrated in chapter three in section 3.3.2, among the Yoruba, land was sacred too. 
The distribution of land was under the exclusive preserve of the traditional rulers, family 
heads and local communities.85  By this method of land tenure, social authority of community 
leaders was upheld as they were in position to distribute lands. The introduction of the Land 
Use Act86 in 1978 by the Nigerian State was aimed at ending such social authority over land 
and putting all lands under the care of the government. Williams noted the intended impact of 
the Land Use Act on groups when he wrote: 
 
“The Land Use Decree promulgated in 1978 by the Nigerian Federal Government 
was designed to pose a direct challenge to alternative sources of social authority by 
relegating all private transactions in land to governmental agencies.”87 
 
The 1978 Act was preceded by the Land Use Panel established by the military government in 
1977 and headed by a Justice of the Supreme Court to look into economic and social life 
because land was considered to be one of the “major bottlenecks to development efforts in the 
country”88 
 
The 1978 reform was much needed because of the problems faced by the land tenure system 
in the country where, as Lloyd has noted, the elite Chiefs and elders of the people arbitrarily 
                                                             
84J.C Caldwell & P. Caldwell., ‘The Cultural Context of High Fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa’ Population Development Review vol. 13, 
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sold communal lands as a business for their own benefit.89 Oshio has also noted that land 
speculation increased, and the selling of a single tract of land for construction to multiple 
buyers was rampant, thus creating uncertainty of land title.90 Events like these led to the 
reform of the land tenure system in Nigeria in 1978. To help reform land use in Nigeria, 




Subject to the provisions of this Act, all land comprised in the territory of each State 
in the Federation is hereby vested in the Governor of that State, and such land shall 
be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act.91 
Section 2 (a): 
all land in urban areas shall be under the control and management of the Governor 
of each State. 
Section 2 (b): 
all other lands shall, subject to this Act, be under the control and management of the 
Local Government within the area of jurisdiction of which the land is situated. 92 
The above provisions were meant to provide a uniform standard of land tenure system in 
Nigeria where lands no longer belonged to communities and groups but to the government of 
Nigeria. Oshio noted that sale of land and partitioning of land requires the consent of the Local 
Government, and not by traditional rulers because it amounts to alienation of land.93  This is 
in keeping with the provisions of section 21 that prohibits the alienation of customary rights 
of occupancy thus: 
 Section 21 provides that: 
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It shall not be lawful for any customary right of occupancy or any part thereof to be 
alienated by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease or otherwise 
howsoever  
  
(a)    Without the consent of the Governor in cases where the property is to be sold by 
or under the order of any court under the provisions of the applicable Sheriffs and 
Civil Process Law; or 
  
(b)    in other cases, without the approval of the appropriate Local Government. 
 
With the above provisions, the Modakeke were in the same position to deal with the land they 
occupied with the consent of the state governor as were the native Ifes. 
However, Section 34 of the Act, complicated issues by preserving the rights of individual 
occupiers of lands under the customary right of ownership as if such lands were granted by 
the state Governor.  
Section 34 (1)(2) (5) provides: 
(1)  The following provisions of this section shall have effect in respect of land in an 
urban area vested in any person immediately before the commencement of this Act. 
  
(2)   Where the land is developed the land shall continue to be held by the person in 
whom it was vested immediately before the commencement of this Act as if the 
holder of the land was the holder of a statutory right of occupancy issued by the 
Governor under this Act. 
(5)     Where on the commencement of this Act the land is undeveloped, then 
  
(a)    one plot or portion of the land not exceeding half hectare in area shall 
subject to subsection (6) below, continue to be held by the person in whom the 
land was so vested as if the holder of the land was the holder of a statutory right 
of occupancy granted by the Governor in respect of the plot or portion as 




The above provisions dealing with both developed and underdeveloped land owned by 
individuals prior to the 1978 Act, preserved the customary land tenure system where the 
Modakeke settlers continue to be indebted to the individual Ife native settlers owning lands 
in Ife regardless of how long they live and farmed those lands in the Ife. The Supreme Court 
in the case of Chief Ojeme & other v Alhaji Momodu 11 & Others94 upheld the right of a 
community to hold rights of occupancy. Also, the provision of Section 29 of the Land Use 
Act which provided that compensation could be paid to chiefs or leaders of community is a 
preservation of customary land tenure system. Although, the Ife and the Modakeke live in 
modern towns and some farming villages, the majority are farmers and fishermen. In fact, the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica refers to the inhabitants of Ile-Ife as “town dwelling-farmers”95 
underscoring the importance of land use to the inhabitants of Ile-Ife including the Modakeke. 
It is no surprise therefore that the Modakeke threatens war if the Ifes continue to prevent them 
from the use of farmlands in Ife after the conflict settlement in the year 2000. It is argued that 
the preservation of the customary land tenure system that sustains inequality between 
‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in Nigeria is detrimental to the Modakeke as later settlers in Ife 
because, as pointed out by Slocum-Bradley: “In the Nigerian experience, being an indigene 
or a settler is a permanent identity, as there is no provision for the latter to convert to the 
former.”96 
The study of Boone, although not carried out in Nigeria, has proved this to be true in other 
African countries such as Ghana and Burkina Faso with similar land tenure systems to the one 
found in south-western Nigeria. Boone noted that ethnic hierarchies built into Burkina Faso’s 
land tenure system continue to exist as a result of the State institutionalising them, starting 
from the colonial administrations that used lands as “markers of political status.”97 The same 
is true with Nigeria: the Land Use Act 1978 institutionalises the customary ownership of land, 
empowering customary landowners to allocate and reallocate lands. By upholding customary 
land tenure regime, the State reproduces and confirms the hierarchical structure of “the local 
political arena.” 98 Boone pointed out that under the land tenure regime in Burkina Faso, 
“social groups claiming to be autochthonous, or first-comers, are in a strong position to assert 
and retain local political dominance.” Therefore, the State should stand to defend migrants 
                                                             
94 (1983) 1Nigeria Law Report. P. 188 
95See the Encyclopadia Britanicca: ‘Ile-Ife’ Online: https://www.britannica.com/place/Ile-Ife 
96N. Slocum-Bradley., Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity. Ash Gate Publishing, England. p. 45 
97C. Boone., Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics (London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Cambridge University Press, 2014) p. 105 
98C. Boone., (2014) Ibid. p. 109 
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such as the Modakeke who cannot hold claims to farmlands in the Ife despite living there for 
hundreds of years because individual Ife natives were first settlers in Ile-Ife. According to 
Cameron, ownership of land in perpetuity was only accorded to first-generation settlers in the 
Yoruba community and therefore only ‘natives’ could then pass the land rights to their 
children and generations afterwards.99 Thus, families that arrived to settle later in the 
community --such as the Modakeke in Ife-- were regarded as stranger/settlers that need special 
permission to use land and such lands cannot be owned in perpetuity, unlike natives/indigenes 
who have such rights. This, creates discriminatory norms and hierarchies between natives and 
settler groups. Mamdani described it as the post-colonial State giving customary rights as a 
bonus to the indigenous citizens.100 
  
Further proof that the effect of the preservation of the customary land tenure system has not 
been a positive one in the Ife-Modakeke conflict is seen in the effect of the requirement to 
pay the Ishakole in Yoruba customary land tenure. As stated in chapter three, the Yoruba 
customary land tenure system preserved by virtue of the Supreme Court judgment involving 
the payment of tribute to the grantor to create a customary tenancy101 has meant that individual 
Modakeke farmers have had to continue paying the Ishakole for using Ife land.  And where 
the obligation to pay such tribute is persistently breached, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
the tenancy has been forfeited.102 The court has also held that payment of such tribute was an 
acknowledgement of the grantor’s over-lordship.103 In the case of Chief Alhaji K.S.O. Akanmu 
v Raji Ipaye & Others104 the Supreme Court held that: 
“Tribute is paid as a mark of respect for a previous overlord: its payment does not 
signify a subsistence of the overlord’s revisionary interest. Rather it is a customary 
incident of occupation of land by a stranger and is usually voluntary and does not 
depend upon any agreement”105  
 
                                                             
99D. Cameron., A Note on Land Tenure in Yoruba Province (Government Printers, Ministry of Information, 1933) p. 3 
100M. Mamdani., ‘Beyond Settlers and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism. Comparative Studies 
in Society and History’ vol. 43. no. 4. Oct. 2001. Cambridge University Press. p. 651-664 [658] 
101Chief Braide v Chief Kalio (1927) Nigeria Law Report (NLR) 34 
102Chief Ojeme & Other v Alhaji Momdu 11 & Others (1983) Nigeria Law Reports 188; Asani Taiwo & Others v Adamo Akinwunmi & 
Others (1975) 4 Supreme Court Reports. p. 143 
103Chief Uwani V Akom & Others (1928) 8 Nigeria Law Report; Ibid. fn 100 
104 (1990) 3 NLR 30 
105 Ibid. fn 103 
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The above statement gives the impression that the over-lords had no protection under 
customary land tenure. However, they do have protection whenever there is express 
agreement to pay ground rent, such as Ishakole, in the Yoruba. In such instances, the Court 
will grant forfeiture of customary tenancy on proof of misconduct.106  Otite rightly noted that 
the 1978 Act led the Modakeke to perceive freedom from paying the ground rent to Ife and 
the Ife continued to demand payment according to the traditional norm, thus, increasing the 
conflict between the two groups.107 Although the Ishakole, according to the dictionary of 
modern Yoruba, is not rent but: 
 
the “fee paid to owner of land or to Ba’le (where land is deemed to be vested in him). 
Such fee is paid to the Ba’le during some ceremony such as a marriage, funeral etc. 
Such payment is no rent but are a token of the paramount rights of the granter of the 
land.”108  
 
Modern judicial precedent, however, has defined the Ishakole as ground rent thereby 
rendering ineffective the Modakeke argument that the land they occupy is not subject to the 
payment of Ishakole.  Their argument was that, based on traditional Yoruba norms, the land 
which they occupy was given freely to them by the late Ife Ooni in 1835. 109However, as noted 
in chapter three (3.8.1), “[l]and[s] are never sold, but may be granted to outsiders for life...”  
The fact that Lands were not alienated by sale in the pre-colonial Yoruba land tenure system 
could form the basis of an argument that the Ife lands that the Modakeke occupy at present 
are covered under the Land Use Act and thus cannot be Modakeke land since Ife cannot 
transfer customary lands. However, the Yoruba land tenure system also guarantees protection 
of land given to outsiders under customary law. As earlier noted in chapter three, in quoting 
Johnson: 
 
                                                             
106Chief Alhaji K.S.O Akanmu v Raji Ipaye & Others (1990) Ibid.; Earlier Cases of Adeleke v Adewusi (1961) 1ANLR 37; Ife Overlords v 
Modakeke (1948) SKY 
107See analysis in Chapter 4.3 and the discussions of O. Otitie., Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: With 
Comparative Materials (Shaneson Ibadan, 2000) p. 24 
108R.C Abraham., Dictionary of Modern Yoruba. p. 321 
109 See dictions in chapter 3.3.2 
121 
 
 “Land once given is never taken back except under special circumstances as treason 
to the State which renders the grantee an outlaw, and he is driven altogether from the 
State or tribe, and his land confiscated.”110 
It follows that lands obtained under the Yoruba customary land tenure system could not be 
reclaimed unless on grounds of misconduct.  Cases such as Aminu Raji v Jimoh Oladimeji 
and Oseni,111 where the plaintiff sought a declaration of forfeiture of the defendant’s 
customary tenancy on grounds of misconduct was allowed reclamation by the Court of Appeal 
on such grounds. Considering the court’s decision above, the land granted to the Modakeke 
in 1835 in pre-colonial times and which they still occupy belongs to the Modakeke by default 
in that the Ife cannot go back to reclaim the land under section 21 of the Land Use Act except 
if they can prove that the Modakeke are their customary tenants and are liable for misconduct. 
This is so because according to the rulings of the Court in Chief Alhaji K.S.O. Akanmu v Raji 
Ipaye & others,112 the agreement to pay ground rent on the land, Ishakole, is “an obligatory 
rent whose main purpose is to ensure subsistence of revisionary rights upon forfeiture of a 
customary tenancy for any reason.”113 It is obvious that the State, by sustaining customary 
land tenure system in Nigeria, has given the Ife superiority over the Modakeke as tenants of 
the Ife regardless of how long the Modakeke have lived on the land which the Modakeke say 
was given to them in 1835.  
However, the Supreme Court have settled the matter of land ownership by stating five types 
of legal land ownership in Nigeria in the case of Elegushi v Oseni 114as: 
1. by acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land in dispute 
2. by the production of the documents of title which must be authenticated 
3. by traditional evidence 
4. by acts of ownership extending over a significant length of time which acts are 
numerous and positive enough to warrant the inference that they are owners 
5. by proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it 
probable that the owners of such connected or adjacent land would in addition be the 
owners of land in dispute 
                                                             
110S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge & Sons 
Ltd ,1921) p. 95 
111 (2014) Court of Appeal/1203/2008 
112 (1990) 3 Nigeria Law Reports, p. 30 
113 Ibid. fn 111 
114 (2005) 14 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, Pt 945 p. 348 
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Under the above types of ownership, the Modakeke and the Ife can determine the areas that 
constitute Ife and Modakeke land. The fact, remains that the Modakeke are settlers in the Ife 
and although they can claim possession of the land they have lived in as the dominant 
population for over one hundred years, they will still be seen in Ife as strangers. However, 
this will not prevent a Local Government Area for the Modakeke. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the 1978 Act was to promote equitable distribution of land 
by State control115and to harmonise the land tenure system throughout Nigeria.116  This has 
renewed the Modakeke struggle for a Local Government117 of its own so that it can control 
the land it occupies in Ife and, in so doing, destroy all vestige of Ife involvement in relation 
to the lands occupied by the Modakeke. This is important to the Modakeke because 
endeavours that demonstrate self-determination from the Ife, such as building their own 
Mosque, had been prevented by the Ife in times past due to the Ife claim to the land the 
Modakeke occupy. It is no wonder that both the Ife and the Modakeke mentioned to the 
Researcher that land dispute is one of the triggers to their conflict.118  
From the foregoing, it is argued that the policies and procedures of the government of Nigeria 
contribute to the conflict of groups and communities in Nigeria by creating avenues for 
misinterpretation of the Land Use Act through the dual tenure system of customary land tenure 
and state-controlled land. 
5.8 Economic Structure of the Modern State and Separation of Groups 
As stated in the theoretical framework in chapter one, generally in the history of Nigeria, “the 
issues of access to resources…exacerbated the problem of ethnic politics during the colonial 
and post-colonial periods.”119 Therefore a solution to the Ife-Modakeke conflict in post-
colonial Nigeria considered in this sub-section necessarily involved a consideration of the 
impact of the group’s economic structure in post-colonial Nigerian federal State. This sub-
                                                             
115E.P Renne., ‘Houses, Fertility and the Nigerian Land Use Act’ Population and Development Review. Population Council vol. 21. no. 1, 
1995, p. 113-126 [122] 
116U.M Igbozurike., Nigerian Land Policy: An Analysis of the Land Use Decree (Department of Geography University of Nigeria Nsukka, 
1980) p. 7 
117 There is no requirement for land ownership in order for people to have a Local Government of their own.  In the event that the Modakeke 
do not succeed in their quest for land ownership, they are still entitled to a separate Local Government if they satisfy the requirements on 
economic and political grounds.  (See Chapter 6.) 
118See coding of the Ife and the Modakeke conflict in Appendix 13 and 14 respectively 
119O.O. Akanji., ‘The Problem of Belonging: The Identity Question and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Nigeria’ African Identities 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group) vol. 9 no.2, 2010p. 117-132 [118] 
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section shows that the revenue allocation formula right from the 1960 constitution to date 
gives the federal government much control of the revenue to states and Local Governments 
and thus the power to determine their survival at creation.120 In addition, revenue from the 
federal and state accounts to Local Governments without internally generated revenue from 
the Local Governments themselves makes groups such as the Ife and the Modakeke rely 
heavily on the revenue allocated to Local Governments from the federal and state accounts 
with little internally generated revenue. Therefore, groups such as the Modakeke hold stronger 
appeal for the Local Government area to get more revenue for the betterment of their group. 
Also, groups such as the Ife prefer to have the Modakeke as part of them for more revenue 
allocation. This lure for more Local Government revenue from the federal and state accounts 
sustains the Ife-Modakeke conflict in post-colonial Nigeria. Obi stated that: “the issue of 
revenue allocation strikes at the very basis of existence of the Nigerian Federation”121 
From the above statement, the issue of revenue allocation can be seen to be central in Nigeria’s 
economic structure. Presently, as a federal State, the revenue generated in the federation is 
divided among the components of the federation which in Nigeria’s case, is the federal 
government, the 36 states of Nigeria and the 774 Local Government areas by virtue of section 
162 of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999.  This revenue allocation is often referred to as fiscal 
federalism. According to Dang, fiscal federalism basically “emphasises on how revenue is 
raised and allocated to different levels of government for development.122” 
 
There have been several studies on how revenue is shared between the federal, state and Local 
Governments in Nigeria and the basis of sharing the revenue studies such as Phillips 1991123, 
Okoh and Egbon 1999,124 Aluko 2004125 and Basir 2008.126 This sub-section does not pretend 
to provide an in-depth discussion of revenue allocation in Nigeria but seeks to highlight the 
effect of the method of allocation to Local Government on the need for separating the Ife-
                                                             
120 Detailed discussion of Local Government revenue is examined in chapter 6 
121C. Obi., The Impact of Oil and Nigeria’s Revenue Allocation System: Problems and Prospects for National Reconstruction in A.K Agbaje, 
A. Suberu, & G. Herault (eds) Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria (Ibadan Spectrum Books Ltd, 1998) p. 262 
122D.Y Dang., Revenue Allocation and Economic Development in Nigeria: An Empirical Study (Sage, 2013). p. 1 
123A.O Phillips., ‘Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues’ (Oxford Journal of Social Sciences) Publius vol. 21. Issue 4., 
1991, p. 103-111. 
124 R.N Okoh & P.C Egbon., Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation: The Poverty of the Niger Delta in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s 
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Modakeke group. Therefore, only a brief analysis of revenue sharing is done here using the 
constitutional provisions from 1960 constitution to the present 1999 constitution of Nigeria.  
 
Revenue allocation in Nigerian history have been in the hands of ad hoc committees/ 
commissions. In the post-independent era, there had been five such committees/commissions 
namely: the Binns Commission 1964; the Dina Interim Committee 1968; the Aboyade 
Technical Committee 1977; the Okigbo Commission 1980; and a permanent body created in 
1989 the National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission enshrined into 
the 1999 Constitution. These committees/commissions have been tasked with the job of 
providing methods of sharing the public funds of the government of Nigeria among the 
federating units. Stephen and Osagie divided these funds into the categories of taxable and 
non-taxable revenue for the economic development127 of the federating units.128  
 
Both the taxable and non-taxable revenue being shared between the levels of government in 
Nigeria comes from the federation account where the federal government collects and retains 
the largest share of Nigeria’s public revenue.129 Between the 1960’s and 1990’s the money 
going into the federal account was mainly income from oil and gas accounting for up to 80% 
of the revenue. However, the relative importance of oil has decreased in recent years as the 
value of crude oil per barrel has dropped from $148.14 in 2010 to $82.7 per barrel.130 Now 
the structure of the Nigerian economy is dominated by agriculture at 23%, 11% crude oil and 
gas and the remaining revenue from taxes, levies, tolls, penalties and charges. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin for 2016, shows that the states and the Local Government 
Areas generate very small amounts of revenue internally making them heavily reliant on the 
allocation from the federation account.131 
 
The component of revenue allocation from the federal account is divided into two, namely the 
vertical and the horizontal formula. The vertical formula is sharing of the revenue by the 
federal government, the 36 states and the Local Government areas. While the horizontal 
formula is for the sharing of already allocated revenue between states and the Local 
                                                             
127Economic development according to Adams is the elimination of poverty and inequality within an economy. See Adams, R.A., (2006) 
Public sector accounting and finance. Lagos Nigeria: Cooperate Publishers Ventures. 
128N.M Stephen & E. Osagie., A Textbook of Economics for West African Students (Ibadan Nigeria: University Press Limited, 1985)  
129I. Nolte., 'Federalism and Communal Conflict in Nigeria’ Regional & Federal Studies vol. 12. no. 1, 2002, p. 171-192 [174] 
130‘United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: Nigeria Country Profile, 2016’ Online: http//www.uneca.org 
131‘CBN statistical Bulletin vol. 27. December 2016 Online: Http://statistics.cbn.gov.ng-cbn-onlinestats. 
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Government Areas.132 The vertical formula is guided by the constitution. For example, 
starting with the 1960 independent constitution, Sections 123 to 130 of the constitution 
provided for the allocation of revenue through the Consolidated Revenue Fund, indicating a 
flow of revenue from the centre, thus making it difficult for grass root politics to survive 
without high dependency on the revenue from the government of the day and such revenue 
going to Local Government Areas. Thus, this creates greater appeal for groups to struggle for 
their Local Government Area. Also, the federal government’s control of the revenue in the 
federal account gives the government power to control the resources to states and Local 
Government, therefore leaving Local Government survival in the hands of the federal 
government.  Although the 1960 Constitution tried to show that all groups are equal by 
prohibiting discrimination of any group by virtue of their tribe, language and so forth,133 the 
elites of each region made the constitutional prohibition ineffective. The elites made sure that 
resources coming from the federal government went straight to the betterment of their groups 
and the minorities among them had nothing to show for themselves.134 Smith alluded to this 
fact when he wrote that: 
“…retention of power at the regional level depended upon resources and 
patronage...the familiar competition for state power in order to control the flow of 
investment became dominated by geographical dimension that reflected the interest 
of major ethnic groups”135 
The above statement shows that the general minority groups in Nigeria136 were disadvantaged 
economically and politically leading to struggles for autonomy and agitations for recognition 
                                                             
132K.A Bashir., (2008) Ibid. p. 3 
133See Section 27(1) Prohibiting Discrimination by Virtue of Tribe. 1960 Constitution 
134B. Smith., ‘Federal-State Relations in Nigeria’ African Affairs (Oxford University Press on Behalf of the Royal African Society) Vol. 80. 
No. 320., July 1981. p. 355-378 [356] 
135B. Smith., (1981) Ibid. p. 356 
136Awolowo defined majority groups in terms of languages identifying ten majority groups based on the fact that 70% of the entire Nigerian 
population at the time spoke the ten languages and the other 30% he classified as minorities. See Awolowo (1947) Path to Nigerian freedom. 
Faber London. In contrast, Otite and Ekeh argued that minority are not based on entirely population, rather minority status is based on both 
population size and political abilities. See O. Otite.,  Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria (Shaneson Ibadan, 1990) p. 26  P. Ekeh.,  
Political Minorities and Historically Dormant Minorities in Nigeria: History and Politics (Mimeo State University of New York Buffalo, 
1994) It follows then that sub-groups such as the Modakeke in Ife are minorities in Ife because they make up very minor population of the 
Ife. The Modakeke have only three wards out of the ten that make up Ife-East Local Government Area which constitute only ¼ of the Ife 
entire Local Government areas. While Ife has 4 Local Government Areas with several wards, the Modakeke have only an area office. So 
politically and in size, the Modakeke can be said to be minority population in the Ife. Ife population is almost 600,000 while Modakeke is a 
mere 113, 000. 
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of their own smaller groups and sub-groups. According to Chabal, the legitimacy of Nigerian 
leaders’ rests solely on their ability to provide economically for their groups.137  
With the 1963 Constitution, revenue allocation continued to be controlled from the centre 
through the Federal to the State levels thus limiting the financial autonomy of the groups and 
in effect increasing the need for groups to have their own Local Governments. Section 140 of 
the 1963 constitution clearly provided that: 
There shall be paid by the Federation to each Region a sum equal to fifty per cent of- 
(a)The proceeds of any royalty received by the Federation in respect of any minerals 
extracted in that Region; and  
(b)Any mining rents derived by the Federation from within that Region. 
 
The fact that revenue was attached to the Regions from the Federal government meant that 
the Governors of the Regions continued to seek the better good for their regions, while the 
minority tribes suffered. Smith alluded to this fact when he wrote that: 
“…retention of power at the regional level depended upon resources and 
patronage...the familiar competition for state power in order to control the flow of 
investment became dominated by geographical dimension that reflected the interest 
of major ethnic groups”138 
The above statement shows that the minority groups were disadvantaged economically and 
politically leading to struggles for autonomy and agitations for recognition of their own 
smaller groups and sub-groups. This was evident from the necessity of section 159 of the 1963 
Constitution, establishing the Niger Delta Development Board to cater for the Niger Delta 
Region. As result, the modern State through the 1963 Constitution, provided avenues for 
regional consciousness and the resultant agitations of the minorities evident in the group crisis 
which has carried on into modern Nigeria. Suberu noted that the clamour for state creation in 
1976 was basically for rapid economic development of minority areas and the devolution of 
central revenue.139  
 
                                                             
137P. Chabal., Violence, Power and Rationality: A Political Analysis of Conflict in Contemporary Africa in P. Chabal & A. Gentili (eds.)., Is 
violence Inevitable in Africa? Theories of Conflict and Approaches to Conflict Prevention (vol. 1. p. 1–16 Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005) p. 
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138B. Smith., ‘Federal-State Relations in Nigeria’ African Affairs (Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal African Society)  
 vol. 80. no. 320. July 1981, p. 355-378 [356]  
139 R.T Suberu., ‘The Struggle for New States in Nigeria 1976-1996’ African Affairs vol. 90., 1991, p. 158-160 
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The 1979 constitution also helped to further increase the dependency of the groups on State 
revenue as the revenue allocation according to the provisions of section 149 of the 1979 
constitution, made the Local Government dependent on the Federal and State allocations for 
survival not from independent local revenue sources as was the case when the groups were 
autonomous in pre-colonial times.140 This has no doubt contributed to the small groups 
fighting for their independent Local Government as it would mean more revenue from the 
Federal and State government rather than relying on limited revenue generated from the Local 
Government to all sub-groups within the Local Government. It is no surprise then that the 
Modakeke group have been actively fighting for their separate Local Government area. 
 
The 1999 constitution also provides for allocation of revenue from the state to the different 
Local Government areas by virtue of section 7 that establishes the Local Governments and 
Section 162 that provides: 
(6) Each State shall maintain a special account to be called "State Joint Local 
Government Account" into which shall be paid all allocations to the Local 
Government councils of the State from the Federation Account and from the 
Government of the State.  
(7) Each State shall pay to Local Government councils in its area of jurisdiction such 
proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed 
by the National Assembly.  
(8) The amount standing to the credit of Local Government councils of a State shall 
be distributed among the Local Government councils of that State on such terms and 
in such manner as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the State.  
 
The current vertical allocation of the revenue in the federation account from the year 2000 is 
52.68%, 26.72% and 20.60% to the federal, state and Local Governments respectively.141 It 
is important to note that the Local Government has had an increase of revenue allocated to it 
from the federation account from 10% allocation in 1964 to 20.6% by the executive order of 
the president in 2000. It is argued here that, because of the increase in allocation to the Local 
                                                             
140 See Analysis of the economic structure of the groups in Chapter 3.4 
141A. Salami., ‘Taxation, Revenue Allocation and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Policy Options’ Economic Annals, 
vol. vi no. 189., 2011, p. 27-50 [ 41] 
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Governments and the sharing formula, separation appears to be more appealing to groups such 
as the Modakeke so as to control the revenue coming into their group. But because of the 
provision of section 162 in conjunction with section 8 of the Constitution that gives the federal 
government the authority to accent the creation of a Local Government, both the Local 
Government creation and financial survival lies in the discretion of the federal government. 
This is evidenced by the federal government preventing the survival of new Local 
Governments created by states through refusing to assent to the creation of new Local 
Governments and starving them of funding. 142 
Also, of importance, is the basis for the horizontal formula for sharing revenue between states 
and Local Government areas such as population, equality of states, internal revenue 
generation, land mass and the principle of derivation has contributed to the conflict of groups 
such as the Ife and the Modakeke. For example, by virtue of the revenue allocation by 
population, there are benefits from having a larger population thus the Ife stands to benefit 
from having the Modakeke as extra population and greater land mass for extra revenue 
allocation. In addition, most Local Governments only generate 10% of the revenue required 
to meet their recurrent expenditure143 therefore relying heavily on federal and state 
allocations. The distributive nature of revenue from the federal to the states and Local 
Government have led to ethnic consciousness at the local level.144 Claude Ake, a political 
scientist, gave the best picture of the negative result of Nigeria’s economic system where the 
federal government gives resources to the state and Local Governments causing so many 
autonomies struggles in these words: 
 
“[T]he habits of consuming…without producing…underlies our fanatical zeal for 
political power, and our political fragmentation. We seek political power avidly 
because it enables us to accumulate wealth without the bother of producing. We 
demand more and more states and Local Government areas because as each group 
divides itself, it appropriates more from the public coffers. We inflate population 
figures because the more we are the more we receive…”145 
                                                             
142 The occasion of the Nigerian federal State preventing creation and functioning of a Local Government is discussed in details in the next 
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General%20of%20Lagos%20State%20V%20Attorney-General%20of%20the%20Federation.htm 
143N.F Mendie., Local Government and Conflict Management in Nigeria (Afahaide and Bros Printing and Publishing Co. Joemason Printers 
Uyo, 2000-2002) p. 26 
144R.T Suberu., Federalism and Ethnic conflict in Nigeria (United States Institute of Peace, 2001) p. 10 
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This may be arguably the case for groups such as the Ife and Modakeke in their modern 
conflict. Where a group may want the other to remain part of it because they have more 
population which means more allocation from the State to the Local Governments controlled 
by them. Thus, exhibiting what Ake called as  “inflate population figures because the more 
we are the more we receive…”146 On the other hand, another group might desire to be separate 
to get development for their immediate group and therefore exhibiting what Ake refers to as 
seeking “political power avidly because it enables us to accumulate wealth without the bother 
of producing.”147 Where this is proven to be the case, it follows that the modern group conflict 
for self-determination through Local Government creation are not merely due to cultural 
differences but the result of a federalism that encourages taking and taking financially without 
producing. A system that does not encourage groups to produce but only to receive financially.  
Although regionalism has been condemned as having fostered majority dominance over 
minority groups, it encouraged revenue generation and not just receiving. The move from 
regionalism to federalism has encouraged only receiving financially from the centre thus 
making separation very appealing to groups that feel economically underdeveloped. 
According to Smith, even the extremely poor people in Nigeria are aware that the control of 
wealth and power in Nigeria is through “social connections of patron-clientelism.”148 In the 
Ife and the Modakeke case, the Modakeke struggle for a Local Government might have some 
bearing on the economic benefits the elite might stand to get. On the other hand, the Ife might 
want to retain any economic benefit they stand to gain from having the Modakeke as part of 
the Ife. 
The general recommendation is that revenue allocation should be towards national economic 
development rather than geopolitical considerations. However, as the revenue allocation 
formula stands to ensure basic amenities goes to each group fairly, the only way to pacify 
both the Ife and the Modakeke is to separate them financially by creating a Local Government 
for the Modakeke to enable them to control their finances themselves. While financial 
separation may be feasible, is the political structure of modern Nigeria one that enables 
separation? 
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5.9 The Political Structure of the Modern State and Separation of Groups 
This section argues that the nature of the Nigerian federal structure has made political 
separation of groups into smaller units such as States and Local Government Areas a 
possibility especially among the Yoruba of Nigeria because Statehood is merely instrumental 
for political gains and not as symbols of nationhood. However, the federal character principle 
in the constitution designed to check Nigeria’s diverse group challenges has sustained 
hierarchy between groups and resulted in the continuance of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. 
Therefore, to resolve the conflict, the State has to separate the Ife-Modakeke groups politically 
to return the peace to the groups and remove the principle of native/indigene-settlers in the 
constitution. 
The country has reorganised itself politically several times since independence. Starting with 
the regional system in 1940’s and 1950’s, the federal structure was divided into three main 
regions with the Hausa-Fulani in the Northern region, the Yoruba in the West and Igbo in the 
East causing ethnic politics among the three regions.149  In 1963 Nigeria was reorganised from 
three regions to four with the Mid-Western Region created from the Western Region. The 
1963 re-organisation was meant to ensure even development in the country to curb minority 
fear of domination by the majority groups in the three Regions prior to 1963.150 This was a 
very important step in curbing majority-minority conflicts, as the majority-minority conflicts 
in Nigeria had at the time, according to Onyeoziri, become an important aspect of the National 
Question in Nigeria.151 The non-integration of the regions led to the Biafra civil war and the 
breakup of the regions into states by then military ruler General Gowon.152  In 1967 the 
country was re-organised from four regions to 12 states. This progression from creating 
regions to state creation, according to Nolte, was “aimed at breaking up the dominance of the 
majority ethnic groups and hoped to create national unity through greater centralization.’’153 
What was the effect of division of the regions into states? Horowitz rightly noted that the 
division of the regions into states effectively diffused the conflict between the regions 
although the ethno-nationalistic conflict did not go away.154The re-organisation continued in 
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1976, from 12 to 19 states, in 1987 from 19 to 21 states and in 1991 from 21 to 30 states and 
finally in 1996 from 30 to 36 states. The government attempts to manage these conflicts 
through state creation and Local Government creation has served to keep the country together 
as a single unit.155 
To reiterate, the Nigerian State is a federal State with a capital territory, 36 states and several 
Local Government Areas. Some scholars such as Adeniyi156 and Lijphart157 argue that for a 
federation to work well, internal borders should be divided through ethnic geography of 
constituent groups to accommodate national diversity so that one group does not capture the 
central government. Other scholars such as Horowitz158 and Filippov159 have argued that a 
federation should be divided into major ethnic groups and sub-divided into a larger number 
of constituent units so as to weaken ethnic politics. However, Basta has noted that 
fragmentation of regions might be more destabilizing of a federation where there is prior 
history of a political entity where the elite of the group might stand to lose political powers 
with such separation.160He emphasised however that such separation is possible when the elite 
group’s interest is protected. For the Yoruba in the West, sub-division of the group did not 
meet with resistance because, as will be recalled in chapter three, the Yoruba were never a 
single political unit. Thus, when they formed the ethno-nationalistic unit the Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa in 1945, it was on a cultural basis not a political basis that was aimed at eliminating 
intra-tribalism among the Yoruba with the Action group party being formed.161 Awolowo’s 
idea of a federal state was on the basis of national self-determination for the Yoruba group 
not on past historical tradition of Yoruba groups’ individual autonomy. Awolowo thus 
recommended that only groups who shared a general experience and “known to be capable of 
working together harmoniously”162 should be put together. If we follow Awolowo’s idea of 
federalism, the Ife and the Modakeke as part of the Yoruba could be united politically under 
the broader national Yoruba civilization but because they do not share similar historical 
experiences and are known not to work together since the pre-colonial era, they should not be 
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brought together as one group politically.  This is in line with Basta’s point that in relation to 
the Yoruba, the State “was not a potent symbol of Yoruba nationhood, but rather an 
instrumental institution, through which party and group interests were to be pursued.”163 It 
follows that the Yoruba can be safely sub-divided into smaller groups such as into more states 
and Local Government Areas without expecting much resistance from other Yoruba groups 
provided the Ife elites’ political interests are protected. Therefore, the Modakeke could be 
given their own Local Government Area without expecting resistance from the Ife provided 
the Ife´s political interests are catered for by the State, such as respect for their Ooni and his 
traditional stool by not citing the Local Government to cover parts of the Ooni’s palace.  
To further encourage equality among groups in Nigeria, Osaghae noted that the quota system 
introduced to reflect the diversity of the nation in the late colonial era was varied and 
reintroduced as the federal character principle in 1979.164 The federal military government of 
Mortala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo during the transition from military rule to 
civilian rule in 1979, introduced the federal character principle into the 1979 
constitution.165Afigbo supported this origin of the federal character when he wrote that “the 
term federal character is one of the inventions of the constitutional drafting committee (CDC) 
inaugurated by the late general Murtala Mohammed on 18th October 1975.166” In order to care 
for the public needs of all groups in Nigeria, the 1979 Constitution clearly stated that the 
composition of government (national, state and local level) was to be done so as to recognise 
the diversity of the people within its areas of authority and the need to promote a sense of 
belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of the Federation of Nigeria.167 The federal 
character principle according to Ekeh was mainly for “disadvantaged groups and areas to 
enable them to compete and catch up with more advanced areas and sectors of the nation.168” 
According to Olayode, the coming of democracy and the introduction of the federal character 
principle was met with high hopes of guaranteeing “the peaceful resolution or management 
of ethnic, religious and other identity conflicts”169 However, rather than resolve them, Nigeria 
                                                             
163K. Basta., (2014) Ibid.  p. 473 
164E.E Osaghae., Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence (Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 1998) p. 115 
165 Section 14(3) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria 
166A.E Afigbo., Federal Character: Its Meaning and History in P.P Ekeh & E.E Osaghae., (eds) Federal Character and Federalism in 
Nigeria (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989) p. 3-18[3] 
167Section 14(3) (4) 1979 Constitution of Nigeria 
168P.P Ekeh., The Structure and meaning of Federal character in Nigerian political system in P.P Ekeh & E.E Osaghae., (eds) 1989, p. 19-44 
[38]  
169K. Olayode., ‘Pro-democracy Movements, Democratization and Conflicts in Africa: Nigeria, 1990-1999’ African Journal of International 
Affairs vol. 10. No. 1&2, 2007  
133 
 
has witnessed a high level of communal and religious conflicts.170 Today, the federal character 
principle of equal representation, is enshrined into section 14(3)(4) of the 1999 Constitution 
which provides that: 
 
14 (3) The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies 
and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the 
federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to 
command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of 
persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that 
Government or in any of its agencies.  
  
14 (4) The composition of the Government of a State, a Local Government council, or 
any of the agencies of such Government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of 
the Government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to 
recognise the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to 
promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the Federation 
 
The above sub-sections of the constitution were designed to protect group rights and to 
prevent any group from dominating other groups of the federation and to foster national unity. 
As lofty as this idea is, rather than resulting in the unity of the groups, Onyeoziri rightly noted 
that the federal character principle had “caused a lot of tension among the different federating 
units in the country.”171 The federal character thus creates dual loyalties, one as a Nigerian 
citizen, two, and most importantly as a member of a group fighting for the benefit of his group. 
Hagher noted that for Nigerians their loyalty is more towards their groups rather than the 
State.172 According to Gberevbie and Ibietan, “the federal character principle reinforces the 
integrity of those sub-structures instead of the general structure.” The obvious effect on the 
groups in Nigeria is a negative one, as each group is loyal to the needs of his immediate group 
rather than to the needs of the entire State. In the case of the Ife-Modakeke conflict, the federal 
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character principle helps to strengthen the need for separation of the groups to bring 
development to the different groups.  
 
In Nigeria, the present 1999 constitution provides that all groups are equal by reason of their 
citizenship in Nigeria as derived in section 25-32 of the constitution. Section 42 specifically 
provides that: 
Section 42 (1)  
A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, 
religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person: -  
(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any 
law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the 
government, to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of 
other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religious or 
political opinions are not made subject; or  
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any 
law in force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, 
any privilege or advantage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of 
other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religious or 
political opinions. 
(2) No citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason 
of the circumstances of his birth.  
The above provisions put all groups in the same level in Nigeria with regards to devolution of power. 
However, being a Nigerian citizen is circumvented by the constitutional provisions that encourage and 
sustain inequalities between groups such as indigene/settler relations promoted in the constitution. For 
example, section 147 of the 1999 constitution provides that: 
147. (1) There shall be such offices of Ministers of the Government of the Federation 
as may be established by the President.  
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(2) Any appointment to the office of Minister of the Government of the Federation 
shall, if the nomination of any person to such office is confirmed by the Senate, be 
made by the President.  
(3) Any appointment under subsection (2) of this section by the President shall be in 
conformity with the provisions of section 14(3) of this Constitution: - provided that in 
giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one 
Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State.  
As indicated above, sub-section 3 limits access to positions and opportunities to indigenes of 
an area and the inability to prove one is an indigene of an area means one cannot enjoy such 
rights.173Although, sub-section 3 limits the issue of indigene to political appointments and not 
land use, the mere introduction of the word indigene demonstrates the government sustaining 
a segregation between citizens of Nigeria on the basis of first settlers. The constitution did not 
provide a definition for indigene. Thus, regardless of the citizenship of Nigerians, the 
constitution does not give everybody equal rights in the country. Suberu observed that the 
reason for Nigeria’s federation is not to share power broadly within states, rather it is to 
accommodate ethnolinguistic, religious diversity of Nigeria, and the communal competition 
for access to state-controlled rewards and resources.174 This standard of devolution of power 
by the Nigerian State on the basis of group interest has not led to the unity of the various 
ethnic groups. Rather it has led to conflict between local groups and has laid the foundation 
for indigene-settler problems in Nigeria.175This thesis argues that this may have influenced 
the Ife attitude toward Modakeke use of land for farming regardless that the government treat 
both groups as the same people. Bamidele and Ikubaje had advised that the constitution should 
be reformed to give all citizens equal rights in all states of Nigeria including land and 
resources rights on the basis of length of stay not on indigene status.176 Implementing such 
advice will mean that the Modakeke can farm the lands they had farmed for hundreds of years 
without fear of reprisals from the Ife and any threat of war by both groups. 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the federal character principle in post-colonial 
Nigeria encourages exclusion of subordinate groups who are not indigenes in accessing 
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resources and even land.177 As a result, there are unequal exchanges and continued internal 
colonialism between groups. In fact, Mamdani stressed that “[e]ven with the Colonial power 
gone, we keep on defining every citizen as either a native or a settler”178 The problem with 
such dual citizenship identity and loyalty is that some become privileged and this inevitably 
leads to conflict such as that of the Ife-Modakeke with the settler community wanting 
emancipation from the privileged native community.179  Describing the situation in the best 
of ways, Mamdani stated that the State has developed “the culture of entitlement as a form of 
Justice…. the bearers of mainstream nationalism have succeeded in redefining yesterday’s 
natives into postcolonial settlers and postcolonial natives.”180 
 
It can safely be argued that the Nigerian State is guilty of reproducing such dual identities 
which create and fuel conflicts between ethnic groups. In its Federal character system 
incorporated into the Constitution, people are inevitably made to stand by their ethnic identity 
before national identity because the ethnic identity pays more than being a Nigerian. Mamdani 
finally noted that “…given the way “federal character” is defined, every ethnic group in 
Nigeria is compelled sooner or later to seek its own ethnic home, its own native authority, its 
own State in the Nigerian Federation.”181  
What has been the general result of all government efforts to curb group conflicts in Nigeria? 
Schwarz provides an answer that: 
“... in Nigeria, as in any Country composed of several ethnic groups, there is conflict 
between the desire to overcome ethnic hostility and separation and the desire to retain 
the culture of various ethnic groups and avoid stamping out individuality in the name 
of national unity.”182 
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Also, Mustapha argues that creation of states has not removed inequality among minority 
groups but has reproduced the inequalities among these groups.183  
In contrast, showing the success of the federal character principle, Osaghae stated that: 
 “...for as long as states continue to be the major units for distributing federal power 
and the principle of ‘federal character’ is upheld, the days when major groups were 
relevant competitors for power are past and gone”184 
Otitie also noted that: 
“...in the distribution of federal positions and resources based on the ‘federal 
character’ principle, the majorities retain the controlling shares in the federation. But 
certainly, the minorities have a more enhanced access to power today than they had 
under the regions.”185 
The above discussions demonstrate that granting greater autonomy to groups in Nigeria by 
creating more states and Local Governments is not always a successful way of resolving the 
problem. However, increased autonomy has placed minorities in a better position than in the 
colonial period and promises to both manage and resolve group conflict of self-determination 
such as the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The issue of indigene-settler relationship incorporated into 
the constitution does not mean that the separation of the Ife from the Modakeke by means of 
a Local Government Area is not feasible. Suberu made a poignant point, that creation of states 
in Nigeria has meant the fragmentation of existing units not the incorporation of new units. 
186 Therefore, land rights by the Ife do not mean that the Modakeke cannot conduct their 
political affairs independently of the Ife, because all the political re-organisations that have 
taken place in Nigeria have involved the division of existing groups not the creation of new 
ones so as to affect land rights. Besides, the Modakeke have held political positions in the 
governance of Modakeke while still part of the Ife for example, Chief Oloyede and Mr Ladun 
Oyemade have had the opportunity to act as chairman of the Ife divisional district in the long 
history of the Ife division.187  
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The above discussion has demonstrated the precedence of the Nigerian State’s use of state 
and Local Government creation as a means of managing group conflicts in the past, although 
not entirely successfully. The question that arises is whether the present constitution and 
democratic setting allows for Local Government creation for the Modakeke as a solution to 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict and who bears the responsibility of creating the Local Government. 
The next sub-section examines the role of the Federal Government in creating Local 
Government for the Modakeke.   
5.10 The Role of the Federal Government of Nigeria in Local Government Creation 
Section 7 (1-6) of the Nigerian constitution 1999 guarantees the existence of Local 
Governments in Nigeria. The primary responsibility for the creation of Local Government in 
Nigeria lies on the state government as provided for in section 8 of the constitution.188 
Interestingly, section 8(5) and (6) makes the Federal government, via the National Assembly, 
responsible for the creation of a Local Government. 
 
Section 8 (5)  
An Act of the National Assembly passed in accordance with this section shall make 
consequential provisions with respect to the names and headquarters of State or Local 
Government areas as provided in section 3 of this Constitution and in Parts I and II 
of the First Schedule to this Constitution.  
Section 8 (6)  
For the purpose of enabling the National Assembly to exercise the powers conferred 
upon it by subsection (5) of this section, each House of Assembly shall, after the 
creation of more Local Government areas pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, 
make adequate returns to each House of the National Assembly 
By the provisions of section 8, Omoruyi noted that the National Assembly has to rationalise 
Local Government creation or else the action of a state in creating a Local Government will 
be null and void.189 Although the National Assembly involves the Federal Government in the 
creation of Local Government in Nigeria, their functions are supposed to be a formality by 
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means of section 8 (5). However, the fact that the constitution has entrusted the states with 
the legal responsibility for creating Local Government Areas and also involved the Federal 
government in the process has limited the state’s rights towards Local Government 
creations.190 Considering that the states have the legal responsibilities to create Local 
Government Areas in Nigeria, the Osun state of Nigeria to which the Ife and the Modakeke 
belong is then expected to be in a position to create a new Local Government area for the 
Modakeke to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict. It should be noted here that the reality at the 
moment is that the Federal government has tried to withhold the creation of new Local 
Government Areas in the country by refusing any revenue allocation to them. This makes the 
Local Government an extension of the federal government and not a third tier of 
government.191 A perfect example is the actions of the Federal government through the 
National Assembly refusing to act to assent to the creation of new Local Government Areas 
according to section 8 (5) of the constitution. In Attorney General of Lagos State v, The 
Attorney-General of the Federation,192 the Supreme court held that: “The Plaintiff has the 
power under S.7 (1) and 8(3) of the Constitution to create new Local Government areas…’’ 
While the Lagos state government was confirmed to have the power to create Local 
Government Areas within Lagos state, the Supreme Court further held that:  
“The Plaintiff has the power under the Constitution to create new Local Government 
but the Local Governments so created will not take effect or come into operation until 
the National Assembly passes an Act to amend Section 3(6) and part of the First 
Schedule to the Constitution’’ 
“So far, the Local Government Areas recognised by the Constitution are those 
contained in part 1 of the First Schedule to the Constitution’’ 
The decision of the Supreme Court that until the National Assembly amend the list in the first 
schedule, the new Local Government created by the Lagos state government will not take 
effect, renders the exercise of Local Government creation by the Lagos state almost futile. It 
has also been argued that the listing of the names of the existing local governments 
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demonstrates that the number of Local Government Areas in the constitution cannot be 
increased without constitutional amendments in accordance with section 9 of the Constitution 
on the amendments of the constitution. Ogunna for example argues that since the Local 
Governments’ names are already entrenched in the Constitution, they cannot be altered 
without constitutional amendments. 193It follows that the recommended creation of the 
Modakeke Local Government Area would be futile if the Federal government refused to 
amend the 1999 Constitution in the first schedule. It then remains in the power of the Federal 
government to make the creation of a Local Government for the Modakeke a reality.  
5.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has established the end of colonial rule and the beginning of the modern State of 
Nigeria. It has shown that the modern State of Nigeria became an independent State on 
October 1st 1960. However, it did not become a republic until 1963. The chapter has provided 
a brief history of the modern-day Ife-Modakeke conflict and has demonstrated that the modern 
cause of the conflict involves land and lack of independence for the Modakeke. The 
government has tried to resolve the problem of majority- minority problems in Nigeria by the 
use of military intervention and by establishing committees. In addition, the Constitution and 
other laws from 1960 were analysed in relation to their impact on the Ife-Modakeke conflict 
and dispute resolution abilities. The economic structure of the modern State that encourages 
revenue allocation from the federal account with very little revenue generation by the states 
and Local Government Areas have increased the need for the Federal Government to look 
into revenue allocation to sustain Local Governments and make it possible for economic 
separation of ethnic groups through Local Government creation. Otite noted that there are 
new gains from maintaining separate ethnic identities such as political offices and economic 
assets.194 Therefore, “[s]ocial groups which have existed together as parts of other groups now 
assert their own historical and cultural exclusiveness.”195 
The analysis in this chapter has led to the conclusion that the modern Nigerian State has 
intervened inadequately by means of military intervention in the Ife-Modakeke conflict to end 
the violence and through its laws and conflict resolution strategies. This chapter has 
demonstrated, by means of examples and records from the modern Nigerian State´s activities, 
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that the modern State has impacted negatively by retaining a customary land tenure system 
through the Land Use Act and, by so doing, has sustained the hierarchy between native Ife 
indigenes and settler Modakeke groups. However, land rights do not need to stop the 
separation of the two groups because the Ife can still retain ownership of the customary lands 
used by the Modakeke, with the Modakeke having administrative control of the area they 
occupy by means of a Local Government area. The recommendations of this thesis are that 
the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria be amended to give all individuals in Nigeria equal access 
to power and resources by removing the word ‘indigene’ in section 147 and replacing it with 
‘citizen’ which gives equal opportunity to all Nigerians regardless of where they live within 
the country and regardless of whether they or their forebears have moved to where they now 
live. This is, in part, because the word ‘indigene’ makes later settlers, second-class 
citizens,196which should not be the spirit of the constitution.  The chapter also reveal that the 
system of revenue allocation in Nigeria encourages groups to be autonomous and separate 
and as a result, as long as Federal revenue continues to be the main source of revenue for 
Local Governments, the federal government continues to hold the key to separation of the 
Modakeke from the Ife to make the new Local Government a possibility. Also, it is the only 
way to ensure that the Modakeke feel that they are fairly dealt with economically in the Ife.  
Having established that the Federal government has the ability to ensure that a Local 
Government is created to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict by assenting to an application from 
the Osun state for the creation of a Local Government for the Modakeke and by providing the 
necessary revenue allocation to enable the Local Government to thrive. The next chapter 
examines necessity, power and feasibility of the state governments to create Local 
Government Areas with special reference to the Osun state government in order to end the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict. 
                                                             
196O. Olakunle, I. Joseph & O. Segun., ‘Indigene-settler Relationship in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Igbo Community in Lagos’ Afro Asian 
Journal of Social Sciences vol. vii. no. iii, 2006 Quarter III p. 3 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: THE POWER, NECESSITY, AND FEASIBILITY 
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS WITHIN NIGERIA TO CREATE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA TO ENSURE 
THAT OSUN STATE CREATES A LOCAL GOVERNMENT FOR 
THE MODAKEKE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses broadly on the power of state governments in Nigeria to create Local 
Government governments, on the necessity and the feasibility of doing so for the Modakeke, 
and on the responsibility of the sovereign Federal government to intervene.  More narrowly, 
the chapter focuses on five issues.  First, whether states within the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
have the legal power to create Local Governments.  Second, whether Osun State has the legal 
power to grant the Modakeke its/their own Local Government.  Third, whether, in light of the 
law and the wider political, economic and demographic circumstances in Nigeria, there is the 
necessity for Osun state to create a Local Government for the Modakeke which is truly 
independent of the Ife. Fourth, whether, there being the legal, political, economic, and 
demographic necessity for such a Local Government for the Modakeke, it is feasible for Osun 
state to create such an authority and one which is permanent.  And, fifth, whether the Federal 
government can and should intervene. 
 
The contention is that if Osun state has the legal power to create a Local Government for the 
Modakeke but either, first, Osun state takes the view that it is not necessary or feasible for it 
to do so in the circumstances or, second, fails to exercise any proper decision-making function 
on the issue, then the issue becomes one for the Federal government either to instruct Osun 
state to act on so as to create the necessary authority, or for the Federal government to take 
the matter into its own hands.  If, for whatever reason, Osun state does not create a separate, 
effective, and permanent Local Government for the Modakeke or if Osun state is instructed 
by the Federal government to create such an authority but still Osun state fails to do so-- then 
the matter should be escalated to the Federal government for a final and effective decision in 




Chapter 5 has analysed the power of the Federal government in regard to the creation of states 
in the context of the resolution of conflicts in Nigeria, and it has also analysed the necessity 
for, and the feasibility of the Federal government creating states for the resolution of majority-
minority conflicts in Nigeria and assenting to the creation of a new Local Government by 
states.  By contrast, this chapter deals with the decision-making of the state government in 
regard to the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict by the creation of an effective 
independent Local Government for the Modakeke.  
 
However, chapter 5 does not deal with the issue of the responsibility of the Federal 
government ensuring that Osun state creates a Local Government to end the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict. Osun state is an organ of the whole State for the purposes of international law1 and 
its decisions are attributed to the sovereign State.  It follows, therefore, that the decisions of 
Osun state in regard to the creation of a separate Local Government authority for the 
Modakeke must be assented to by the Federal government, and if there is a failure by Osun 
state, it is the responsibility of the Federal government to make the decision.  These issues are 
dealt with in this chapter.   
6.2 The Research Questions Answered in This Chapter 
Based on the discussion in chapter 5, this chapter acknowledges the role of the Federal 
government in the creation of a new Local Government for the Modakeke and seeks to 
establish the power and feasibility of the Osun state creation of a new Local Government for 
the Modakeke. On this foundation, the discussions in this chapter aim to answer the following 
research sub-questions: is a Local Government an appropriate form of local governance in 
light of the problems which Nigeria has experienced with Local Government functioning; is 
it necessary for the Osun state government to create a Local Government for the Modakeke 
so as to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict by economic and political separation of the 
Modakeke from the Ife; is it feasible for the Osun state government to create such a Local 
Government for the Modakeke in light of the land tenure and land use issues affecting the 
Modakeke and the Ife; is it feasible for the Osun state government to create a separate Local 
                                                             
1 Articles 4-11 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) Online: 




Government for the Modakeke in light of the impact (if any) which such creation might have 
on other state governments in Nigeria and on the Federal government; is it feasible for the 
Osun state government to create a separate Modakeke Local Government in light of 
repercussions locally and more widely within Osun state which might follow if the Ife are 
denied control over the people (the Modakeke) who occupy the Ife lands; in the event that the 
Osun state government declines without considering the matter or for improper or no reasons, 
or for reasons which would not be acceptable in international law, to create a Local 
Government for the Modakeke, either on the basis of there being no necessity or on the basis 
of it being infeasible, should the Federal government instruct the Osun state government to 
create a Local Government or should the Federal government create a Local Government for 
the Modakeke; and does the Federal government have an obligation in international law to 
assent to a Local Government created by  Osun state as an organ of the Republic of Nigeria?. 
6.3 The Problem and the Evidence Concerning a Local Government for the Modakeke 
As already documented in chapter 5, the majority of the violent clashes between the Ife and 
the Modakeke in post-independence Nigeria have been as a result of refusals to grant the 
Modakeke a separate Local Government authority for themselves so as to eliminate the 
necessity for the two groups to encounter each other in regard to politics and economics.2  
This does not eliminate the necessity for the two groups to encounter each other in relation to 
land ownership and land usage.  However, as this issue has been settled by the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria3 in favour of the Ife, there ought not to be any further tension in this regard, even 
though the Modakeke are likely to continue to be angered by the payment of Ishakole (as they 
still term it) or ground rent (as the Supreme Court terms it).  It will be argued in this chapter 
that the Modakeke do not have to have tenure over the land they use in order to be granted a 
Local Government.  It will also be argued that a Local Government for the Modakeke is an 
appropriate means for separating the Modakeke from the Ife 
Leading studies on the Ife-Modakeke conflict almost always refer to the Modakeke quest for 
their own Local Government authority as one of the causes of the post-independence conflict 
                                                             
2 R.A Asiyanbola., ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: A Case of Ife-Modakeke in Historical Perspective’ Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences 
and Creative Arts vol. 5. no. 1, 2010, p. 61-78 [63] 
3 See discussions in chapter 5.7 
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between the two groups.  For example, Albert,4 Olutobi and Oyeniyi,5 Akinjogbin,6 Ogbara,7 
Imobighe,8 Akanji,9and Asiyanbola10 all discuss the lack of creation of a Local Government 
for the Modakeke as one of the causes of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. This is also supported 
by the interviews conducted by this Researcher among contemporary Ife and Modakeke 
groups in 2014.  Some of the statements made by Ife and Modakeke participants are set out 
below.  However, before the issues of necessity and feasibility are discussed, it is first 
appropriate to consider the suitability of a Local Government --rather than any other kind of 
entity-- to separate the Modakeke from the Ife. 
6.4 Definition of Local Government and its Relevance to Group Independence  
Although the Modakeke have repeatedly called for their own Local Government, it is essential 
to consider whether a Local Government is the appropriate form of organisation for them, and 
indeed for any other minority group of people wanting to be separated from their majority 
counterparts: in this conflict the Modakeke (minority) and the Ife (majority).    
 
A Local Government has been defined as a political sub-division of a State legally constituted 
towards defined purposes with the powers to control local affairs such as taxes.11 This 
definition implies that for the establishment of a Local Government there must be a 
constitutional or other legal basis for such action to be taken. It follows that, in general, groups 
in a State cannot arbitrarily declare themselves to be a Local Government without legal basis. 
This understanding is corroborated by the definition of a Local Government provided by the 
Nigerian Local Government Reform Handbook 1976 as: “Government at the local level 
exercised through Representative Councils established by law to exercise specific powers 
within defined areas.’’12  
                                                             
4I.A Albert., ‘Ife-Modakeke Crisis’ in O. Otite O & I.A Albert., (eds) Communal Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and 
Transformation (Spectrum Books Ltd, 1999) p. 145 
5 O. Olutobi & A. Oyeniyi., Modakeke from Grass to Grace (Olutobi Ventures Osun State Nigeria, 1994) p. 2 
6I.A Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yorubaland 1793-1893(Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1998) p. 14 
7 N. Ogbara., The Ife-Modakeke Crisis: Hope Betrayed? A Report on the Impunity and State Sponsored Violence in Nigeria (World 
Organization Against Torture (OMCT) and Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), 2002) p. 41 
8T.A Imobighe., Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria (Spectrum Books Limited Ibadan, 2003) p. 159  
9 O.O Akanji., ‘Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: A Critical Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria’ International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rightsvol.16. no. 1., 2009, p. 31-51[46] 
10R.A Asiyanbola., (2010) Ibid. p. 63 
11 A. Ogunna., A Handbook on Local Government in Nigeria (Owerri: Versatile Publishers, 1996) p. 1 
12 Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1976 Guidelines on the 1976 Local Government Reforms. Government Printer Nigeria. p. 111 
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The above definition also emphasises the importance of a Local Government being legally 
defined and comprising a representative government at the grassroots of the population where 
grassroots individuals participate in its governance. The fact that a Local Government must 
be legally created demonstrates the importance of there being a constitutional provision for 
Local Government creation in Nigeria as well as there being a role for the Osun state 
government to create a Local Government for the Modakeke. It also demonstrates that the 
Modakeke declaring themselves to be a separate Local Government in the year 200013 was an 
arbitrary and an unconstitutional act.14 Thus, the violence that resulted could have been 
avoided if at the time a legal process –and the right legal process-- had been used to create a 
Local Government for the Modakeke rather than by leaving the issue unattended to and, so, 
resulting in the arbitrary and illegal acts of the Modakeke. States must realise that, in order to 
avoid arbitrary and illegal acts, the State must ensure that local authorities are created for 
groups which need them.  In the Modakeke case, a Local Government is needed for conflict 
resolution and prevention purposes. According to Bello-Imam “[t]o some countries in the 
Third World, it is the only semblance of authority known beyond the traditional institution.”15 
In the case of the Ife-Modakeke beyond their traditional rulers, the next form of authority 
known to the people in modern Nigeria is the Local Government. Whether the Local 
Government is the most appropriate for the people is considered below. Bello-Imam argues, 
however, that “[l]ocal government is government at the local level”16 and not agents of local 
administration, whether of a State or national government in carrying out local administration. 
Bello-Imam thus shows the formal legal nature of a Local Government within a sovereign 
State. Further capturing the legal nature of a Local Government is the definition of Local 
Government by Oyediran as:  
“Government in which popular participation both in the choice of decision-makers 
and in the decision-making process is conducted by the local bodies, which while 
recognizing the supremacy of the central government, is able and willing to accept 
responsibility for its decisions.”17 
                                                             13‘Nigeria: Ife, Modakeke Crisis: the Modakekes Raise the Stakes’ 6 March, 2002. Online: http://www.modakeke.info/2013/05/23/nigeria-
ife-modakeke-crisis-the-modakekes-raise-the-stakes/.  
14 The discussion can be found in chapter 5 
15 I.B Bello-Imam., The Local Government System in Nigeria (College Press & Publishers Limited Lead City University. Ibadan, 2007) p. 
1 
16 I.B Bello-Imam., (2007) Ibid.  p. 4 
17 O. Oyediran., Essays on Local Government Administration in Nigeria (Lagos, Project Publishers, 1988) p. 8 
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The above discussion demonstrates that a Local Government is a legal and independent body 
which recognizes the supremacy of the central State while ensuring the independence of the 
different local authorities from one another. In the context of the Ife and the Modakeke, the 
alternatives to a Local Government are either a traditional entity18 or a legally constituted 
entity within a constitutionally created Local Government such as an area council of which 6 
are listed in part 2 of the first schedule of the 1999. A traditional entity would not provide the 
Modakeke with the essential separation from the Ife because the Ife would continue to 
dominate the entity on account of the Ile Ife being the foundation of ancient Yoruba structures 
as discussed in chapter three.  The alternative is an Area Office for the Modakeke within one 
of the local authorities dominated by the Ife.  The first issue here is whether such an Area 
office is constitutionally authorised.    
The creation of the Area Office for the Modakeke within a Local Government is legal 
according to the Constitution of Nigeria. Section 3 (6) of the 1999 constitution mentioned the 
768 Local Governments in existence in 1999 when the Constitution came into force. Also, 
while Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the 1999 Constitution provides the list of the Local Government 
areas, Part 2 provides the list of names of the six area councils approved for the Federal Capital 
Territory in 1999 Constitution. The arrangement for an Area Office, unlike a Local 
Government authority, is not a form of independent local governance within the definition of 
a Local Government: it is not a distinct and separate form of government at the local level, 
but merely an administrative centre which does not provide a tier of autonomous Local 
Government which grants independence.  For example, it would not be separation for the 
Modakeke from the Ife in regard to economic and political issues affecting the Modakeke 
locally. In the course of interviewing a Modakeke person who claimed to have served in one 
of the committees set up by the Federal government to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict in 
1997, the researcher asked: What was the resolution that enabled peace between the groups? 
The middle-aged male responded: 
 “One of the resolutions is that the Modakeke people requested for a separate local 
area government should be set up for Modakeke (something they were denied for many 
years), the Ife people they requested for creation of a new state from the old Osun 
state. They agreed to set up an Area Office at Modakeke with all the functions of the 
Local Government pending when a Local Government will be created and the funds 
                                                             
18 As discussed in chapter three 
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to be taken from the State that was not pleasing to Modakeke because it was 
manipulated. The Modakeke had no option, the president was talking so they had to 
listen”19 
The response of the interviewee shows that the Modakeke people were not pleased with an 
Area office being provided but because it was made, pending a full Local Government 
creation and a reconciliation effort by the State, they had no legal power to do otherwise. 
Although the Modakeke had occupied political positions as part of the Ife government 
representing the Modakeke in the past, they have always complained of their minimal political 
progress and participation in local governance, even in the Ife.20 A Modakeke interviewee in 
2014 also stated that: 
“Since 1977 Modakeke has remained three wards. There is a neighbouring town 
called Ipetumodu that had three wards now have seven wards while Ife have ten. We 
remain the same. We are marginalised.” 21 
In addition, according to Akanji’s research on the Ife-Modakeke conflict, the Modakeke have 
argued that the opposition of the Ife to the building of a secondary school in Modakeke and 
the upgrading of an existing Modakeke school is a proof of Modakeke being neglected and 
suffering economic setbacks in terms of infrastructures and development of the community.22  
Therefore, at best, an Area office for them could be referred to as agents of the Ife and not 
local governance and as a result, an Area Office for the Modakeke is not considered good 
enough to satisfy the autonomy sought by the Modakeke. From the comments of the 
Modakeke interviewees above, an Area Office while tending to pacify the Modakeke at the 
present time, was not sufficient to remove their perceptions of political and economic 
oppression from their Ife neighbours showing the necessity for a Local Government area for 
the Modakeke. 
                                                             
19 Modakeke Interview MMaM 7 
20 As reported by the Nigerian Tribune Newspaper in 1981, Part of the argument of the legal counsel for the Modakeke in the 1981 Judicial 
Panel of Inquiry set up by the Oyo state government for the Ife-Modakeke conflict was the suppression suffered by the Modakeke in the 
hands of the Ife. Ife however, refuted Modakeke argument pointing out that the equal representation in chairmanship of the Ife council as of 
1981. See Nigerian Tribune Ibadan 13 May, 1981. p. 3 
21 Modakeke Interview MMaM 8 
22 See O.O Akanji., (2009) Ibid. p. 42 
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6.5 Self-determination by Local Government Self-rule 
Obafemi and Ayakoroma, capturing the importance of Local Government and its 
development in a country, have noted that: 
“A top-bottom approach to development, one which focuses on the national while 
ignoring the sub-national and the local, is superficial and unwholesome…If the 
capital/headquarters are developed and the states and Local Governments, where the 
majority of the electorates resides, are underdeveloped, that kind of development is 
not only partial and lopsided but it is inconsequential and tokenistic.”23 
In the case of Nigeria, up to 70% of Nigerians reside in Local Government areas24 and, as 
Tonwe argues, in order to match the needs of all citizens, especially those at the grassroots, 
the central government needs a form of decentralization.25  In addition, Obafemi and 
Ayakoroma, observe that “the real foundation for strong and substantial democracy in Nigeria 
lies in an effective, accountable and democratic Local Government system at the grassroots 
level.”26 
Further reasons for Local Government creation in Nigeria were identified by Aleyomi, as 
grassroots participation and administrative convenience so as to provoke development and to 
pursue the heritage and communal interest of the people.27 These reasons ensure that groups 
are given the opportunity to promote self-rule, the absence of which as discussed in chapter 
five 5.7 has been one of the root causes of the Ife-Modakeke post-colonial conflict.  And until 
that degree of self-rule is achieved by the Modakeke, it does not appear that they will be 
willing to allow peace to reign between the two groups. From the interviews conducted among 
the Ife and the Modakeke in 2014, the Researcher observed a significant difference between 
the Ife account of the causes of the Ife Modakeke conflict and the Modakeke account. Some 
apt comments from the Ife and the Modakeke participants set out below strongly show the Ife 
through all age grades recognising land and payment of Ishakole as the main causes of the 
conflict, while the Modakeke´s reoccurring response to the cause of the conflict is Local 
                                                             
23 O. Obafemi & B. Ayakoroma., Culture and Socio-Economic Transformation of Local Governments in Nigeria: Setting an Agenda for 
Development (Ibadan Nigeria: Kraft Book Ltd., 2013) p. 9 
24S.O Uhunmwuangho., ‘Problems of Revenue Generation in Local Government Administration in Nigeria’ AFRREV IJAH An International 
Journal of Arts and Humanities Bahir Dar, Ethiopia vol. 2. no. 3, 2013, p.192-209 [194]; O. Obafemi & B. Ayakoroma., (2013) Ibid. p. 5 5 
25 D.A Tonwe., Aspects of the Theory of Local Government (Trust Publications Benin City Nigeria, 2007) p. 1 
26 O. Obafemi & B. Ayakoroma., (2013) Op cit p. 22 
27 M.B Aleyomi., ‘Local Government Administration in Nigeria: A Review’ Africana vol. 6. no. 2., 2013, p. 34-47 [ 39-44] 
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Government creation. It appears to the Researcher that the Ife simply do not recognise or want 
to accept the Modakeke’s need for even a Local Government area. Some of the Ife responses 
to the question what is/are the cause(s) of the conflict? Are: 
Ife Interview 26:  
“Dispute over land” 
Ife Interview 28: 
“Modakeke not making payments to the Ife” 
Ife Interview 36:  
 “Modakeke people trying to take Ife land”28 
Ife Interview 48:  
“Land dispute and Local Government area”29 
 Ife Interview 2:  
“The cause of the problem I think is that when the Modakeke refused to pay the 
Ishakole. If they were giving the land and they were to pay back in money or in kind 
to the Ife people, but a time came when the Modakeke people refused to pay the 
homage or the Ishakole, they said that they too had the right to the land. So, the Ife 
people would not accept since the Modakeke are settlers. As long as the Modakeke 
pay the Ishakole then there will be no problems.”30 
Ife Interview 51: 
“Conflict with the Modakeke started because they decided not to pay their dues to the 
Ife king and wanted to take land which wasn’t theirs.” 31 
                                                             
28 Ife Interview IMaF 36 
29 Ife interview IMaM 48 
30 Ife interview IAF 2 
31 Ife Interview IAF 51 
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Two responses from each Ife age group interviewed including male and female responses are 
shown above. A mere 18% of the Ife participants stated that the conflict was caused by the 
Modakeke´s quest for Local Government.32  
As for the Modakeke, 61% of the Modakeke mentioned the quest for Local Government by 
the Modakeke as one of the causes of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Some of the Modakeke 
interviewee responses are: 
Modakeke Interview 16: 
 “Land and Local Government”33 
Modakeke interview 40: 
 “Local Government”34 
Modakeke Interview 8: 
“The most important thing that caused the conflict was the issue of Local 
Government.”35 
Modakeke Interview 9: 
“They [The Modakeke] said the Local Government is supposed to be in Modakeke 
instead of Ife”36 
Modakeke Interview 17: 
 “Local Government Creation”37 
Modakeke Interview 37: 
“Ishakole and struggle for Local Government”38 
Obviously, the quest for a separate Local Government area is stronger for the Modakeke than 
the Ife because unlike the former the Ife have their autonomy within Osun state and the 
                                                             
32 See the general coding of Ife and Modakeke responses in Appendix 7. 
33 Modakeke Interview MYaF 16 
34 Modakeke interview MYaF 40 
35 Modakeke Interview MMaM 8 
36 Modakeke interview MMaM 9 
37 Modakeke interview MAF 17 
38 Modakeke Interview MAF 37 
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Federal State. This difference shows the importance of critically analysing the feasibility of 
resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict by creating a new Local Government for the Modakeke 
with particular consideration of the effect of such Local Government creation on the Ife and 
the wider citizenship of Osun state. 
6.6 The Necessity for a Modakeke Local Government in Osun state 
Local Government in Nigeria had a history long before Nigeria became a sovereign 
independent State in 1960 but, as shown in chapter 5, it has been successfully used to manage 
group conflicts in Nigeria. There are challenges to the desirability of creating further Local 
Governments in Nigeria, but it will be argued that the appropriate response is to expand the 
number of local authorities for reasons of development and conflict prevention rather than to 
prevent the creation of additional Local Government authorities. 
Specifically, it will be argued that Osun state should create a Local Government (and not an 
Area Office) for the Modakeke, without taking into consideration the 774 Local Governments 
which exist under the Constitution throughout Nigeria.39 Although the thesis acknowledges 
the general consensus that the majority of the existing Local Governments in Nigeria are not 
viable due to overdependency on Federal and state revenue, and because of mass corruption 
in Local Government administration, it is argued that this should not prevent the creation of 
one additional Local Government for the Modakeke, if they meet the legal requirement, for 
the greater good of preventing genocide in the Ife-Modakeke. As the demographic profile of 
Nigeria increases and changes there will be an increased necessity for more local authorities.  
Although the necessity for a Modakeke Local Government is based on conflict resolution and 
prevention rather than on demographics, this should not be a reason for preventing the creation 
of an additional Local Government to add to Nigeria’s 774 authorities or Osun state’s existing 
30 local authorities.40 The population growth since the 1991 census in Nigeria and the 
projection for future growth, shows population growth across Nigeria,  Osun state, and Ife-
East Local Government area of which Modakeke make up the majority.41 As the respective 
populations of Nigeria, Osun state, and the Modakeke and Ife grow, there will be a need for 
                                                             
39 Section 3(6) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution 
40 Local Government Areas Osun State: http://www.osun.gov.ng/government/lgas 
41 The Nigerian census of 1991 placed Nigeria population as 88, 992,220, 2006 as 140,431,790 and a projection for 2016 as 193,392,500. 
For Osun state the 1991 population was 2,158,143, for 2006 it was 3,416,959 and was projected to rise to 4,705,600 in 2016. For Ife-East 




additional local authorities, without which there is the possibility of increased conflict in 
Nigeria, Osun state, and between the Modakeke and the Ife.    
The recommendation is, therefore, that the creation of one additional Local Government for 
the Modakeke should not be regarded as infeasible because of the existing number of local 
authorities in Nigeria or in Osun state.  Feasibility should only be based on issues affecting 
the impact on the Ife and the Modakeke of having or not having a Local Government for the 
Modakeke. 
Another feasibility issue for discussion is the impact on the Ife and by the Ife on the Modakeke 
if the Ife lose political and economic control over the people who occupy Ife lands.  Although 
the argument will be that ownership of land is not a legal precondition for the granting of a 
Local Government, the loss of control by the Ife of the politics and economics associated with 
their land (Ife land) might be a good reason for Osun state to deny the Modakeke a Local 
Government, particularly bearing in mind that the Ife out-number the Modakeke.   
The two feasibility issues which need further exploration are, first, the availability of 
traditional governance entities and, second, the legality and appropriateness of the Area Office 
which is available to the Modakeke at present.  The first of these two issues are now examined 
by reference to the history of local governance by traditional rules (section 6.7).  The second 
of these will be examined in section 6.8. 
6.7 History of Traditional Governance in Nigeria and the Ife-Modakeke Conflict 
As earlier pointed out in chapter three (in section 3.5.1), pre-colonial Yoruba groups including 
the Ife and Oyo (from which the Modakeke migrated) had their rulers (Obas) and chiefs who 
were responsible for governance and the judicial systems. These pre-colonial traditional 
rulers42 were very powerful, holding powers of life and death.43 Speaking about the traditional 
ruler of pre-colonial Oyo, Atanda observed that “[i]t was an accepted philosophy of the 
society that while the Alaafin44 was under obligation to respect the rights of members of royal 
                                                             
42 “A traditional ruler is a person who by virtue of his ancestry occupies the throne or stool of an area or who has been appointed to it in 
accordance with the customs and traditions of the area and whose throne has been in existence before the advent of the British in Nigeria.” 
See Nigerian Traditional Rulers: Conference conclusions of the National conference of Traditional Rulers held in Kaduna between 28-29 
November, 1983. P. 1. Also, the old Bendel state of Nigeria, defines a traditional ruler as the “head of an ethnic unit or clan who is for the 
time being the holder of the highest traditional authority within the ethnic unit or clan and whose title is recognised as a traditional ruler’s 
title by the Government of the State.’’ See Bendel State Government: Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Law, 1979 
43 See discussions of social structure of the groups in chapter three 
44 Alaafin is often used as a title for the traditional rulers of the Oyo tribe 
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families as well as those of nobles and members of their families, he could trample with 
impunity on the rights of commoners.”45 Dudley also noted the powers of a Hausa traditional 
ruler in pre-colonial era that: “The Emir was an almost absolute autocratic ruler who dealt 
directly with all his citizens…”46 
Regardless of the independent kingdoms and powerful rulers the colonial government met in 
Nigeria, by means of various Ordinances, such as the Ife Jurisdictional Ordinance47 applicable 
to Ife and Ijebu, the colonial authorities extended English laws and judicial processes to the 
Yorubaland.48 In an attempt to represent the various groups in the grassroots, in order to give 
the colonial administration a chance of succeeding among these powerful kingdoms, the 
colonial administration made use of the indirect rule49 also known as the Native authority 
system.50 
Native Authority according to Perham is “a system by which the tutelary power recognizes 
existing African societies and assists them to adopt the functions of Local Government.”51 
The Native Authority system thus had the representatives (resident officers) of the Colonizers 
on top of governance, the tribal chiefs next, funded by a native treasury and native courts. 52 
Ibietan and Ndukwe described the place the traditional rulers had in the Native Authority 
system prior to the modern Nigerian State in these words: 
“In the 1930s and 1940s, Local Government was known as chief-in-council and chief-
and-council, where traditional rulers were given the pride of place in the scheme of 
things.53” 
 
 The legal basis of Native Authority was the Native Authority Ordinance of 1916 which 
appointed Native Authorities. Although, it has been argued that indirect rule through the 
                                                             
45 J.A Atanda., ‘The Changing Status of the Alaafin of Oyo Under Colonial Rule and Independence’ in M. Crowder & O. Ikime., West 
African Chief, Ile-Ife (University of Ife Press, 1970) p. 212-230. 
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native authorities best served the interest of the colonial administration,54 the colonial 
government did help in resolving long standing conflicts in Yorubaland, and when the native 
authority system started, peace between the Yoruba groups was maintained. For example, an 
18th century Yoruba ruler Adeyemi, the Alaafin of old Oyo Kingdom, with the greatest 
distress, called for assistance to the British colonial government in these words: 
  “[w]ith all possible speed I beg that the Imperial Government…come to my help.”55 
Those frantic words show the failure of Yoruba traditional rulers to end violent conflicts 
between the Yoruba groups. Akinjogbin reported that, by 1862, militarism had overshadowed 
and undermined monarchy and the powers of rulers.56 Adepegba has described the extent of 
the powers of the military over the rulers of the people, claiming that when there were claims 
of superiority among the Yoruba, they were decided in the battlefields.57With respect to this, 
Adepegba further noted that; 
“those who dictated the events of the period were in some cases not the rulers of the 
people; they were the soldiers of fortune to whom the rulers looked in the face of 
attack.”58 
Because the traditional rulers were overcome by the war situation in the Yorubaland, the 
British colonial administration tried to salvage the situation by introducing indirect rule, 
where the powers of the military were reduced by bestowing new chieftaincies on prominent 
military war lords and placing them under the existing traditional rulers.59It could be argued 
that it was these attempts by the colonial administration through the agreement of the 
traditional rulers that brought an end to the Yoruba wars in 1888. The restoration of traditional 
rulers to their authority through the native authority system, which has transcended to the 
Local Government system, led to the resolution of the Yoruba wars and therefore a precedent 
of Local Government system resolving conflicts among the Yoruba. However, the Local 
Government system was transformed and made a matter of regional government by the 1946 
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Constitution in response to the clamour for Nigerians to self-govern free from colonial 
administration, and this Local Government reform left the traditional rulers out of politics. 60  
 
Obafemi Awolowo, who was the Action Group Ijebu-Yoruba leader in the colonial era, 
introduced the 1952 Western Region Local Government policy fashioned after the English 
Local Government Act 1933 of the United Kingdom which introduced a three-tier 
government; district, divisional and local councils.61 Each council was financially 
autonomous with ability to collect taxes, award contracts and employ its staff.62 The divisional 
council exercised authority over already created colonial divisions while the district councils 
exercised authority over related towns, and the local councils exercised authority over remote 
communities.63 The demands of a modern State structure meant the restructuring of Local 
Government from the Native Authority systems to the new 1950’s Local Government 
reforms. The traditional authorities in the new Local Government reform were greatly reduced 
from unlimited traditional leading powers under the native authority system to being 
controlled by the regional authorities.64Under the 1952 reform, the regional authority had 
powers to appoint inspectors to inspect the performance of the local councils. The traditional 
rulers no longer had the final say in matters of dispute resolution. The regional government 
could redefine their jurisdiction and alter their functions and could dissolve a local council for 
contravention of the Local Government laws.65For example, the Western Region 1952 Local 
Government law in section 2 defined chiefs as “any person recognised as a chief by the 
Lieutenant Governor.”66 It did not matter who the groups regarded as their chiefs, it was the 
appointment of the Governor that was recognised. The Local Government reform in the 
Western region by the governor led to dissatisfied Obas and chiefs of the local councils.67Also, 
Section 71 of the 1952 Western Local Government law provided the functions of the Local 
Government. Out of the 82 functions, none relates to autonomous traditional rulers being able 
to deal with land and dispute resolution. Sections 182 and 183 dealt with the right of Local 
Government to lease, mortgage or even sell land but only with the consent of the Regional 
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Assembly.68 Regardless of the dissatisfaction of the traditional rulers at the time, it can be 
argued that the Western Region Local Government law did not contribute to any fundamental 
increase in the conflict between the Ife and the Modakeke considering that there was only one 
violent episode of conflict between the groups prior to the colonial era and two violent 
episodes of the Ife-Modakeke conflict in the colonial era compared to the five episodes in the 
post-colonial era. Also, the Local Government law provided a unified system of local 
governance that removed traditional powers to deal discriminatorily in land issues. Therefore, 
although the 1950’s reforms placed a cap on the authorities of the traditional leaders, it proved 
to be a positive step towards local governance because the traditional leaders had become 
financially irresponsible, hostile to new reforms, and had several rivalries among 
themselves.69  
Even though there were some structural changes in local governance between the 1950’s and 
1976, those changes were not nation-wide. It was the 1976 Local Government reform, 
initiated by the Federal military government, that was the most significant because it made a 
single tier government -the Local Government- an arm of the Federal government.70 In the 
forward to the guidelines for Local Government reform 1976, the rationale for the 
reorganization of the Local Government system is given as: 
‘’…The Military Government was essentially motivated by the necessity to stabilize 
and rationalize Government at the Local level. This must of necessity, entail the 
decentralization of some significant functions of the State Government to Local level 
in order to harness local resources for rapid development. The Federal Military 
Government has therefore decided to reorganize Local Government as the third tier 
of governmental activity in the nation.’’71 
Ogunna72 summarised the rationale for the 1976 Local Government guidelines: 
1. To unify Local Government systems in the country 
2. To make Local Government an autonomous third tier of government  
3. To institutionalise statutory allocations of resources to Local Governments 
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4. To make Local Governments democratically administered. 
Asaju added another point, namely; to make Local Governments a legal entity distinct from 
state and Federal government.73 Before the 1976 reform, there was no single system for the 
Local Governments, thus each developed at a different pace.74 However, with the coming of 
the 1976 reform, a single-tier Local Government was introduced as a third tier of government 
in Nigeria.75 Ademolekun noted that the major difference between previous reforms of Local 
Government in Nigeria and the 1976 reform was the democratization of Local Government 
and making it a third tier of government in Nigeria.76 
The 1976 reform also introduced joint bank accounts for state and Local Governments for the 
funding of the Local Government which proved problematic because Local Government 
became exceedingly reliant on Federal and state government funding. Ojo and Adebayo noted 
that the gap between statutory allocation introduced by the 1976 reforms, the internally 
generated revenue of Local Government and the expenditures of Local Government had 
become so wide as to disrupt the functioning of the Local Government areas.77 Ikeanyibe 
noted that “[a]llocations to Local Governments were cornered through the Joint Local 
Government Accounts, and states engaged in many other actions that subverted the autonomy 
of Local Governments.”78 As a result, the Local Governments do not get the appropriate 
funding to cover their expenditure. 
Furthermore, the population criteria identified in the Local Government reform 1976 provided 
that viability for a Local Government was set at a population of 150,000-800,000 residents.79 
This has been criticised for its failure to even out the local administrations as some Local 
Governments are too large while others are relatively small. However, although the Modakeke 
are a minority in the Ife, with a smaller population than the Ife, (600,00080 and 300,000.81) 
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respectively, there are smaller Local Government areas in population size in Nigeria such as 
Bakassi Local Government in Cross River with a mere 31,641 population, and Ilejemeje in 
Ekiti State with 43,459.82 Even within Osun State Ifedayo Local Government is made up of 
37,508.83 This puts the Modakeke in a favourable position for a Local Government.  
Asaju has noted that, because of the rivalries between the Federal government and the state 
government, no elections were held for Local Governments from 1979 to 1983.84 Nigeria 
went back into military rule from 1983 to 1999, and the next reorganisation of Local 
Government was only in 1999 when the 1999 Constitution made the Local Government a 
third tier of government. The effect of the 1999 Constitution on Local Government creation 
and administration in Nigeria is discussed below, but it can be noted here that the issue of 
population size has been carried forward to the present day. 
The 1976 guidelines were incorporated into the 1979 Constitution and subsequently into the 
current 1999 Constitution by virtue of sections 7(6) a, 7(6) b and 162(6) and 162(7). Section 
7 gave legal existence to Local Government as a tier of government. Section 7(6) makes 
provision for their financing from Federal government and the state. The impact of the reform 
(as incorporated into the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions) on the legality of the creation of a 
Local Government by Osun state in Nigeria will be discussed under the sub-heading below. 
6.8 The Legality of a Local Government by Osun State   
As pointed out in the earlier discussion in section 6.4 above, the 1999 Constitution, in section 
3 and the first schedule, listed 774 Local Government authorities and 6 Area Offices.  The 
1976 Local Government reform, which was incorporated into the 1979 Constitution and is 
incorporated into the present 1999 Constitution by virtue of sections 7, 8, 162 of the 
Constitution as well as the list of Local Governments in the fourth schedule of the constitution, 
makes the creation of a Local Government by states a possibility but with mounting challenges 
in funding and administrative difficulties that must be addressed by the Federal government. 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Osun state government, although in a legal 
position to create a Local Government for the Modakeke to end the conflict between the Ife 
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and the Modakeke is very constrained, and the feasibility of such Local Government being 
created and sustained is very low.85 The researcher found that the feasibility of resolution of 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict by means of a Local Government for the Modakeke lies not entirely 
in the hands of the authority of the Osun state government but on the Federal government of 
Nigeria which has the obligation of assenting to the creation of a Local Government according 
to the provisions of section 8 of the 1999 constitution. Therefore, the responsibility for further 
violence between the Ife and the Modakeke goes mainly to the Federal government as the acts 
and omissions of the organs of the State are attributable to the State.86 
As shown in chapter five, the thesis recognises that although constitutionally possible, the 
reality of the Osun state of Nigeria creating a Local Government for the Modakeke is based 
on the political inclination of the Federal government. However, the recommendation in this 
thesis is that the Federal and state governments need to cooperate for the sake of peace to 
make this happen and end conflict between the Ife and Modakeke because the Constitution 
can be regarded as ‘a set of rights, powers and procedures’’87 regulating the relationships 
between public authorities and citizens.  
6.8.1 Effects of the 1999 Constitution on Local Government Creation in Nigeria 
The year 1999 saw the return of Nigeria to democratic rule and the struggles between the 
states and the Federal government over the control of Local Government in Nigeria returned. 
However, it has been argued that Local Government lost autonomy because of the constant 
whittling down of Local Government powers by the states. As a result, the need for a Local 
Government in special circumstances in order to end a long-standing conflict does not shine 
through. Odo noted that:  
“The excessive control of some Local Governments by the states has reduced them to 
local administration or local arms of state administration.”88  
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Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution ensures the system of a democratically elected Local 
Government Council that act as representative government at the grassroots. Section 7 of the 
1999 Constitution provides:  
Section 7 (1)  
The system of Local Government by democratically elected Local Government 
councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of 
every State shall, subject to section 8 of this Constitution, ensure their existence under 
a Law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and 
functions of such councils. 
The provisions of section 7(1) gives the mandate to states government to ensure the existence 
of Local Government areas in their states, thus giving the Osun state government the right to 
create a Local Government in Osun state subject to the process to be followed in section 8 of 
the constitution. The sub-section also shows the importance of a Local Government that is 
created under the confines of the law. Anything outside a legal creation fails to qualify as a 
Local Government in Nigeria. This underscores the importance of considering the legality of 
Osun state creation of a Local Government for the Modakeke. 
Section 7 (2) 
The person authorised by law to prescribe the area over which a Local Government 
council may exercise authority shall (a) define such area as clearly as practicable; 
and (b) ensure, to the extent to which it may be reasonably justifiable that in defining 
such area regard is paid to - (i) the common interest of the community in the area; (ii) 
traditional association of the community; and (iii) administrative convenience. 
Sub-section (2) above makes it clear that in the event of a Local Government being regarded 
as necessary and feasible, an area over which such authority is necessary and feasible must 
be designated. This qualifies as a Local Government, and not an Area Office. This subsection 
outlines the criteria for Local Government creation. In summary, the criteria for the creation 
of Local Government in section 7(2) includes: a defined area of authority, common interest 
of the community, traditional association of the community and administrative convenience. 




6.8.1.1 Defined Area of Authority 
A new Local Government for the Modakeke must specify a defined area of authority of the 
Local Government area. As earlier discussed in chapter five, land matters have been settled 
by the Supreme Court in the case of Elegushi v Oseni89 In that case, evidence of long 
possession of land in Nigeria is a proof of ownership. Also, in the case of Chief Ojeme & 
other v Alhaji Momdu 11 & Others90 the Supreme Court upheld the right of a community to 
hold rights of occupancy as a general rule. Thus, it can be argued that the areas of land 
occupied by the Modakeke belong in law to the Modakeke on the basis of proof of long 
possession by the Modakeke. On the other hand, land being used for farming by the 
Modakeke, which belongs to the Ife, and which is subject to payment of ground rent (Ishakole) 
by Modakeke farmers, remains Ife land according to the case of Alani Akanmu v Raji & 
Others.91 Further, the Appeal Court in Emmanuel Anizaku & 33 Others v The Governor of 
Nassarawa State & 2 Others92 ruled that indigenes of a place are those who lived there at 
independence in 1960. However even if the Supreme Court does not make a judicial 
proclamation on the matter to the effect that the Modakeke are indigenes, it does not prevent 
the Modakeke from owning land which is contiguous with all other land owned by Modakeke 
inhabitants. Moreover, the Modakeke can continue to rent land from the Ife for farming with 
the payment of ground rent for such land use. However, the creation of a Local Government 
for the Modakeke must not include lands owned by the Ife and occupied by the Ife, including 
the area where the Palace of the Ife is situated because it is unthinkable that the Ife would 
have given the Modakeke their revered palace land or areas surrounding it to qualify the 
Modakeke to claim such lands through evidence of long possession. This would be an 
invitation for a repeat of the violent confrontation between the Ife and the Modakeke in 1996 
when a Local Government was created for the Modakeke covering areas of the Ooni’s 
palace.93 But if the Local Government for Modakeke is created with defined land covering the 
Modakeke occupied land (not lands subject to ground rent) it is feasible that such Local 
Government will create little or no problem for the Ife. 
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6.8.1.2 Traditional Association of the Modakeke and the Common Interest of the 
Community 
The then Ooni of Ife in 2009 Oba Okunade Sijuwade, crowned the traditional ruler of the 
Modakeke, Ogunsua of Modakeke Francis Adedoyin, as Oba of Modakeke. He was 
subsequently presented with a staff of office by the then Governor of Osun state, Olagunsoye 
Oyinlola, in 2009.94 The Ogunsua of Modakeke has his office in the traditional palace of 
Modakeke rulers in Modakeke. The entire Yoruba culture, inclusive of the Modakeke, boasts 
of many traditional institutions which include the office of the king, chiefs, deities, chief 
priest, and the Ogboni court.95 Furthermore, the interviews conducted in the Ife and Modakeke 
by the Researcher in 2014 show that the Modakeke view their traditional ruler differently 
from the Ife. 92% of the Modakeke said that they had different traditional rulers from the 
Ife.96 However, the official crowning of the Modakeke ruler by the generally revered spiritual 
leader of the Yoruba, the Ooni of Ife makes it more official and recognised by all Yoruba as 
a separate ruler for the Modakeke and increases the feasibility for a separate Local 
Government for the Modakeke.  
6.8.1.3 Administrative Convenience 
The administration of the Area Office presently in Modakeke, although not the same as a 
fully-fledged Local Government, is a sign of the need for administrative convenience in the 
locality, and a sign that a full Local Government in necessary for the Modakeke. 
While section 7 (2) provides the criteria for Local Government creation, section 7(3) provides 
for some of the functions of the Local Government. 
Section 7 (3)  
It shall be the duty of a Local Government council within the State to participate in 
economic planning and development of the area referred to in subsection (2) of this 
section and to this end an economic planning board shall be established by a Law 
enacted by the House of Assembly of the State. 
                                                             
94 The Vanguard Newspaper: ‘Ooni Crowns Ogunsua of Modakeke’ September 6, 2009. Online: 
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/09/ooni-crowns-ogunsua-of-modakeke/ 
95 Elugbaju, A.S (2016) The Role of Traditional Institution in Managing Ife-Modakeke conflict. International Journal of Arts and Humanities. 
(IJAH) Bahir Dar-Ethiopia Vol. 5 No. 2. S/No 17. P. 9 
96 See Modakeke Coding’s in appendix 14  
164 
 
The importance of a Local Government for the economic development of an area is stated 
clearly in section 7(3). Therefore, the struggle of groups for the creation of Local Government 
for economic development of their groups appears in line with the spirit of the law as outlined 
in section 7(3). 
Section 7(4)  
The Government of a State shall ensure that every person who is entitled to vote or be 
voted for at an election to House of Assembly shall have the right to vote or be voted 
for at an election to a Local Government council.  
Section 7(4) gives the right to the states to conduct elections to Local Government offices. 
However, Section 9(1)(2)(3) of the Electoral Act 2010 provides: 
Section 9 (1)  
The Commission shall compile, maintain and update, on a continuous basis, a 
National Register of voters, in this Act referred to as the (“Register of Voters”) which 
shall include the names of all persons entitled to vote in any Federal, State or Local 
Government or Area Council elections. 
Section 9 (2) 
The Commission shall maintain as part of the National Register of Voters, a register 
of voters for each State of the Federation and for the Federal Capital Territory 
Section 9(3) 
The Commission shall maintain as part of the National Register of Voters for each 
state and Federal Capital Territory a Register of Voters for each Local Government 
or Area Council within the State and the Federal Capital.97 
The above provisions demonstrate that it is only the Independent Electoral Commission 
(INEC) a Federal executive body, that is responsible for compiling and updating the voters’ 
registers and making it available to the state electoral body.98 By so doing the Federal 
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government is seen to play a role in Local Government administration in Nigeria outside the 
authority of the state to create Local Government areas.  
Section 7 (5) 
The functions to be conferred by Law upon Local Government council shall include 
those set out in the Fourth Schedule to this Constitution 
 Section 7 (6)  
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution - (a) the National Assembly shall make 
provisions for statutory allocation of public revenue to Local Government councils in 
the Federation; and (b) the House of Assembly of a State shall make provisions for 
statutory allocation of public revenue to Local Government councils within the State. 
The above provisions set the Local Government as a third tier of government in Nigeria. 
Section 7 (1-6) guarantees the existence of Local Governments in Nigeria, with the specific 
role of promoting economic development in their respective areas of occupation.  
The right of the states to create Local Governments in their states is subject to the Federal 
government assenting to any Local Government creation before it can be submitted to the 
Federal Parliament for enactment as law. Section 8 of the Constitution provides for the powers 
of creating a Local Government area based on specific evidence provided by the local area in 
respect of which a new Local Government is requested.  Section 8 (3) states: 
A bill for a Law of a House of Assembly for the purpose of creating a new Local 
Government area shall only be passed if –  
(a) a request supported by at least two-thirds majority of members (representing the 
area demanding the creation of the new Local Government area) in each of the 
following, namely - (i) the House of Assembly in respect of the area, and (ii) the Local 
Government councils in respect of the area, is received by the House of Assembly;  
(b) a proposal for the creation of the Local Government area is thereafter approved 
in a referendum by at least two-thirds majority of the people of the Local Government 
area where the demand for the proposed Local Government area originated;  
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(c) the result of the referendum is then approved by a simple majority of the members 
in each Local Government council in a majority of all the Local Government councils 
in the State; and  
(d) the result of the referendum is approved by a resolution passed by two-thirds 
majority of members of the House of Assembly.  
Section 8 quoted above gives powers to the state governments in Nigeria to create Local 
Government areas in their states through the Federal House of Assembly. Therefore, the Osun 
state of Nigeria, by virtue of section 8 of the constitution, has the power to create a new Local 
Government area. However, as discussed in chapter five, the reality of Osun state creating a 
Local Government that will thrive for the Modakeke is dependent on the Federal government 
assenting to the creation of Local Government for the Modakeke. 
Another difficulty with the creation of a new Local Government area for the Modakeke is the 
problematic nature of the funding of Local Governments in Nigeria. Section 162(3)(5)(7)(8) 
of the Nigerian constitution99 provides for the funding of the Local Government areas to keep 
them operating effectively. However, Ola and Tonwe stated that the inadequate funding of 
Local Government has been a major problem in their running effectively.100 
Section 162 (3) of the 1999 constitution provides: 
Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed 
among the Federal and State Governments and the Local Government Councils in 
each State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly. 
The above section makes provision for the funding of the Local Governments in Nigeria from 
the federal account. Olaoye identified this funding as one of the external sources of funding 
for Local Government in Nigeria, namely. federal account statutory allocation.101 
Section 162 (5) provides 
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The amount standing to the credit of Local Government Councils in the Federation 
Account shall also be allocated to the State for the benefit of their Local Government 
Councils on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly. 
Section 162 (7) and (8) provides: 
Each State shall pay to Local Government Councils in its area of jurisdiction such 
proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed 
by the National Assembly. 
(8) The amount standing to the credit of Local Government Councils of a State shall 
be distributed among the Local Government Councils of that State on such terms and 
in such manner as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the State. 
The above section gives states the right to maintain the funds being allocated from the federal 
account for Local Government councils. Ola and Tonwe had noted that the states in most 
cases fail to remit the 10% of federal funding to the Local Governments causing revenue 
problems for the Local Governments.102 Supporting Ola and Tonwe, Ikeanyibe noted that 
“[a]llocations to Local Governments were cornered through the Joint Local Government 
Accounts, and states engaged in many other actions that subverted the autonomy of Local 
Governments.”103 
Also, Orewa and Adewumi had noted that the states control over Local Government budgets 
with several restrictions on Local Government spending have led to problems in the effective 
functioning of Local Governments.104 This raises questions regarding the need to have the 
Local Governments if they cannot function effectively. In addition, Ohunmwuangho stated 
that “in most cases, the state government make several deductions, such as counterpart 
funding of projects, income tax (upfront) by Local Government employees(payee) etc before 
remitting to councils whatever it deems fit.”105 Such actions by the states definitely lead to 
                                                             
102 R.O Ola & D.A Tonwe., (2005) Ibid. p. 203 
103O.M Ikeanyibe., ‘Federalism, Constitutionalism, and Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria’ Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
(MCSER Publishing Rome-Italy) 2016 p. 383-393 [ 387] 
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105 S.O Ohunmwuangho., ‘Problems of Revenue Generation in Local Government Administration in Nigeria’ An International Journal of 
Arts and Humanities Bahir Dar, Ethiopia vol. 2 no. 2, 2013, S/N 7 p. 192-209 [202] 
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revenue problems being experienced by the Local Governments which makes the feasibility 
of states creating a new thriving Local Government very slim. 
Although, the fourth schedule of the 1999 Constitution gives the Local Government the right 
to participate in the government of the local people by providing and maintaining schools, 
health services and agricultural development among many other functions thus making a 
Local Government in Nigeria a separate government capable of existing on its own.106As 
shown in the above discussion  section 162 of the 1999 constitution gives significant power 
to the Federal and state governments with regard to funding to determine the life and death of 
a Local Government area. According to Khaleed quoted in Oyedele et al: “There is no state 
of the federation of Nigeria where one form of illegality or the other is not committed with 
funds of Local Government.”107 
The above statement shows that it is not just the Federal government that encroaches on the 
autonomy of the Local Government through inadequate funding but the states are culprits of 
corruption and the financial ruin of the Local Government by means of hijacking the funds of 
Local Government allocated in the joint account maintained for the state and Local 
Government thereby preventing the Local Governments from carrying out their functions.108 
This being the case, it becomes very difficult to consider creating a new Local Government 
when the existing ones are unable to function due to financial constraints. This directly affects 
the feasibility of creating a new Local Government for the Modakeke because if the existing 
Local Government which the Modakeke are currently under, the Ife-east Local Government, 
is found to be struggling financially, the feasibility of creating an additional Modakeke Local 
Government to be put in such a financially difficult state will be very low.  
Another aspect that affects the feasibility of Local Government creation in Nigeria is the 
encroachment of the autonomy of Local Governments leading to ineffective functioning of 
the Local Governments. For example, the Osun state to which the Ife and the Modakeke 
belong bears some responsibilities towards encroaching on the autonomy of Local 
Government in Osun by amending the Local Government law to give the state legality in 
appointing management committees for Local Governments rather than conducting Local 
                                                             
106 J.A Yakubu., Socio-Legal Essays in Local Government Administration in Nigeria (Demyaxs Law Books. Ibadan Nigeria, 2003) p. 4  
107 S.O Oyedele & Others., ‘Local Government Administration and Natural Development in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects’ Ilorin 
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Government elections.109 Although, the Osun state government gave reasons for the 
amendment that economic recession meant the state could not conduct elections until 2018,110 
such actions of preventing elections only tends to remove the possibilities of creating a new 
Local Government. Oyedele et al noted that the members of such committees are friends and 
loyalists of the state governors who create the local authorities,111 making it easy to hijack the 
funding for Local Government authorities and not create new ones. Ohunmwuangho also 
noted that “no transition committee chairman has the guts to question the governor of a state 
that magnanimously appointed him.” 112 It is no surprise then that Osun state have not created 
another Local Government for the Modakeke as they are not ready to fund such governments 
correctly as prescribed in the constitution. 
 
The Federal government also get involved in unconstitutional activity by improperly 
withholding access to Local Government revenue as in the case of the Federal government 
withholding revenue for Local Governments in Lagos and other states that created new Local 
Governments in line with their mandate in the 1999 constitution.113 The solution to these 
challenges to Local Government was suggested by Nolte who discussed extensively the 
problem of the Federal government having majority control of revenue to the detriment of 
states and Local Government areas in Nigeria.114 Nolte has advocated the devolution of 
political initiative to the states including financial autonomy.115  The present system leaves it 
open to politicians to grant local authorities only when they, the politicians can see a way to 
obtaining more revenue. It can be argued that in the case of the Modakeke, there may be 
likelihood of politicians within the elite hierarchy standing to gain financially or politically 
from the Modakeke having a separate Local Government.  However, financial autonomy for 
Local Government areas which should include greater revenue sources from internally 
generated revenue rather than state and federal funding will reduce any such tendencies for 
struggles for Local Government areas for purely financial gain. If this is not done, the country 
must expect Local Government creation and administration to be continually politicised. 
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It then falls on the state but most especially the Federal government to ensure that the 
challenges of Local Government autonomy and funding are addressed to allow for the proper 
envisaged use of the Local Government as grassroot governance to bring the benefits to the 
grassroots and in the case of the Ife-Modakeke to allay the fears of the Modakeke of 
domination by the Ife. Whether the contemporary Ife and the Modakeke are in a position to 
allow the State to intervene in their conflict by creating a Local Government for the Modakeke 
is discussed below. 
6.9 Implementation of a Recommendation for Osun State to Grant a Local Government 
to the Modakeke with the Assent of the Federal government 
As shown in the history of the Ife-Modakeke conflict in chapter five, it must be noted that all 
recommendations for the creation of Local Government for the Modakeke by various 
committees have been ignored or inadequately dealt with, and have always led to violent 
conflicts between the Ife and the Modakeke.116 The question that this raises is whether there 
is a possibility that the Ife group will honour the Nigerian decision to create a Local 
Government authority for the Modakeke if the advice of this thesis is considered by the State. 
Although the question was not directly related to Local Government creation,117 and the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis below represent a very thin chance, the Researcher found 
a clue from the interviews conducted in 2014 by the Researcher among the Ife and Modakeke 
groups which related to the views of both the Ife and the Modakeke on their relationship with 
governments (Federal and state) in general terms not on the specific issue of Local 
Government creation. 
The Researcher asked participants in Ife and Modakeke the question below: 
Question on relationship between the groups and the Federal State 
How do you understand the relationship between this village and the government of Nigeria? 
Table 9 Responses on the Relationship between the State and the Ife and Modakeke Groups 
 
                                                             
116 See discussions of conflict triggers in the modern violent confrontations between the Ife and the Modakeke in chapter 5.5 
117 On Hing sight the questions should have been directedly related to Local Government this the researcher regrets but learnt from it. 
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This question further justified the discussions of autonomy and internal self-determination in 
chapter 7. And the responses have assisted in two tasks: first, in determining the best advice 
to be given to the Ife and Modakeke groups in terms of accepting Federal State intervention 
through the creation of a separate Local Government for the Modakeke; and, second, in 
advising the Federal State on how best to channel their intervention efforts.  The table above 
shows the questions that were put to participants in relation to the relationship between two 
groups and the modern State. 
The responses below demonstrate that the Ife and the Modakeke respect the Federal and state 
governments and co-operate with both governments, while honouring their traditional rulers 
at the same time. Some of the responses of the Ife are:  
Response 1: 
“People listen to the king because they feel he has a better understanding but when 
push comes to shove, they go to the Local Government chairman.”118 
Response 2: 
“We have the Local Government chairman because each town is subdivided, and 
though they are directly under the government they are under the king, the Ooni of 
Ife”119 
Response 3: 
“The government is the head now”120  
Response 4: 
“The government rules but the traditional rulers have a say about what happens” 121 
Response 5: 
“Our Ooni still rules and the government is ruling towns”122 
                                                             
118 Interview Iya8 
119 Interview Ima 20 
120 Interview IA 47 
121 Interview Ima 23 




“We cooperate with the government” 123 
The Modakeke responses were similar to the Ife. When asked to describe the relationship 
between the State and the tribes, four respondents illustrated it this way: 
Response 7: 
“Kabiasi (king) is ‘typewriter’ and chairman Local Government is proprietor’’124 
Response 8: 
  “No, the government is greater now”125 
 Response 9: 
“Cordial I will say even though the law does not officially recognise them.”126 
Response 10: 
“The government is like the supreme but they give the chiefs opportunity to rule 
locally as traditional rulers” 127 
The responses above are statistically represented below in Table 2 below. 
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124 Interview Mma 4 
125 Interview Mya 16 
126 Interview Ma 19 
127 Interview Mma 25 
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Table 10 Questions on the Effect of the Conflict 
The responses above can be perceived as indicators that the Ife are less likely to accept the 
creation of a Local Government for the Modakeke with only 3 participants saying that they 
cooperate with the government. The Modakeke on the other hand had 13 positive responses 
indicating that they cooperate with the government in general but not on specific points of 
Local Government creation. However, both groups acknowledged that the Federal State has 
authority over them regardless of their respect for their traditional rulers. It is argued in this 
thesis that either the Osun state government or the Federal government now must intervene 
by the creation of a new Local Government for the Modakeke, but with the knowledge that 
there might be some resistance from the Ife so that the change can be managed in a peaceful 
manner. 
In addition, when the history of Local Government creation in Ile-Ife is taken into 
consideration as discussed in chapter 5, especially the very controversial Local Government 
created in 1996, we find that the Ife only protested against the creation of the Local 
Government for the Modakeke because the area comprised within the authority encompassed 
the palace of the Ife’s revered traditional ruler. In a situation where a Local Government for 
the Modakeke is strategically located in Modakeke populated land and not in any inclusion of 
any revered place of the Ife, the likelihood of the Ife cooperating is very feasible. 
Considering the above discussion, the Osun state government should seriously consider the 
criteria for Local Government creation for the Modakeke and, if they qualify legally, to make 
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sure that such Local Government is created as a permanent, separate institution for the 
Modakeke. As will be shown below, the Federal government is responsible for the inaction 
of the Osun state government for non-creation of a Modakeke Local Government area to 
prevent further encroachment on the fundamental human rights of both the Ife and the 
Modakeke and the prevention of future genocide from the conflict continuing. The 
responsibility of the Federal government to approve and partly fund the Local Government 
for it to survive to prevent further violent conflict is discussed below. 
6.10 Attribution of Decisions of State Organs to the Federal State: Osun State  
The significance of discussing the responsibility of the Federal government in supervising a 
Local Government creation for the Modakeke lies in the persuasion of the Federal government 
to take the lead in instructing the Osun state to create Local Government for the Modakeke 
especially as the Federal government have in the past refused to fund the new Local 
Governments created in Nigeria since 1999.128 The Federal government cannot hide under the 
guise that Osun state have not created a Local Government for the Modakeke to help end the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict and prevent further violence. The reference text in this area is the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 2001.129 These Articles were a recommendation to the General Assembly of 
the United Nations to be annexed in a General Assembly Resolution.130 As a result, they are 
not binding law as such,131 however they are regarded as an essential piece of international 
law and have been “considered to reflect customary international law.”132 The International 
Law Commission’s Articles deals only with responsibilities of States.133 
                                                             
128 See discussions in chapter 5.7 
129 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Text adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session. The report, which also contains 
commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10). 
The text in this chapter is reproduced as it appears in the annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001. Online at 
https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/drwcasebook/Documents/Documents/International%20Law%20Commission%202001%20Draft
%20Articles%20on%20State%20Responsibility.pdf 
130 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Text adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session. The report, which also contains 
commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10). 
The text in this chapter is reproduced as it appears in the annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December, 2001. Online at 
https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/drwcasebook/Documents/Documents/International%20Law%20Commission%202001%20Draft
%20Articles%20on%20State%20Responsibility.pdf 
131 But many Articles are already law, and others will become recognised as law by the conduct of states 
132 S. Talmon., ‘The Responsibility of Outside Powers for the Acts of Secessionist Entities’ International and Corporate Law Quarterly vol. 
58, 2009, p. 493-517 [495] 
133 The ILC Articles does not cover international organisations. See Article 57 of the ILC Articles 
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The rules of attribution to a State of the conduct of individuals as they are reflected in this 
thesis are covered by Articles 1, 2, 4, 12-15 and 22-25 of the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001.  
Article 1 sets out the essential principle of attribution of conduct to a State in these words: 
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of 
the State 
Article 2 provides that: 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 
Article 2 clearly shows that the conduct attributable to the State can consist of two elements, 
namely, actions or omissions.134 Crawford rightly notes that these elements are both objective 
and subjective depending on the circumstances under consideration.135 In the United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case,136 the Court concluded that the responsibility 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran was entailed by the “inaction” of its authorities which “failed 
to take appropriate steps” to prevent harm, in circumstances where such steps were evidently 
called for.137 This decision shows that the Federal government is responsible for the actions 
or inactions of the Osun state which result in an internationally wrongful act. Although, 
chapter seven will consider whether failure by the Federal State to prevent breaches of human 
rights in Nigeria in the context of possible genocide of the Ife-Modakeke people constitute an 
internationally wrongful act, this section sets the tune for detailed discussion in chapter seven. 
Osun state is a political and administrative organ of Nigeria, as revealed by section 2(2) of the 
1999 Constitution. As a result, the provisions of articles 4 of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts applies to Nigeria. 
Article 4 provides:  
                                                             
134 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001. Online: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. p.35 
135 J. Crawford., The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentators (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) p. 82 
136 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980. p. 31–32, parag. 63 and 67 
137  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Judgment. Ibid 
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1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or 
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial 
unit of the State  
2.  An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with 
the internal law of the State 
Article 4 quoted above establishes the basic rule of attribution of conduct of any of its organs 
to the State. According to the Commentaries to the draft Articles in the United Nations 
website: 
“Under many legal systems, the State organs consist of different legal persons 
(ministries or other legal entities), which are regarded as having distinct rights and 
obligations for which they alone can be sued and are responsible. For the purposes of 
the international law of State responsibility the position is different. The State is 
treated as a unity, consistent with its recognition as a single legal person in 
international law.”138  
It does not matter whether organs of the State are part of the central government or not: 
conduct is attributable when an individual or organ is acting in an apparently official 
capacity.139 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has stated that: 
“According to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any organ 
of a State must be regarded as an act of that State. This …is of a customary 
character…”140 
So, the ICJ has referred to the actions of organs of State being attributable to the State as a 
well-established and customary international law. Therefore, the Osun state government, 
being the second tier of government in Nigeria (the Federal State government being the first 
tier), is an organ of the Nigerian State whose actions or omissions are therefore attributable 
to the Nigerian State where such acts or omissions constitute an internationally wrongful act. 
                                                             
138 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries 2001. Ibid. p. 35. 
139 J. Crawford., (2002) Ibid. p. 99 
140 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion. 
ICJ Reports 1991, p. 87 parag. 62.  
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The Nigerian State cannot, therefore, hide behind the inaction of Osun state even if Osun state 
gives reasons, or no reasons, for failing to act. Articles 12-15 cover internationally wrongful 
acts.  
Furthermore, Article 12 provides that:  
There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is 
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin 
or character. 
Article 13: 
An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the 
State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs. 
Articles 15: 
The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions or 
omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or omission occurs 
which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful 
act. 
The question is whether the failure to grant internal self-determination to prevent genocide is 
a breach of an international obligation and what pleas are available to a State for not acting? 
Article 25.  
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness 
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the 
act: (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State 
or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a 
whole.  
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity; or (b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity” 
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Articles 22 to 25 have counter-measures for not acting or acting against the international 
obligation of a State which the Nigerian government would need to consider. However, these 
measures are not considered in this thesis. 
The 7th House of Representatives Federal Republic of Nigeria Committee Review of the 1999 
Constitution, received more than thirty-five (35) requests for the creation of new states. The 
Committee’s comment in their report was that: 
“[n]one of the requests submitted to the Committee complied with the procedure for 
creation of States outlined in section 8 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Committee 
was unable to treat any of these requests. The Committee however recognizes that the 
existing provision of the Constitution for the creation of new States is unclear and 
cumbersome. Accordingly, the Committee has clarified the process to make it 
easier.”141 
Although this is not directly relevant to the issue of local authorities, this shows a positive 
indication of the possibility of more Local Governments being created in the future with the 
support of the Federal government of Nigeria.  It might also be interpreted as evidence that 
the Nigerian legislature is aware of the inadequacy of the 1999 Constitution in regard to the 
governance structure of Nigeria, including the difficulties with the creation of local 
authorities.  In the context of breach of its international responsibilities, to protect citizens 
from mass suffering due to war situations the international community might take cognisance 
of the Committee’s comments.  
6.11 Conclusion 
The chapter has demonstrated the necessity and relevance of creating a Local Government for 
conflict resolution. The chapter has provided evidence from the Federal Constitution to show 
that the Osun state of Nigeria has the legal power to create a new Local Government authority 
for the Modakeke, and that it is both necessary and feasible for Osun state to do so 
notwithstanding, first, any consequences for the Ife, and from the Ife and, second, any 
demands for similar treatment by other Nigerian ethnic groups 
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Granted, there are very challenging obstacles to creating a Local Government area for the 
Modakeke by virtue of two statutory provisions: first, section 8 (3) of the Constitution that 
gives power to the Federal government to assent to the creation by a state of a Local 
Government authority area; and, second, section 162 and Part 1 of the First Schedule of the 
1999 constitution on funding of Local Government authorities. However, these challenges are 
heightened more by political considerations on the part of the Federal government and state 
governments. It is therefore within the legal realms of the state government to resolve the Ife-
Modakeke conflict by applying to the Federal government for a new Local Government area 
for the Modakeke but ultimately it is the Federal government’s decision to allow such a Local 
Government to be created. 
Having established in chapters 5 and 6 that it is both necessary and feasible for the Federal 
and state governments of Nigeria to create a new Local Government for the Modakeke to end 
the more than a century long conflict, the next chapter examines the feasibility of extending 
international pressure on the Nigerian State to end the Ife-Modakeke by all means including 
creating an effective and permanent Local Government for the Modakeke.
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION OF 
THE NIGERIAN STATE AND SEPARATION OF GROUPS: THE 
CASE OF IFE-MODAKEKE NIGERIA 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapters 5 and 6 it has been demonstrated that the Constitution of Nigeria discriminates 
between indigenes and settlers,1 yet the Federal government treats the Ife (indigenes) and the 
Modakeke (settlers) as a single people despite the evidence that the two groups are distinct 
from each other.2   It has been demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4 that there is no longer the 
possibility of separating the two groups by moving the Modakeke to new lands away from 
the Ife, and that the only viable way to separate them from each other is by economic and 
political separation in situ.  Consequently, that means granting the Modakeke what they want, 
namely; their own separate and effective independent Local Government.  Chapters 5 and 6 
have also provided a demonstration that Osun state has the legal capacity to grant the 
Modakeke its own separate Local Government, yet it has not done so.  And it has also been 
demonstrated in those latter two chapters, that the Federal government has responsibility for 
the acts and omissions of Osun state as an organ of State.  The necessity for, and the viability 
of a separate Local Government for the Modakeke has also been demonstrated in chapter 6. 
However, the feasibility of creating a Local Government for the Modakeke has not been 
without challenge.  If Osun state were to grant a Local Government to the Modakeke, this 
might lead the Ife to retaliate in a violent way even though the likelihood is small.  So, there 
is an argument which can be made on the part of the Ife to show that the land which they rent 
or lease to the Modakeke should be associated with political and economic control of the 
people (the Modakeke) who rent the land.  However, it has been contended that there is no 
legal reason for an overlap between ownership and Local Government in order for the 
Modakeke to be granted their own Local Government.  On the other hand, it is clear that 
leaving the Modakeke with no Local Government of their own, but only an area office and 
the limited powers of traditional rulers, is not the way to deal with the conflict between the 
                                                             
1 See section 147 of The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Cap. C.23 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, 
Government Printer Lagos 
2See discussions in chapter 5.4 on the relationship between Ife and the Modakeke in modern Nigeria, which included answers given to the 
researcher by both the Ife and the Modakeke participants. 
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two groups: no action by Osun state government and no action by the Federal State 
government --irrespective of their respective reasons-- is not a solution in the short or long 
term to a conflict which has been running for so long and which gives rise to frequent serious 
violent conflict. 
The first argument in this chapter is that the sovereign State of Nigeria must be persuaded to 
act without reliance on, or reference to its internal laws and reasoning: as a member of its 
regional community and of the international community. Nigeria (through its sovereign 
government) should act so as to be in conformity with both regional and international law by 
granting internal self-determination to the Modakeke in order to avoid four possible 
outcomes: first, the African Union or the international community might put diplomatic 
pressure on the Nigerian State to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict permanently so as to prevent 
further injury and loss of life; second, the regional community or the international community 
may take slightly stronger action in order to force the Nigerian government to enforce the 
human rights of the Modakeke; third, even stronger action might be taken by the regional and 
international communities on the basis of breach by Nigeria of its international State 
Responsibility to prevent genocide or the likelihood of genocide; and, fourth, there could be 
military intervention by the African Union if authorised by the UN Security Council. 
The analysis in this chapter provides proof and support for the overall hypothesis that the Ife 
and the Modakeke people, having been in conflict with each other over land, citizenship status 
and identity issues since pre-colonial times and with the frequency of violent conflict having 
increased since the end of colonialization, will continue to be in conflict with each other 
because they have not been effectively separated; and that economic and political separation 
of the groups is both a necessity and is feasible to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict. 
The second argument is that the Nigerian government should not wait to be pressured by the 
international community and the African Union, but should act so as to create a new Local 
Government for the Modakeke, or should instruct Osun state to do so; and that whichever 
government acts to create the Local Government, must do so in an effective manner for the 
immediate and the long-term peaceful future of the Ife and the Modakeke: it must irrevocable 
unless replaced with a more effective arrangement. 
It should be noted that, although the Modakeke might continue to argue about land tenure, the 
arguments in this chapter are not concerned with that argument.  On the other hand, it can also 
be noted that the granting of a Local Government to the Modakeke might lead to their 
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argument about land tenure being treated as no longer an issue which causes tension and 
violent conflict. It is possible that the Modakeke accept the land tenure and land use as 
determined by the Court and that the added benefit of separation would be that the issue of 
land use ceases to be one which the Modakeke raise in future. However, it must be noted that 
there might be challenges for Osun state in making the Modakeke adhere to such a 
commitment for all time; just as Osun state might have a problem entrenching the Local 
Government into law. The international and regional laws which deal with the responsibility 
of the Nigerian State towards its citizens with regard to prevention of breaches of human 
rights, crimes of war and threat of genocide are considered below. 
7.2 International and Regional Laws on the Nigerian State’s Obligation Toward Groups 
States are governed by national, regional and international laws.3 The governance of States 
by national and international law has been in place for several centuries (the starting point 
usually said to be Westphalia).4  But regional laws are probably new since World War II.  In 
the case of Nigeria, the State has been subject to laws other than its internal law since 
independence in 1960. The pursuit of the intent of the Charter prompted by the experiences 
of World Wars I and II, has led to the prioritizing of Human Rights by all sovereign States 
subject to the UN Charter.5 The basic civil and political rights such as the right to life, right 
to own properties, and freedom from torture (jus cogens) are undoubtedly protected in 
International law 6as well as regional7 and national laws.8 
The approach of studying the international law implications of the Ife-Modakeke conflict has 
been adopted by some Nigerian studies on the Ife-Modakeke conflict, such as Imobighe 9 and 
                                                             
3M. Dixon., International Law (6th edition. Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 4 
4 Westphalia Treaty of 24 October, 1648 ended the thirty years of war in Europe and marked the start of international law of modern States. 
see A. Clapham., Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International Relations (Oxford Scholarly 
Authorities on International Law (OSAIL), 2012) p. 5 
5 M. Dixon., (2007) Ibid. p. 4 
6Various International Law Instruments protects these rights such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 Online: 
Https://Www.Un.Org/En/Universal-Declaration-Human-Rights/Index.Html; Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. General Assembly Resolution 39/4610 December, 1984. Online: 
Http://Www.Ohchr.Org/EN/Professionalinterest/Pages/CAT.Aspx.; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (Adopted 19 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 
7African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 1986 Online: Http://Www.African-Court.Org/En/Index.Php/Documents.Legal-
Instruments/Basic-Document.  Herein after referred to as the African Charter. 
8Chapter IV of The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Cap. C.23 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. Government 
Printer Lagos 
9 T.A Imobighe., Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria (Spectrum Books Limited Ibadan, 2003) p. 159  
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Akanji.10  However, this chapter is limited in its discussion of regional and international laws 
to some aspects of three related issues: first, the State’s responsibility to protect; second, the 
State’s responsibility to enable minority people to have appropriate internal self-
determination; and, third, the State’s obligation to ensure that individual and group human 
rights are not breached by itself (the State) or by any other entity within its territory.  All three 
of these issues have been explored in great depth by many scholars11 and, so, it is not within 
the ambit of the chapter to do more than apply the law to the omissions of the Nigerian Federal 
government and the Osun state government.   In addition, although Nigeria is a third world 
country and the researcher recognises the vast array of research work that has been done by 
scholars on third world countries and the fight for contemporary rights of people of the third 
world countries.12 This Thesis does not engage in third world analysis of international law 
(Third world Approaches to International Law - TWAIL) because of lack of space.  So, this 
chapter focuses on the application of the general principles of responsibility to protect, 
internal self-determination, and human rights as they relate to intra-State group conflict 
between small groups of citizens.   
The focus on these three aspects of international and regional laws is intended to answer the 
fifth research sub-question: what is the international and regional legal obligation of the 
Nigerian State to protect the Modakeke and the Ife from each other; to grant internal political 
and economic self-determination to the Modakeke; and to prevent the human rights of the 
Modakeke being breached by any individual or group of individuals (whether organs of the 
State or otherwise). 
As already indicated in section 7.1 above, if the Nigerian State is or will be in breach of any 
one or more of its regional and international legal obligations by failing to prevent further 
violence between the Ife and the Modakeke, the main argument is that the regional and 
international communities can, and perhaps will, bring pressure to bear on the Nigerian 
                                                             
10O.O Akanji., ‘Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: A Critical Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria’ International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rightsvol.16. no. 1., 2009, p. 31-51 [46] 6 
11 For detailed discussions of self-determination see T.D Musgrave., Self-Determination and National Minorities (Oxford University Press, 
1997); D. Philpott., ‘In Defence of Self-Determination’ Ethics (The University of Chicago Press) vol. 105. no.2., 1995, p. 352-385.; J. 
Klabbers., ‘The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International Law’ 28 Human Rights Quarterly, 2006, p. 186-206; R.M 
Ryan & E.L Deci., Self-Determination; Basic Psychological Needs in Motivation, Development and Wellness (New York: Guilford Press, 
2017) 
12 Notable scholarly works on contemporary rights of third world countries includes R. D’Souza., What’s Wrong with Rights? Social 
Movements, Law and Liberal Imaginations (London: UK Pluto Press, 2018); B.S Chimni., ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: 
A Manifesto’ International Community Law Review London vol.8. no.1., 2006, p. 3-27; M. Mutua., ‘Change in the Human Rights Universe’ 
Harvard Human Rights vol. 20., 2006, p. 3-2 
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government to put in place arrangements which will stop future instances of violence.  In the 
worst-case scenario, failure of the Nigerian Federal government to act might result in military 
action within the territory of Nigeria when the next (and any subsequent) violence breaks out 
between the Ife and the Modakeke.  
The first step in answering the research sub-question is to examine the foundations of the 
principle of R2P (‘responsibility to protect’) and to determine whether R2P is a customary 
law in the international domain, whether the principle overrides national constitutions and, if 
not, whether the principle is enough to put pressure on Nigeria to act to end the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict. 
7.3 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Normative and Legal Foundations 
According to the World Federalism Movement: 
“R2P is an emerging norm which sets forth that states have the primary responsibility 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing, but that when the states fail to protect its populations, the 
responsibility falls to the international community.”13 
The above statement emphasises three features of the R2P namely: one, that R2P is an 
emerging norm of international law; two, the primary responsibility to protect citizens from 
the four crimes mentioned above lies on the State; and, three, failure to protect citizens shifts 
the responsibility to the international community.  
The first feature is that the principle of R2P is an emerging norm which is derived from the 
principle of sanctity of human life examined briefly under the historical foundation of the 
principle of R2P below. 
7.3.1 R2P Historical Foundation 
The protection of human lives and prevention of massacres has a long historical background 
dating back to the efforts of the international Red Cross established in 1864.14 The effects of 
                                                             
13 ‘R2P Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society’ A Project of the World Federalism Movement-Institute for Global Policy. p. 5 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2Pcs%20Frequently%20Asked%20Question.pdf 




the Holocaust15 also led to greater efforts at protecting human lives through the United Nations 
Resolution 260, 9 December 1948 on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. The Holocaust was not the last to be seen of mass destruction of lives.  After the 
holocaust came the mass famine in Biafra from the civil war in Nigeria in the 1960’s,16 the 
Cambodian war17 and the 1994 Rwandan genocide,18 to mention a few.19 To prevent such mass 
atrocities from taking place within a State’s internal territories, two doctrines appear to come 
into conflict with each other: the doctrine of State sovereignty and the doctrine of non-
intervention. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the case of United States v 
Netherlands,20 stated that: 
“Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise them, to the exclusion of any 
other State, the functions of a State”21 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) went further to 
distinguish between external and internal sovereignty.22 While external sovereignty refers to 
the relationship between States, the ICISS defined internal sovereignty as “the capacity to 
make authoritative decisions with regard to the people and resources within the territory of 
the state.”23 The independence of States is carried out both inwardly (within the State) and 
outwardly (between the State and other States in the world). 
                                                             
15 According to the Holocaust Encyclopaedia, the Holocaust was a systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of six 
million Jews by the Nazi regime and it’s collaborates” See ‘Introduction to the Holocaust’ Holocaust Encyclopaedia by the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum. Online: https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/introduction-to-the-holocaust.  
16 Thousands of people in Biafra starved to death during the Nigerian civil war sparking international outrage. See ‘Moments in U.S 
Diplomatic History :The Famine in Biafra: USAID’S Response to the Nigerian Civil War’ Online: https://adst.org/2014/05/the-famine-in-
biafra-usaids-response-to-the-nigerian-civil-war 
17‘Cambodia Genocide 1975-1979’ Available in the Holocaust Museum Houston Online: 
https://www.hmh.org/ed_Genocide_Cambodia.shtml 
18 ‘Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country’ Outreach Programme in the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations. 
 Online: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.html 
19 There are also the Bosnian Genocide 1995 and Darfur 2003.  See ‘Past Genocides and Mass Atriocities’ Online: 
http://www.endgenocide.org/leaen/past-genocids 
20United States v Netherlands (1928) Reports of International Arbitration Awards Island of Palmas Case. 4th April, 1928, vol. 2. p. 829-871. 
Online: Http://Legal.Un.Org/Riaa/Cases/Vol_II/829-871.Pdf 
21Island of Palmas case (United States V Netherlands) (1928) Reports of International Arbitral Awards. Vol. II. p. 829-871 Online at 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_II/829-871.pdf  
22 ICISS was set up by the Canadian Government in December 2001 and its Report was published by the International Development Research 
Centre Canada 
23 ‘ICISS (2001) Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. December 2001. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. p. 12 Herein after 
referred to as ICISS.  
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Furthermore, Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union provides that: 
The objectives of the Union shall be to “(b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and independence of its Member States;”  
The above provision arguably is an affirmation that any secessionist demands will be rejected 
by the African Union as a defence of the territorial integrity of Member States. More 
discussions of sovereignty were undertaken by Jackson24 and Hobbs.25  The point to make is 
that internal self-determination would be permitted. 
Customary international law establishes respect for the territorial sovereignty of States 
through the doctrine of non-intervention in the international and domestic activities of a 
sovereign State, thus making non-intervention and sovereignty two sides of the same coin. 
For example, the United Nations Charter, to which Nigeria is a signatory, provides for the 
non-intervention of States in the internal and external affairs of another State. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations State.26 
 
The provision of Article 2 (4) is clearly a rule in support of non-intervention of participating 
States in the domestic affairs of all other participating States. International courts have also 
promoted the principle of non-intervention. In Nicaragua v United States of America,27 the 
ICJ reiterated the principles of refraining from the threat of use of force against the territorial 
integrity of other States and the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of other States.28 In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
                                                             
24R. Jackson., Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea (Polity Press Cambridge, 2007) 
25T. Hobbes., Leviathan. (Reprinted from 1651 (1979) Introduction by K.R. Minogue Everyman’s Library. New York. Dent London, 1651)  
26Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945. Online: United Nations Treaty Collections 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf 
27(1986) Reports of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) August 1985- July 1986. General Assembly Official Records: Forty-First Session 
Supplement No. 4. (A/41/4) United Nations New York. online at Http://Www.Icj-Cij.Org/Court/En/Reports/Report_1985-1986.Pdf 
28 Nicaragua V United States of America (1986) Ibid.  
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Republic of the Congo v Uganda)29 the Court said that the Nicaragua case made it clear that 
States should not intervene in matters of other States whether by force or peacefully.30 
The provision of article 2(4) is clearly a rule of non-intervention of participating States in the 
domestic affairs of other participating States. To what extent does this apply to the African 
Union?  Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union provides that the objectives 
of the Union shall be to: (a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries 
and the peoples of Africa; (b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
its Member States. Also, Article 4(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union provides 
that the Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: “(g) non-
interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.” This is arguably a strong 
desire to protect Member States from secession movements and to ensure respect of state 
sovereignty. 
 
Regardless of the international communities’ high regard for State sovereignty and non-
intervention in the domestic matters of the State, certain situations have led to the call for the 
international community and regional communities to intervene in the internal matters of a 
State. Such situations were identified by Brownlie as Human Rights abuses, genocides, war 
crimes and internal displacement of people.31 According to Brownlie, the international 
community acknowledges that intervention is required for violations of Human Rights.32 
Intervention could also be on humanitarian grounds, although this has been criticised by 
Weiss to be the use of force in disguise by arguing that Humanitarian interventions remain a 
dominant military reality of the current era.33 Also, in United Kingdom v Albania (Corfu 
Channel case),34 the ICJ held that the right of intervention is a manifestation of the policy of 
force. 
On the regional level, Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union preserves the 
right of the Union to intervene in “a [m]ember State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
                                                             
29 (2005) ICJ Reports. 
30 Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda 2005. Ibid.  p. 164 
31 I. Brownlie., Principles of Public International Law (6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 293; See also T. Zick., ‘Are 
the States Sovereign?’ Washington University Law Quarterly vol. 83, 2005, p. 229-337 [235] 
32I. Brownlie., (2003) Ibid. p. 235 
33T.G Weiss., ‘Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons’ Journal of Peace Research (Sage Publications Limited vol. 38. no. 
4., 2001, p. 419-428) [422] 




in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.” Article 4 (j) gives Member States “the right of Member States to request 
intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security”35 in other States.  Packer 
and Rukare, however, point out that the “fact that intervention will require a decision by the 
Union’s Assembly of heads of States and the Government arguably raises the risk of 
inaction.”36 In order to carry out their mandate, the AU through the Constitutive Act has 
established nine principal organs such as the Peace and Security Council, the Assembly (the 
supreme organ of the Union) and the Pan-African Parliament. 
 
It is the Assembly of the African Union with the authority of the United Nations that decides 
on any intervention to take place.37 The Assembly does not encourage military intervention, 
rather it calls on Member States to use all necessary political and moral support to help 
governments.  For example, the AU in 2012 endorsed the deployment of a regional protection 
force to separate the warring parties in South Sudan, and to protect major installations and the 
civilian population in Juba.38 
 
It is no surprise that, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervened in the 
former Yugoslavia in 1999, debates followed on the balance of intervention in the internal 
conflicts of States.39 The need for balance of sovereignty and non-intervention in State affairs 
led the then Secretary General for the United Nations, Kofi Annan, to challenge the member 
States of the United Nations to find a balance between State sovereignty and the doctrine of 
non-intervention to enable the world to end such mass atrocities from occurring by being able 
to intervene in internal conflicts of States that have the likelihood of genocide and breaches 
of human rights. Kofi Annan noted: 
                                                             
35 The Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of heads of State and Government 
11 July, 2000. Online: https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf 
36C.A.A Packer & D. Rukare., ‘The New African Union and its Constitutive Act’ The American Journal of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press) vol. 96 no. 2., 2002, p. 365-379 [373]  
37AU Assembly AU/Dec.612 (xxvii) Decision on the State of Peace and Security in Africa, 18 July, 2016. 
38Assembly/AU/Dec.613 (xxvii) Decision on the situation in South Sudan Doc. Assembly/AU/5(xxvii) 
39 NATO took military action against Ypgoslavia during the Kosova war from March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999 until the Yogoslavia armed 
forces withdrew from Kosovo and a UN peace keeping mission set up in Kosovo. According to the Human Rights Watch, the result of the 
air strikes was a death toll of between 489-528 people in Kosovo.  See Human Rights Watch Report 2000 “The Crisis in Kosovo” Online at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.html. Retrieved June 2018 
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“if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to …systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept 
of our common humanity?”40 
The responsibility to protect citizens, thus, is a doctrine that developed so as to overcome 
difficulties with the strict doctrine of sovereignty. Sovereignty comes with international 
responsibilities.41 According to Bellamy, sovereignty has implications which come with a 
responsibility.42 Evans noted that the Responsibility to Protect is the inward 
reconceptualization of the notion of sovereignty.43 Early pioneers of the R2P are Deng et al.44 
who set out to convince the international community through the Brookings Institute45 that 
States have a responsibility towards internally displaced citizens of States. This led to the 
creation of ICISS in the year 2000 which clearly stated in its 2001 Report that States have the 
primary responsibility to protect citizens and if they fail, the international community can 
intervene to protect the citizens.46 According to Weiss and Kone, the R2P is a way to: 
“reconcile the seemingly clashing principles of state sovereignty and non-
intervention…with the need to halt the worst kinds of atrocities against humans and 
even to intervene militarily in the most egregious of cases.”47  
R2P “is closely linked to efforts within international justice system to end impunity of 
crimes”48 of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In fact, the then Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that: “no legal principle-not even 
sovereignty-should ever be allowed to shield genocide, crimes against humanity and mass 
human suffering.49” 
                                                             
40The 2000 Millennium Report: We the peoples’ the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. By Kofi Annan the then Secretary 
https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf 
41ICISS (2001) Op cit. p. XI 
42A.J Bellamy., ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention’ International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944) vol. 84. no. 4., 2008, p. 615-639 [619] 
43G. Evans., Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once for All (The Brookings Institution Press, 2008) p. 13  
44 F.M Deng & Others., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. P. XI, 
1996) 
45The Brookings Institution was part of the attempt by Africa to Investigate Conflict Management in Africa. See J. Anderson., ‘Sovereignty 
as Responsibility: R2P and IDP Protection’ Public Policy and Governance Review vol. 4. Issue 2, 2013, p.56-71 at p. 60  
46‘ICISS (2001) Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ December 2001. 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. p. XI 
47Weiss and Kone., (2006) p. 24 
48 ‘R2P Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society’ A Project of the World Federalism Movement-Institute for Global Policy, p. 
5Online: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2Pcs%20Frequently%20Asked%20Question.pdf 
49 The Secretary-General in Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All. A Report of the Secretary-General 
129 United Nations Doc. A/59/2005.21st March 2005 
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7.3.2 R2P The Rule 
Despite R2P being regarded as an emerging norm, the international community-- even while 
respecting the territorial sovereignty of a State-- can intervene to protect citizens of a State 
where the State is either unwilling or incapable of protecting its citizens. This is based on the 
fact that R2P was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 and affirmed by 
the Security Council in its 2006 Resolution 1674.50 It can be argued that, by so doing, the 
“Security Council has accepted the role”51 of acting on a case by case basis when States are 
failing to protect their citizens.  
From the combined provisions of the ICISS Report and the Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on 16 September 200552 from the World Summit in 2005, it can be argued that the 
Responsibility to Protect citizens has developed from mere intervention in the domestic 
matters of a State --without the consent of the State-- to an obligation to help prevent genocide, 
war crimes and breaches of Human Rights in States.53 
Bellamy summarised the provisions of the World Summit Resolution in paragraphs 138 and 
139 in this way: 
“The two paragraphs can be boiled down to four basic commitments. First, all States 
acknowledge that they have the responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Second, they agree to aid 
other States to build the capacity they need to discharge their responsibility. Third, in 
situations where the host State is ‘manifestly failing’ in its responsibility, they agree 
to use all peaceful means to protect vulnerable populations. Fourth, should those 
measures fail or be deemed inappropriate, the Security Council stands ready to use 
all necessary means, including non-consensual force.”54  
The United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect stated that 
“the adoption of paragraphs 138 and 139 by consensus at such a high political level adds 
                                                             
50A.J Bellamy., (2008) Ibid. 
51‘R2P Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society. Ibid. p. 5 
52 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005 A/RES/60/1. United Nations Website 
53 S.P Marks & N. Cooper., ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Watershed or Old Wine in New Bottle? ‘Jindal Global Law Review vol. 2 Issue 
1, 2010, p. 86-130 [96] 
54A.J Bellamy., (2008) Ibid. p. 623 
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impetus to the development of these obligations.”55It has also been argued that the R2P 
principle is not a new set of international norms binding on States but are norms already 
recognised by the international community. The World Federalist Movement noted that: 
“The framework draws on a pre-existing human rights standard, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the four Geneva Conventions, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Genocide Convention Against 
Torture, and the International Covenants”56 
As a mere reconceptualization of existing international obligations, it is arguable that R2P is 
binding on States. Molier noted that R2P in theory is “old wine in new bottles.”57 Marks and 
Cooper also stated that it is the “overarching failure of the pre-existing framework” that has 
led to the principle of R2P as approved by the world leaders in 2005.58 Also, the United 
Nations Office on Genocide Prevention stated that R2P: 
“seeks to narrow the gap between Member States’ pre-existing obligations under 
international humanitarian and human rights law and the reality faced by populations 
at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”59 
Even though still regarded as an emerging theory, being of universal application, R2P is 
intended to bind States to their existing international obligations. Commenting on the future 
of the R2P principle, Marks and Cooper stated that “…R2P could eventually crystalize into a 
customary norm of international law.”60 
7.3.3 R2P Application to Nigeria 
From the above discussion, it can be safely concluded that, although, the United Nations 
General Resolutions and the Security Council 2006 Resolution of 1674 are not binding laws 
which have the power to override national constitutions, the R2P in Resolution 1674 and the 
                                                             
55‘Responsibility to Protect’ United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect Online: 
http//www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html 
56 ‘World Federalist Movement, Institute for Global Policy, Responsibility to Protect Civil Society Project, Engaging Civil Society: 
Frequently Asked Questions’ 2009 
57 G. Molier., ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect After 9/11’ Netherlands International Law Review vol. 53 no.1, 
2006, p. 47 
58 S.P Marks & N. Cooper., ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Watershed or Old Wine in New Bottle?’ Jindal Global Law Review vol. 2 Issue 
1., 2010, p. 86-130 [ 96] 
59 ‘Responsibility to Protect. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ Ibid fn. 48 
60 S.P Marks & N. Cooper., (2010) p. 130 
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report of the World Submit 2005 on the R2P, is so persuasive as binding rather than soft law 
that States would be unwise to ignore it. In obvious realization of this, intervention to protect 
has usually been undertaken in larger political conflicts such as United States intervention in 
Grenada in 198361 and Liberia in 1990.62 In the case of Nigeria, the Nigerian State, having 
ratified some of the existing international law treaties, is bound to carry out its international 
obligations towards its own citizens in fulfilment of their obligations. Applicable treaty law 
ratified by Nigeria which places the Nigerian State under international obligation to protect 
citizens from war crimes and mass suffering include: the Geneva Convention Relating to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War ratified 1988; the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1969; the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1993; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights 1993; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2001; and the the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 1983.63 These laws put Nigeria under obligation to 
protect the Ife and the Modakeke from further loss of life and property from their conflict.  
On the regional level, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union requires States 
to protect citizens from War crimes and genocide.  Articles 20 of the African Charter of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights also addresses the rights of citizens to life and peaceful existence 
by granting self-determination to groups such as Modakeke and Ife within the remit of the 
State. Failure of the Nigerian State to protect its citizens would, therefore, leave Nigeria open 
to intervention in its internal affairs by the African Union, or even, by the international 
community.  
The second aspect of international law as it applies to the Ife-Modakeke case is that of internal 
self-determination and Human Rights law in Nigeria. This is now discussed. 
7.4 Group Autonomy and Internal Self-determination 
The discussion under this sub-heading argues the position of the international community and 
the African Union on group autonomy and internal self-determination as the means of 
persuading the Nigerian State to grant the Modakeke internal self-determination from the Ife. 
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The importance of autonomy was emphasised by Ingram when he wrote that: “...a government 
which fails to support autonomy fails to provide its citizens with the opportunity for 
meaningful life.”64 
Self-determination is an expression of autonomy.65Autonomy is the larger notion of freedom 
within reason, self-determination. However, as described in Article 3 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly in 
2007,66self-determination is the right of a people to freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The description of what self-
determination entails in the 2007 resolution is in line with earlier scholarly definition of self-
determination. According to Philpott, self-determination is a “legal arrangement” which gives 
any group of individuals within a defined territory “independent statehood or greater 
autonomy within a Federal state.”67 Philpott’s definition of self-determination demonstrates 
the two basic features of self-determination namely: right to secession and right to 
representative government. Musgrave addressed the two types of self-determination apparent 
in the world scene as developed in earlier times.68 Musgrave identified the occurrence of self-
determination based on ethnic and linguistic boundaries as practised in central and eastern 
Europe as well as in the United States.69 In this type of self-determination, he explains, States 
are created based on geographical boundaries and bear the threat of secession.  According to 
Musgrave, self-determination gives emphasis to the groups not to individuals,70 creating a 
nationalistic atmosphere. The only sure outcome for the expression of this form of self-
determination is secession and more quests for self-determination by minorities due to 
intermingling of the different peoples. When States are created based on boundaries, it is 
inevitable to find minorities of other ethnic origin already settled among the majority. Also, 
as the minority of a State develop national consciousness, ethnic conflict tends to re-emerge. 
There is little evidence that early efforts to solve the problem of nationalism through 
assimilation of the minorities within the State did not work anywhere in the world. McCartney 
noted that Russia and Germany attempted to assimilate the Poles in the 1800’s by placing a 
                                                             
64A. Ingram., A Political Theory of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 113. 
65 Autonomy is characterised by self-government. See Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. A Peer Review. Academic Resources. Online: 
Http://Www.Iep.Utm.Edu/Aut-Norm.Html 
66 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly in 2007. United Nations Resolution 
A/61/295 
67D. Philpott., ‘In Defence of Self-Determination’ Ethics (The University of Chicago Press) vol. 105. no.2., 1995, p 352-385[353] 
68T.D Musgrave., Self-Determination and National Minorities (Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 13 
69 T.D Musgrave., (1997) Ibid. p. 13 
70T.D Musgrave., (1997) Op cit. p. 13 
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ban on the use of the Polish language in Russia and Germany.71 However, it obviously did 
not stop the minority cry of the Polish people. Neither does today’s attempts at assimilation 
work to end group quest for greater autonomy in the States. Therefore, merely trying to 
assimilate the minority group into the majority groups does not solve the issue of minority 
self-determination as is the case of the Modakeke who want to be treated as separate from the 
Ife. 
The second expression of self-determination is that which gives more autonomy to the people 
but does not involve secession. Seigel’s book on self-determination in Western Europe holds 
the idea that self-determination was not based on ethnic, linguistic or geographical boundaries 
in traditional Western Europe but was based on representative government.72 This expression 
of self-determination is what the Modakeke are seeking from the Nigerian State and not 
secession but greater autonomy by means of a Local Government Area. The basic features of 
both expressions of self-determination are discussed below to provide an informed basis of 
deciding the true nature of self-determination demanded by the Modakeke. 
7.4.1 Expressions of Self-determination: External and Internal Freedoms  
The right to self-determination can be expressed both externally and internally. Self-
determination is often expressed externally as the freedom of States to carry out their affairs 
without interference from other States.73 External self-determination is based on respect for 
the territorial integrity of States as expressed in Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
Articles 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter also makes specific reference to the 
promotion of self-determination of peoples but no explicit nature of the rights was provided. 
These provisions allude to the external nature of self-determination between States. Also, the 
World Summit Outcome adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 24th of 
October 2005 states: “We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign 
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equality of all States…”74 The problem with the outcome of the World Summit is that it does 
not deal with internal self-determination where a group within a sovereign State is claiming 
discrimination allowed by the government.75  
Granted, the recognition of the territorial integrity of States has been a priority for first world 
countries, but this has filtered into all States of the world, thus creating avenues for 
expressions of self-determination internally by a State. According to Franck, the principle is 
now one of inclusion not exclusion.76 The principle of self-determination now has broader 
application including the rights of peoples and States to determine their political, economic, 
social and cultural life and not just the initial State-centred rights.77 It follows that if the 
Modakeke are ‘peoples’, they can express their self-determination within the Nigerian State.  
 
In defining peoples, Article 1 of the ICCPR78 states that “All peoples have the right of self-
determination”79 and Article 27 states the following: 
“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language.” 
Whether Articles 1 and 27 are referring to the same class of peoples who have the right to 
self-determination has been debated by academics. For example, McGoldrick has argued that 
the definition of peoples in Article 1 is different from the minorities in Article 27.80 In 
explaining how the modern State can accommodate the diverse groups common in most 
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nations, Henrard and Smis, argue that ‘peoples’ in Article 1 includes possible minorities.81 
Michael Walzer has noted that, in most cases, the ‘self’ in self-determination includes many 
selves because of the overlapping history of most people.82 A stereotype criterion for 
determining who is qualified for self-determination is misleading. Buchanan has insisted that 
a territorial claim needs to be established for self-determination. He insisted that a group 
seeking self-determination must be able to show that they are under threat of genocide.83 In 
support of this is Brimayer who argued that proving territory and historical grievance is a 
prerequisite for a claim of self-determination.84 According to Philpott, size of a people  should 
not be used to determine who has right to self-rule.85  Neither can inability to claim land or 
territory be a criterion for determining who has the right to self-determination.86 thus making 
the issue of land a crucial factor to self-determination. As further argued by Philpott: 
“legalized self-determination could quite conceivably contribute to order and 
stability, not anarchy. Only when current rivalries and ancient hatreds are 
accommodated within a just legal framework...are they likely to become tame.”87 
From the above argument, the right to self-determination should be seen as a legal right 
expressed within reason of the circumstances surrounding it. Agreeably, self-determination 
has shifted from the mere political to the legal.88 Today, the international community 
recognises both the external self-determination which is freedom from colonialization and 
foreign occupation, as well as internal self-determination practiced by democratic nations. 
However, the principle of self-determination still remains largely external with the protection 
of State integrity as priority. While this may seem to be the case at the moment, the changing 
nature of self-determination and international law as a whole does not guarantee that it will 
remain the same for a long time. As a result, the ability to resort to international law on self-
determination by peoples such as the Modakeke is promising with the development of internal 
self-determination. As suggested by Klabbers, self-determination should be interpreted as a 
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peoples’ right internally to be taken seriously in its internal affairs,89 thus extending the right 
to democratic practices of States. In implementing self-determination therefore, internal self-
determination does not involve entitling the people to their own independent State. Therefore, 
the researcher argues that international law does not provide a clear-cut direction for all States 
when it comes to self-determination but recognises the violations of human rights committed 
against ethnic minorities as a basis for intervention in crisis situations. However, as earlier 
noted in this section, the ICCPR and the outcome of the 2005 World Summit have provided 
a more advanced approach within international law, creating obligations for States to help 
other States who fail to prevent or stop violations of human rights. Thus, since the struggle 
for internal self-determination of the Modakeke has led to human rights breaches according 
to the findings in section 7.4., the international community may decide to act to assist Nigeria 
carry out its responsibilities to the citizens of the Ife and the Modakeke.  
At the regional level, self-determination is supported and promoted. Article 20(1)(2) of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights90 provides for the broad interpretation of the 
right to self-determination. Article 20(1):  
“All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political 
status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy 
they have freely chosen.” 
From the above provisions, the broad tenet of self-determination is promoted in the actual use 
of the words “right to self-determination” the same way as is present in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007.91 Thus, self-determination does not 
only apply to external freedom but also to internal freedoms within a State. In addition, Article 
20(2) of the African Charter states that: 
“Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the 
bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international 
community.” 
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The above provisions make clear the exercise of both external and internal self-determination 
for either colonized or oppressed peoples. Therefore, under sub-section 2, small groups such 
as the Modakeke that claim oppression by the Ife can be deemed to have the right to self-
determination under regional laws. However, since the government treats the Modakeke as 
the same as the Ife, their status as a ‘people’ giving them the right of internal self-
determination under Articles 20(1) is debatable. 
Articles 47 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights allows for communication 
by States alleging violations of the provisions of the African Charter including those of self-
determination. It provides that:  
“If a State party to the present Charter has good reason to believe that another State 
party to this Charter has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written 
communication, the attention of the State to the matter. This communication shall also 
be addressed to the Secretary General of the OAU and to the Chairman of the 
Commission.”92 
Article 47 uses the word “may”, suggesting that one State is not under obligation to protect 
the right of self-determination of a group in another State as it is based on a States’ discretion. 
However, by virtue of Article 55 of the African Charter, communications by individuals are 
allowed, thus showing that the Charter recognises that self-determination is not only between 
States but also includes internal self-determination by groups (peoples). Apart from the 
provisions of the African Charter, the judicial pronouncements of the African Commission93 
demonstrate the same attitude of both external and internal self-determination for peoples. For 
example, the African Commission upheld the right to self-determination in Katangese 
People’s Congress v Zaire94 stating that:  
“In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that 
the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question and in the absence of 
evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in Government 
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as guaranteed by Articles 13(1) of the African Charter, the Commission holds the view 
that Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible 
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.”95 
From the above provisions, it is evident that the African Commission has promoted external 
self-determination but recognizes internal self-determination based on breaches of human 
rights to individuals and groups.  It clearly shows that if the Modakeke as individuals and a 
group can prove with concrete evidence violations of human rights, then their right to self-
determination might be upheld by the African Union. However, the Commission encouraged 
the use of variants of self-determination. It was the same position taken by the courts in Kevin 
Mgwanga Gunme v Cameroon96 where the court held that self-determination can be realised 
through structures such as Federalism, con-Federalism and self-government. Earlier, the 
Commission held in Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali97 that the right to self-determination 
does not include the right of secession from an independent State as the right to colonial 
boundaries are fixed by African leaders.  In Gunme & Ors v Nigeria98 where twelve 
Cameroonians alleged that their right of self-determination had been breached by Cameroon 
but required Nigeria as party to the African Charter to present a case before ICJ on their behalf, 
the ICJ held that a foreign State had no obligation to enforce the right of self-determination 
under the African Charter. The twelve Cameroonians would have had a better chance under 
the African Commission rather than in ICJ.99 Therefore, for small groups such as the 
Modakeke, greater chance of achieving internal self-determination lies with the cooperation 
of the Nigerian State.  
What can be gleaned from the Case law? While the right of self-determination has been 
restricted by case law to external self-determination, the recent case of Katangese peoples 
shows that someday the Commission may recognise the right of groups to internal self-
determination rather than just encouraging democratic measures of realising self-
determination. The African Union, in applying the African Charter and the case of Katangese, 
is in a position to put pressure on the Nigerian government to take all necessary steps to end 
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the Ife-Modakeke conflict by granting Modakeke self-government based on discrimination 
by the Ife as a group and for individual breaches of their human rights to peaceful existence, 
life and properties. It is a matter for the State to prevent others (the Ife) from breaching the 
human rights of the targeted people (the Modakeke). 
7.4.2 Benefits to the Nigerian State of Granting Internal Self-determination to the 
Modakeke in Ife 
The researcher argues that the cost of the Ife-Modakeke conflict to the Ife and Modakeke 
people, as well as to the Nigerian State, will be enormous if further violent conflict is not 
prevented. Ending the conflict will ensure that there is no financial, emotional and moral 
condemnation from the international and regional community on the Nigerian State. 
In general, people may interpret the impact of any violent conflict in different ways because 
of their level of involvement or their proximity to the center of the violence. For example, 
while the elders and chiefs of Ile-Ife submitted a memorandum to the Military Administrator 
of Osun state in September, 1998 stating the loss of cultural materials worth millions of 
naira,100 the University of Ile-Ife reported the displacement of 5,000 students and 1,000 staff 
members as well as disruption of lectures and the academic calendar as a result of the forceful 
closure of the campus for several weeks during the various violent conflicts between 1997 
and 2000.101 The Government, on the other hand, reported a cost of 31.8 million naira for 
treating hundreds of victims of the crisis in just one hospital, namely, Obafemi Awolowo 
University Teaching Hospital.102 Despite their different dimensions, it could be argued that 
humans share a level of emotional response to certain levels of violence.  For example, 
genocide cases have incurred the distress and annoyance of the world in general. Also, certain 
crimes, such as murder or other conduct that shows a high level of violence to another human, 
are considered capital crimes in most human communities.  
Akanji noted that although there were no official statistics on the losses that the violent 
conflict of the Ife-Modakeke inflicted on the people, there are unofficial records of over 600 
deaths and loss of property worth several million naira.103 There is no subject that has affected 
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humans in general so much as the loss of a loved one. Both communities have lost loved ones 
in the violent conflict. This loss is immeasurable.  
 
In addition, Nigeria’s image in the international community can be affected negatively by the 
continuation of the conflict. According to a CNN News report “Nigeria tops the list of African 
countries with the newest displacements in 2015 when 737,000 were uprooted.” Although, 
90% is the result of Boko Haram terrorist activities,104 Nigeria does not want to add to the 
displaced ones by not resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Also, as discussed under earlier 
sub-headings in this chapter, the Nigerian State risks the intervention of the international 
community, especially the African Union, to stop any violence between the groups that might 
lead to genocide. This illustrates the point of using the right resolution methods to end the 
conflict. Nothing could be more expedient as finding a permanent solution to ethnic conflict 
resolution in Nigeria. A possible solution, where all parties are agreeable and supportive, is 
one that will not undermine the sovereignty of the Nigerian State but will take into 
consideration the agitation of each of the groups in conflict. The chapter thus recommends 
that in order to protect her international image and to be seen to be carrying out her obligations 
towards citizens and the protection of Human Rights in Africa, the Nigerian State should take 
steps to separate the Ife-Modakeke to end their conflict. As will be demonstrated in the 
discussion below, in order for Nigeria to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict, much work needs to 
be carried out by Nigeria in strengthening the furtherance of its international obligations 
towards groups. 
7.5 International Law on Human Rights: its Application in Nigeria  
The argument in this section is that the present Nigerian legal framework is not adequate for 
the protection of the human rights of either individuals or groups in accordance with Nigeria’s 
international law obligation, whether as a member of the international community, or of the 
United Nations, or as signatory of human rights and other treaties. As a result, the international 
community can persuade Nigeria to carry out its international obligations to respect and 
implement the international human rights of the Ife and the Modakeke. This argument is based 
on an examination of Nigeria’s application of international legal provisions which are binding 
on Nigeria.  
                                                             





The effort toward universal application of human rights led to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights adopted in 1948 which is considered the foundation of international human 
rights law. The Universal Declaration on human rights has been translated into different 
“treaties, customary international law, general principles, regional agreements and domestic 
laws.”105 For example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights repeat most of the rights 
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights making the treaties “effectively binding 
on states that have ratified them.”106 
 
An apt description of how international law protects human rights was given by the United 
Nations Website that: 
 
“International human rights law lays down obligations which States are bound to 
respect. By becoming parties to international treaties, States assume obligations and 
duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights.  The 
obligation to respect means that States must refrain from interfering with or curtailing 
the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires States to protect 
individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means 
that States must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. 
Through ratification of international human rights treaties, Governments undertake 
to put into place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty 
obligations and duties. The domestic legal system, therefore, provides the principal 
legal protection of human rights guaranteed under international law. Where domestic 
legal proceedings fail to address human rights abuses, mechanisms and procedures 
for individual and group complaints are available at the regional and international 
levels to help ensure that international human rights standards are indeed respected, 
implemented, and enforced at the local level.” 
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From the above statements, it is obvious that the ability to be bound under international law 
as described above lies mainly in Nigeria’s position on treaty laws and their application in 
Nigeria. The adequacy of treaty laws in Nigeria leaves much to be desired in terms of 
enforcement of treaties in Nigeria, including those that deal with human rights violations. 
The Nigerian Treaties (Making Procedure, etc) Decree No. 16107 deals with Treaty making by 
Nigeria and it shows that a Treaty must be ratified to be enforceable in Nigeria.  This is the 
position stated in the Nigerian Constitution 1999 by virtue of Section 12(1) which clearly 
states that: 
“No treaty between the Federation and any other Country shall have the force of law 
to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National 
Assembly.”108 
In effect, Treaty law does not form part of the primary sources of Nigerian law, unless a Treaty 
is transformed into a Nigerian law, and made enforceable in Nigeria. The Supreme Court of 
Nigeria applied section 12 of the 1999 Constitution in determining the case of The Registered 
Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria & Orders v 
Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria.109 The Court held that the International Labour 
Organization Convention had not passed through the process of transformation into Nigeria’s 
domestic law and therefore had no binding force in Nigeria. Conversely, in Abacha v 
Fawehinmi110 the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that: 
“...the African Charter which is incorporated into our municipal law becomes binding 
and our courts must give effect to it like all other laws falling within the judicial power 
of the courts.” 
From the above statements, Nigeria’s position toward Treaty making and implementation can 
be summarised as respect for international law in relation to Treaties by virtue of its ratifying 
the Vienna Convention and its constitutional provisions on Treaty making and 
implementation. However, Nigeria errs on the side of caution in this regard. Where Nigeria 
does not assent to an international Treaty, it does not bind the country regardless of the 
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benefits of the Treaty to the protection of human rights in the country.  For example, in 
November, 2006, the African countries in a Draft Aide Memoire raised their concerns relating 
to the provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.111 
Among the various concerns raised was the absence of a definition for indigenous peoples in 
the Declaration and Promotion of Self-determination within nation States by virtue of Articles 
3 and 4.  These Articles go against constitutional provisions of many African States because 
they relate to land ownership and control. The insufficient clarification of these areas of 
conflict, Nigeria claims, was the reason for abstaining from voting for the adoption of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.112 The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 on becoming part of 
customary international law by the conduct of States in general adopting the provisions as 
binding on them otherwise as signatories of the treaty, might be binding on Nigeria even 
though it voted against the Declaration.  
 
The question, therefore, is whether the international community and the African Union can 
assert pressure on Nigeria to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict and prevent further breaches of 
their human rights as individuals and groups? 
The answer is Yes. Since Nigeria has ratified some of the treaties promoting human rights 
such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ratified July 29, 1993,113 Nigeria is bound to carry 
out its obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of its citizens and if  found 
that Nigeria has failed, or Nigeria is failing to carry out its international obligation, the 
members of the international community can hold Nigeria accountable for these breaches of 
human rights. This question is whether they will. 
It is noteworthy that two of the studies114 that have analysed the Ife-Modakeke conflict show 
that the Nigerian State has failed in its responsibility to protect its citizens from human right 
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violations and war crimes. The Report on the immunity and State sponsored violence in 
Nigeria was commissioned by the World Organization Against Torture (OMIT) Switzerland 
and the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) Lagos Nigeria to investigate the 
human right issues of the Ife-Modakeke conflict following the violent conflicts of the Ife-
Modakeke in the modern State of Nigeria from 1981 to the year 2000.  
The Report noted several failures of the Nigerian government to protect the human rights of 
citizens in the Ife-Modakeke conflict and thus the government can be pressured by the 
international community to carry out its obligations under international law, the violations of 
citizens’ rights in the conflict according to the 2002 report included: 
1. Violations of the right to life of citizens of both the Ife and the Modakeke as well as 
violations of citizens civil and political rights with recorded deaths of over 2,000 
people in two decades as a result of the conflict 
2. Internal displacement and violations of economic, social and cultural rights with over 
10,000 refugees in a temporary refugee camp at the Obafemi Awolowo University in 
1997 
3. Violations against children.115 
The report also noted that the reports of the investigative committees set up by different 
government administrations in Nigeria were ignored and the government were reluctant to 
start any disciplinary measures against human right violators.116  
 
The recommendation of the 2002 report was: 
“To the United Nations: To request the United Nation’s Special Rapporteurs in 
Summary, Arbitration and Extra-Judicial Executions, Torture, Violence Against 
Women and Independence of Judges and lawyers to undertake a joint investigation of 
violence, extra-judicial executions and related violations in Nigeria and to request the 
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government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to accede to the conduct of such an 
investigation. 
To the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights: To consider in its next 
meeting and, in any case, at its earliest opportunity, the allegations of serious, massive 
and systematic violations of the Harare Principles as supplemented by the Millbrook 
Declaration, against the Federal Republic of Nigeria”117 
The recommendations above required the international community to take the first step to act, 
by investigating these failures on the part of the Nigerian State. However, so far nothing 
appears to have been done with regards to the report. 
  
Akanji also noted several failures on the part of the government of Nigeria both at Federal 
and state levels in preventing human right violations during the Ife-Modakeke violent clashes. 
A few of the failures he identified are: 
1. The government used curfew to end the violence in 1981, 1983 and 1997-2000 caused 
by the Ife-Modakeke conflict and this resulted in the loss of livelihood (trading) in 
both communities; 
2. The shutting down of primary, post-primary and higher education in the 1997-2000 
conflict resulted in displacement of 5,000 students; 
3. The Ife-Modakeke conflict assumed the posture of genocide in 1849, 1881, 1886, and 
1997-2000.118 
As a result of these failures, Akanji stated that: 
“...the Nigerian state is to be held responsible for encouraging and sustaining the 
communal conflict, through the non-provision of appropriate mechanisms to 
accommodate the rights of both groups.”119 
What can be concluded about the level of success of Nigeria in protecting the Ife-Modakeke 
from human rights abuses in times of conflict and non-violent conflict? The argument in this 
                                                             
117N. Ogbara., Hope Betrayed? A Report on Impunity and State Sponsored Violence in Nigeria 2002 (World Organization Against Torture 
(OMIT) Switzerland & Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), 2002) p. 191 
118All three points are from O.O Akanji., (2009) Op cit. p. 42-48 
119O.O Akanji., ‘Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: A Critical Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria’ International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights vol. 16, 2009, p. 31-51 [51] 1 
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Thesis is that by the absence of appropriate actions of the Nigerian State in times of violence 
between the Ife and the Modakeke as outlined above, the Nigerian State did not protect the 
lives and properties of the Ife and the Modakeke as citizens of Nigeria either as individuals or 
groups as prescribed in chapter IV of the Nigerian constitution and the international treaties 
Nigeria subscribes to. This Researcher has concluded that the Nigerian State has not 
effectively protected the Ife-Modakeke citizens from violations of their human rights; and 
therefore, the State ought to take prompt steps to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict, and to 
prevent further breaches of the rights of its citizens as a result of violence between the two 
groups. This can be enforced by both the general international community and the regional 
community of the African Union.  The solution which the government should take in order to 
avert intervention by external entities is the separation of the Modakeke from the Ife by the 
creation of a separate, permanent Local Government for the Modakeke, or else risk regional 
intervention through the bodies described below: The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is 
the standing Organ of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) 
7.6 Pressure by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the standing Organ of the African Union for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC was setup as an early warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and effective responses to conflicts and crisis situations. The 
PSC derives its authority from Article 20 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (as 
inserted by Article 9 of the Protocol on Amendment to the Constitutive Act 2003), together 
with Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union.  
Section 7 of the 2002 Protocol gave the PSC the following powers (among others): 
1) Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies, which may lead to 
genocide and crime against humanity 
2) Recommend intervention in a Member State in respect to grave circumstances, namely 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
3) Institute sanctions 
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4) Follow up promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of 
human life and international humanitarian law.120 
In response to its mandate above, the PSC has given sanctions to defaulting Countries121 
which one can rightly classify Nigeria by virtue of the continued tension between groups in 
Nigeria such as the Ife-Modakeke and the Hausa-Fulani herdsmen. Therefore, Williams has 
rightly noted that: 
“By articulating the AU’s voice on issues related to Peace and Security, and through 
the strategic use of official statements and instruments such as mediation, sanctions 
and peace operations, the PSC attempts to persuade and/or influence its intended 
audiences, especially parties involved in conflict or crisis situations.”122  
Also, the African Union, through ECOWAS missions such as the overthrow of the Gambian 
government in 2017, has put pressure on the Gambia to prevent unconstitutional change of 
government and possible internal conflict.123 From the above provisions, the African Union 
through the PSC organ can put pressure on Nigeria to resolve conflicts that have potential for 
genocide or human rights abuses in Nigeria. 
Considering Nigeria’s position on foreign laws applicable in the country, it can be argued that 
for a change to the Constitution to allow more Treaty laws such as the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 to be applicable to peoples in Nigeria 
such as the Modakeke, the government has to be rightly persuaded to see the benefits of 
transforming it into a Nigerian law to help easier enforcement of the rights of self-
determination to peoples such as the Modakeke. Such persuasion might be in form of pressure 
for failing to protect citizens in times of violent conflict. It will be a necessary pressure in 
relation to the Ife-Modakeke conflicts as the discussion above demonstrates that Nigeria has 
failed in its responsibility to protect the Ife-Modakeke in times of conflict. 
                                                             
120Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union. Available at 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf 
121P. Williams., ‘The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic International Institution’ Journal of modern 
African Studies (Cambridge University Press). vol. 47. no. 4, 2009, p. 603-626[ 605] 
122P. Williams., (2009) Ibid. p. 616 
123P. Williams., ’A New African Model of Coercion? Assessing the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia’ Centre for Security Studies. IPI 
Global Observatory, (March 16, 2017) Online: Available at http//theglobalobservatory.org  
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From the above analysis, it is clear that the international and regional communities are in a 
position to intervene in the Ife-Modakeke conflict either to assist Nigeria to make laws that 
will end the conflict, or to require the government to use other means, including sanctions, to 
make Nigeria end the conflict. One such intervention might be to require the Federal 
government and Osun state government to separate the Modakeke from the Ife by a separate 
and permanent Local Government. 
However, if the international community were to choose to assist in the prevention and 
management of future violent conflicts between the groups, it would be strong persuasion for 
Nigeria. Deng et al noted that States have the choice of working with the international 
community to protect their citizens or risk intervention on their sovereignty.124  
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has answered the fifth research sub-question: what is the international legal 
obligation of the Nigerian State to protect the Modakeke and the Ife from each other; to grant 
internal political and economic self-determination to the Modakeke; and to prevent the human 
rights of the Modakeke being breached by any individual or group of individuals (whether 
organs of the State or otherwise)? 
This chapter has demonstrated that by virtue of international law provisions on R2P, internal 
self-determination and international human rights law and regional laws, that the Nigerian 
State has an international obligation to protect its citizens from the effects of violent conflicts, 
such as in the case of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The combined effect of international laws 
on the prevention of human rights breaches, protection of citizens from war crimes, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing found in the world leaders´ agreement at the 2005 World Submit to 
protect citizens; the United Nations Resolution 1674 of 2006; and Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, require States to protect their own citizens from War 
crimes and genocide. This is proof of the binding nature of the R2P in Nigeria, and it applies 
to the Ife-Modakeke conflict. 
 
The chapter has also demonstrated that the position of group autonomy and self-determination 
in customary international law is an inconclusive right made subject to exceptions of State 
sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, the international community cannot yet 
                                                             
124F.M Deng & Others., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington D.C Brookings Institution, 1996) p. 28 
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force Nigeria to grant internal self-determination to the Modakeke by the application of 
customary international law. However, the provisions of the ICCPR and the report of the 
World Submit 2005 although not binding laws on Nigeria, provide very persuasive grounds 
for Nigeria to grant the Modakeke self-determination to prevent any human right breaches 
and to help Nigeria manage her internal conflicts as the Modakeke can apply to the ICJ for 
human right breaches.  
 
On the other hand, the African Charter, to which Nigeria is a signatory, covers many of the 
rights such as right to self-determination in Articles 19-24 of the African Charter thus giving 
the African Union a basis for intervention to prevent breaches of human rights in the Ife-
Modakeke. The provisions of Articles 47 and 53 of the Africa Charter and the decisions of 
the Court in Katangese People’s Congress v Zaire125 are indicative of a persuasive power of 
the African Union potentially to be directed at Nigeria to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Since 
Nigeria has such Constitutional provisions and stands to benefit to protect Her sovereign 
rights of non-intervention in Her domestic affairs, it makes it feasible for the Nigerian State 
to accommodate the Modakeke’s quest for increased autonomy and self-determination 
internally both by strengthening the existing legal platforms through clear unambiguous 
Constitutional provisions for self-determination and democratic considerations for Local 
Government creation.  
 
The discussions in this chapter are sufficient proof that the international community is in a 
position to put pressure on the Nigerian State (even though there is no customary international 
law yet) to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Failure by the Nigerian State to protect the Ife-
Modakeke by preventing further breaches of their human rights by recognising the right of 
the Modakeke to internal self-determination therefore could be an invitation to the 
international community and the African Union to intervene in Nigeria’s domestic affairs.   
 
In the alternative, there is the need for enactment of a new Federal legislation on access to 
self-determination in clear and unambiguous terms. Such legislative initiative must be 
supported by the government and combined with other initiatives such as educating the 
government on the way forward for granting internal self-determination without 
compromising its sovereignty as a State.  
                                                             




With the feasibility of Nigeria being pressured to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict, the next 
chapter combines the doctrinal study with the analysis in this chapter to arrive at the answers 




8. CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The foregoing chapters attempted to interrogate the hypothesis that the government of Nigeria 
should be advised that the Ife and the Modakeke people, having been in conflict with each 
other over land, citizenship status and identity issues since pre-colonial times and with the 
frequency of violent conflict having increased since the end of colonialization, will continue 
to be in conflict with each other because they have not been effectively separated from each 
other. And further that economic and political separation of the groups is both feasible and 
necessary to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict.  
Evidence and examples from the social, economic and political history of the Ife-Modakeke 
groups, as part of the larger Yoruba ethnic group, as well as Nigeria’s Constitutions and other 
legislation were used to examine, and ultimately to confirm the hypothesis. This concluding 
chapter provides a summary of the thesis by considering the evidence and examples which 
justifies the necessity and feasibility of separating the Ife-Modakeke groups for a permanent 
resolution of their conflict in Nigeria. The chapter will also provide a summary of the findings 
and recommendations and proposed directions for future research on the subject.  
8.2 Re-visiting the Research Problem 
The research problem addressed in this thesis was the result of a hybrid-group in Ile-Ife 
created by the historical connection of two ancient powerful but independent Yoruba groups 
in Nigeria namely: the Ife and the old Oyo kingdoms. In pre-colonial times, the Yoruba were 
comprised of several ‘kingdoms’ including the Ife and the Oyo (old Oyo).  During the 
nineteenth century, before colonisation, the old Oyo kingdom collapsed as a consequence of 
internal wars and wars with neighbouring kingdoms. As a result, refugees from the old Oyo 
kingdom dispersed from the fallen kingdom. Some of the refugees, who later became known 
as the Modakeke, were accepted by the people of the town of Ile-Ife and were provided with 
the use of Ife land in return for the payment of tribute (Ishakole) in accordance with Yoruba 
land law. With time, conflict started between the two groups because of the native/indigene 
and settler/non-indigene relationship in Yorubaland, land issues, and historical differences in 
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religion. Although these problems were the central feature of the conflict, the conflict has 
evolved with increasing complexity involving devolution of power by means of a Local 
Government area for the groups.1 
The conflict between these two Yoruba sub-groups, has given rise to violent clashes on seven 
occasions,2 the first one (1825-49) occurring before colonisation; two occurring during the 
British colonial period (1882-1909, and 1946-49); and four occurring since the independence 
of Nigeria from the British in 1960 (1981, 1983, 1997-1998, and 2000).3  The conflict between 
the Ife and the Modakeke is notorious in Nigeria, but no successful steps were taken by the 
British colonialists, and no permanent success has been recorded since the independence of 
Nigeria in 1960 to resolve the conflict between these separate but integrated groups. Up to 
this present time, contemporary Ife and Modakeke perceive that the conflict is still potentially 
explosive between the two groups. In 2014, participants in both the Ife and the Modakeke 
were asked if they think the troubles between the two communities have been resolved. The 
question was aimed at further justifying the research interest on the Ife-Modakeke conflict 
and proffering solutions to the conflict situation. The question asked below was: 
Question on the effect of the conflict 
Would you say that the troubles between the two communities have been resolved 
permanently? 
Table 11 Coded Responses (with Key) on the Effect of the Conflict 
The frequency of the answer is presented below. 
Sub-Group Combined 
Answer 














                                                             
1S. Olayiwola & N. Okorie., ‘Integrated Education: An Instrument for Resolving Ife-Modakeke Conflict in Osun State, Nigeria’ Journal of 
Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences vol. 2. no. 2., 2010, p.953-965[954]  
2A.R Asiyanbola., ‘Urban-ethno Communal Conflict in Africa: Nigeria’ A Paper Submitted for Presentation at the Union for African 
Population Studies (UAPS) Fifth African Population Conference, Arusha, Tanzania, 10 -14 December, 2007. 





































NS  Not Sure 
NA No Answer 
DK Don’t Know 
 
As explained in the methodology session of this thesis in chapter two 2.7, a few of the 
participants did not want to answer the question, so they replied “no answer.” The replies of 
those that answered “no answer” were not included in the total percentage calculated. The 
combined answers to the question did not show much difference between the Ife and the 
Modakeke perception of the conflict as 66% and 69% of Ife and Modakeke participants 
respectively responded with considerable scepticism as to the resolution of the conflict either 
by responding out right that the conflict had not been resolved or by saying that they were not 
sure if the conflict has ended. However, when grouped by age, the younger the age-group in 
each community, the more sceptical they were that the conflict had ended. Also, it is 
significant to note that there were great differences between answers of the three Modakeke 
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age-groups and the three Ife age-groups. For example, among the advanced age-group (60 
and above), 36% of the Ife participants as against 57% of the Modakeke participants said that 
the conflict had not ended. And 43% of the Ife middle-aged group as against 78% of the 
Modakeke middle-aged group said the conflict is not resolved. While 57% of the Young Ife 
group against 85% of the Modakeke group of the same age bracket were not convinced that 
the conflict had ended. The result of the interview above reveals that in each age-group, the 
Modakeke had a higher number of participants who do not believe the conflict was over. This 
suggests that perhaps, even though the Modakeke now have an area office in Ife, since the 
Modakeke have not been separated from the Ife by means of a Local Government area, they 
still feel strongly that the conflict will begin again. 
An Ife interviewee said: 
 “The conflict can start anytime.”4 
In the same vein, a Modakeke Participant noted: 
Response 2: 
“… I can see fighting coming soon. The Modakeke will not continue to suffer 
injustice”5 
Apart from the perception of the contemporary Ife and Modakeke people in 2014, as recently 
as October 2017, some youth groups in Modakeke called on the Osun State Governor, Mr. 
Rauf Aregbesola and security agencies in the state to intervene in a fresh crisis brewing 
between residents of Ile-Ife and Modakeke over allegations of land encroachment.6 
Unfortunately, the successive governments of Nigeria had refused to treat the two groups as 
sufficiently distinct from each other so as to justify the demand of the Modakeke for territorial 
and economic independence from the Ife.  It is not physically possible for this independence 
to take the form of physical relocation of the Modakeke but economic and political separation 
is feasible by means of a separate local authority for the Ife and for the Modakeke.  However, 
this has not happened, perhaps because customary laws provide that the Modakeke should 
always be regarded as subordinate to the Ife as they are the later settlers in Ile-Ife. Still, there 
                                                             
4 Interview IMa 15 
5 Interview MMa 22 




are imperatives which the Nigerian government should observe.  First, that section 45 of the 
Constitution requires that there must be no discrimination between the peoples of Nigeria.  
Second, that international law requires that the Nigerian State must protect its citizens from 
violence.7  And, third, the African Union treaty (to which Nigeria is a party) has a mandate to 
ensure that the peoples of Africa live in peace with one another.8  It is now time for the 
Nigerian government to act to end the native/indigene and settler/non-indigene relationship 
between the groups and provide an equal ground to accessing devolved power by means of a 
Local Government creation.  
This chapter deals with the three imperatives noted above and develops recommendations on 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict from the analysis and conclusions reached in the seven previous 
chapters. The social, economic and political history of the two groups revealed major themes 
that the thesis addressed in chapters three to seven. These themes included citizens’ identity 
issues (native/indigene and settler/non-indigene relationship), economic dependency of 
groups, devolution of power by means of Local Government creation, international and 
regional protection of warring citizens from war crimes, abuse of human rights and possible 
genocide, necessity and power of the federal and state government in Nigeria to end the Ife-
Modakeke conflict. Below is the outline of how the thesis addressed the themes that developed 
in the course of the research. 
Chapter one set out the conceptual background to the problem, the theoretical framework or 
foundation which is the anthropological, sociological and legal basis for group conflict 
resolution which justifies the separation of the Ife and the Modakeke by means of a Local 
Government area for the Modakeke. Chapter one also presented the research hypothesis, 
questions and the scope of the thesis.  Chapter two dealt with the application of the 
methodology throughout the study to arrive at the conclusions. Chapter three provided an 
analysis of the anthropology of dispute resolution of the Ife-Modakeke through a 
consideration of their pre-colonial social, economic and political structure to determine the 
feasibility of physically separating the Ife-Modakeke groups to resolve their conflict. The 
                                                             
7 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘ICISS (2001) Responsibility to Protect: Report of The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ December 2001. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. P. XI; the 
Principle Endorsed by the World Leaders at the 2005 World Summit and Reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 in A.J Bellamy., ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect and The Problem of Military Intervention’ International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) vol. 
84 no. 4, 2008, p. 615-639 [622] 
8 See Articles 23 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Adopted 27 June 1981 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 




findings indicate that separation was, to a considerable extent, useful for resolving the Ife-
Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial times. However, there were challenges to the success of 
separating the groups such as the Yoruba land law that distinguished indigenes from non-
indigenes and the economic dependency of the Ife on Modakeke manpower and the Modakeke 
dependency on Ife land for survival of the group. These challenges were caused by the social, 
economic and political structure of the pre-colonial Ife and Modakeke groups. Flowing from 
this finding, the thesis acknowledged that in order to separate the groups, these challenges 
must be adequately addressed. Chapter four examined the colonial social, economic and 
political structure of the Ife-Modakeke, their conflict and conflict resolution and the effect on 
the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict by separation. The necessity of chapter four arises 
from the challenges of separating the groups in pre-colonial Nigeria. Chapter five discussed 
the group’s conflict and conflict resolution in the post-colonial Nigeria, the political structure 
of the modern State of Nigeria and its effect on the Ife-Modakeke conflict by separation. The 
chapter analysed how the modern State can separate cultural identities from political identities 
by eliminating the traditional distinction between natives/indigenes and settlers/non-indigenes 
and by aligning land law with the reality of the ownership and possession of land by groups 
to end the conflict. The chapter found that the modern Nigerian State, by the operation of its 
legal principles, has had a negative impact by retaining customary land tenure system through 
the Land Use Act and by so doing, has sustained the hierarchy between native Ife and settler 
Modakeke groups. Also, the system of revenue allocation in Nigeria encourages groups to be 
autonomous and separate because groups only receive and generate a very modest amount of 
revenue. The chapter also found that the federal government is in a position to resolve the Ife-
Modakeke conflict by separation. Chapter six flowed from the discussions in chapter five to 
examine the necessity, feasibility and power of the states in Nigeria to separate groups by 
creating Local Government areas in Nigeria. The chapter found that the states have the legal 
ability to create Local Government areas in their territory however, the federal government 
ultimately have the final say in the existence of such Local Government. Chapter seven 
analysed the obligations of the Nigerian State as regards protecting citizens from human rights 
abuses, war crimes and possible genocide and the feasibility of the international community 
and the African Union putting pressure on Nigeria to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The 
chapter found that by virtue of the provisions in the Nigerian Constitution, the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union and ICISS, the Nigerian State is obliged to protect its citizens from 
the effects of violent conflicts, such as the Ife-Modakeke conflict, and stands to benefit both 
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economically and with regards to protecting her sovereign rights of non-intervention into her 
domestic affairs by other States. 
8.3 General Findings on the Major Themes of the Thesis 
The general findings presented in this thesis were derived from the analysis of major themes 
which developed from reviewing the literature on the Ife-Modakeke conflict, and dispute 
resolution from the pre-colonial to the modern era of the groups as well as the responses to 
the interviews conducted among the contemporary Ife and Modakeke groups in 2014. The 
major themes emerged from the analysis are summarised below. 
8.3.1 The Pre-colonial Relationship Between the Ife and the Modakeke 
The study found that the Ife and the Modakeke people are aware of the long enduring conflict 
and the role that the traditional rulers and traditional conflict resolution has played in trying 
to resolve the conflict.9 The responses from the interview analysed in chapter three 
demonstrated that the Ife-Modakeke lived as two autonomous groups of the Ife and Oyo 
kingdoms in pre-colonial Nigeria. The interviews provided the perceptions of contemporary 
members of the Ife and the Modakeke and verifies available literature on the Ife-Modakeke 
groups. The interviews revealed that the Yoruba sub-groups, although claiming the same 
divine origin (Oduduwa), are different people.10 This supported the argument that the 
Modakeke can maintain political autonomy from the Ife because they were politically 
autonomous as part of the old Oyo group in pre-colonial Nigeria. 
In this thesis, the unique nature of the Ife-Modakeke groups was a major part of the analysis 
of the Ife-Modakeke conflict and possible resolution of their conflict. The unique nature of 
the Ife-Modakeke groups cannot be overlooked in discussing the resolution of the Ife-
Modakeke conflict because. as noted in the theoretical framework in chapter one, a group 
social structure affects the success of their conflict resolution. According to ethnic conflict 
analysis by sociologists, groups with different status positions will always be in conflict 
because the superior group strives to maintain its status while the inferior group seeks 
liberation from an inferior position.11 According to Blumer, group prejudice comes when a 
                                                             
9 See coding of the participant responses in appendix 13 and 14 
10 See discussions in Chapter Three 
11J.C Turner., ‘Social Categorization and Social Comparison in Intergroup Relations’ 1975 Unpublished PhD Thesis University of Bristol 
in S. Aharpour., social identity theory and group diversity: an analysis of functions of group diversity (University of Kent Canterbury, 1999)  
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group feels threatened in its position.12  As discussed  in the analysis of chapter three of this 
thesis, the Modakeke are a hybrid group from the old Oyo Empire13 while the Ife originate 
from the Ife kingdom to which the Yoruba owe their existence.14 It follows that the Ife group 
want to protect their indigene status, while the Modakeke will ever feel threatened as settlers 
feeling inferior at all times. regardless of how well they are treated by the Ife. The fact that 
the Modakeke came to reside among the Ife did not remove the reality that they were once 
from an autonomous society. According to Akinjogbin, the historical consciousness of an 
average Yoruba is restricted to his sub-cultural group and not the whole Yorubaland.15 
Although, it was possible for Yoruba groups in situations akin to the Modakeke as settlers to 
become part of their host groups, Falola and Genova noted that the “…Modakeke did not fully 
integrate with those already living in Ile-Ife…”16Therefore, unless they are returned to their 
state of economic and political autonomy from the Ife, the Ife-Modakeke conflict is unlikely 
to be resolved permanently. In addition, the interviews conducted by the researcher in 2014 
have revealed that both groups recognize their established traditional dispute resolution which 
mirrors those described in the literature. The traditionally established method of resolution 
described by participants of both communities shows that the traditional rulers play a great 
role in resolving internal conflicts in their respective communities and invariably between 
communities. The powers of the traditional rulers in pre-colonial Yoruba meant that they 
could resolve conflict between groups and within groups by whichever means they chose 
including separation. This made separation a possible attempt at resolution of the Ife-
Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial times. The thesis acknowledges that physical separation is 
unlikely in resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict as it was in pre-colonial times.  
8.3.2 The Yoruba Norms of the Native/Indigene and Settler/Non-indigene and the Land 
Tenure System 
Yoruba norms on land tenure and the identity of settlers in a community have been sustained 
through the pre-colonial times to the colonial and post-independent Nigerian State. Esman 
has argued that the very nature of the post-colonial State encourages exclusion of subordinate 
                                                             
12H. Blumer., ‘Race Prejudice as a Sense of group position’ Pacific Sociological Review vol. 1., 1958, p.3-7 [5] 
13 O. Olutobi & A. Oyeniyi., Modakeke from Grass to Grace (Olutobi Ventures Osun State Nigeria, 1994) p. 2 
14 Ife was traced to the 11th Century as an Established Kingdom. The Encyclopaedia Britannica: Ile-Ife. Online:  
Http://Www.Britannica.Com/Ebchecked/Topic/282720/Ile-Ife 
15A. Akinjogbin., War and Peace in Yoruba Land 1793-1893 (Heinemann Educational Books, 1998) p. 16 




groups.17 Sorbo and Vale support this theory, pointing out that African governments have 
“sustained conflicts…to serve their own interest”18  through exclusion policies where one 
group is excluded from gaining access to power due to discriminatory norms.19 Boone also 
noted that by upholding customary land tenure regimes, the State reproduces and confirms 
the hierarchical structure of the local political arena.20   
The history of the Yoruba land tenure system examined in chapter three of this thesis revealed 
that the Yoruba land tenure created a system of hierarchy between first settlers in a community 
and later arrivals. The Yoruba land tenure system brought about the payment of Ishakole by 
settlers and those in the group who made use of the land of another person. The 
native/indigene-settler/non-indigene hierarchy, made the physical separation of the groups 
initiated by the then Ife traditional ruler Oba Abewaile short-lived. In addition, the economic 
structure of pre-colonial Yoruba which centred mainly on farming, fishing and trading meant 
heavy reliance on human labour which likely made the settler Modakeke groups valuable 
assets to the Ife and prompted the Ife to want to keep the Modakeke within the Ife territory. 
The thesis also found that the Ife and the Modakeke people recognize that the authority of 
their traditional rulers was reduced by the colonial administration in Nigeria. Sadly, the efforts 
of the colonial administration in separating the Ife from the Modakeke through the Treaty of 
Peace in 1886 was short lived because the Yoruba norm which discriminated against settlers 
on land ownership (Ishakole) continued during the colonial era. Also, the traditional rulers 
lost their absolute authority to resolve conflicts in colonial times thus they could not institute 
another separation of the Modakeke from the Ife.  The Modakeke returned to the Ife mainland 
in 1920 and this provided an avenue for the continuation of the Ife-Modakeke conflict in 
colonial Nigeria. 
The study found that post-independent efforts of the Nigerian State have not led to a 
permanent resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The State, by means of the Constitution 
in section 147 which prevents non-indigenes from participation in political offices in 
communities and the Land Use Act of Nigeria 1978 which continued communal land 
ownership, has continued the discrimination between native/indigene and settlers/non-
indigenes in Nigeria. And by extension the Constitution and the Land Use Act appear to have 
                                                             
17J.M Esman., Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994) p. 19 
18M.G Sorbo & P. Vale., Out of Conflict from War to Peace in Africa (Nordiska Afrikainstitute, Uppsala, 1997) p. 132 
19M.G Sorbo & P. Vale., (1997) Ibid. p. 141 
20 C. Boone., Property and Political Order in Africa. Land Rights and the Structure of Politics. London School of Economics and Political 
Science (Cambridge University Press, 2014) p.109 
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empowered the Ife natives from discriminating against the Modakeke settlers or non-
indigenes. In the same way the Land Use Act has emboldened the Modakeke to stop paying 
the Ishakole land rent by arguing that all lands belong to the government. This has continued 
the conflict between the groups. However, the issue of land tenure has been settled by the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria in Elegushi v Oseni 21 by setting forth the five types of legal 
ownership of land in Nigeria. This settles the issue of Modakeke land use in the land they 
occupy in Ife through long possession. However, rulings of the Court in Chief Alani Akanmu 
v Raji & Others,22 stating that the agreement to pay ground rent on the land, Ishakole, is “an 
obligatory rent whose main purpose is to ensure subsistence of revisionary rights upon 
forfeiture of a customary tenancy for any reason”23is in favour of the Ife collecting ground 
rent from individual Modakeke farmers leasing land from the Ife. Therefore, there ought not 
to be any further tension in this regard, even though the Modakeke are likely to continue to 
be angered by the payment of Ishakole (as they still term it) or ground rent (as the Supreme 
Court terms it).   
8.3.3 The Power of the Federal and State Government of Nigeria to End the Ife-
Modakeke Conflict  
Another theory of group conflict is the State as contributor to conflict by means of ineffective 
intervention and by exclusion policies which contribute to group conflict. Subaru’s work on 
ethnic minority conflicts demonstrates that the lack of effective intervention by the Nigerian 
State in ethnic conflict situations was largely due to over-centralization of power and 
resources in the federal government.24A consideration of the social-economic and political 
structure of the modern State of Nigeria, right from post-independent Nigeria, revealed that 
the Nigerian State has often used military force to end the violence from the conflict and made 
use of committees/commissions established to manage the conflict. However, the 
recommendations of these committees have not been acted upon.  The use of police or military 
force to end violence could be beneficial to the Ife and the Modakeke in the short-term. 
However, in the long term, the State granting autonomy to the groups to each control their 
political lives separately within Nigerian by means of a Local Government area is most likely 
to end the conflict between the groups. Interestingly, from the interviews conducted in 2014 
                                                             
21 (2005) 14 Nigeria Weekly Law Report, Pt. 945, p. 348 
22 (1990)3 Nigeria Law Reports. p. 30 
23Chief Alhaji K.S.O Akanmu v Raji Ipaye & Others (1990) Ibid. 
24R.T Suberu., Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria (Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1996) p. 67 
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among the Ife and the Modakeke groups, the thesis found that each group recognize the need 
to co-operate with the Nigerian State in the resolution of their conflict, thus making State 
intervention in their conflict resolution feasible and more readily acceptable to the groups.  
The thesis found that the federal character principle in the Constitution was designed to allay 
the fears of domination of minority groups by the majority groups in Nigeria. However, the 
federal character principle which ensures a quota system for fair distribution of public services 
in the country among groups, have only led to dual citizenship loyalties. Leading to situations 
where the group interest comes before State interest, elites of groups continue to clamour for 
more control of resources by means of revenue allocation, state creation and Local 
Government creation for their respective groups. The thesis found that the revenue allocation 
formula which gives the majority of revenue to the federal government of Nigeria and the 
subsequent distribution to the states and Local Government areas without internally generated 
revenue from the states and Local Governments have contributed to the struggles of groups 
to own their respective Local Government areas where they can misappropriate the resources 
while generating little or no revenue themselves. 
The thesis also found that by virtue of section 8 of the 1999 Constitution on the creation of 
Local Government in Nigeria, the federal government is in a position to assent to the creation 
of Local Government by states in Nigeria. This power had been misused by the federal 
government to refuse the creation of more Local Governments in the country. The government 
have also used their Constitutional powers in section 162 of the Constitution to starve newly 
created Local Governments of funds, thereby discouraging the creation of new Local 
Government areas in the country. Although the states of Nigeria have legal powers to create 
Local Governments as provided in chapter 7 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, the ultimate 
existence and life of a Local Government lies on the federal government. Furthermore, most 
states in Nigeria have deliberately encroached on the autonomy and revenue of Local 
Governments, thus making the Local Governments inefficient and not a true third tier 
government in Nigeria. 
8.3.4 Persuasion of the Nigerian State to End the Ife-Modakeke Conflict by Granting 
Internal Self-determination to the Modakeke Group 
The thesis also found that the Nigerian State can be persuaded by the traditional international 
law on autonomy and self-determination promoted by the West because, by virtue of the 
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United Nations charter and the African Union constitutive Act, the international community 
and the African Union can intervene in a sovereign State’s internal affairs on matters of human 
rights violations and when a State fails on its responsibility to protect its citizens from human 
rights violations and genocide. The African Union promotes internal self-determination by 
means of democratic practices and the Nigerian State, being a member of the African Union, 
can, therefore, be persuaded to exercise its democratic powers to make laws ensuring that all 
groups have equal access to devolved powers by means of Local Government for those groups 
that require and qualify for one. By so doing, the Nigerian State will benefit by ending the 
costly Ife-Modakeke conflict and protecting their sovereign rights to manage their domestic 
affairs without intervention from outside communities. Below is a discussion of the specific 
findings and recommendations on each of the research sub-questions. 
8.4 Specific Findings and Recommendations on Chapter Three the Pre-colonial History 
of the Ife and the Modakeke and the Idea of Separation 
Chapter three of the thesis analysed the social, economic and political structure of the Ife and 
the Modakeke as part of the larger Yoruba group in Nigeria. The chapter determined whether 
these structures demonstrate separation as a useful tool for conflict prevention and resolution 
in pre-colonial Ife-Modakeke history. The chapter answered the first research sub-question: 
“to what extent does the pre-colonial social, economic and political structure of societies such 
as the Ife and the Modakeke demonstrate that separation was useful for conflict prevention 
and resolution and how successful was separation in preventing and managing the Ife-
Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial times?” 
A major finding of the chapter is that the Ife and the Modakeke are part of the wider Yoruba 
group in West Africa and Nigeria and that although they had close cultural and economic ties 
they enjoyed political and judicial autonomy and self-determination from each other as 
Yoruba sub-groups. It also shows that pre-colonial dispute resolution of the Ife-Modakeke 
was highly dependent on hierarchical authority and such authority meant that physical 
separation was possible at the request of the highest authority of the land, but the loss of 
support from the various checks and balances existing within the authority led to an 
unsuccessful resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial times. By means of 
evidences from the history of Ife-Modakeke conflict and dispute resolution, the chapter laid 
the foundation for advising the government of Nigeria to grant the Modakeke economic and 
political self-determination from the Ife. 
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An analysis of the social-economic and political structure of the Ife and Modakeke as sub-
groups of the Yoruba provided illustrative examples and evidence that due to the unique 
relationship between the Ife and the Modakeke from Oyo, the separation initiated by the Ife 
king to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict was only short lived in preventing and managing 
the Ife-Modakeke. To reach this conclusion, the chapter presented evidence on the following 
key aspects of the Ife-Modakeke social, economic and political structure in pre-colonial times: 
(1) causes of Ife-Modakeke conflict and separation attempts (2) kinship ties (3) land tenure 
(4) the Yoruba pre-colonial economic system (5) pre-colonial state capitals and subordinate 
towns and the power of the king. The evidence presented under the key aspects discussed 
above answered the first research sub-question by demonstrating that, to a large extent, the 
pre-colonial social, economic and political structure of the Ife and the Modakeke shows that 
separation was useful for conflict prevention and resolution and was successful in preventing 
and managing the Ife-Modakeke conflict in pre-colonial times. However, there were 
challenges to the success of separating the groups. These challenges were caused by the social 
norm of the Yoruba which encouraged separate and autonomous existence of the Yoruba 
groups, native/Indigene-settler discrimination, economic benefit and the reliance of the Ife on 
Modakeke migrant labour and the political structure of the pre-colonial Ife and Modakeke 
sub-groups. The thesis in acknowledgement of these challenges recommended that in order 
to separate the groups, the native/Indigene-settler discrimination in the use of land, economic 
reliance on the Modakeke labour input and the power of the kings to order such physical 
separation must be addressed to enable permanent separation of the Modakeke from the Ife. 
8.5 Specific Findings and Recommendations on Chapter Four on the Colonial Social, 
Economic and Political Structure of the Ife-Modakeke and the Feasibility for Separation 
Chapter four analysed the social, economic and political structure of the Ife and the Modakeke 
in colonial times to determine their effect on the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The 
materials retrieved from archives, published literature and contemporary oral testimonies of 
the Ife and the Modakeke groups in 2014 provided illustrative examples of the effect of the 
colonial administration on the Ife-Modakeke conflict.  
 A time-line for the colonial rule was identified running from the period of trading of the 
British in Nigeria in 1886 to 1960 when Nigeria gained her independence.  The chapter 
applied the analysis of the social, economic and political structure of the groups in colonial 
times to answer the second research sub-question: to what extent does the colonial social, 
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economic and political structure of the Ife-Modakeke demonstrate separation as a means of 
resolving their conflict?  
The preliminary finding under this chapter is that the social, economic and political structure 
of the Ife and the Modakeke in colonial times made separation difficult as a means of resolving 
the Ife-Modakeke conflict because the traditional rulers lacked the judicial power to separate 
the groups and the colonial government sustained the norms of the Yoruba which prejudiced 
all efforts at separation such as the hierarchy created between natives and settlers in land 
tenure by means of the Constitution. The method of resolution of the conflict initiated by the 
British colonial administration through having parties to all the existing local conflicts in the 
Yoruba land sign a peace Treaty in 188625 with the 5th clause of the Treaty providing that 
the Modakeke should abandon their land and move to the mainland of the Ife26 and for the  
Modakeke land to revert to the Ife kings and chiefs who were to deal with the land as they 
thought expedient27 was clearly one which sustained the native/indigene-settler hierarchy 
relationship between the Ife and the Modakeke. It was a clear statement that the land belonged 
to the first settlers the Ife thus the Modakeke had no rights to the land as settlers in Ife.  
Also, all the colonial Constitutions from 1922 to 1960 in Nigeria had elements that fostered 
the native-settler relationships along political lines.28 The regionalization policy in the 1946 
Constitution led to the creation of three majority groups, the Hausa in the North, the Yoruba 
in the West and the Igbo in the East. Within these groups lay minorities and further minorities 
within the minorities.29The regionalism introduced by the 1946 Constitution led minority 
groups to begin clamouring for the creation of more states and Local Government areas to 
alleviate the discrimination suffered by the minority tribes in the regions.30 
To prove that the two conflicts during the colonial period were related to the non-enforcement 
of the separation of the groups in colonial times, the chapter demonstrated that the land tenure 
in the colonial era remained largely communal but with the increased value of land came the 
                                                             
25S. Johnson., The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate (George Routledge and Sons, 
1921)  p. 723 
26I.A Akinjogbin., The Cradle of a Race: Ife From the Beginning to 1980 (Sunray Publications. Port Harcourt, 1992) p. 272 
Akinjogbin, I.A., (1992) Ibid. P.272 
27See 1886 Treaty in Appendix of S. Johnson., (1921) Ibid. 
28 O.O Akanji., ‘The Problem of Belonging: The Identity Question and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Nigeria’ African Identities 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group) vol. 9 no.2, May 2010, p. 117-132[118]  
29 Chapter Five examines in more details the impact of the majority-minority problems raised by the Regionalism created by the 1946 
Constitution had on the Ife-Modakeke conflict 
30See B. Smith., ‘Federal-State Relations in Nigeria. African Affairs’ (Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society) vol. 
80 no. 320., July 1981, p. 355-378 [356] 
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prominence of the discrimination between natives and settlers where the settler Modakeke 
could not use land freely as did the Ife indigenes, thus the continuation of the conflict. Also, 
the native/settler relationship meant that to their own displeasure the Modakeke continued to 
pay the Ishakole as land rent in colonial times. Furthermore, the chapter provided evidence 
and examples from the colonial times to show the hardship of not separating the groups in 
times of economic boom of agriculture and oil in the colonial times. The political structure of 
the groups in colonial times also revealed that indirect rule elevated the Oyo over the other 
Yoruba groups thereby creating power struggles which affected the Ife and Modakeke 
conflict.  
The chapter recommends that to resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict, it is necessary to separate 
the norms of the people from the realities of dispute resolution because non-separation of the 
Yoruba norm of Ishakole and native/indigene-settler relationship made the colonial 
government unable to resolve the conflict by separation.  
8.6 Specific Findings and Recommendations on Chapter Five on the Impact of the 
Modern Nigerian State on the Ife-Modakeke Conflict and Dispute Resolution 
The chapter examined the impact of the social, economic and political structure of the modern 
State on the Ife-Modakeke conflict, attempts at dispute resolution and the power of the federal 
government to assent to a creation of a Local Government for the Modakeke group. Chapter 
five provided an account of the four violent clashes of the Ife-Modakeke and various attempts 
at dispute resolution in post-independent Nigeria and then applied a legislative perspective in 
the analysis of the impact of the social, economic and political structure of the modern State 
in the Ife-Modakeke conflict and dispute resolution. The Nigerian Constitution, as well as 
other types of legislation, was used to illustrate the impact of the Nigerian State on the Ife-
Modakeke conflict and dispute resolution. 
The chapter examined the four (1981, 1983, 1997-98 and 2000) violent clashes between the 
groups in post-independent Nigeria to identify the triggers to the clashes for a solution to the 
conflict.  The impact of the modern State on the Ife-Modakeke conflict and dispute resolution 
was accessed by answering the third research sub-question: “to what extent does the social, 
economic and political structure of the modern Nigerian State affect the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict and dispute resolution in relation to the separation of the groups?” 
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In answer to the research sub-question in chapter five, the chapter found that the major cause 
of the four violent post-independent clashes between the groups was the Modakeke’s quest 
for internal self-determination from the Ife by means of a Local Government dominated by 
the Modakeke. From the interviews conducted among the Ife and the Modakeke in 2014 and 
the academic records of the four clashes between the Ife and the Modakeke in post-
independent Nigeria, the study found that the State always intervened in the conflict by means 
of military intervention and setting committees to investigate the clashes. However, the use 
of military intervention was not sufficient in resolving the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Military 
intervention merely helped to stop the violence at the particular time only for it to erupt again 
in another violent clash. Neither were the recommendations of the various committees 
followed and as a result the conflict remained unresolved. 
The analysis in this chapter also led to the finding that the Land Use Act 1978 institutionalised 
the customary ownership of land, empowering customary landowners to allocate and 
reallocate lands. Further, it empowered the State, through the Land Use Act, to uphold 
customary land tenure regime, the State thus reproducing and confirming the hierarchical 
structure of the local political arena.31 In the case of the Ife and the Modakeke, the State 
thereby sustained the hierarchy between the native/indigene Ife and the settler Modakeke in 
the unequal rights to land. That is why, even after the last recorded violent conflict in 
1999/2000, there had been threats of a repeat of violence following Ife refusal to allow the 
Modakeke group to use land freely in Modakeke.32 Otite noted that the 1978 Act led the 
Modakeke to assume freedom from paying their ground rent to Ife thus increasing the conflict 
between the two groups.33 
With regards to the economic impact of the modern State structure on the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict, the study determined that the revenue allocation formula from the 1960 Constitution 
to date makes groups such as the Ife and the Modakeke rely heavily on the revenue allocated 
to Local Governments from the federal and state accounts without much internally generated 
revenue.  Therefore, groups such as the Modakeke have stronger appeal for Local Government 
areas in order to get more revenue for the betterment of their group. In like manner, groups 
such as the Ife prefer to have the Modakeke as part of their area for more revenue allocation. 
                                                             
31C. Boone., (2014) Ibid. p. 109 
32 “Osun Citizen News: ‘Brewing Ife/Modakeke Crisis: Youth ask Aregbesola to intervene’ 28 October, 2017. Online: 
https://osuncitizen.com/2017/10/28/brewing-ifemodakeke-crisis-youths-ask-aregbesola-to-intervene 
33See analysis in Chapter Three, O. Otitie., Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: with Comparative Materials 
(Shaneson. Ibadan, 2000) p. 24 
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This lure for more Local Government revenue from the federal and state accounts sustains the 
Ife-Modakeke conflict in post-colonial Nigeria. The current vertical allocation of the revenue 
in the federation account from the year 2000 is 52.68%, 26.72% and 20.60% to the federal, 
state and Local Governments respectively.34 The thesis argues that, because of the increase in 
allocation to the Local Governments and the sharing formula, separation appears to be more 
appealing to groups such as the Modakeke so as to control the revenue coming into their 
group.  
In addition, the basis for the horizontal formula for sharing revenue between states and Local 
Government areas, such as population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, land 
mass and the principle of derivation, has contributed to the conflict of groups such as the Ife 
and the Modakeke.  For example, there are benefits from having more population, thus groups 
such as the Ife stand to benefit from having the Modakeke as extra population and greater 
land mass for extra revenue allocation. The general recommendation is that revenue allocation 
should be towards national economic development rather than geopolitical considerations. 
However, as the revenue allocation formula stands, to ensure basic amenities go to each group 
fairly, the only way to pacify both the Ife and the Modakeke is to separate them financially 
by creating a Local Government for the Modakeke to enable them to control their finances 
themselves. For as long as federal and state revenue continues to be the main source of 
revenue for Local Governments, separation of the Ife from the Modakeke is the only way to 
ensure that the Modakeke feel that they are fairly dealt with economically in the Ife.  
With regards to the impact of the political structure of the modern State on the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict, the chapter found that the Nigerian State by means of section 147 (3) sustains a 
hierarchy between groups as native/indigene against settlers because a settler cannot access 
devolved powers equally regardless of how long they have lived in an area. As a result, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for groups in Nigeria such as the Modakeke to get access to 
devolved power by means of a Local Government area without triggering opposition from 
indigene groups such as the Ife who maintain pride of place. The chapter found out that the 
political structure of the Federal State also provides precedence of conflict resolution in 
Nigeria by the Federal State sharing powers with the states in order to curb majority-minority 
conflicts. Also, section 8 of the Constitution gives the Federal government the power to assent 
                                                             
34A. Salami., ‘Taxation, Revenue Allocation and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Policy Options’ Economic Annals vol. 
6 no. 189, 2011, p. 27-50 [41] 
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to a creation of a Local Government for the Modakeke. Therefore, the Federal State is in a 
position to effect conflict resolution at the grassroots by enabling states to share powers with 
the Local Governments. In so doing, the Federal State can resolve the Ife-Modakeke conflict 
by accentuating Local Government created by states and funding such Local Governments. 
 
The chapter also found that the federal government is in a position to assent to a Local 
Government being created for groups in Nigeria and without the assent of the federal 
government, any Local Government created by a state is on the path of destruction and 
inactivity. 
 
The thesis recommends that the Constitution of Nigeria be amended to give all individuals in 
Nigeria equal access to power and resources by removing the word ‘indigene’ in section 147 
and replacing it with ‘citizen’ giving equal opportunity to all Nigerians regardless of where 
they live within the country because the word indigene makes later settlers in an area second-
class citizens35 which should not be the spirit of the Constitution.   
8.7 Specific Findings and Recommendations on Chapter Six on the Necessity, Feasibility 
and the Power of the states to Create Local Governments in Nigeria 
Chapter six focused broadly on the power of state governments in Nigeria to create local 
authority governments, on the necessity and the feasibility of doing so for the Modakeke, and 
on the responsibility of the sovereign Federal government to intervene. The chapter 
demonstrated that the states within the Federal Republic of Nigeria including the Osun state 
of Nigeria, have the legal power to create local authority governments pursuant to section 7 
of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. The chapter discussed the necessity of Osun state to create 
a Modakeke Local Government putting into consideration the law and the wider political, 
economic and demographic circumstances in Nigeria. 
 
The contention of the chapter was  that if Osun state has the legal power to create a local 
authority government for the Modakeke but either Osun state takes the view that it is not 
necessary or feasible for it to do so in the circumstances, or fails to exercise any proper 
decision-making function on the issue, then the issue becomes one for the Federal government 
                                                             
35O. Olakunle, I. Joseph & O. Segun., ‘Indigene-settler relationship in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Igbo Community in Lagos’ Afro Asian 
Journal of Social Sciences vol.7 no. 3, 2006, Quarter 3, p. 3 
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either to instruct Osun state to act so as to create the necessary authority, or for the Federal 
government to take the matter into its own hands. This contention was based on the principle 
of attribution of internationally wrongful acts by organs of States on the State.  
 
The chapter demonstrated the necessity and relevance of creating a Local Government for 
conflict resolution. The chapter provided evidence from the Federal Constitution to show that 
the Osun state of Nigeria has the legal power to create a new Local Government authority for 
the Modakeke, and that it is both necessary and feasible for Osun state to do so 
notwithstanding, first, any consequences for the Ife, and from the Ife and, second, any 
demands for similar treatment by other Nigerian ethnic groups. 
Beginning with the definition of Local Government and the importance of having local 
governance in a country such as Nigeria, the chapter analysed the history of local governance 
in Nigeria to establish its impact and relevance in the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. 
The Constitutional provisions for local governance and the possibility of creating Local 
Government areas for groups such as the Modakeke in Nigeria were also examined. The 
chapter concluded with the argument that the modern State of Nigeria is in a position legally 
to create a Local Government for the Modakeke and the failure to create such Local 
Government will only lead to continued conflict between the Ife and the Modakeke. 
The chapter provided evidence from the Constitution by virtue of section 7, and the fourth 
schedule of the 1999 Constitution that the Ife-Modakeke conflict can be resolved by an 
economic and political separation of the Modakeke from the Ife through the creation of a new 
Local Government authority for the Modakeke, notwithstanding any consequences from the 
Ife and demands of similar treatments by other Nigerian ethnic groups. The chapter found that 
there are very challenging obstacles to creating a Local Government area for the Modakeke 
by virtue of part 1 of the first schedule and section 162 on funding of the Local Government 
areas. However, the challenges are more political than legal considerations on the part of the 
Federal government. Therefore, it is within the realms of the Federal government to resolve 





8.8 Specific Findings and Recommendations on Chapter Seven on the International 
Obligation of the Nigerian State to Separate the Groups and end the Ife-Modakeke 
Conflict  
The chapter analysed the obligation of the Nigerian government as part of the international 
community to grant self-determination to the Modakeke to prevent intervention from the 
international community and the African Union and how it affects Modakeke struggles for 
internal self-determination. The purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that separation of 
the Ife and the Modakeke is essential for the resolution of the Ife-Modakeke conflict to prevent 
the international community (including the African Union) from pressurising Nigeria to 
resolve the conflict by other means that are likely to lead to greater conflict.  There is a risk 
that a lack of resolution may give rise to outside intervention based on Nigeria’s responsibility 
to protect its citizens and in furtherance of the protection of the Human Rights of the Ife and 
the Modakeke peoples in Nigeria.  
The chapter identified the problems of Nigeria not granting self-determination to the groups 
by means of a Local Government area dominated by the Modakeke by engaging in two key 
aspects of group autonomy and self-determination namely (1) sovereignty, non-intervention 
and Nigeria’s responsibility to protect citizens (2) the African Union´s protection of groups 
from Human Rights breaches.  
The chapter answered the fifth research sub-question on the international legal obligation of 
the Nigerian State to protect the Modakeke and the Ife from each other; to grant internal 
political and economic self-determination to the Modakeke; and to prevent the human rights 
of the Modakeke being breached by any individual or group of individuals (whether organs 
of the State or otherwise). 
This chapter demonstrated that by virtue of international law provisions on R2P, internal self-
determination and international human rights law and regional laws, that the Nigerian State 
has an international obligation to protect its citizens from the effects of violent conflicts, such 
as in the case of the Ife-Modakeke conflict. The combined effect of international laws on the 
prevention of human rights breaches, protection of citizens from war crimes, genocide and 
ethnic cleansing36 requires States to protect their own citizens from war crimes and genocide, 
                                                             
36 See the World leader’s agreement at the 2005 World Submit to protect citizens; the United Nations Resolution 1674 of 2006; and Article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
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proving the binding nature of the R2P in Nigeria, and this applies to the Ife-Modakeke 
conflict. 
 
The chapter also demonstrated the position of group autonomy and self-determination in 
customary international law as an inconclusive right made subject to exceptions of State 
sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, the international community cannot yet 
force Nigeria to grant internal self-determination to the Modakeke by the application of 
customary international law. However, the provisions of the ICCPR and the report of the 
World Summit 2005, although not binding laws on Nigeria, provide very persuasive grounds 
for Nigeria to grant the Modakeke self-determination to prevent any human rights breaches 
and to help Nigeria manage her internal conflicts as the Modakeke could apply to the ICJ for 
such breaches.  
 
On the other hand, the African Charter, to which Nigeria is a signatory, which covers many 
of the rights, such as right to self-determination in Articles 19-24 of the African Charter, gives 
the African Union a basis for intervention to prevent breaches of human rights in the Ife-
Modakeke. The provisions of Articles 47, and 53 of the Africa Charter and the decisions of 
the Court in Katangese People’s Congress v Zaire37 are indicative of a persuasive power of 
the African Union potentially to be directed at Nigeria to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict. 
Since, Nigeria has such Constitutional provisions and stands to benefit to protect Her 
sovereign rights of non-intervention in Her domestic affairs, it makes it feasible for the 
Nigerian State to accommodate the Modakeke’s quest for increased autonomy and self-
determination internally both by strengthening the existing legal platforms through clear 
unambiguous Constitutional provisions for self-determination and democratic considerations 
for local authority creation.  
 
The discussions in this chapter are sufficient proof that the international community is in a 
position to put pressure on the Nigerian State (even though there is not yet any customary 
international law) to end the Ife-Modakeke conflict. Failure by the Nigerian State to protect 
the Ife and the Modakeke by preventing further breaches of their human rights by recognising 
the right of the Modakeke to internal self-determination therefore could be an invitation to the 
international community and the African Union to intervene in Nigeria’s domestic affairs.   
                                                             




In the alternative, there is the need for enactment of a new Federal legislation on access to 
self-determination in clear and unambiguous terms. Such legislative initiative must be 
supported by the government and combined with other initiatives such as educating the 
government on the way forward for granting internal self-determination without 
compromising its sovereignty as a State.  
 
The chapter also found that the cost of the Ife-Modakeke conflict to the Ife and Modakeke 
people, as well as the Nigerian State, has been enormous. Ending the conflict will ensure that 
there is no further financial, emotional and moral condemnation from other States on the 
Nigerian State. The chapter, therefore, recommended that in order to protect her international 
image and take the lead in carrying out her obligations towards citizens and the protection of 
Human Rights in Africa, the Nigerian State should take steps to separate the Ife-Modakeke to 
end their conflict. Also, there is the need for enactment of a new legislation on access to self-
determination in clear and unambiguous terms. Such legislative initiative must be supported 
by the government and combined with other initiatives such as educating the government on 
the way forward for granting internal self-determination without compromising its 
sovereignty as a State. 
8.9 Directions for Future Research: The Need to Analyse How Nigeria Can Strengthen 
the Constitution and Laws to Enable Equal Access to Devolution of Power Through 
Local Government Creation in Nigeria 
“The tribes are no longer the landlords of Nigeria. Rather, they are now the subjects 
of Nigeria. Nigeria owns the tribes within it. No tribe can assert its independence on 
Nigeria or defy its Statutes. The Nigerian army will come knocking if the Nigeria 
Police is unable to dissuade such adventurism”38 
As the above quotation demonstrates, the current awareness of Nigerians is the suppression 
and destruction of group quest for autonomy, demonstrating that most Nigerians, and even 
the government of Nigeria, is unaware of the possibility of creating equal access of devolution 
of power without violence or impacting on State sovereignty.  
                                                             
38The Vanguard Newspaper: ‘Confab: No to Tribal Delegates’ 28 October, 2013. Online: Http://Www.Vanguardngr.Com/2013/10/Confab-
Tribal-Delegates-1. Assessed 08/03/14 
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The actual issue now is how to legalise the enforcement of internal self-determination 
provided for in the African Charter by giving a clear definition of the peoples and the scope 
of this right, taking into consideration the arguments of third world countries for democratic 
settings backed by African Union decisions. Unfortunately, there is no institutional body that 
is completely dedicated to set out for the review of the African Charter self-determination for 
groups and there are no scholarly works examining the court’s positions on internal self-
determination for groups under the African Union. There are success stories of 
accommodation of group conflict resolution by the modern State. This can form a basis for 
educating the Nigerian government on how it can achieve similar success in resolving the 
century long Ife-Modakeke conflicts. Also, the recommendation for setting up a local 
committee that will look into the administrative nature of upgrading the area office in the 
Modakeke into a full Local Government area that will serve to separate the groups politically 
and end the conflict is the subject of further investigation. It is hoped that this will form the 
basis for future research. 
8.10 Conclusion 
In final conclusion, the Osun state government of Nigeria has the power to create a Local 
Government for the Modakeke to end the Modakeke quest for autonomy and internal self-
determination from the Ife. The federal government should take steps to separate the Ife from 
the Modakeke by assenting to the creation of a Local Government area dominated by the 
Modakeke to keep the two groups apart by appropriate State intervention; and to maintain that 
autonomy and separation by entrenched national laws. By doing this, it is hoped that the Ife-
Modakeke conflict, of many centuries, can be rendered peaceful and any disputes can be 
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APPENDIX 6 -INTERVIEW QUESTIONS GUIDE 
Introduction: My name is ............................, I am a University Student, studying how to 
resolve troubles peacefully. I am 33 years old and a native of this Country. I will first read to 
you the purpose of this interview and if you agree you will sign this form saying you want to 
do the interview 
A. Introductory Questions/Settling Questions 
1. What do you do for a living? 
2. How long have you been living in this community, have you always lived here? 
3. What is your educational background? 
4. Do you like living here or find problems living here? 
5. How would you describe the various people living in this community, are they mixed? 
B.  Structure of the Community 
6. How are the people in this community organized? Tribes, Clans, Wards, Villages? 
7. How many clans/villages are in this community? 
8. Are there the same chiefs for both communities? 
9. What are the religious practices in this community? 
10. Do both communities take part in the same religious ceremonies? 
11. What language is spoken in this community? 
12. Does the Ife-Modakeke have the same language? 
13. Is the Ife mixed with the Modakeke? If yes, how did the mixing come about? 
14. Would you say that the Ife and the Modakeke are the same people? 
C. History of the Community  
15. Can you please tell me the history of this community before the white man came? Did 
the community have their own traditional rulers?  
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16. Did the community have traditional rulers and did the traditional rulers have powers 
during the colonial times? 
17. What about today, do you have traditional rulers? Do they have powers? 
D. Personal Dispute Behaviour 
18. How often would you say that you have troubles with people living close to you? 
19. Please describe how troubles are normally settled traditionally? 
20. Have you tried other methods of settlement outside tradition? Such as using the courts? 
21. Do you seek legal advice? How do you view court settlement? 
E. Past Community Dispute Resolution Behaviour 
1. Are you aware of troubles between clans in this community or between this 
community and another community? 
2. How often would you say there are troubles between this village and others? 
3. How does the trouble start? 
4. Who participates in the fighting? Is it the young men, oldermen, chiefs? What about 
the women? 
5. When there is trouble between villages are the villagers allowed to engage in trying to 
settle the trouble? 
6. Do the clans honour traditional settlements? 
7. What is done if one party or both does not honour the settlement? 
8. How do you view the traditional method of settling troubles? 
9. Does the government intervene to resolve the troubles? 
F. Structure of the Conflict  
1. What would you say is the cause of the fighting? 
2. Who orders the fighting? 
3. What weapons do they use to fight? 
4. How do they get the weapons? 
5. Who participates in the fighting? 
6. Do outsiders participate in the fighting? 
7. How the fighting was contained, or stopped? 
8. Are there periods of peace and fight or continuous fighting? 
249 
 
G. Present Community Dispute Resolution Behaviour 
a) Relationship between the State and the tribes 
1. How do you understand the relationship between this village and the 
government of Nigeria? 
2. Did you feel in any way that this village continued to rule itself after 
independence? 
b) Dispute Resolution methods: State vs Tribes 
1. Would you describe the government method of resolution as the 
same with the tradition? 
2. Would you recommend the government method of resolving 
conflicts? 
3. If you had the opportunity to do so, what method of resolving 
conflicts would you advice? 
H. Effects of the conflicts and Resolution Methods 
1. Would you say that the troubles between the two communities have been 
resolved permanently? 
2. What is the effect of the conflict in your community? 
3. Was traditional method of resolution successful in resolving the conflict 
4. Was government intervention successful in resolving the conflict? 
Additional Questions for participants who served in Committees for dispute resolution 
1. Q: Have you taken part in resolving the conflict? 
2. Q: When did you serve in the committee? 
3. How where the members of the committee selected? 
4. Why did you decide to serve? 
5. Please describe the process of resolution employed? 
6. Was the method used by the committee traditional method? 
7. What was the success of the method used by the committee? 
 
 
APPENDIX 7- PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET 
The Research Study: STATE INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NIGERIA: AN ANTHROPO-
SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION.  
250 
 
To:  Potential Interview Participant  
From:  Okuda Ewomazino Oghenerobo 
Subject:  Informed Consent to Participate in Study 
Date: ________________________ 
Dear: _______________________ 
My name is Okuda Ewomazino Oghenerobo, I am a student studying how to settle troubles between village 
clans and neighbouring villages.  I am inviting you to take part in my research study. I will be asking you some 
questions that relate to how troubles between two clans in your village are settled and how trouble between 
your village and another village is settled. These questions will be broken down into smaller ones to help you 
to give answers during the interview. 
Your answers will help me and other students to understand and advise on how trouble in villages can be 
settled without fighting. This advice might help you and your village to manage and settle troubles in the 
community peacefully. 
The whole interview with you will take about thirty minutes to one hour. When you and I talk, our spoken 
words will be recorded and I may write some down on paper so that I will not forget. If you want to hear your 
answers, I will play the tape for you to listen to them. To make sure that nobody else hears your answers, I will 
keep the tape in a locked cupboard that only I will have the key to. And when I write your answers in my book, 
I will not write your name.  So nobody else will know that you are the one that gave those answers. Some of 
the answers you give may be included in another book, a published book that will contain my advice on how 
to settle troubles peacefully.  However, I will never write your name or describe you in the book.  If, I need to 
use your answers for another, later study, I will ask for your permission again. 
Please note: 
• You do not have to take part in this study. You can choose not to be interviewed. 
• You can withdraw from the interview process at any time before, during or after the interview by 
telling the interviewer in person or by telephone that you no longer want to continue. 
• You can also inform your village head that you do not wish to continue and he will inform me. 
• You can ask for all or any of your answers to be withdrawn as long as this is practical, and for your 
personal information to be destroyed.  
• You do not have to answer particular questions during the interview if you do not wish to. 
• The answers that you give during the interview will not be told to anyone. 
• This information sheet and the consent below containing your name will be kept in a locked 
cupboard on University premises so that your answers are safe. 
• If you want to contact me before or after the interview to say that you no longer want to be 
interviewed or that you want to withdraw your answer or answers,  please call me (or ask 
someone to call me) on this number (+447538185717) or email me on 
(okuda.ewomazino@yahoo.co.uk).   




If you are sure that you understand everything I have written in this form, and you understand what you are 
being asked to do, please sign below to show that you understand.  Then if you want to take part in the study 
please sign the consent form too. 
Thank You. 
 




If you have further questions about this study you can contact Dr. Kim Van der Borght by email on 
k.vanderborght@westminster.ac.uk 
Sincerely,  
Okuda Ewomazino Oghenerobo 
CONSENT FORM 
The Research Study:  STATE INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NIGERIA: AN ANTHROPO-
SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
To : Okuda Ewomazino Oghenerobo 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I have read, or have had read to me the Participation Information Sheet (above) for the research study, and I 
am willing to act as a participant in the study. 
Name:   _______________________________ 
Signature:  __________________________ Date:  _______________ 
This Consent form and the Participant Information Sheet will be stored separately from any data you provide 
so that your responses will not be known by anyone else. 
I have provided an appropriate explanation of the study to the participant 
Researcher Signature ____________________________ 
 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSIGNMENT       
         Date:  ________________ 
I hereby grant Okuda Ewomazino Oghenerobo permission to provide evidence from interviews and 
questionnaires derived from audio and/or video recording and transcription on ethnic conflict 
resolution for the purpose of advancing knowledge on ways of resolving ethnic conflicts in Nigeria.   
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I understand that my response to questions in this interview is for educational purposes only and I 
will not be paid in any manner for this interview or the use of the interview for educational purposes. 
The knowledge contained in the interviews conducted will not be given to any non-project staff 
except in cases where it is useful for protection and preservation purposes.  When this material 
becomes available, it may be read, quoted, or cited from and disseminated for educational and 
scholarly purposes only. No name for identification will be included. 
NOW THEREFORE, I hereby agree to assign and transfer unto Ewomazino Okuda, all my right in every 
manner or form, title and interest in this interview. I grant to Ewomazino Okuda a royalty-free, 
exclusive, irrevocable, perpetual, world-wide license to read, quoted, cite, reproduce this interview 
for the purpose of her research.  
I have read the information in the Participation Information Sheet, and I am willing to act as a 
participant in the above research study. 
 
  Signature of Interviewee(Thumb Print)                                                
 
                          Name 
I confirm that the interpretation have been done accurately. 
 
               Signature of Interpreter 
 
                         Name 
I have provided an appropriate explanation of the study to the participant 
 
             Signature of interviewer 
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APPENDIX 13: IFE GENERAL CODING All QUESTIONS
  
Section A: Introduction/Background  
Serial Number  Age    Sex   Education  
1  3  M  A  
2  3  F  A  
5  3  M  B  
6  2  F  A  
7  1  F  C  
8  1  F  C  
9  2  M  C  
11  2  M  C  
13  2  M  A  
14  2  M  C  
15  2  M  C  
17  2  F  A  
18  2  F  A  
19  2  M  A  
20  2  M  C  
21  2  M  B  
22  2  M  A  
23  2  M  C  
24  1  M  B  
25  2  M  B  
26  2  F  A  
27  1  F  C  
28  2  F  B  
29  2  F  A  
30  1  M  B  
31  2  F  A  
 32  2  F  C  
33  3  F  C  
34  1  M  C  
35  2  M  B  
 
36  2  F  A  
37  3  M  A  
38    1  F  B  
39  2  F  A  
40  2  F  C  
41  2  M  A  
42  3  F  A  
43  2  F  C  
44  2  M  A  
45  2  M  A  
46  2  F  B  
47  3  F  A  
48  2  F  C  
49  3  F  B  
50  3  M  B  
51  3  M  A  
52  2  M   C  
53  2  F  A  
54  2  F  C  
55  3  F  B  














Section B: Structure of the Community  









Religion  Same  








1  Villages  N/A  N  N  N  Pure Ife  N  N  Y  
2  Town &  
villages  
N/A  N  N  N  Traditional Ife 
dialect  
N  N  Y  
5  DK  DK  N  N/A  N/A  Yoruba   N  N  Y  
6  N/A  N/A  NA   N/A  N/A  N/A  NA   Y  Y  
7  N/A  N/A  NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  NA  N  Y  
8  N/A  Many  NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  NA  N  N  
9  Community  N/A  NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  NA  N  NA   
11  Villages  Many   NA  Idols, Christian  N/A  Ife dialect,  
Yoruba  
N  N  Y  
13  N/A  N/A  N  N/A  N/A  N/A  NA  NA  NA  
14  Villages  1000  NA  N/A  N/A  Yoruba  N  Y  Y  
15  N/A  1000  NA  N/A  N/A  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
17  N/A  N/A  NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  NA  Y  Y  
18  N/A  N/A  N  N/A  N/A  N/A  N  N  Y  
19  Small villages  N/A  N  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A   NA  
20   N/A  N/A  N  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N  Y  
21  N/A  N/A  NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  NA  Y  Y  
22  Villages  100  N  Tradition 
Christian  
N  N/A  Y  N  Y  
23  Villages  NS  N  Tradition Muslim  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
24  Villages  100’s  N  ChristianIslam, 
Tradition  
N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
 25  Villages  DK  N  ChristianIslam 
Tradition  
S  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
26  Villages  50  N  Christian Islam  N  Pure Ife  N  N  
  
Y  
27  Villages  DK  N  Christian Muslim  N/A  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
28  Villages  150  N  TraditionMuslim,  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
 
  









Religion  Same  








    Christian       
29  Villages  Many  N  Chris, Muslim  N  Pure Yoruba  N  N  N  
30  Villages  50  N  Chris,Muslim  S  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
31  Villages  Many  N  Chris,Muslim  S  Original Yoruba  N  N  Y  
32  Villages  Many  N  Chris,,Islam  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
33  Villages  DK  N  Chris,Muslim  N  True Yoruba  N  N  Y  
34  Villages  10-20  N  Chris,,,Muslim, 
Trad.  
N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
35  Town, 
Villages  
Many  N  Christian  N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
36  Clans, 
Village  
DK  N  Chris,,Trad.  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
37  Villages  Many  N  Christian  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
38  Villages  DK  N  Christian  Y  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
39  Clans, 
Villages  
DK  N  Chris,Muslim  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
40  Town, 
villages  
DK  N  Chris,,Muslim  N  Yoruba  Y  N   Y  
 41  Town, 
villages  
20  N  Chris, Tradition  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
42  Clans, 
villages  
Plenty  N  Chris,Muslim  N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
43  Clans, 
villages  
20  N  Christian  N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
44  Villages  DK  N  Christian  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
45  Town, 
villages  
10  N  Chris,Muslim,Trad.  N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
46  Villages  30  N  Chris,Muslim  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
47  Town 
Villages  
Many  N  Chris,Muslim, 
Tradition  
N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
48  Town, 
Villages  
DK  N  Chris,Muslim  N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
49  Town 
farming 
villages  
20  N  Chris,Muslim, 
tradition  
N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
50  Clans, 
villages,   
Many  N  Chris, Muslim  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
51  Clans, 
villages  
DK  N  Chris,Muslim, 
Tradition  
N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
52  Groups  5  N  Chris,Muslim  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
53  Town, 
Villages  
14  N  Chris,Muslim  N  Yoruba  Y  N  Y  
  
Section B: Structure of the Community  









Religion  Same  








54  Wards, clans, 
villages  
20  N  Chris,Muslim, juju  N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  
 55  Wards, 
villages  
Many  N  Chris,Muslim,   N  Yoruba  N  N  Y  










































   
Section C: History of Autonomy    
I/N  Pre-colonial Traditional Rulers  Colonial  Traditional Rulers  Post-Colonial Traditional Rulers  
1  Y  N  N  
2  Y  Y  Y  
5  NA  NA  NA   
6  NA  NA  NA  
7  DK  DK  DK  
8  Y  NA  Y  
9  NA  NA  NA  
11  Y  Y  Y  
13  Y  NA  NA  
14  Y  NA  N  
15  Y  NA  NA  
17  Y  NA  NA  
18  Y  N  Y  
19  N/A  NA  NA  
20  Y  Y  Y  











 Section C: History of Autonomy  
I/N  Pre-colonial Traditional Rulers  Colonial  Traditional Rulers  Post-Colonial Traditional Rulers  
22  Y  N  Y  
23  Y  D K  Y  
24  Y  N  R  
25  Y  N  R  
26  Y  N  Y  
27  Y  N  R  
28  Y  Y  Y  
29  Y  N  Y  
30  Y  N  R  
31  Y  N  R  
32  Y  N  R  
33  Y  N  Y  
34  Y  N  R  
35  Y  N  R  
36  Y  N  Y  
37  Y  N  Y  
38  Y  N  R  
39  Y  N  Y  
40  Y  N  N  
41  Y  N  R  
42  Y  N  Y   
43  Y  N  Y  
44  Y  Y  N  
45  Y  Y  Y  
46  Y  N  R  
47  Y  N  R  
48  Y  N  R  
49  Y  N  Y  
 50  Y  N  N  
51  Y  Y  R  
52  Y  N  N  
53  Y  N  N  
Section C: History of Autonomy    
I/N  Pre-colonial Traditional Rulers  Colonial  Traditional Rulers  Post-Colonial Traditional Rulers  
54  Y  N  N  
55  Y  N  Y  





























 Section D: Personal Dispute Behaviour      
I/N  Frequency Troubles  How troubles resolved 
traditionally  
Tried Courts  View of court  
1  N/A  Chiefs in palace  Y  Positive  
2  N/A  Chiefs Palace  Y  N/A  
5  N/A  N/A  NA  N/A  
6  N/A  Elders  Y  N/A  
7  N/A  N/A  Y  N/A  
8  N/A  Palace King  Y  Positive  
9  N/A  N/A  NA  N/A  
11  N/A  Compound , Oba  NA  N/A  
13  N/A  N/A  Y  Positive  
14  N/A  N/A  Y  N/A  
15  N/A  Traditional Council  NA  N/A  
17  N/A  King  N  Negative  
18  We are peaceful people  King   N  N/A  
19  N/A  Chiefs, king  N/A  N/A  
20  N/A  Chief, king  Y  No fair Judgement  
21  N/A  Chiefs  Y  Positive  
22  Not Often  Chiefs  Y  Good  
23  None  Palace  Y  N/A  
24  Never  Chief  Y  Good  
25  Never  Palace  N  Negative  
26  No problems  Palace chiefs  N  Positive prefer Tradition  
 
27  Hardly   Elders, Palace  N  N/A  
28  None  Chiefs   N  Negative  
29  Sometimes  Elders  N  Negative  
30  None  Palace  N  Negative  
31  Never  Palace  N  Negative  
 32  Sometimes  Palace  N  Positive  
33  None  Palace  N  Negative  
34  Never  Elders  N  N/A  
35  Not often  Elders  N  Positive  
36  None  Palace  N  Negative  
37  None  Palace  N  Positive  
38  None  Palace  N   Positive  
39  None  Palace  N  Negative  
40  None  Elders  Y  Positive  
41  None  Palace, Elders  N  Negative  
42  None  Palace  Y  Negative Expensive  
43  Not Often  Elders, Ooni  Y  Negative  
44  Never  Palace  N  Negative  
45  None  Elders in the Family  Y  Positive  
46  None  Elders  Y  Good  
47  None  Elders  N  Negative  
48  Sometimes  Elders, War  Y  Positive  
49  None  Palace  N  Positive  
50  Never  Palace  Y  Negative  
51  None  Ooni’s court  Y  Positive  
52  Sometimes  Chiefs  Y  Negative  
53  Sometimes  Chiefs  N  Negative  
54  None  Family heads  N  Positive  
55  All the time  Heads of family  Y  Positive  


















Section E: Past Community Dispute 
Behaviour  
      
I/N  Trouble 
Awareness  
Trouble  















View of  
Traditional  
Resolution   
Government 
Intervened  
1  Y  N/A  Throwing 
stones  
N/A  Y  N  N/A  No force  Y  
2  Y  N/A  N/A  N/A  Y  Y  N/A  Positive  Y  
5  Y  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N  N/A  N/A  Y  
6  Y  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  Y  Talk them to 
stop  
N/A  Y  
7  Y  N/A  N/A  Everybody  Y  Y  N/A  N/A  Y  
8  Y  N/A  N/A      Y      Y  
9  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N  N/A  N/A  Y  
11  Y  N/A  N/A  N/A  Y  Y  Outcast  N/A  Y  
13  Y  N/A  N/A  N/A  Y  Y  Govt. 
intervene  
Respect it   NA  
14  Y  N/A  N/A  Everybody  Y  Y  Law courts  N/A  Y  
15  Y  N/A  N/A  Youths  Y  NA   Conflict, 
War  
N/A  N  
17  Y  N/A  N/A  N/A  Y  Y  N/A  Positive  N  
18  Y  N/A  N/A  Youths  N/A  Y  Go and settle  N/A  Y  
19  Y  N/A  N/A  Everybody  Y  Y  No choice 
must  
try to settle  
Positive  Y  
20  Y  N/A  N/A  Youths  Y  Y  N/A  Positive  Y  
21            Y      Y  
 22  Y  Not Often  Land 
issues and 
ishakole  
DK  Y  Y  Y  Positive  Y  
23  Y  Not often  DK  Youths  Y  DK  High Court  Positive  Y  
24  Y  No recent 
one  
DK  Young ones  Y  Y  Try again  Positive  Y  
25  Y  Often  Land  Everyone  Y  Y  War  Positive  Y  





fighting age  
Y  Y  War  Positive  Y  
27  Y  No troubles  DK  Young ones  Y  Y  Go to State  N/A  Y  
 
Section E: Past Community Dispute Behaviour  
I/N  Trouble 
Awareness  
Trouble  












what happens  
View of  
Traditional  
Resolution   
Government 
Intervened  
       Court    
28  Y  Not often  Land  Everyone  Y  Y  Punishment 
from King  
Good  Y  
29  Y  None  Land,  
Ishakole  
Everybody  Y  Y  Court  Good  Y  
30  Y  No troubles 
now  
Land  Youths  Y   N  Leave village 
in shame  
Good  Y  
31  Y  N/A  Ishakole  Youths  Y  Y  Banished  Important  Y  
32  Y  N/A  DK  Young men 
and women  
Y  Y  Court  Ok  Y  
33  Y  Not often  DK  Young 
People  
Y  Y  They Have to  Good  N  
34  Y  Sometimes  Land  All  Y  Y  Court High 
Court  
Good  Y  
 35  Y  Sometimes  Local 
Govt. and 
Ishakole  
Young men  Y  Y  Court  Good  Y  
36  Y  All the time  Land  Young men  Y  Y  Court  I like it  Y  
37  Y  Sometimes   Land  Those who 
can  
fight  
Y  Y  No Choice 
must  
listen  
Part of our 
tradition  
Y  




Y  Y  Court  Good  Y  





Y  Y  Court  Very Good  Y  





and women  
Y  Y.   Court  I prefer 
court  
Y  




Everyone  Y  Y  Court  Good  Y  
42  Y  Sometimes  Land  Youth  Y  N  Court  Good  Y  
43  Y  Often  Land and 
election  
Youths  Y  Y  Court  Good  Y  
44  Y  Sometimes  Land and  Young 
people  
Y  Y  Court  Good  Y  
Section E: Past Community Dispute Behaviour        
I/N  Trouble 
Awareness  
Trouble  












what happens  
View of  
Traditional  
Resolution   
Government 
Intervened  
   election        
45  Y  Always  Land and 
election  
Youths  Y  Y  Court  Very Good  Y  
 46  Y  Sometimes  Local 
govt.  
Everybody  Y  N  Fines  Better  Y  




Y  Y  Abuse no 
trades with 
them  
Important  Y  
48  Y  Always  Land and 
local 
govt.  
Youths  Y  N  Court  Good  Y  
49  Y  Many  Land and 
local 
govt.  
Young   Y  Y  Court  Very good  Y  




Y  Y  Court  Very 
important  
Y  
51  N  Some troubles  Ishakole  Young men  Y  Y  Court  Very good  Y  
52  Y  Sometimes  Land   Men and 
youths  
Y  Y  Fines  Best  Y  




Youths  Y  Y  Fines  Best  Y  
54  Y  All the time  Local 
govt.  
Everybody  Y  Y  Fine  Best  Y  
55  Y  All the time  Local 
govt.  
Everybody  Y  Y  Fine  Best  Y  
















































Section F: Structure of the Conflict  
I/N  Causes of 
conflict  


















1  Ishakole, 
land  
 NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  G  N/A  
2  Ishakole   NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  G  N/A  
5  N/A  Don’t know  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
6  N/A   NA  Guns, 
cutlasses, 
charms  
N/A  N/A  N/A  G  N/A  
7  N/A  Don’t know  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
8  Land  Don’t know  Guns, 
cutlass  
N/A  Everybody  N/A  G  Y  
9  N/A   NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
11  Land   NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
 13  N/A   NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
14  N/A   NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  G  N/A  
15  Power tussle, 
money  
 NA  N/A  N/A  Youths  Y  G  N/A  
17  Land   NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  King settled 
it  
N/A  
18  N/A   NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  G  N/A  




 DK  Cutlass, 
dangerous 
weapons  
DK  Everybody  Y  G  N/A  
20     NA  Guns, 
bomb  
DK  Youths  N  G  N/A  
21    NA              
22  Land and 
Ishakole  
DK  Guns, 
Cutlass  
DK  Everyone  N  G  Y  








Section F: Structure of the Conflict  
I/N  Causes of 
conflict  


















24  Land  King  Guns, bow 
and arrows  
DK  Young ones  N  G  Y  
 25  Land  King  Guns, 
machete,   
DK  Themselves  N  N  Y  
26  N/A  Modakeke  Cutlass, 
guns, 
stones  
DK  Everybody  N  G  N  
27  DK  Rulers  DK  DK  Youths  DK  G  N/A  
28  Ishakole  DK  Stones, 
cutlass  
Themselves  Everybody  N  G  Y  
29  Land  DK  Guns  DK  Everyone  N  G  Y  
30  Land  Leaders  Guns, 
Cutlass,  
DK  Young People  Some  G  Y  
31  Ishakole  DK  Guns  Buy them  Youths  No  G  Y  


















of fighting  
  
N/A  
34  Land and 
Election  
Leaders  Guns  Already in 
possession  
Youths  N  G  DK  
35  Local Govt. 
Ishakole  
DK  Guns  DK  Young people  Y  G  Y  
36  Land  DK  Guns, 
cutlasses  
DK  Everybody  Y  G  N  
37  Land  DK  Guns  DK  Young ones  N  Realization 
of effect  
N  
38  Local Govt.  DK  Guns  DK  Everybody  Y  G  Y  
39  Land and 
local govt.  
Leaders  Guns, 
bombs  
DK  Young men  N  G  Y  
40  Local Govt.  Don’t Know  DK  DK  Young ones  Y  G  N/A  
 
 
 Section F: Structure of the Conflict  















participate   








All sorts  DK  Everybody  N  G  Y  
 42   Land   Don’t 
Know  
 Guns   DK   All   DK   Communities   Y  
43  Land and 
election  
Don’t Know  Guns  Black 
Market  
Youths  Y  G  N  
44  Land and 
election  
Can’t say  Guns  
Machete  
DK  Young men  N  G  Y  
45  Land and 
election  
Leaders  Guns  DK  Youths  N  G  Y  
46  Local Govt.  Don’t Know  Guns  DK  Everybody  DK  G  N  
47  Land and 
Ishakole  
Can’t say  Guns  DK  Young people  Y  G  Y  
48  Land and 
local govt.  
Don’t Know  Guns  DK  Young people  N  G  Y  
49  Land and 
local govt.  
Leaders  Guns 
cutlass  
Dealers  Young people  Y  G  N  
50  Land, 
ishakole  
Leaders  Guns  DK  Men and 
Youths  
N  G  Y  
51  Land  Rulers  Guns  DK  Youths  N  G  Y  





N/A  Y  G  N  
53  Land  Hard to say  Guns, 
Cutlass  
DK  N/A  Y  G  N  
 54  Local govt.  Don’t Know  Everything  DK  N/A  Y  G  N  
55    Don’t Know              
Total=50   Land  






















Section F: Structure of the Conflict        















participate   
















 Section G (1): Present Relationship Between State and Tribes   
I/N  Relationship between community and Nigerian State  Community Continue to rule itself  
1  Rulers not involved in politics  N  
2  N/A  N/A  
5  N/A  N/A  
6  N/A  N/A  
7  N/A  N/A  
8  N/A  N/A  
9  N/A  N/A  
11  Support  N/A  
13  N/A  N/A  
14  N/A  N/A  
15  N/A  N/A  
17  N/A  N/A  
18  N/A  N/A  
19  N/A  N/A  
20  Under government still under Ooni  Y  
21  N/A  N/A  
22  Listens to Government  Y  













Section G (1): Present Relationship Between State and Tribes  
I/N  Relationship between community and Nigerian State  Community Continue to rule itself  
24  Cordial, Respect each other  N  
25  Ok  N  
26  Good  Y  
27  No Problems  N  
28  Tradition works together with Government  Y  
29  Fine- Co-operate with government  N  
30  Work with government  Y  
31  Good  N  
32  Positive work together  N  
33  Good, everyone plays their part  Y  
34  Positive  N  
35  Good  N  
36  Good  N  
37  Co-operate  N  
38  Good  N  
39  Government can do more to support this community  N  
40  No problem  N  
41  Okay, government recognise our Ooni  N  
42  Okay  N  
43  Okay  N  
44  Good  N  
45  Good, co-operate with government  N  
46  Okay we recognise the government now  N  
47  Government is head now  N  
 48  Cordial  N  
49  Okay we respect the government  Y  
50  Government is king now  N  
51  Government ruling town, Ooni villages  Y  
52  Government is big guy we respect it  R  
53  We co-operate with government but listen to our Ooni  Y  
54  We co-operate with government  R  
55  We obey government and Ooni  R  
Section G (1): Present Relationship Between State and Tribes   
I/N  Relationship between community and Nigerian State  Community Continue to rule itself  






















 Section G (2): Traditional Resolution Vs State 
Resolution  
  
I/N  Government Method Same as 
Traditional Resolution  
Recommend Government  Preference for Government or Tradition   
1  N  N/A  T  
2  N  N/A  T  
5  NA  N/A  G  
6  NA  N/A  NA  
7  Y  N/A  NA  
8  NA  N/A  G  
9  N  N/A  NA  
11  N  N/A  NA  
13  NA  N/A  NA  
14  N  N/A  NA  
15  N  N/A  T  
17  NA  N/A  T  
18  NA  N/A  T  
19  NA  N/A  G  
20  N  Y  G  
21  N  N/A  G  
22*  N  Y  T  
23  N  N/A  G  
24  Y  N/A  G  












Section G (2): Traditional Resolution Vs State Resolution  
I/N  Government Method Same as 
Traditional Resolution  
Recommend Government  Preference for Government or Tradition   
26  N  N/A  T  
27  S  Y  G  
28  N  N  G  
29  Y  N/A  T  
30  Y  Y  B  
31  N  N  T  
32  Y  Y  G  
33  N  N  T  
34  Y  Y  B  
35  Y  Y  G  
36  N  Y  G  
37  Y  N  T  
38  Y  Y  G  
39  Y  Y  T  
40  N  Y  G  
41  Y  N  G  
42  N  N  T  
43  N  Y  T  
44  N  N  T  
45  N  Y  T  
 46  N  N  T  
47  N  R  T  
48  N  N  G  
49  N  N  T  
50  N  N  T  
51  N  N  T  
52  N  N  T  
53  N  N  T  
54  N  N  T  
55  N  N  T  
Total=50   Y=11  Y=15  T=27  
Section G (2): Traditional Resolution Vs State 
Resolution  
  
I/N  Government Method Same as 
Traditional Resolution  
Recommend Government  Preference for Government or Tradition   















 Section H: Effect of Conflict     




1  N  Deaths  N  Y  
2  Y  Deaths  N  Y  
5  Y  Children no school  N  Y  
6  Y  No school Markets  N  Y  
7  Y  Deaths  N  Y  
8  NA  Deaths   N  Y  
9  Y  Deaths  N/A  N/A  
11  Y  Deaths  N/A  N/A  
13  NA  Deaths  N/A  N/A  
14  NA  Loss of property, no schooling  N  Y  
15  N  Death casualties  Y  N  
17  Y  houses burnt people dead  Y  N  
18  N  Houses burnt people dead  N/A  N/A  
19  N S  Deaths  N  Y  
20  NA  Deaths  N  Y  
21  N  Deaths  N  Y  
22*  Not Sure  Death Loss of properties  N  Y  
23  Y  Death   N  Y  
24  N  Death  N  Y  
25  Y  Death Loss of properties  N  Y  
26  Y  Death Loss of properties  N  Y  










Section H: Effect of Conflict  




28  Y  Deaths  Y  Y  
29  N  Death  Y  N  
30  Not Sure  Death, loss properties  Y  Y/N  
31  Y  Death Loss of properties  N  Y  
32  Y  Death job loss  N  Y  
33  Not Sure  Death families  Y  N  
34  Not Sure  Loss of infrastructure  N  Y  
35  Y  Loss of lives  N  Y  
36  Y  Suffering deaths  N  Y  
37  Y  Deaths  Y  Y  
38  Y  Death Loss of properties  N  Y  
39  Not Sure  Death  N  Y  
40  Not Sure  Death  N  Y  
41  Not Sure  Deaths  Y  N  
42  Y  Suffering deaths  Y  N  
43  Y  Deaths  Y  N  
44  Y can’t tell  Deaths  N  N  
45  Y  Deaths   Y  Y  
46  Y  Deaths  N  N  
47  Y  Deaths  Y  Y  
48  N  Deaths  Y  N  
 49  Y  Deaths  Y  N  
50  N  Deaths  Y  N  
51  Y  Death Loss of properties  Y  N  
52  N  Deaths loss of properties  Y  N  
53  N  Deaths  Y  N  
54  N  Death children young men  Y  N  
55  N  Displaced   Y  Y  





Loss of properties  
No Development  









Section H: Effect of Conflict     













   
Key  
1  19-30 years old  
2  31-60 years old  
3  60 plus  
M  Male  
F  Female  
I/N  Number in interview transcript  
A  Uneducated  
B  Semi-Educated up to 
secondary school  
C  Higher Education  
CM  Community  
DK  Don’t Know  
G  Government  
NA  No Answer  
M  Many  
R  Relative  
P  Positive  
S  Similar  
T  Tradition  
V  Villages  
W  Wards  




 APPENDIX 14: MODAKEKE GENERAL CODING ALL QUESTIONS 
Section A: Introduction/Background 
  S/N  Age   Sex  Education 
1 3 M A 
2 2 M C 
3 2 F A 
4  2 M A 
5 2 M A 
6 3 M B 
7 2 M C 
8 2 M B 
9 2 M B 
10 1 M C 
11 2 F C 
12 1 M B 
13 2 M B 
14 2 F B 
15 3 M B 
16 1 F B 
17 3 F A 
18 2 M C 
19 3 F C 
20 2 M A 
21 3 F A 
22 2 M B 
23 2 M C 
24 2 F C 
25 3 F C 







27 2 F A 
28 2 M C 
29 2 F A 
30 2 M C 
31 2 F B 
32 1 M C 
33 2 M C 
34 2 F C 
35 2 F B 
36 1 M C 
37 2 F B 
38 1 F C 
39 2 F B 
40 1 F C 
41 2 F B 






































1 N/A N/A N N/A N/A Yoruba N N Y 
2 N/A N/A N N/A N Yoruba N N Y 
3 N/A N/A N N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A  
4 N/A N/A N N/A N/A Real 
Yoruba 
N NA Y 
5 N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A Y 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N N/A  
7 N/A N/A N N/A N/A Traditiona
l Oyo 
Y N NA 
8 Clans, 
hamlets 
7 N N/A N/A Yoruba N N Y 
9 N/A 4 N Muslims, 
Christian, 
Tradition 
N/A N/A N N Y 
10 Clans N/A N Christian, 
Muslim 
Tradition 
Y N/A N N Y 
11 Villages 14 NA  Y Y Oyo 
Yoruba 
NA  NA Y 
12 Clans 
Villages 




N N Y 
13 Main Town 
Villages 




N N Y 

























14 Clans and 
Villages 
10 N Christian 
Islam, 
Tradition 
N Oyo pure 
Yoruba 
N N Y 
15  Villages DK N Christian N/A Oyo 
Yoruba 
N N Y 
16 Clans and 
Villages 




N N Y 
17 Clans and 
Villages 





N N Y 
18 Town and 
Villages 
4 N Tradition, 
Christian 
Muslim 
N Yoruba N N Y 




N Yoruba N N Y 
20 Villages 4 N Traditiona
l Christian 
N Yoruba N N Y 
21 Town and 
Villages 
5 N Christian 
and Islam 
N Yoruba N N Y 
22 City, Town 
and 
Villages 






N N Y 




N N Y 

























24 Town and 
Villages 
4 N Christians,   
Muslim 
N Yoruba N N Y 
25 Central  
Villages 




N N Y 
26 Town and 
Villages 




N N Y 




Y N Y 





N N Y 
29 Town and 
Villages 
12 N Christian, 
Tradition 
N Yoruba Y N Y 
30 Town, 
Villages 
14 N Christian 
Tradition 
N Yoruba N N Y 















Y N Y 
33 Town 
,Villages 
6 N Muslim, 
Tradition   
N Oyo 
Yoruba 
N N Y 



























10 N Muslim, 
Christians 
N Yoruba N N Y 
35 Town, 
villages 
6 N  Muslim, 
Tradition 
N Yoruba N N Y 
36 City, Town, 
villages 
6 N Christian, 
Muslim  
N Oyo N N Y 
37 Town, 
villages 




N N Y 
38 City, 
villages 
10 N Christian, 
Tradition 
N Oyo N N Y 
39 Town and 
Villages 
5 N Christian, 
Muslim  
S Oyo N N Y 
40 City and 
villages 
4 N Christian, 
Muslim, 
Tradition 
N Yoruba N N Y 
41 Central 
Villages 
10 N Christian, 
Muslim 
N Oyo N N Y 




























































Section C: History of Autonomy 
I/N 
 
Pre-colonial Traditional Rulers Colonial  Traditional 
Rulers 
Post-Colonial Traditional Rulers 
1 NA NA Y 
2 NA  NA NA  
3 NA NA NA 
4 Y NA Y 
5 Y N R 
6 Y N R 
7 Y NA R 
8 Y N R 
9 Y N R 
10 Y Y R 
11 Y N R 
12 Y Y R 
13 Y Y R 
14 Y Y R 
15 Y N R 
16 Y Y R 
17 Y N Y 
18 Y N R 
19 Y N R 
 Section C: History of Autonomy 
I/N 
 
Pre-colonial Traditional Rulers Colonial  Traditional 
Rulers 
Post-Colonial Traditional Rulers 
20 Y N N 
21 Y N Y 
22 Y N N 
23 Y N R 
24 Y N R 
25 Y N N 
26 Y N N 
27 Y Y N 
28 Y N N 
29 Y N N 
30 Y N N 
31 Y N Y 
32 Y N N 
33 Y N N 
34 Y N N 
35 Y N N 
36 Y N N 
37 Y N N 
38 Y N N 
39 Y N N 
40 Y N N 
41 Y N N 
42 Y N N 



















How troubles resolved traditionally Tried Courts View of court 
1 None King N N/A 
2 N/A Palace N/A N/A 
3 N/A Palace N/A N/A 
4 N/A Palace N/A N/A 
5 N/A Elders N/A  N/A 
6 N/A N/A NA N/A 
7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9 N/A Palace N/A Positive 
10 N/A Chiefs N/A  Positive 
11 None Palace Y Positive 
12 None Palace Y Positive 
13 Never Chiefs Palace N Negative 
14 None Chiefs, king Y Positive 
15 None Older ones palace N Positive 
16 None Families, Palace N N/A 
17 Always Palace Y Positive 
18 Sometimes Older ones ,Palace N Negative 
19 Sometimes Elders N Negative 
20 None Chief in Palace N Positive 
21 Sometimes Elders  Y Relative Expensive 
22 None Elders, Palace Y Positive 
23 Never Chiefs  Y Negative 
24 Sometimes Palace N Negative 
25 None Oldest member of family N Negative 
26 None Older members of family Y Positive 





How troubles resolved traditionally Tried Courts View of court 
27 None Families, Palace Y Relative 
28 Many times Palace Y Relative Expensive 
29 Never Older men of family Y Negative 
30 Sometimes Elders N Negative 
31 Never Elders in the family  N Negative 
32 Sometimes Families, Palace N Positive 
33 Sometime Heads of compounds Y Relative 
34 Sometimes  Elders, Palace N Positive 
35 None Chiefs Y Positive 
36 None Elders , chiefs Y Positive 
37 Sometimes Elders, Palace Y Negative Expensive 
38 None Chief and king N Positive 
39 None Elders , Palace N Negative 
40 None Chiefs Y Positive 
41 Sometimes Palace N Positive 


















































1 Y N/A N/A N/A Y N/A Court N/A N/A 
2 Y N/A N/A N/A Y Y N/A Positive Y 
3 Y N/A N/A Everybody N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
4 Y N/A N/A N/A N/A Y Talk them to 
stop 
N/A Y 
5 Y N/A N/A Youths and old 
ones 
N/A Y Court Positive Y 
6 Y N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7 Y N/A Local 
Govt. 
Struggles 
Everybody N/A N/A N/A Positive Y 
8 Y N/A Ishakole N/A Y N/A N/A N/A Y 
9 Y N/A Local 
govt. 
Young and old N/A Y Discipline, 
punishment 
N/A Y 
10 Y N/A N/A Young and old N/A Y Discipline Better Y 
11 Y Sometimes N/A Everybody Y Y  Court Good Y 
12 Y Sometimes DK All who could 
fight 
Y Y Court Good Y 
13 Y None Land Young people Y Y Court Good Y 
14 Y Always Land Everybody Y Y Court Good Y 
 Section E: Past Community Dispute Behaviour 
15 Y Sometimes DK Young men, 
women , older 
ones 
Y Y Banished Good Y 




Y Y Court Like it Y 
17 Y Sometimes Election 
and Land  
Youths Y Y N/A Useful Y 






Y Y Punishment Best Y 




Strong men Y Y Banishment Best Y 
20 Y Sometimes Youths Young boys 
and strong men 
N Y Punish in 
palace 
Very good Y 
21 Y Always Trouble 
start in the 
farms 
Men Y Y Fine Very good Y 
22 Y Sometimes DK Men and 
Youths 
Y Y Fine or 
ostracize  you 
Good Y 
23 Y Sometimes DK Men and 
Youths 
Y Y Fined Best Y 
24 Y Sometimes Youths Men Y Y Fine Best Y 
25 Y Always Land Everybody Y Y Court Better Y 
26 Y N/A DK Young men Y Y Court Good Y 




Y Y Court I like it Y 
28 Y Sometimes Election 
fights 
Youths N Y Court Very 
Good 
Y 
 Section E: Past Community Dispute Behaviour 




Strong men Y Y Banish  Best Y 





Young men Y Y Court Good Y 
31 Y Sometimes DK Men and 
Youths 
Y Y Fined Best Y 





Y Y Punishment Okay Y 






Y Y Fined Better Y 
34 Y Sometimes DK Men Y Y No Choice Best Y 
35 Y Sometimes 
 
Youths Young men Y Y.  Punish family Good Y 
36 Y Sometimes DK Men Y Y Fines Good Y 
37 Y Always Ishakole Men, Youths Y Y Fines Good Y 
38 Y Sometimes DK Men Y Y Trouble Best Y 
39 Y Sometimes Ife attack 
in the 
farms 
Youths Y Y Fine Good Y 
40 Y Sometimes DK Youths Y Y Fine Good Y 
41 Y Sometimes Youths Men and 
youths 
Y Y Outcast Best Y 
 Section E: Past Community Dispute Behaviour 
42 Y Sometimes Youths Men and 
young ones 








































Section F: Structure of the Conflict 
I/N 
 



















1 Boundary N/A N/A N/A Men N/A N/A N 
2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A G N/A 
3 Local govt. N/A N/A N/A Everybody N/A N/A N/A 
4 N/A NA N/A N/A Everybody N/A G N/A 
5 Local govt. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A G N/A 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A G Y 
7 Local Govt. NA N/A N/A Everybody N/A N/A N/A 
8 Ishakole, local 
govt., calling 
slaves 
 Leaders Guns N/A N/A N/A G, NGO N/A 
9 Local Govt.  N/A Swords, Cutlass, 
guns 
N/A Young and old N/A G N/A 
10 N/A  NA N/A N/A N/A N/A G N/A 
11 Slaves Leaders Guns, bombs, 
cutlass, axes 
DK Everybody Y G N/A 
 12 Land Leaders Guns DK Youths DK G DK 
13 Local Govt. Leaders Guns, cutlass, 
bows,  
DK Everybody N G Y 
14 Local govt. 
and Land  
Leaders Guns DK Everybody N G Y 
15 Land Leaders Guns DK Everybody DK G Y 
16 Land and 
Local govt. 
DK Guns AK 47 DK Everybody N G N/A 
17 Local govt. DK Guns, DK Everybody N G Y 
18 Ishakole Older ones Guns, machete,  They find way Young strong 
men 
N G N 
19 Ishakole Older ones Guns, machete DK Men N G N 
20 Land Older ones Guns  DK Mena and 
young boys 
N G N 
21 Ishakole, local 
govt. 
DK Guns ,Cutlass DK N/A Y G N 
22 Land Leaders Guns DK N/A Y G N 
23 Local Govt. DK Guns knives DK N/A Y G N 
24 Land DK Guns, cutlass DK N/A Y G N 
25 Land and local 
govt. 
DK Guns, Cutlass, DK Young People Y G Y 
26 Land and local 
govt. 
Leaders Guns DK Youths DK G Y 
27 Local govt. Leaders Guns DK Everybody N G N 
28 Local govt. Leaders Guns, juju DK Youths N G Y 
29 Land and 
Local govt. 
DK Guns, machete DK Men N G Y 
30 Ishakole Leaders Guns, machete DK Men N G Y 
31 Local govt. DK Guns, knives DK N/A Y G N 
32 Land and local 
govt. 




33 Ishakole, Local 
Govt. 
Leaders Guns Somehow Men N G Y 
34 Local govt. DK Guns  DK Men Y G Y 
35 Land DK Guns DK Men and 
women 










Leaders Guns, cutlass DK N/A Y G N 
37 Ishakole. Local 
govt. 
DK Guns, cutlass DK N/A Y G N 
38 Local govt. DK Guns DK N/A Y G N 
39 Ishakole, local 
govt. 
DK Guns, cutlass, 
stones 
DK N/A Y G N 
40 Local govt. DK Guns DK N/A Y G N 
41 Local Govt. DK Guns, cutlass DK N/A Y G N 





































1 19-30 years old 
2 31-60 years old 
3 60 plus 
M Male 
F Female 
I/N Number in interview transcript 
A Uneducated 
B Semi-Educated up to 
secondary school 
C Higher Education 
CM Community 
DK Don’t Know 
G Government 










 Section G (1): Present Relationship Between State and Tribes 
I/N 
 
Relationship between community and Nigerian 
State 
Community Continue to rule itself 
1 Dependency of Ife Y 
2 N/A N/A 
3 N/A N/A 
4 Kabiesi typewriter local government proprietor Y 
5 N/A N/A 
6 N/A N/A 
7 N/A N/A 
8 Dependency N/A 
9 N/A N/A 
10 N/A N/A 
11 N N 
12 Okay N 
13 Good N 
14 Co-operate N 
15 Co-operate N 
16 Good N 
17 Cordial N 
18 Government rules now N 
19 Co-operate with government N 
20 Co-operate with government N 
21 Government boss N 
22 Accept government N 
23 Government is head R 
24 Respect  government R 
25 Government overall Y 
26 No choice obey government N 
27 Good N 
28 Good N 
 Section G (1): Present Relationship Between State and Tribes 
I/N 
 
Relationship between community and Nigerian 
State 
Community Continue to rule itself 
29 Co-operate with government R 
30 Co-operate N 
31 Government allows our king R 
32 Co-operate N 
33 Co-operate N 
34 Respect Government N 
35 Co-operate N 
36 Don’t like government N 
37 Co-operate N 
38 Co-operate N 
39 Co-operate N 
40 Government Superior N 
41 Co-operate N 

















 Section G (2): Traditional Resolution Vs State Resolution 
I/N 
 




Preference for Government or Tradition  
1 N/A N/A N/A 
2 N/A R N/A 
3 N/A N/A N/A 
4 NA N/A NA 
5 N/A N/A T 
6 NA N/A N/A 
7 N/A Y T 
8 N/A Y T 
9 N/A N/A T 
10 N/A N/A T 
11 N/A Y N/A 
12 Y Y G 
13 N Y T 
14 N N T 
15 N R T 
16 N N T 
17 N N G 
18 N N G 
19 N N T 
20 N N T 
21 N N T 
22 N N T 
23 N Y T 
24 N Y T 
25 N N T 
26 N N T 
27 N N T 
28 N N T 
 29 N N T 
30 N Y T 
31 N N T 
32 N N T 
33 N N T 
34 N N T 
35 N N T 
36 N N T 
37 N N T 
38 N Y G 
39 N N T 
40 N N G 
41 N Y T 






















Section H: Effect of Conflict 
I/N 
 




1 Y No development Y N/A 
2 NS  Loss of 
properties, Deaths 
N/A N/A 
3 DK N/A N/A N/A 
4 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5 Y  N/A N/A N/A 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7 Y Devastation for 
both communities 
N/A N/A 
8 N/A Deaths N/A N/A 
9 Y Deaths, Loss of 
properties 
N/A N/A 
10 Y Loss of properties N/A N/A 
11 Y Death Y Y 
12 Y Deaths, loss of 
properties 
N Y 




14 N Deaths R Y 
15 N Deaths Y Y 
16 DK Deaths Y Y 
17 NS Death  N Y 
18 NS Death of young 
ones  
R N 
19 N Death Y Y 
 Section H: Effect of Conflict 
I/N 
 




20 N Death Loss of 
properties 
Y R 
21 N Death of young 
men 
Y N 
22 N Death , peace gone Y N 
23 N Deaths, loss of 
properties 
Y N 
24 N Death of children Y N 
25 N Death, N Y 
26 N Death  Y Y 
27 N Deaths, loss of 
properties 
Y Y 
28 NS Deaths, loss of 
properties 
Y N 
29 N Deaths Y N 
30 N Deaths Y Y 
31 N Deaths Y N 
32 N Deaths Y N 
33 NS Death Loss of 
properties 
Y N 
34 N Death, loss of 
properties 
Y Y 
35 N Death Y N 
36 N Loss of everything N Y 
37 N Deaths Y N 
38 N Deaths Y Y 
 Section H: Effect of Conflict 
I/N 
 




39 N Deaths Y N 
40 N Deaths  Y Y 
41 N Houses burnt Y N 



































1 19-30 years old 
2 31-60 years old 
3 60 plus 
M Male 
F Female 
I/N Number in interview 
transcript 
A Uneducated 
B Semi-Educated up to 
secondary school 
C Higher Education 
CM Community 
DK Don’t Know 
G Government 











APPENDIX 15: DEFINITIONS 
Some of the major terms that are reoccurring in this thesis are explained in this definition’ 
section. Other terms not mentioned in the Appendix are defined in the footnotes where they 
appear, or within the various chapters, they are used. This thesis does not engage with the 
whole of the literature on the definitions, but only puts forward one or two sources, which 
supports the decision as to the researcher’s usage of the words.   
People Groups and Groups 
The word ‘people’ has various meaning according to the context in which it is used. 
Sometimes it is used to describe “a nation in its collective and political capacity”1 or generally 
human beings linked by common interest.2  
This thesis adopts a general and basic definition. One given by the Merriam Webster online 
dictionary as: 
 “A body of persons that are united by common culture, tradition, or sense of kinship, 
that typically have common language, institutions, and beliefs, and that often 
constitute a politically organised group.”3 
 People in the above definition demonstrate commonality in a group. Therefore, ‘people 
group’ as used in this thesis to describe the Ife and the Modakeke represent a people with 
common interest, culture and beliefs. The Researcher had chosen to use ‘people group’ or in 
most case ‘groups’ to refer to both the Ife and the Modakeke peoples rather than using ethnic 
group or tribal groups which have come to be affected by controversies. 
The Researcher contemplated the use of tribes and sub-tribes to describe the Ife and the 
Modakeke of Nigeria. However, because of the negative connotation of the word ‘tribe’ the 
thesis refrains from using the term. According to Southall, the term ‘tribe’ has negative 
connotations such as implying primitiveness and slavery. Indeed, he admonished fellow 
                                                             
1H.C Black., Black’s Law Dictionary: Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence Ancient and Modern 
(The Publishing Editorial Staff. West Publishing Co., 1968) p. 1292 
2 Merriam Webster online dictionary. Available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/people 
3 Ibid. fn. 2  
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anthropologists to “stop calling primitive and tribal the contemporary communities”.4 Rather, 
he advocated that societies should be referred to as ethnic groups.5In keeping with modern 
description of groups,6 this thesis uses the term ‘people group’ or plainly ‘groups’ and ‘sub-
groups’. 
Conflict and Dispute 
Goldman and Rojot defined “conflict” as “divergence of interest.”7 “Dispute” on the other 
hand is defined by Merrills as “a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law or 
policy in which a clan or assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or denial 
by another.” Hibberd and Newman argues that “[d]ispute need not follow claims, nor does 
conflict need to follow a dispute.”8 
The above definitions shows that ‘Conflict’ and ‘Disputes’ are two distinct terms. And, for 
the purposes of the thesis, ‘dispute’ is disagreement which the parties are seeking to resolve 
calmly by a process such as mediation or litigation, whereas ‘conflict’ is a more emotionally 
charged disagreement which can be resolved either (i) by identifying the underlying issues 
and settled as a dispute by resolution processes such as mediation or adjudicated, or (ii) by 
methods or techniques such as separating the conflicting parties from each other. This thesis 
is not concerned with dispute settlement or adjudication, but with conflict resolution and 
prevention.  
State and sub-state 
The definition of a State adopted in this thesis is that of the Oxford English Dictionary which 
defines a State as “a nation or territory considered as an organized political community under 
one government9” and as an “organised political community or area forming part of a federal 
                                                             
4 A. Southall., The illusion of Tribe in C.W Peter., The Passing of Tribal man in Africa (ed. 28-50 Leiden Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1970) p. 
47 
 
5 A. Southall., (1970) Ibid. p. 48 
6 Akanji in describing the Ife and the Modakeke applied the term ‘people group’. See O.O Akanji., ‘Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: 
A Critical Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria’ International Journal on Minority and Group Rights vol. 16. no. 1., 2009, p. 31-51 [35] 
7A.L Goldman & J. Rojot., Negotiation theory and Practice (Kluwer Law International, London, 2003) p. 7 
8P. Hibberd & P. Newman., ADR and Adjudication in Construction Disputes (Oxford: Blackwell Science, 1999) p. 10 
9 Oxford Dictionary of English by A. Soanes & A. Stevenson., (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 1727  
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republic.10” To this end, the thesis refers to a sovereign State as a complete and self-existent 
government rather than to a constituent part of a greater State to which a nation or community 
is subject. “The Nigerian State” therefore refers to the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a 
sovereign entity composed of thirty-six states and local government areas. It is not in doubt 
that Nigeria is a sovereign State. However, it is important to indicate from the beginning that 
the terms ‘State of Nigeria’ and Nigerian State’ are rendered with a capital letter ‘S’ for 
‘State’, whereas the term ‘state’, referring to regional states within Nigeria (such as Osun 
state) is rendered with a small letter ‘s’. 
Autonomy and Self-determination 
Autonomy is from the ancient Greek word auto-nomos characterised by self-government, and 
self-determination is an expression of autonomy.11 What this implies is freedom to act within 
reason and respect for others’ individuality and space. For the Ife-Modakeke groups this 
means that both the Ife and the Modakeke can only live in harmony with each other if each 
sub-group has separate identity and space within the Nigerian established systems without 
undermining the sovereignty of the Nigerian State. Thus, self-determination which, in 
general, is the right to self-rule does not include (so far as concerns this thesis) the right to 
cession from Nigeria.  The expression ‘internal self-determination’ is restricted to the struggle 







                                                             
10Oxford Dictionary of English. Ibid. fn. 9 p. 1727 
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